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Experts by Experience: ‘Madness’ Narratives, Language, and Politics  
Alexandra Hutchinson 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the historic silencing of those labelled ‘mad’ is – paradoxically 
– inextricable from language. Stigma is a semantic issue. The focus of my first chapter is to 
establish how and when the language available to discuss ‘madness’ became so problematic. 
Chapter one establishes a dual language problem: first, the language which surrounds 
‘madness’ is limited and limiting; second, this language imposes social ‘otherness’, often 
permanently. I approach the politics of the language of ‘madness’ using Saussure’s 
hypothesis of signification, Lacan’s theory of the nom du père, and narrative theory, in order 
to investigate who is to blame when language and narratives fail. 
In chapter two, I examine the reality of these semantic and narrative politics. This 
chapter covers a variety of ‘madness’ narratives salvaged from psychiatric textbooks, for 
example those of influential psychiatrists Emil Kraepelin, Eugen Bleuler and Sigmund Freud. 
Such texts have been essential to the development of psychiatry, but how have these 
discourses about ‘madness’ functioned to establish stigma? I retrieve personal accounts from 
these hegemonic publications, establishing how the presence of paratexts and psychiatric 
‘authority’ manipulate the receipt of such narratives. This will demonstrate how the historic 
silencing of ‘madness’ began.  
Chapter three focuses on how a cross section of nineteenth-century fiction portrays 
‘madness’, in order to explore the potential for fiction to offer ‘madness’ an accessible 
narrative platform. Initially, I examine literature as a continuation of psychiatric discourse, 
including Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’; Alfred Lord Tennyson’s ‘Maud’; Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula; and Elizabeth Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret. As a point of comparison, I 
examine literary representations which go beyond psychiatric discourse to articulate 
‘madness’, exploring Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper; Edgar Allan Poe’s 
‘The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether’; and texts which explore other selves and 
other worlds (Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘William Wilson’; and Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass). 
Chapter four examines the merits of visual art as a platform for ‘madness’ narratives, 
as it is divorced from many of the issues which are latent in language use. I explore the 
oeuvres of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century artists Richard Dadd, Vincent Van Gogh, 
Louis Wain, Adolf Wölfli, August Klett, and Hyacinth Freiherr von Wieser. Despite the 
theoretical assumption that visual art is universal and accessible, the social reception of art, 
necessary for this communication to be heard and validated, proves that the practice is far 
removed from this hypothesis.  The stereotype of the ‘mad’ artist is, in itself, an oxymoron: in 
the realm of social engagement, either the artistic identity of the individual is compromised 
and eventually disparaged, or ‘madness’ is obscured and censored. 
Chapter five shows how the nineteenth-century model for (mis)understanding 
‘madness’ is the foundation for our twenty-first-century discourse. This chapter examines 
narratives of ‘madness’ in popular culture, to understand how these discourses echo or 
challenge psychiatric representations of ‘madness’, and how a mainstream social audience is 
encouraged to feel about such depictions, including episodes The Simpsons, House and Peep 
Show, to explore how psychiatric discourse has shaped these narratives. This chapter also 
scrutinises the language employed by the media and other mainstream agencies in order to 
establish what these popular discourses reveal about entrenched societal prejudices and fear. 
This thesis addresses the question: can we truly ever speak of ‘madness’ without 










An individual in the mental health system today has the same chance of ‘recovery’ as their 
nineteenth-century equivalent.1  Since the nineteenth century, there has been an apparent 
acknowledgement of the stigma surrounding mental illness; the development of 
psychopharmacology; and a move from asylum culture towards ‘community care’. However, 
despite this ‘progress’, I contend that psychiatric discourses of ‘madness’ and the prognosis 
for an experience of ‘madness’ have not changed or improved.2 
Since the genesis of psychiatry, ‘madness’ has been depicted as requiring psychiatric 
management. In a twenty-first-century Western context, despite government and legal 
policies that champion deinstitutionalisation, current statistics suggest that those who 
experience ‘madness’ still need psychiatric intervention.3 From 2012 to 2013, ‘there were 
nearly 1.6 million people in contact with specialist mental health services’, and 50,408 
individuals were detained under the Mental Health Act.4 ‘Madness’ is still clearly portrayed 
as belonging to the realm of psychiatry: this dynamic establishes psychiatry as the authority 
                                                          
1 David Healy, The Creation of Psychopharmacology (London: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 12. 
2 My use of the term ‘experience’ is not in a phenomenological context, but more fitting to the OED definition 
of ‘being consciously the subject of a state or condition, or of being consciously affected by an event’. OED, 
‘experience’,  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66520?rskey=pXckwY&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> [accessed 15 June 
2015]. 
3 Britain’s policy which focuses on community-based mental health and social care rather than hospitalisation 
and institutionalisation – referred to as the ‘care in the community’ policy – came into being in the 1980s. See 
Sir Roy Griffiths’s 1988 report entitled ‘Community Care: Agenda for Action’. This shift was enabled by a 
series of legal changes to ‘patient’ rights, such as ‘the 1959 Mental Health Act [which] abolished the distinction 
between psychiatric and other hospitals and encouraged the development of community care’ and ‘the Mental 
Health Act 1983 [which] set out the rights of people admitted to mental hospitals, allowing them to appeal 
against committal’. See ‘The Origins of Community Care’, 13 October 1999, BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/229517.stm> [accessed 16 April 2016]. 
4 Information taken from National Health Service Confederation, ‘Key Facts and Trends in Mental Health’ 
<http://www.nhsconfed.org/~/media/Confederation/Files/Publications/Documents/facts-trends-mental-health-
2014.pdf> [accessed 2 October 2015]. 
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on ‘madness’ – significantly usurping that authority from the individual experiencing 
‘madness’. When someone engages with mental health services, a diagnostic label is attached 
to them, and with it, the enforcement of a particular social role. As anthropologist and 
psychologist James Davies observed, ‘as soon as you’re assigned a diagnosis […] you 
become a protagonist in a larger myth […] you have entered into a social contract in which 
you are now socially positioned as dependant on psychiatric authority’.5 As I demonstrate 
throughout this thesis, contact with psychiatry acts to medicalise, dehumanise and ‘other’ 
‘madness’. This means that the individual experience remains unspoken or unheeded; 
dominated and silenced by psychiatry, the hegemonic discourse on ‘madness’. 
When I talk about the language of ‘madness’, I do so from three perspectives. I 
approach it as a researcher, examining it as both historical issue and twenty-first-century 
concern. Second, I understand it in a professional capacity, as someone who works in mental 
health, and who regularly witnesses the impact of stigma and discrimination. In this role, I am 
able to understand the parts both mainstream society and the mental health system 
inadvertently play in reinforcing the marginalisation of those labelled ‘mad’. Finally, as 
someone who has been on the receiving end both of stigma and of psychiatric intervention 
and ‘treatment’, I am able to appreciate the gravity of a psychiatric diagnosis. I am, however, 
in this third of three standpoints, only able to speak of my own account of ‘madness’, and my 
own experience of being ‘mad’ in a Western context.6 Despite my educational privilege, 
there is no immunity from ‘madness’. Mental illness is a disorder of equal opportunity. 
                                                          
5 James Davies, Cracked: Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than Good (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), p. 
219. Italics added for emphasis. 
6 I am grouping together Western social attitudes towards ‘madness’ as, despite geographical diversity, all have 
been subjected to the same overarching psychiatric discourse. Clinical psychiatrist Michael Stone described how 
this discourse was homogenised across Europe: British psychiatric ‘developments’ were ‘occurring [elsewhere] 
on the continent’, with the likes of France, Germany and Britain all witnessing ‘the same […] movements’. 
Michael H. Stone, Healing the Mind: A History of Psychiatry from Antiquity to the Present (London: Pimlico, 
1998), p. 104. My knowledge of what it means to be ‘mad’ in a Western context is also enhanced by my 
experience of working in the UK mental health system. 
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Current statistics state that one in four people will experience a mental health problem 
each year in the United Kingdom.7 According to anthropologist Robin Dunbar, each 
individual has a ‘social world’ populated by approximately 150 people: this is ‘the number of 
people that you know as persons and you know how they fit into your social world and they 
know how you fit into theirs’.8 When these statistics are combined, it is fair to assume that 
over thirty-five people in the social network of the ‘average’ person experience some form of 
mental illness.9 In theory, we are well placed to learn about ‘madness’ from this wealth of 
first-hand knowledge which surrounds us. However, despite having direct contact with those 
living through ‘madness’ – those who are experts by experience – Western society 
perpetually silences individual narratives in favour of psychiatric discourse.10 But how did 
this trend begin: how did we learn to heed one account and disregard another? Who is the 
true authority on ‘madness’? To whom should we be listening: the discourse about 
‘madness’, or the discourse of it?  
‘Madness’ is clearly a political and financial priority. From 2012 to 2013, investment 
in UK mental health services totalled over £6.5 billion, a number which has increased by 
59% since 2001.11 The UK government’s Department of Health has invested vast amounts of 
money into the mental health system in an attempt to accommodate current – and growing – 
                                                          
7 Information taken from Mind, ‘Mental Health Facts and Statistics’ <http://www.mind.org.uk/information-
support/types-of-mental-health-problems/statistics-and-facts-about-mental-health/how-common-are-mental-
health-problems/> [accessed 16 April 2015]. 
8 Robin Dunbar, quoted in Tom Geoghegan, ‘What’s the Ideal Number of Friends?’, BBC News Magazine, 3 
March 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7920434.stm> [accessed 9 October 2015]. 
9 Geoghegan, ‘Number of Friends’ 
10 When referring to ‘psychiatric discourse’, I am unable to ignore the spectre of the definite article entirely. In 
this thesis, the definite article has been omitted in this context as there are multiple psychiatric narratives which 
form hegemonic discourse, although there is an overarching, mainstream psychiatric narrative which excludes, 
for example, anti-psychiatric voices and ‘patient’ experiences. Any references to ‘hegemony’ refer to psychiatric 
hegemony unless otherwise specified. However, as indicated by the title of my thesis, I believe that lived 
experience needs to be understood as the authoritative discourse of ‘madness’, or at least be viewed as equal to 
or merged with psychiatric discourse in a way that does not serve to censor or disenfranchise. Information and 
knowledge should come from experts by experience, rather than experts by observation.  
11Mental Health Strategies, ‘2011/12 National Survey of Investment’, 3 August 2012  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/140098/FinMap2012-
NatReportAdult-0308212.pdf> [accessed 2 October 2015]. However, the impact of this financial investment is 
severely undermined by government austerity measures, such as cuts to support services, social services and the 
NHS, and tougher Work Capability Assessments.  
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demand. Despite this expenditure, the prognosis for ‘madness’ has not improved since the 
genesis of psychiatry: in the nineteenth-century asylum, ‘recovery rates of up to 50 percent 
were reported. Such rates are comparable to those of psychiatric facilities today’.12 As a 
society, we are clearly doing something wrong. More and more money is spent on mental 
health provisions, but the prognosis of ‘madness’ has not changed. Stigma still exists. Despite 
being increasingly likely to know experts by experience, we still rely on psychiatric discourse 
for (mis)information. Because of this, personal experiences of ‘madness’ more often than not 
remain unknown and unfamiliar.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to identify how and why lived experiences of 
‘madness’ are obscured and ‘othered’ in favour of psychiatric discourse. This silencing of the 
language of ‘madness’ is the catalyst for stigma. French philosopher Michel Foucault 
observed that ‘language is the primary and ultimate structure of madness. It is the constituent 
form, since it is on language that all the cycles in which it reveals its nature rely’. 13 Society 
depends on language to communicate information: for the three out of four without personal 
experience of mental illness, the language surrounding it is their only point of reference for 
‘madness’. In the absence of a narrative which counters hegemonic discourse, ‘the language 
of psychiatry […] shapes public discourse on mental health’.14 This thesis demonstrates that 
there is both judgement and condemnation latent in psychiatric and social language about 
‘madness’. As anti-psychiatrist R. D. Laing asserted, ‘the label [attached to an individual] is a 
social fact, and the social fact a political event [which] imposes definitions and consequences 
on the labelled person […] he is invalidated as a human being’.15 
                                                          
12 Healy, Psychopharmacology, p. 12. 
13 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 
1972), p. 237. 
14 Simon Cross, Mediating Madness (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 33. 
15 R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), pp. 100-
01. Although I refer to Laing as a part of the anti-psychiatry movement, this is something of an 
oversimplification. Laing himself dismissed the label, although his rejection of the medical model of mental 
illness in favour of an anthropological approach ran counter to orthodox psychiatric narratives. As with the 
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Stigma is a semantic issue. The term ‘stigma’, originating in Ancient Greece, initially 
referred to the physical and the visual, to ‘bodily signs designed to expose something unusual 
and bad about the moral status of the signifier’.16 However, the social concept of stigma has 
evolved. According to sociologist Erving Goffman, post-war use of the term evokes ‘the 
disgrace itself rather than to the bodily evidence of it’.17 As I will demonstrate, psychiatric 
language about ‘madness’ is loaded with an assumption of ‘disgrace’: that to be labelled 
‘mad’ is to be simultaneously ‘disgraced’. This language is not a neutral discourse. It 
signifies ‘otherness’, and thus it is fundamental to the genesis and maintenance of the social 
stigma surrounding mental illness. 
The process of attaching and enforcing stigma is disconcertingly simple. The 
individual experiencing ‘madness’ is given a psychiatric diagnosis – for example, 
‘schizophrenia’. That label has social ramifications. To name but a few of these, it might 
denote the potential for violence, or an ill-informed assumption of a split personality: tropes 
which render the individual experience ‘other’. Psychiatric discourse informs us that 
‘schizophrenia’ is characterised by speech abnormalities – ‘poverty of speech’18, ‘incoherent 
speech’19, ‘difficult[y] grasp[ing] meaning’20 – failures in communication which depict lived 
experience of ‘madness’ as a ‘closed’ and inaccessible narrative.21 As the individual narrative 
does not enter popular currency; the ‘authority’ of psychiatric discourse is reinforced. Any 
account which could contradict the assumptions of hegemony, or that could make ‘madness’ 
familiar, something relatable and thus other than ‘other’, is silenced. If the language we use to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Outsider Art movement which I discuss further in chapter four, the anti-psychiatric movement was less of a 
conscious collective, and more an homogenised label attached in hindsight. 
16 Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 
11. 
17 Goffman, Stigma, p. 11. 
18 Christopher Frith, ‘Language and Communication in Schizophrenia’, in Communication and the Mentally Ill 
Patient, ed. by Jenny France and Niki Muir (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1997), pp. 10-17 (p. 10). 
19 Richard Keefe and Philip D. Harvey, Understanding Schizophrenia: A Guide to the New Research on Causes 
and Treatment (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 22. 
20 Philip Cowen, Paul Harrison and Tom Burns, Shorter Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 256. 
21 I discuss these terms in more detail in chapter one. 
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describe and inform is flawed and tainted, but never challenged; if it is instead perpetually 
echoed, the cycle will never be broken.  
Socially, we are aware of stigma but only as an abstract concept. We understand it as 
a theory but, as society has not yet meaningfully acknowledged lived experiences of 
‘madness’, we do not comprehend it as a reality for those who contend with such 
discrimination on a daily basis. Western society has recognised stigma as an issue but has not 
identified clear, realistic solutions. This thesis explores how language functions as the 
foundation for stigma by establishing how the language of ‘madness’ has historically 
impacted on the individual narrative, from the birth of psychiatry and taxonomy in the 
nineteenth century, to our twenty-first-century context. I reveal the roles mainstream society 
has played in implicitly supporting limited and limiting psychiatric discourse, and I identify 
alternatives and solutions: ways in which ‘madness’ can be communicated without 
immediately evoking stigma and judgement. I investigate how ‘madness’ can be known 
without being ‘othered’. 
It is inevitable that, in a thesis concerned with the language of ‘madness’, my own use 
of terminology invites scrutiny. I have chosen to refer to an experience of mental illness as 
‘madness’. Historian Roy Porter described the term ‘madness’ as assuming ‘all the solemnity 
of a clinical diagnosis, or [it could] be a street-corner insult: now a stigma, next an 
endearment [it] trade[s] upon the mysteries of liminality’.22 Not only is ‘madness’ 
comprehensive – encompassing both neurosis and psychosis – there is something inherently 
fluid in the term which contrasts with the rigidity of psychiatric terminology. Rather than 
reductionist vocabulary such as ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘bipolar’, which corresponds to specific 
psychiatric classifications, the definition of ‘madness’ can range from ‘imprudence’, ‘wild 
                                                          
22 Roy Porter, Madmen: A Social History of Madhouses, Mad-Doctors and Lunatics (Oxon: The History Press, 
2004), p. 32. 
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excitement or enthusiasm’, ‘anger’, ‘strange’ and ‘unusual’, to ‘infatuated’.23  
In our Western context, we refer to numerous things as ‘mad’ without them 
automatically being ‘other’. ‘Madness’ is ‘often […] used as a rhetorical device’.24 Retailers 
advertise ‘mad’ sales; we have ‘mad’ days at work; as an adjective, it can apply to anything 
from the traffic to the weather. We use the term ‘mad’ to describe enthusiasm and passion, 
such as ‘football-mad’ or ‘shopping-mad’. Out of all available terms to discuss mental illness, 
‘madness’ appears the least static, and thus has the potential to be the least ‘other’. When I 
speak of ‘madness’ (as opposed to ‘mental patient’ or ‘mentally ill’), the lack of clinical, 
diagnostic vocabulary does not immediately suggest an individual that has been 
pathologised.25 There is potential for ‘madness’ to be self-managed, rather than instantly 
dismissed as belonging to the realm of – and submitting to – psychiatric forces, as ‘madness 
is a term that actively defies […] formal diagnostic categorisation’.26 ‘Madness’ is not a 
passive term, and my use of it is also a nod to the activist ‘resistance network’ Mad Pride.27 
However, I have also used this word with the qualifier of quotation marks to expose the 
fragility and arbitrary nature of the ‘sane’/‘mad’ binary opposition.28 Similarly, at various 
points in this thesis, I refer to the ‘mad’ individual as a ‘patient’. This is not intended to be 
reductionist: I am specifically signifying an individual in a psychiatric context which renders 
them a ‘patient’, subservient to psychiatric ‘authority’. Quotation marks highlight the 
problematic power dynamics latent in the ‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. 
                                                          
23OED, ‘madness’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/112066?redirectedFrom=madness&> [accessed 2 October 
2015]. 
24 Charley Baker and others, Madness in Post-1945 British and American Fiction (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), p. 4. 
25 In this respect, my use of less sanitised and rigid terminology contrasts with the suggestion given by Time to 
Change, a UK campaign dedicated to eradicating stigma. Time to Change advise that instead of ‘mad’, we 
employ the term ‘a person with a mental health problem’, but I feel that such phrasing is both clunky and 
indicative of an individual in a psychiatric – and thus medicalised and ‘othered’ – context. See Time to Change, 
‘Mind your Language!’ <http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/news-media/media-advisory-service/help-
journalists/mind-your-language> [accessed 2 October 2015]. 
26 Baker, Madness, p. 4. Emphasis in original. 
27 For more information, see Mad Pride <http://madpride.org.uk/index.php> [accessed 16 June 2016].  
28 I discuss this problematic binary further in chapter one. 
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The phrase ‘madness narrative’ refers to any account of an individual experience of 
‘madness’. Throughout this thesis, I examine ‘madness’ narratives in various contexts, from 
those salvaged from psychiatric textbooks, to literary narratives, to representations in visual 
art. ‘Madness’ narratives should be understood as distinct from psychiatric discourse: I am 
referring to an attempt to articulate ‘madness’ as a lived experience – a narrative of 
‘madness’, rather than about it. 
 
The Language of ‘Madness’: A Theoretical Approach 
The focus of my first chapter is to establish how and when the language available to discuss 
‘madness’ became so problematic, and how this impacts on the individual’s experience. I 
approach psychiatric discourse about ‘madness’ using linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
hypothesis of signification. Psychiatric discourse is the only semantic framework employed 
to discuss ‘madness’ in a mainstream social context. I use Saussure’s process of signification 
and the concept of the sign as a means of deconstructing psychiatric labels.29 When an 
individual receives a psychiatric diagnosis, a signifier (the label) is projected onto the 
signified (the individual). Thus, the individual is burdened with the meaning of this signifier, 
often permanently. I explore both psychiatric and social baggage attached to taxonomy, in 
order to identify the genesis of stigma. If we understand the process which created stigma, 
can this process be halted or even reversed? 
Chapter one continues by investigating another language problem: the language of the 
‘patient’. This discourse has been thoroughly medicalised, with the symptom pool for 
‘madness’ relying heavily on the ‘mad’ individual’s relationship with semantics. How can 
one articulate one’s personal experiences when one’s speech and narrative have already been 
dismissed as ‘other’? I establish the role these semantic politics play in verifying the 
                                                          
29 My use of the term ‘deconstruct’ throughout is not Derridean, but refers to the process of dismantling; taking 
language and the associated politics apart to understand how they function to establish and enforce stigma. 
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‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. Using psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s theory of the nom du 
père, I investigate the assumption that ‘madness’ is a rejection of conventional language. I 
question who is to blame when language fails: Sigmund Freud described the disconnect 
between ‘madness’ and language as a ‘failure of translation’.30 Is this due to the ‘patient’ 
consciously refusing to conform to the nom du père? Is it the fault of the psychiatrist, for 
misunderstanding the signifiers of the ‘patient’, and recognising only symptoms and 
anomalies? Or does this ‘failure’ reveal an underlying flaw in the language system, which 
prevents lived experience of ‘madness’ from being acknowledged by a social audience? 
Of central importance is the significant role narratives play in allowing for social 
engagement and validation: essential for the self after a traumatic experience of illness. 
Chapter one deconstructs the narrative process in order to investigate where ‘madness’ 
narratives fail. The process begins with the individual: a narrative is an articulation of the 
experiences of the self. The narrative is then communicated through a medium; most 
frequently it is constructed using language. Finally, the narrative needs to be delivered to – 
and validated by – a social audience.  
When it comes to speaking of ‘madness’, the primary obstacle is a semantic conflict 
between authenticity and accessibility.31 The only current mainstream language about 
‘madness’ is the discourse of psychiatry: this is the socially familiar, and thus available, 
vocabulary. A personal narrative formulated in these terms is one which fails to communicate 
an authentic sense of what ‘madness’ is – this hegemonic discourse speaks of psychiatry’s 
experience of ‘madness’, but not lived experience. Such a narrative may be socially 
accessible, but the self is jeopardised: rather than offering a radical counter-narrative, an 
account which is constructed using psychiatric discourse will serve only to reinstate 
psychiatry’s ‘authority’. 
                                                          
30 Sigmund Freud, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, trans. and ed. by 
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986), p. 208. 
31 I unpick the notion of ‘authenticity’ further in both chapter one and chapter two. 
12 
 
The alternative is to communicate ‘madness’ through an unconventional medium, and 
by means of unorthodox language, in order to accommodate and articulate lived experiences. 
Such narratives are able to communicate authentic ‘madness’ – an experience not limited to, 
distorted, or censored by psychiatric language. However, as these semantics or narrative 
models deviate from familiar modes of communication, the final part of the process – 
delivery to a social audience – is forfeited: these narratives are not validated by their social 
recipients.  
The process of communicating ‘madness’ is obstructed by a conflict between 
expectation and experience. Narrative theorists Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps observed that 
‘the struggle to reconcile expectation with experience is particularly salient in the narratives 
of sufferers of mental and physical illness’.32 Our response to a narrative is heavily 
influenced by the presence of paratexts: both literal (such as an editor’s note, a preface, or an 
introduction) and metaphorical (such as the expectations and assumptions one may harbour 
when a certain text is approached).  Chapter one establishes the impact this framing has on 
the reception of a lived account of ‘madness’: is it, in fact, this excess material which 
obstructs the dissemination of a ‘madness’ narrative? Can an awareness of these other voices 
allow us, as a society, to adapt our reading process to deconstruct and disregard damaging 
paratexts? 
 
‘Plundered, Organised and Published’: Constructing the Self under the Psychiatrist’s 
Gaze33  
The theoretical grounding of chapter one establishes the semantic and narrative obstacles that 
must be negotiated in order to speak of ‘madness’. In chapter two, I examine the reality of 
these politics. This chapter covers a variety of ‘madness’ narratives salvaged from psychiatric 
                                                          
32 Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps, ‘Narrating the Self’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 25 (1996), 19-43 (p. 29). 
33 Emil Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, trans. by Mary Barclay (Chicago: Chicago Medical 
Book Company, 1916), p. 12. 
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case studies and textbooks: I refer to the individual narrative within these texts as a ‘case 
study narrative’. My focus is nineteenth- and early twentieth-century publications, for 
example those of influential psychiatrists Emil Kraepelin, Eugen Bleuler and Sigmund Freud. 
Such texts have been essential to the development of psychiatry as a discipline, but how have 
these discourses about ‘madness’ functioned to establish stigma? I investigate how the 
language about ‘madness’ became so inextricable from the stigma which now animates it; 
which gives ‘madness’ meaning in a mainstream social context; and which grants psychiatric 
vocabulary a semiological life of its own. 
Hidden within the paratexts of psychiatric publications – such as Kraepelin’s Lectures 
on Clinical Psychiatry (1904) and Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia (1916); Bleuler’s 
Textbook of Psychiatry (1924); and Freud’s Studies on Hysteria (1895), Case Histories I 
(based on cases published in 1905 and 1909), Case Histories II (material originally published 
between 1909-20), and A Case of Hysteria (1905) – ‘madness’ narratives are employed as 
proof of an anomaly or symptom. The presence of the ‘mad’ voice is permitted only to reflect 
‘otherness’, to be ‘other’. However, I retrieve personal accounts from these hegemonic 
publications, establishing how the presence of paratexts and psychiatric ‘authority’ 
manipulate the receipt of such narratives. This will demonstrate how the historic silencing of 
‘madness’ began. My interest lies in the language choices employed by the individual to 
discuss their experience of ‘madness’: how is the self configured and communicated after a 
disorientating and devastating experience of illness and, perhaps, incarceration?34 What 
relationship does this semantic account have with hegemonic discourse, and how might it be 
received in a social context? 
                                                          
34 My use of the term ‘incarceration’ here and throughout refers both to the physical act of confinement and to 
the inevitable political disenfranchisement which occurs when a ‘patient’ is detained. As Goffman argued, 
institutionalisation ‘disrupt[s] or defile[s]’ the autonomy of the ‘patient’. See Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays 
on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p. 43. 
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By deconstructing the paratexts which frame case study narratives, I identify how 
these narrative layers serve further to distort the ‘mad’ voice, and establish and reinforce the 
dynamics of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. As I demonstrate in chapter one, 
‘madness’ narratives are a battleground for experience versus expectation. The narrative 
framing which features in my chosen psychiatric texts functions to shape the expectations of 
the reader. This encourages a social audience to rely on psychiatric ‘authority’ before the 
individual account – the experience – is presented. I examine how society is urged to respond 
to lived experience of ‘madness’. I also expose how the role of ‘authority’ assumed by the 
psychiatric presence overrides the ‘authority’ of the individual. 
The rest of chapter two is organised according to different relationships with 
language. First of all, I examine case study narratives which echo or employ psychiatric 
discourse as a means of communicating an experience of ‘madness’. Although using such 
conventional semantics to articulate ‘madness’ offers the promise of social validation, the 
limited and limiting nature of this language has an inevitable and damaging impact on social 
and personal conceptions of identity.  To accept and internalise psychiatric discourse is to 
submit to the role of ‘patient’: a marginalised position, subject to psychiatric ‘authority’. 
However, according to philosopher Georg Hegel, this is a necessary part of ‘recovery’: ‘cure 
must be sought in the re-externalization (rebirth) of the self into relations with others through 
a path back to language’.35 When hegemonic discourse is adopted by the ‘patient’, does the 
promise of ‘cure’ outweigh the risk of reducing the self to a label?  
As a point of comparison, I examine what happens when case study narratives refuse 
to conform to discourse imposed by the psychiatric presence. This chapter explores 
alternative semantic frameworks employed to discuss ‘madness’. These range from a 
                                                          
35 Daniel Berthold, ‘Talking Cures: A Lacanian Reading of Hegel and Kierkegaard on Language and Madness’, 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 4 (2009), 299-311(p. 306). Wherever possible, I have gone to the 




marriage of ‘madness’ and spirituality, to an overt rejection of the illness model, to narratives 
which transcend orthodox language. I focus on where these verbalised accounts contrast with 
conventional models for talking about ‘madness’, primarily, the ways in which the self is 
articulated, and how the psychiatric presence encourages the reader to respond to such 
narratives. These accounts are, potentially, radical counter-narratives which threaten to 
undermine psychiatric (mis)understandings of ‘madness’; they represent the possibility that 
‘madness’ can evoke empathy and become familiar, divorced from the ‘otherness’ latent in 
psychiatric vocabulary. How has the psychiatric presence prevented such narratives from 
entering popular currency? If we understand how this process began, might we find ways to 
reverse it, allowing personal experience of ‘madness’ to become known? 
Finally, chapter two investigates case study narratives which are reluctant – or unable 
– to verbalise an experience of ‘madness’. Here, the significance of silence is considered: to 
be silent can be to bid for power, to submit and/or to refuse to expose the self to psychiatric 
forces. A silent ‘patient’ represents a blank canvas, onto which the psychiatrist can project 
assumptions, labels and theories. However, silence can also represent a refusal to engage with 
the power dynamics of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship: if ‘madness’ is manifest in 
speech anomalies, an absence of speech denies psychiatry of its principal medium. Can 
silence be used as a narrative model, or is it merely a last resort to protect the self against 
psychiatric intervention?  
 
‘An Illusion of Exteriority’: Rereading Literary ‘Madness’36 
Chapter two, then, serves to establish the narrative and semantic politics which prevent case 
study narratives from being accessed by a receptive audience. The psychiatric presence in 
these texts influences the reader, shaping expectations which serve to undermine the 
                                                          
36 Chris Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997), p. 17. 
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perceived worth of individual experience. However, fiction, by its very nature, offers a less 
regulated platform: divorced from an explicitly psychiatric context, there is potential for 
fiction to represent ‘madness’ without simultaneously ‘othering’ it. Chapter three focuses on 
how a cross section of nineteenth-century fiction portrays ‘madness’. Compared to case study 
narratives, fiction offers a direct conduit between reader and text: there is no explicit 
psychiatric presence acting as intermediary. As literature occupies a unique space, both 
influencing and influenced by social discourses, is there potential for fiction to offer 
‘madness’ an accessible narrative platform?  
In order to forge a comparison between fictional accounts of ‘madness’ and case 
study narratives, chapter three is structured according to the relationship such texts have with 
language. Initially, I examine literature as a continuation of psychiatric discourse. I explore 
texts which, like hegemonic discourse, employ tropes of ‘otherness’ to articulate ‘madness’, 
and those which overtly rely on psychiatric terminology. My analysis begins with Edgar 
Allan Poe’s short story, ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, through which ‘madness’ is, on the surface, at 
least, reduced to a Gothic subplot: an unreliable narrator and a violent, 2D villain. Alfred 
Lord Tennyson’s poem ‘Maud’ also propagates psychiatric myths of ‘madness’, representing 
‘madness’ as the opposite of reason and borrowing from psychiatric discourse to describe 
‘madness’. Similarly, Bram Stoker’s Gothic novel Dracula reflects hegemonic discourse, by 
portraying ‘madness’ in relation to governing psychiatric forces. Finally, Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon’s Sensation novel Lady Audley’s Secret evokes contemporary narratives of 
hereditary ‘madness’ and a phrenological merging of ‘madness’ and visual stereotypes: the 
text also represents a ‘mad’ protagonist who uses psychiatric terminology to construct her 
identity. Do these textual representations merely function to support and affirm the power of 
hegemonic narratives? Or, by exposing the damaging and limiting nature of psychiatric 
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discourse, can we interpret these texts as counter-narratives? How have these authors 
encouraged their readers to respond to, and connect with, the ‘madness’ they portray? 
As a point of comparison, I examine literary representations which go beyond 
psychiatric discourse to articulate ‘madness’. I explore Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story 
The Yellow Wallpaper, which merges ‘madness’ and intense creativity, and which depicts a 
‘psychotic’ break from ‘reality’ as liberation from a claustrophobic, patriarchal environment. 
I also analyse another short story by Edgar Allan Poe – ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and 
Professor Fether’ – which, in contrast to ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, destabilises the binary 
oppositions of ‘mad’/‘sane’, and ‘patient’/psychiatrist. Finally, I examine texts which explore 
other selves and other worlds: Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘William Wilson’; and Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. Do these literary 
examples allow such ‘alien’ states – deviations from conventional understandings of the self 
and of ‘reality’ which characterise ‘madness’ – to become familiar, something to which the 
reader can relate, and thus empathise with? 
 
From the ‘Meaningless’ to the Mythologised: ‘Madness’ Narratives and Art37 
I have established the politics and problems latent in semantic accounts of ‘madness’: a 
verbalisation of ‘madness’ is either couched in psychiatric terms, and is thus limited and 
limiting, or it is formulated using unconventional language which prevents such narratives 
from being accessed and validated in a social context. In order to establish potential 
alternatives, chapter four examines the merits of visual art as a platform for ‘madness’ 
narratives, as it is divorced from many of the issues which are latent in language use. In the 
interests of examining the accessibility and universality of art as a narrative model, my 
chosen artists vary from the canonical to the less familiar: my only criterion is that the 
                                                          
37 Hans Prinzhorn, The Art of Insanity (Chicago: Solar Books, 2011), p. 64. 
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individual has experienced – or has been told they experience – a form of ‘madness’ over the 
course of their lives. I explore the oeuvres of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century artists 
Richard Dadd, Vincent Van Gogh, Louis Wain, Adolf Wölfli, August Klett (given the 
pseudonym ‘August Klotz’ by psychiatrist and art historian Hans Prinzhorn) and Hyacinth 
Freiherr von Wieser (given the pseudonym ‘Heinrich Welz’, again by Prinzhorn). All of these 
artists had direct contact with psychiatric forces, with diagnoses ranging from ‘schizophrenia’ 
to ‘generalised delirium’. Despite these diagnostic variables, the work of my chosen artists is 
used as a narrative platform to communicate a personal experience of ‘madness’, and so can 
be used to illuminate the tumultuous relationship between the ‘mad’ self, ‘reality’ and 
mainstream society. 
Although, in theory, art is a medium detached from the stigma of language, it is 
subject to its own politics. Chapter four establishes the values and expectations of the 
mainstream art world in the nineteenth century, exploring orthodox assumptions of what art is 
in order to investigate the potential for it to accommodate an experience of ‘madness’. For 
example, the nineteenth-century trend for imitative art – images which represent ‘reality’ – is 
an unsuitable vehicle for a ‘madness’ narrative, as ‘madness’ is depicted as a break from 
shared notions of ‘reality’. I consider the viability of other genres – particularly the Outsider 
Art movement – to deliver an authentic ‘madness’ narrative to mainstream society.  
This chapter exposes as a paradox the cliché of the ‘mad’ artist. On the one hand, 
there is the indisputable ‘madness’ of August Klett. The inescapable psychiatric context of 
his work ensures that his oeuvre is allowed only to reflect its ‘otherness’, interpreted as 
symptomatic of his ‘madness’, rather than as art. By contrast, the work of Vincent Van Gogh 
is indisputably perceived as Art, although Van Gogh’s identity as a mainstream artist has 
prevented his work from being received as a ‘madness’ narrative. Despite his art explicitly 
acknowledging his ‘mad’ identity – from self-portraits which feature his infamous act of self-
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mutilation, to painting fellow ‘patients’ and his attending psychiatrist – I shall demonstrate 
how Van Gogh’s ‘madness’ has been thoroughly deemphasised and silenced. 
Despite the theoretical assumption that visual art is the only medium of ‘complete and 
unhindered communication’, the social reception of art, necessary for this communication to 
be heard and validated, proves that the practice is far removed from this hypothesis.38 The 
stereotype of the ‘mad’ artist is, in itself, an oxymoron: in the realm of social engagement, 
either the artistic identity of the individual is compromised and eventually disparaged, or 
‘madness’ is obscured and censored. 
 
The Psychiatric, The Political and The Personal: How We Talk about ‘Madness’ Today 
Where chapter one functions to establish the problems latent in verbalising ‘madness’; 
chapters two and three explore the reality of these issues by examining how semantic politics 
impact on the narration of individual experiences; and chapter four examines the merits of 
possible alternatives. Chapter five demonstrates that, although my primary focus has been on 
nineteenth-century ‘madness’ narratives, this thesis is not intended to be entirely historical. 
Instead, I show how the nineteenth-century model for (mis)understanding ‘madness’ is the 
foundation for our twenty-first-century discourse. Despite the development of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – with its ever-expanding vocabulary to talk 
about ‘madness’ – alongside a move towards a ‘scientific’, drug-based paradigm of care and 
the ‘care in the community’ initiative, we are no closer to understanding ‘madness’, of 
learning from it, of accepting it, of empathising, or of truly helping those who desperately 
require support.39 
                                                          
38 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee, 2005), p. 109. 
39 For the sake of space, any further mention of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders will 
use the well-established abbreviated title of DSM. In brief, the DSM is the standard classification for mental 
disorders used by medical professionals. The first edition of the DSM was published in 1952, coinciding with 
the development of first generation psychotropic medication: this was clearly a time during which the landscape 
of psychiatry was – on the surface – drastically changing. This edition listed a modest 106 mental disorders, and 
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Chapter five, then, examines narratives of ‘madness’ in popular culture, to understand 
how these discourses echo or challenge psychiatric representations of ‘madness’, and how a 
mainstream social audience is encouraged to feel about such depictions. I analyse episodes of 
American animated sitcom The Simpsons, American medical drama House and British cult 
comedy Peep Show, to explore how psychiatric discourse has shaped these narratives. These 
examples of popular culture have been chosen for their accessibility and wide audience: in a 
societal context, they function as readily available sources of information. Additionally, this 
chapter surveys other mainstream, twenty-first-century conversations about ‘madness’. By 
scrutinising the language employed by the media and other mainstream agencies (such as the 
2013 controversy over Asda’s and Tesco’s ‘mental’ Hallowe’en costumes), I establish what 
these popular discourses reveal about entrenched societal prejudices and fear. Primarily, I 
focus on the concept of institutionalisation – a continuous theme, despite the 
deinstitutionalisation championed by the ‘care in the community’ policy. I consider how this 
social fear of the ‘free’ ‘mad’ individual demonstrates both the continued reliance on 
nineteenth-century discourses of ‘madness’, and of a deep-seated social anxiety of the ‘mad’ 
individual who is not policed or contained by psychiatric forces. 
As this thesis draws to a close, I discuss current problems and potential solutions. 
Representations of ‘madness’ fall into a distinct binary: on the one hand, there is an evident 
fear of the ‘lunatic at large’ – the ‘mad’ individual who is not ‘managed’ by psychiatry – on 
the other, there is the submissive ‘mad’ ‘patient’, who is ‘othered’ but contained by a 
psychiatric context.  But what about those who occupy the liminal space between such 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
would seem to have little in common with the most recent incarnation, the DSM-V – comprised of nearly 950 
pages. The growth of medication culture, fuelled by the rise of biological theories surrounding mental illness, 
runs parallel to, and is driven by, the creation of the DSM. In the UK, there is also the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). However, James Davies reported that the DSM is often used over the ICD: ‘in 
countries like Britain where the ICD is used along with the DSM, many mental health researchers and 
professionals often prefer the DSM. In fact, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (the body that sets the 
clinical guidelines for the NHS) now recommends the use of the DSM over the ICD for disorders’. See Davies, 
Cracked, p. 19. 
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extremes? Those who fall in-between the twin pillars of mainstream depictions of ‘madness’ 
are not consistently or meaningfully represented in popular culture, which portrays ‘madness’ 
as a dichotomy which can only be sanitised by, and controlled with, psychiatric intervention. 
As a result, lived experience of the vast majority of those labelled ‘mad’ does not enter 
popular currency, and is thus perpetually silenced. 
Since the birth of psychiatry and development of medical taxonomy in the nineteenth 
century, the prognosis of ‘madness’ remains unchanged: labelled with neo-Kraepelinian 
diagnostic categories; treated on the basis of theory rather than science; spoken of only in 
terms of ‘otherness’; those diagnosed as ‘mad’ experience the same disenfranchisement and 
stigma as their nineteenth-century equivalents.40 In the absence of the literal asylum, we have 
created a metaphorical one: a system of ‘care’ in the community, comprised of constant 
reminders of illness and ‘otherness’ – a daily regime of psychotropic medication, and regular 
contact with mental health services, in addition to waging a constant battle against stigma and 
discrimination.41 Despite campaigns to eradicate stigma, the conversations about ‘madness’ 
remain static: while we continue to disregard lived experience, we will never be able to 
challenge the entrenched hegemonic discourse. 
At the very least, this thesis is intended to encourage my reader to be aware of how 
language enforces stigma, to question their own use of language, and to challenge the 
language choices of those around them. I want my reader to be mindful that mainstream 
accounts of ‘madness’ are from those who medicalise and medicate. The current hegemony is 
                                                          
40 Author and journalist Will Self discussed the reliance on theory rather than science in his short film, Will 
Self’s Street Drugs. Self talks about the psychotropic drugs he had discovered on the streets outside his house as 
indicative of the growing number of individuals experiencing mental illness made homeless under the ‘care in 
the community’ initiative. When researching a recent find of Buccastem, Self observed: ‘it’s thought – thought – 
to block dopamine receptors […] there’s an entire industry that is making vast profits off these thoughts. It’s 
essentially a creative industry’. See Will Self’s Street Drugs  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xvZuRSmmC3A> [accessed 2 July 2015]. Italics added for emphasis. 
41 A Time to Change survey revealed that ‘almost nine out of ten people with mental health problems (87%) 
reported the negative impact of stigma and discrimination on their lives’. Information taken from Time to 
Change, ‘Mental Health and Stigma’ <http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/what-are-mental-health-
problems/stigma-discrimination> [accessed 9 September 2015]. 
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excluding, disenfranchising and ‘othering’ those who have lived through ‘madness’. We have 
the privilege of a voice, and the freedom to employ language, to speak and to be heard. But 










In our everyday discourse, the power language wields is often overlooked. Saussure argued 
that ‘in the lives of individuals and of societies, language is a factor of greater importance 
than any other’.1 Language is a primary component in our social interaction: it is a tool used 
to describe, to explain, to create and maintain connections with those around us. We rely on 
language to externalise our internal narratives, to voice our thoughts, and to engage with 
others. The ability to communicate is an essential part of entering collective discourse, of 
being a vocal, active entity on the social landscape. Our identity is dictated by how we 
correspond or connect with our social context: our employment status, our family history, the 
relationships we establish. Our sense of self – despite seeming like a personal and intimate 
concept – is a profoundly public affair, determined by our ability to interact with and conform 
to the cultural networks in which we find ourselves. 
British essayist Erich Heller observed that ‘man has been given language […] so that 
he can say what he has chosen not to be silent about’.2 This oversimplification of our 
relationship with language reinforces the idea that the ability to communicate is the ‘norm’. It 
is assumed that language use is inextricable from the human condition: that, by virtue of 
having the physical mechanisms of speech (such as vocal chords), we have the privilege of 
communicating and being heard. Hegel asserted that ‘to be a human self is to be a linguistic 
self’: thus, to be silent – a non-linguistic self – is to be less than human.3 The belief that being 
a ‘linguistic self’ is an intrinsic part of the human experience leaves little space on the social 
                                                          
1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 7. 
2 Erich Heller, ‘Observations on Psychoanalysis and Modern Literature’, in Literature and Psychoanalysis, ed. 
by Edith Kurzweil and William Phillips (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 72-84 (p. 78). 
3 Berthold, ‘Talking Cures’, p. 306. Such an argument is, of course, ethically dubious. 
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landscape for the individual who is silent or silenced. Communication is ‘bound up with […] 
structures of power and privilege’, and the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic ‘brings into 
particularly sharp focus the inequalities in power’, as revealed by and sustained by the 
politics of language.4 
The historic silencing of those labelled ‘mad’ is – paradoxically – inextricable from 
language. As social beings, we employ language to identify those we consider ‘other’, and 
rely on semantics to communicate that perceived difference to those around us: this enforces 
an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary, and allows us socially to marginalise those we brand ‘other’. 
Goffman described stigma as ‘the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full 
social acceptance’.5 The individual who is categorised as ‘mad’ and burdened with the stigma 
evoked by that label is both condemned and censored by language; disqualified from 
becoming part of the self-same dialogue which denounces them. We have prevented 
‘madness’ from answering back: we use our language to deny ‘madness’ the same privilege 
of voice.  
This chapter will demonstrate that, when it comes to speaking of and about 
‘madness’, language becomes both obstacle and tool: it has the ‘power to harm as well as to 
heal’.6 Foucault observed that ‘language is the primary and ultimate structure of madness. It 
is the constituent form, since it is on language that all the cycles in which it reveals its nature 
rely’.7 Society relies on language to absorb and communicate information: unless we have 
personal experience of ‘madness’, the language surrounding mental illness is our only point 
of reference for what ‘madness’ is, and what it means. From the birth of psychiatry in the 
nineteenth century to the development of the DSM, we have been granted language to talk 
about ‘madness’. Psychiatrists have constructed a semantic framework to demarcate and 
                                                          
4 Paul Crawford and others, Communicating Care: The Language of Nursing (Cheltenham: Stanley Thornes, 
1998), p. 108. 
5 Goffman, Stigma, p. 9. 
6 Crawford, Communicating Care, p. 1. 
7 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 237. 
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diagnose ‘madness’. This language has evolved from a crude attempt to distinguish ‘idiocy’ 
from ‘insanity’ (as featured in an 1840 United States census), to the latest edition of the DSM: 
a hefty 947 pages.8 However, when faced with the vast diversity of human experience, is it 
appropriate or even possible to reduce individual suffering to a homogenous ‘clinical entity’, 
regardless of how broad the psychiatric vocabulary is?9 Despite attempting to approach 
‘madness’ as a medical, biological phenomenon, psychiatric discourse ‘does not so much 
define as denounce’.10  
Initially, this chapter investigates the language available to talk about ‘madness’. 
Psychiatric terminology provides the only mainstream point of reference for ‘madness’: 
problematically, we rely on clinical lexis to discuss distinctly subjective, personal 
experiences. I approach the development and employment of taxonomy through a Saussurean 
lens, using the process of signification and the concept of the sign to deconstruct the 
psychiatric labelling process. Applying a psychiatric category is the enforcement of 
signification: it apparently binds a signifier (a label) with the signified (the individual 
experience). However, the signifier becomes a brand – freighted with the social stigma 
attached to that term – which encompasses the individual, rather than just referring to the 
individual’s experience. We speak of the ‘schizophrenic’, not a fleeting, transient 
‘schizophrenic’ episode: as observed by Laing, ‘once a “schizophrenic” there is a tendency to 
be regarded as always a “schizophrenic”’.11 Psychiatric discourse reduces ‘madness’ to a 
signifier which medicalises and objectifies. Human experience – along with the possibility of 
understanding and empathy – is alien to the governing language about ‘madness’. As Laing 
asked, ‘how can one demonstrate the general human relevance and significance of the 
                                                          
8 For more information on the 1840 US census, see Kim E. Nielson, A Disability History of the United States 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2012). 
9 R.D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 18. 
10 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 163. Emphasis in original.  
11 Laing, Politics, p. 101.  
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patient’s condition if the words one has to use are specifically designed to isolate and 
circumscribe the meaning of the patient’s life to a particular clinical entity?’12 
I explore the disconnect between this language (a psychiatric label) and its subject (a 
lived experience of ‘madness’) in order to identify the origins of stigma. Time to Change 
conducted a survey in 2008 which revealed that ‘almost nine out of ten people with mental 
health problems (87%) reported the negative impact of stigma and discrimination on their 
lives’.13 Academic and writer Simon Cross rightly observed that ‘the language of psychiatry 
[…] shapes public discourse on mental health’.14 Despite the clinical genesis of such 
language, it comes with social baggage, with stigma. It is not an objective discourse. 
Psychiatric terms imply a ‘marked deviation from conventional or normal ways of acting, or 
thinking, or feeling [...] to make it appear that there must be something lacking in the 
constitutional makeup of the individual’.15 Significantly, this results in the individual being 
‘disqualified from full social acceptance’, stigmatised in order to disenfranchise and maintain 
the silence of those labelled ‘mad’.16 
Rather than exclusively denoting a medical entity, psychiatric vocabulary overlaps 
with the sphere of moral judgement. Terms such as ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘psychotic’ do not 
just signify illness: they refer to a social role, a marginalised identity, or a permanent state of 
‘otherness’. Laing elaborated: 
The label is a social fact, and the social fact a political event [which] imposes 
definitions and consequences on the labelled person. It is a social prescription that 
rationalizes a set of social actions whereby the labelled person is annexed by others 
[…] The “committed” person is labelled as patient, and […] is degraded from full 
existential and legal status as human agent and responsible person, no longer in 
possession of his own definition of himself […] the space he occupies is no longer of 
his own choosing […] he is invalidated as a human being.17 
                                                          
12 Laing, Divided, p. 18. 
13 Time to Change, ‘Stigma’. 
14 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33. 
15 Robert E. L. Faris, ‘Cultural Isolation and the Schizophrenic Personality’, American Journal of Sociology, 2 
(1934), 155-64, (p. 156). 
16 Goffman, Stigma, p. 9. 




James Davies argued that ‘as soon as you’re assigned a diagnosis […] you become a 
protagonist in a larger myth […] in which you are now socially positioned as dependent on 
psychiatric authority’.18 In later chapters of my thesis, I explore the psychiatric assumption 
that ‘madness’ equates to ‘otherness’, considering how this trope has become firmly 
entrenched in popular discourse and culture. This present chapter investigates how psychiatric 
discourse has come to imply so much more than a state of illness. Taxonomy occupies a 
paradoxically objective and subjective space: ‘a fear formulated in medical terms but 
animated, basically, by a moral myth’.19 How is it that a word such as ‘schizophrenia’ can – 
allegedly – denote a chemical deficiency in the brain, while simultaneously imposing moral 
judgement?20 How can this language refer to a supposed medical anomaly and yet 
simultaneously ‘invalidate’ one’s humanity? 
 The silence of ‘madness’ has a complex history: it is a phenomenon tightly bound to 
the formulation and employment of psychiatric taxonomy. I establish how language about 
‘madness’ misrepresents, distorts and ‘others’ lived experience, rendering it an ‘imperfectly 
known’ and unfamiliar state.21 However, this is not the only obstacle posed by the tumultuous 
relationship between ‘madness’ and language. Language use acquires a new dimension of 
significance in the ‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. Unlike the realm of somatic medicine, 
characterised by a physical process (such as an x-ray to demonstrate the presence of a 
                                                          
18 Davies, Cracked, p. 219. 
19 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 
202. 
20 This reference to brain chemicals is rooted in the popular hypothesis that ‘schizophrenia’ is caused by an 
abundance of dopamine, and ‘depression’ is the result of low serotonin levels. However, psychiatrist Joanna 
Moncrieff stated that ‘it is important that everyone knows how little evidence there is to support [these theories]’ 
(see Joanna Moncrieff, ‘The Chemical Imbalance Theory of Depression’ 
<http://joannamoncrieff.com/2014/05/01/the-chemical-imbalance-theory-of-depression-still-promoted-but-still-
unfounded/> [accessed 9 July 2015]. 
21 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 79. 
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fracture), psychiatry’s primary currency to ‘prove’ the presence of an anomaly is the narrative 
of the ‘patient’. As Lacan observed, there is ‘only a single medium: the patient’s speech’.22 
However, instead of this reliance on the narrative of the ‘patient’ bestowing  personal 
accounts of ‘madness’ with mythological importance, the opposite has happened. The 
language of the ‘patient’ has been thoroughly medicalised, to the extent that constellations of 
symptoms associated with ‘madness’ centre on the ‘mad’ individual’s relationship with 
language. I explore this medicalisation of language use: from Kraepelin’s claim that 
‘madness’ is characterised by ‘peculiar, distorted turns of speech – senseless playing with 
syllables and words’ to increasingly clinical, twenty-first-century terms such as ‘poverty of 
speech’.23 This assumption that the ‘mad’ individual’s discourse is characterised by ‘speech 
pathology or disturbed communication’, serves to invalidate ‘madness’ narratives.24 If 
psychiatry declares the ‘patient’ narrative ‘incoherent’, ‘incomprehensible’ – what 
anthropologist Anne M. Lovell termed a ‘closed’ text – then lived experience of ‘madness’ is 
not granted any importance other than providing psychiatry with the means for a diagnosis.25  
Thus far, a dual language problem has been identified: first, the language which 
surrounds ‘madness’ is limited and limiting; second, this language imposes social ‘otherness’, 
often permanently. Were a counter-narrative to exist, articulating an individual experience of 
‘madness’ but in accessible, human terms (rather than in clinical, psychiatric vocabulary), 
there is potential for this ‘otherness’ to be diminished, and for lived experience to enter 
popular currency. However, the possibility of such a counter-narrative being heard becomes 
increasingly remote with the medicalisation of language use. Narratives are depicted as 
symptoms, as ‘empty speech’, rather than a vitally important bid to be heard, and for the self 
                                                          
22 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 44. 
23 Emil Kraepelin, Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry, trans. by Mary Barclay, ed. by Thomas Johnstone (New 
York: William Wood, 1904), p. 24. 
24 Roy H. Wolcott, ‘Schizophrenese: A Private Language’, Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 2 (1970), 
126-34 (p. 133). 
25 Anne M. Lovell, ‘The City is My Mother: Narratives of Schizophrenia and Homelessness’, American 
Anthropologist, 2 (1997), 355-68, (p. 356). 
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to be understood as more than just a psychiatric label.26 If the self and the narrative have been 
colonised by psychiatric ‘authority’ – medicalised, disenfranchised, medicated, silenced –
then lived experience of ‘madness’ remains mute (and, indeed, moot). The psychiatric 
interpretation of ‘madness’ is the one on which we rely to discuss ‘madness’, as other voices 
and discourses have been prevented from entering the vernacular. As Ochs and Capps argued, 
‘dominating stories that preserve the status quo can estrange and muffle alternative 
perspectives’.27 However, the preservation of psychiatry’s dominance has a very human cost.  
Once the language problems have been established, I shall investigate the politics of 
narrating ‘madness’, beginning with a deconstruction of the narrative process. This is done 
not only to understand the significance of narratives – particularly their function in 
developing, affirming and externalising the self – but also in order to understand the role that 
these accounts play in our ability to interact with the world around us, essential to being an 
accepted social entity. A successful narrative has three fundamental components: it is an 
articulation of an experience of the self; it is communicated via a medium; it is delivered to a 
social audience.28 According to narrative theorist Mieke Bal, ‘a narrative text is a text in 
which an agent or subject conveys to an addressee […] a story in a particular medium’.29 
Ochs and Capps asserted that narratives are ‘an essential resource in the struggle to bring 
experiences to conscious awareness’, and therefore could be a tool to bring lived experience 
of ‘madness’ to the attention of the collective social consciousness.30 But if a narrative holds 
                                                          
26 Lacan, Écrits, p. 46. 
27 Ochs, ‘Narrating the Self’, p. 19. 
28 Judging narrative ‘success’ is a complex and contentious process, and one I unpick in greater detail later in 
this chapter. In brief, in order for a narrative to succeed, it must be socially accessible without jeopardising the 
authenticity of the self it attempts to communicate. A revealing example can be found in Love’s Work by 
philosopher Gillian Rose. Halfway through her narrative, Rose asked her reader to consider: ‘Suppose that I 
were now to reveal that I have AIDS, full-blown AIDS, and have been ill during most of the course of what I 
have related. I would lose you. I would lose you to knowledge, to fear and to metaphor. Such a revelation would 
result in the sacrifice of the alchemy of my art, of artistic “control”’. See Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (New York: 
New York Review of Books, 2011), pp. 76-77.  
29 Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, 3rd edn (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2009), p. 5. 
30 Ochs, ‘Narrating the Self’, p. 21. 
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so much power, why do we not hear of such experiences? Where does the narrative process 
fail in the case of ‘madness’ narratives? Are individual experiences simply ineffable? Is the 
conduit between self and society unsuitable? Or is the intended audience simply refusing to 
engage with ‘madness’ narratives in any meaningful way? 
There are, of course, limitations to the three-stage narrative process; I am specifically 
exploring the viability of narratives in a social context. There is potential to argue that the 
narrator is simultaneously the creator and original audience for their narrative – particularly 
in the context of narration which serves a therapeutic purpose. My focus on social viability is 
not to ignore the vitally important process of self-narration. By exploring narratives which 
necessitate acknowledgement from a social audience in order to ‘succeed’, and the politics 
which obstruct this validation, I am able to employ narrative analysis in a way which 
examines and deconstructs the tumultuous relationship between mainstream society and the 
‘mad’ ‘other’.  
This three stage approach also inevitably examines a narrative in isolation. In the ebb 
and flow of daily life, or hidden in the layers of a text, it is rare that narratives are 
encountered in such a pure state. Our response to a narrative is heavily influenced by the 
presence of paratexts. Literary theorist Gerard Genette argued that paratexts are ‘a fringe of 
the printed text which in reality control […] one’s whole reading of the text’.31 Such framing 
occupies a ‘privileged place of […] influence on the public’: it is a conscious process of 
recontextualisation which only psychiatric hegemony – granted both a voice and an ability to 
silence other voices – may conduct.32 These paratexts may be literal, such as an editor’s note, 
a preface, an introduction, or metaphorical, such as the expectations one may harbour when a 
                                                          
31Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 2. 
32 Genette, Paratexts, p. 2.  
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certain text is approached.33 I explore the impact this framing has on the reception of such 
narratives: is it, in fact, this ‘excess’ material which obstructs the successful dissemination of 
a ‘madness’ narrative?This excursion into narratology is developed by exploring alternative 
models available to those experiencing ‘madness’. In chapter four, I explore the possibility of 
using visual art as a medium for ‘madness’ narratives, as it is divorced from semantic 
politics. In this chapter, I discuss the relevance and merits of alternatives. If orthodox 
narrative models – or, indeed, conventional language – are unsuitable, how sustainable is it to 
create a new language to speak of ‘madness’? The viability of these narrative platforms will 
be judged on their ability to communicate an experience of ‘madness’ without limiting or 
obscuring it, and on their accessibility and availability to a mainstream social audience.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with the conflict between authenticity and 
accessibility: a battle waged around the politics and problems latent in the language of and 
about ‘madness’.34 I identify why psychiatric discourse is considered the hegemonic narrative 
of ‘madness’, rather than allowing society to hear from those living with and through 
‘madness’. As later chapters will show, this silencing is historic and entrenched, but it began 
with the genesis of psychiatry. Prior to the nineteenth-century asylum boom, ‘madness’ 
apparently represented what Foucault termed ‘a difficult, hermetic, esoteric knowledge’, 
bound with concepts of wisdom and spirituality.35 By contrast, psychiatric intervention 
informed society that ‘madness’ was, instead, ‘a kind of non-knowledge’, a ‘closed’ text, a 
state of ‘incomprehensibility’.36  
                                                          
33 When we open a crime novel, for example, we may expect it to conform to a certain model: the crime is 
discovered; clues are collected; the mystery is solved; the criminal apprehended. The metaphorical paratext here 
is composed of our expectations, and is rooted in our experience – or anticipations – of a particular genre. 
34 The word ‘authentic’ appears quite frequently in narratology. My use of this term denotes an authentic 
‘madness’ narrative: one which communicates lived experience of ‘madness’ without being limited (by use of 
psychiatric discourse which reduces ‘madness’ to a list of symptoms and is burdened with stigma), obscured (by 
paratexts) or censored (for example, a narrative may be edited, or an experience of ‘madness’ deemphasised in 
order to maintain audience engagement). 
35 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 19. 
36 Tony Cutler, ‘Lacan’s Philosophical Coquetry’, in The Talking Cure, ed. by Colin MacCabe (Hampshire: 
MacMillan, 1986), pp. 90-107 (p. 93). 
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This medicalisation of ‘madness’ has obscured its ‘cosmic, tragic consciousness’: the 
humanity of ‘madness’, its soul; its place in the context of life.37 The means we have of 
understanding ‘madness’ – the current language available to signify mental illness – merely 
renders the experience misunderstood. As Laing observed, ‘the mad things said and done by 
the schizophrenic will essentially remain a closed book if one does not understand their 
existential context’.38 But can we ever acknowledge and situate ‘madness’ in an ‘existential 
context’ which grants it meaning when the only mainstream discourse available to talk of 
‘madness’ is the language of ‘observation and classification’?39 
 
Stigma and Semantics: The Politics of Taxonomy  
Psychiatric labels applied to those experiencing ‘madness’ can be understood as a kind of 
verbal panopticon. The panopticon is, in brief, an institutional building designed on the 
premise that the detained are always visible: an idea proposed by English philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham. Bentham explained the mechanics of this design as follows: ‘the building circular 
[…] the prisoners, in their cells, occupying the circumference – the officers [occupying] the 
centre […] By blinds and other contrivances, the inspectors concealed […] hence the 
sentiment of a sort of invisible omnipresence’.40 According to Foucault, this model was 
designed ‘to induce […] a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power’.41 Of the detained – the watched – Foucault explained, ‘he is 
seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in 
communication’.42 The panopticon model has relevance to asylum culture in more ways than 
                                                          
37 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 27. 
38 Laing, Divided, p. 17. 
39 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 488. 
40 Jeremy Bentham, quoted in The Committee of the Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline, Remarks 
on the Form and Construction of Prisons with Appropriate Designs (London: Richard Taylor, 1826), p. 65. 
41 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991), 201. 
42 Foucault, Discipline, p. 200. 
33 
 
one: on a fundamental level, numerous nineteenth-century asylums were constructed using 
Bentham’s design or at least inspired by his principles.43 However, there is also a 
metaphorical connection, through which the politics of psychiatric discourse can be 
understood further. 
 The significance of the Foucauldian panopticon lies in the disenfranchisement of the 
individual, and the enforcement of power. This process also occurs with a psychiatric 
diagnosis, a label that exposes the individual without engaging them. As with the inmate in 
the panopticon, those declared ‘mad’ become ‘the object of information [but] never a subject 
in communication’.44 Immediately, there is a process of marginalisation – represented by the 
inmate banished to the circumference of the institution, rather than the centre – and 
objectification. The individual branded with a psychiatric label becomes ‘pure spectacle and 
absolute subject’: the watched, the documented, the ostracised, spoken of but not to.45 Much 
like the inmate who is exposed to the officer’s gaze but not able to return it, the ‘mad’ 
individual is the subject of psychiatric discourse, but not part of its dialogue. 
How is it that a single word – ‘schizophrenic’, ‘psychotic’, ‘bipolar’ – can wield such 
power? In order to understand the relationship between taxonomy (the words) and stigma (the 
assortment of social misconceptions, assumptions and moral judgements inherent in such 
labels), one must take a step back. How are words assigned a value, a thing to signify? How 
does language become so burdened with meaning, so laden with social implications? By 
approaching taxonomy through a Saussurean lens, I establish how this process takes shape – 
and, by association, investigate the possibility of it being reversed.  
                                                          
43 See, for example, John Conolly, The Construction and Government of Lunatic Asylums and Hospitals for the 
Insane (London: John Churchill, 1847), p. 26. Here, psychiatrist Conolly explained the function of the 
‘inspection-plate’: ‘The plate is made of iron, and towards the gallery merely presents a flat surface and a small 
circular opening, over which there is a cover, which moves without noise […] the inside of the plate is broad 
and concave towards the patient’s room, all parts of which thus become visible’. Examples of asylums 
constructed using the panopticon model include Glasgow asylum and Wakefield asylum. 
44 Foucault, Discipline, p. 200. 
45 Foucault, Civilization, p. 262. 
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Saussure argued that although we may have the physical capacity of speech (for 
example, vocal chords), we are unable to communicate without the langue – a language 
system, unique to each culture, which attributes shared, social meaning to the physical and 
written sounds of speech. Parole – the physical act of speech in the individual – requires the 
langue to be rendered a form of communication: ‘speech sounds are only the instruments of 
thought, and have no independent existence [without] combin[ing] with an idea to form [a] 
complex unit’.46 The langue is comprised of connections between spoken words and ideas, a 
process Saussure termed ‘signification’. Therefore, when I vocalise the word ‘tree’ to 
someone else who has been initiated into and has explicitly consented to the langue of my 
culture, that word (the signifier, or acoustic image) allows the other person to understand that 
I am referring to a large perennial plant, with branches, a trunk, and roots. The psychological 
imprint triggered by the word ‘tree’ is termed the signified, the concept, ‘as given to him [the 
other party, who is being spoken to] by the evidence of his senses’.47 The process of 
acquiring language is ‘a kind of apprenticeship in order to acquaint himself [the child] with 
its workings’: it is absorbed through social osmosis from a young age.48 This ‘apprenticeship’ 
is necessary for social engagement: without an acceptance of the langue, the words one 
speaks have not been assigned any shared meaning, and communication is obstructed. 
To continue with my previous example, the process of signification allows me to talk 
to my companion about a tree, with the other person able to recognise what it is that I am 
talking about. It also means that we – as a society – have signifiers on which we rely to 
communicate and talk about anything, including states or objects which are not neatly 
contained in a single word.49 There is, for example, a vast array of human experience limited 
                                                          
46 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 9. 
47 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 66. 
48 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 14. 
49 My use of the plural personal pronoun here refers to a group of people who share a langue; a society reliant 
on a shared understanding of the signifier and the signified to communicate. Any further references to the 
langue refer specifically to the language I encounter in my Western, Anglophone context.  
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to the signifier ‘schizophrenic’. I mentioned earlier that taxonomy is the enforcement of 
signification: it connects the signified (the individual) with a signifier (the label), and thus 
reduces the signified to the signifier. Multi-faceted lives, experiences and people are 
relegated to a single word: an acoustic image which, as I have already established, denotes 
‘otherness’ and leads to such individuals being ‘invalidated as […] human being[s]’.50 
At present, Western psychiatry predominantly uses the DSM to give ‘madness’ 
language: in a Saussurean sense, the DSM functions as a kind of dictionary, allowing 
psychiatrists to attach a signifier (a diagnostic label) to the signified (the individual) under 
their jurisdiction. From a psychiatric perspective, it allows chaotic patterns of symptoms to be 
reined in to a diagnosis, and – in theory – it ensures that there is a universal language system 
in psychiatry so that the diagnostic process can be consistent.51 Despite Saussure’s assertion 
that ‘once the language has selected a signal, it cannot be freely replaced by any other’, 
psychiatry has created and evolved its own langue – thus, ‘dementia praecox’ became 
‘schizophrenia’ and its numerous subsections, ‘melancholia’ became ‘depression’, ‘manic 
depression’ became ‘bipolar’, to name but a few. A Saussurean interpretation reveals that, as 
psychiatry has ‘a community of speakers’ – bestowed with the ‘authority’ associated with 
their profession – these factors have allowed its langue not only to merge with the 
overarching langue of the Western world, but additionally to become the sole discourse for 
discussing ‘madness’.52 It is possible that the issues latent in creating a new langue may be 
accountable for at least part of the ‘madness’ language problem.  
                                                          
50 Laing, Politics, p. 101. 
51 By this, I mean that all psychiatrists using the DSM are able to access the same criteria and language so that a 
‘patient’ presenting with – for example – ‘delusions’, ‘poverty of speech’ and ‘incoherence’ which have 
persisted for over six months would consistently receive a label of ‘schizophrenic’ regardless of which 
psychiatrist diagnosed him/her. Psychiatrist Robert Spitzer – part of the taskforce for the later editions of the 
DSM – attempted to address this ‘reliability problem’ with increasingly detailed and specific criteria. However, 
a 2007 study in Psychiatry journal reports that 86 per cent of psychiatrists asked still felt that diagnostic 
reliability was poor. See Davies, Cracked, p. 18. 
52 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 77. Italics added for emphasis. 
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Understanding taxonomy in terms of signification presents a paradox. This language – 
terms such as ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘bipolar’ – is too limiting and too imprecise. The initial 
issue – that taxonomy is too limiting – is a direct result of medicalising human experience. 
One term will never fit all. The DSM-based diagnostic model examines symptoms in 
isolation, failing to acknowledge the overarching picture: the context of this distress in the 
life and experience of the individual. ‘Madness’ is approached and diagnosed as a ‘clinical 
entity’: labels which do not consider the contextual aetiology and significance of mental 
distress.53 The human excess – the surplus material which is not considered relevant to the 
DSM criteria, the suffering, grief and trauma which threaten to render ‘madness’ familiar – 
remains unspoken, beyond the realm of taxonomy. Psychiatric discourse reduces and limits 
the individual to a framework of symptoms. 
However, this clinically meticulous approach of imposing order onto the organic 
disorder of human experience stands in contrast to the evasive and unstable meaning of 
psychiatric terms in a social context. According to Saussure, language ‘is intrinsically 
defenceless against the factors which constantly tend to shift relationships between signal and 
signification’.54 In the social realm, the signifier ‘schizophrenic’ evokes an array of 
concepts.55 It could suggest an individual who hears voices instructing them to commit 
violent acts; someone who is convinced that they have superhuman powers; who is crippled 
by paranoia; who is plagued by visual hallucinations; who has a split personality; someone 
who rants and raves inappropriately.56 To someone who has just seen the film Fight Club, it 
might denote a sort of ‘dissociative identity disorder’.57 For one who has just seen Girl, 
                                                          
53 Laing, Divided, p. 18. 
54 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 76. 
55 ‘Concepts’ is a Saussurean term, interchangeable with ‘signified’. 
56 In chapter five, I discuss the social assumption that ‘madness’ equates to violence in more detail. I also 
explore the wider role that popular discourses of ‘madness’ plays in shaping societal perspectives and enforcing 
stigma. 
57 This confusion of ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘dissociative identity disorder’ is – in addition to being a popular 
Hollywood trope – rooted in the etymology of the term ‘schizophrenia’. I will discuss this in more detail shortly. 
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Interrupted, it could suggest someone who, like the character Polly Clark, is depersonalised 
to the extent that they have no idea who they are, or what they look like. Psychiatric labels 
become so ‘burdened with attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form 
[…] between the knowledge which animates it [the social discourse] and the form into which 
it is transposed [the psychiatric category], a gap widens’.58 If the signified is so inconsistent, 
how can the signifier truly signify anything when it is fraught with too many – and often 
contradictory – meanings?59  
According to Saussure, the social evolution of language is inevitable: the signifier and 
the signified transform as the langue passes on from generation to generation. However, 
Saussure argued that although creating an ‘artificial’ langue60 was possible, maintaining 
control of it was not: 
Anyone who invents an artificial language retains control of it only as long as it is not 
in use. But as soon as it fulfils its purpose and becomes the property of the 
community, it is no longer under control […] Once launched, the language will in all 
probability begin to lead a semiological life of its own.61 
 
Psychiatric taxonomy has become autonomous – ‘lead[ing] a semiological life of its own’ – 
which has warped, distorted and further estranged such terms from the individual they 
attempt to signify. This semantic evolution has led to a ‘cultural legacy of misrecognition’.62 
Psychiatric language was imperfect to begin with, and its multi-faceted presence in the 
mainstream social sphere reduces still further the possibility of ‘madness’ being known.  
                                                          
58 Foucault, Civilization, pp. 18-19. 
59 I am not suggesting that this is an issue exclusive to mental illness: misuse and misappropriation of 
terminology which obscures meaning does happen in other experiences of illness, too. However, this semantic  
obfuscation occurs more frequently in the sphere of mental illness, as, for example, ‘A 2007 study of the terms 
“schizophrenia” and “schizophrenic” in the UK national press found that 11% of references were metaphorical, 
with broadsheet papers more likely to deploy such phrasing than tabloids. By contrast, cancer was only used in 
this manner in 0.02% of cases’. See Jon Kelly and Denise Winterman, ‘OCD, Bipolar, Schizophrenic and the 
Misuse of Mental Health Terms’, BBC News Magazine, 10 October 2011  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15213824> [accessed 16 October 2015]. 
60 By ‘artificial langue’, I mean an inorganic language such as psychiatric taxonomy: one consciously 
constructed, rather than one shaped in use over time. 
61 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 76. 
62 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 7. 
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 Foucault observed that the crude psychiatric classifications of the nineteenth century – 
terms which signified the origin of taxonomy as we know it today – ‘ultimately functioned as 
little more than images, whose value lay in the vegetal myth that they contained within 
them’.63 Thus, although the social distortion of psychiatric language is partly to blame for 
stigma, a Foucauldian interpretation would suggest that such taxonomy was burdened with 
meaning – indeed, burdened with ‘myth[s]’ – at its genesis. Is there something inherent in the 
etymology of these terms which has caused what anti-psychiatrist David Cooper described as 
a ‘perpetual slipping over of words’: an innate disconnect between the signifier and the 
signified, or the presence of too many concepts under the bracket of a single, unstable 
signifier?64 
An investigation into the label of ‘schizophrenia’, for example, exposes a fracture 
between the signifier and the signified. The origin of ‘schizophrenia’ can be found in 
Kraepelin’s use of the term ‘dementia praecox’, following his textbook of the same name, 
which was published in 1896. The Latin etymology of the prefix ‘dement’ is to be ‘out of 
one’s mind’, developing into the noun ‘dementia’ which suggests a decline or total failure of 
one’s mental capacity.65 The term ‘praecox’ has its origins in the Latin adjective precoce, 
which signifies an ‘early or precocious ripening’.66 ‘Dementia praecox’, in its entirety, 
denotes a ‘patient’ who goes ‘out of one’s mind’ at an early age, supported by Kraepelin’s 
own declaration that ‘these peculiar dementias seemed to stand in near relation to the period 
of youth’.67 Kraepelin intended the label to be used until ‘a profounder understanding would 
                                                          
63 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 194. 
64 David Cooper, The Language of Madness (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p. 20. 
65 OED, ‘dement’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49628?rskey=9gTFKM&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> 
[accessed 17 June 2011]. 
66 OED, ‘precoce’ 
 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149685?rskey=yaco0g&result=1&isAdvanced=true#eid62674979> 
[accessed 17 June 2011]. 
67Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 4. 
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provide an appropriate name’.68 However, as the term ‘schizophrenia’ is loaded with 
misunderstanding, to what extent can it really be considered an ‘appropriate name’? 
The label ‘schizophrenia’ was formulated by Bleuler in 1908, developing Kraepelin’s 
hypothesis of ‘dementia praecox’, with a view to ‘renaming the disease to focus on a splitting 
of usually integrated psychic functions’.69 The etymological foundations of the term reveal 
Bleuler’s intentions to represent the condition as one which ‘contradict[s] one of the most 
fundamental assumptions of our culture [...] the Western conception of the person [...] 
organized into a distinctive whole’.70 The prefix ‘schizo’ denotes a ‘split’, cleaving or 
division.71 When coupled with the adjective ‘phrenic’ (‘of or relating to the mind’), the label 
evokes a fragmented mind, a divided self, and a split personality, thus corresponding with 
and engendering the popular social construction of ‘schizophrenia’ as a form of ‘dissociative 
identity disorder’.72 Laing offered yet another interpretation of the etymology of 
‘schizophrenia’: ‘Schiz – “broken”; Phrenos – “soul or heart”. The schizophrenic in this sense 
is one who is broken-hearted’.73 This emotive and empathetic interpretation of 
‘schizophrenia’ stands in stark contrast to the psychiatric meaning of the term.74 
The public perception of ‘schizophrenia’ has taken on substance and meaning beyond 
the psychiatric construct. A brief excursion into the etymology of ‘schizophrenia’ reveals that 
societal (mis)use of the term is not entirely liable for this inconsistency. These popular 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Irving I. Gottesman, Schizophrenia Genesis: The Origins of Madness (New York: W. H. Freeman and 
Company, 1991), p. 8. 
70 Louis A. Sass, ‘Introspection, Schizophrenia, and the Fragmentation of the Self’, Representation, 19 (1987), 
1-34 (p. 1). The etymology of the term ‘individual’ originates from classical Latin – indīviduus – referring to 
something indivisible. See OED, ‘individual’  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/94633?redirectedFrom=individual#eid> [accessed 18 September 2015]. 
71 OED, ‘schizo-’, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172402?rskey=rUOfTb&result=2&isAdvanced=false#id> 
[accessed 17 June 2011]. 
72 OED, ‘phrenic’, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/142968?rskey=N6Lfk&result=7&isAdvanced=false#> 
[accessed 17 June 2011]. 
73 Laing, Politics, p. 107. 
74 Compare Laing’s compassionate interpretation of ‘schizophrenia’ as a broken heart or soul with psychiatrist 
Peter F. Liddle’s ‘three syndrome hypothesis’ which defines ‘schizophrenia’ with terms such as ‘psychomotor 
poverty’, ‘reality distortion’ and ‘disorder of internal monitoring’. See David Semple and Roger Smyth, Oxford 
Handbook of Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 173. 
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stereotypes of the condition (particularly the assumption that ‘schizophrenia’ equates to a 
split personality, or a split self) materialised after the term ‘schizophrenia’ had been 
developed, as ‘many people came to believe that schizophrenics display multiple, or split, 
personalities’.75 This conviction is still prominent today. A 2008 American survey, conducted 
by the National Alliance on Mental Illness, reported that ‘the greatest misconception [held by 
64% of participants] is that “split or multiple personalities” are symptoms of 
schizophrenia’.76 
 Psychiatric terms came into being in imperfect forms; never able to signify all that 
they were meant to, never able to encompass the variants of human experience they were 
attached to. Borne out of unstable etymology, psychiatric langue does not seem to translate 
into a broader social context without expanding, taking on new life and new meanings. 
Perhaps this is the fault of those who initially devised such terms; perhaps this is an inherent 
issue in applying clinical taxonomy to a phenomenon which resists pathological 
classification. Regardless, psychiatric discourse is flawed and laden with stigma, and the 
societal interpretation of such terms renders their use even more problematic.  
If, according to Lacan, ‘the self is “absolutely nothing” apart from its being 
constituted by language’, and the semantics available to give that self meaning are tainted, 
inappropriate and damaging, can we ever really appreciate how utterly devastating that can 
be?77 Do we really know how radical an impact this language has on identity, on the self – 
fragile but essential concepts which must be entirely revised to accommodate these new 
labels? The first language problem is a battle for selfhood against the pressure of limited and 
misinformed labels, which usurp identity during a psychiatric intervention. And yet – 
                                                          
75 Gottesman, Schizophrenia Genesis, p. 8. 
76 National Alliance on Mental Illness, ‘Schizophrenia: Public Attitudes, Personal Needs’  
<http://www.nami.org/schizophreniasurvey> [accessed 27 November 2015]. 
77 Berthold, ‘Talking Cures’, p. 305. 
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disconcertingly – this is not the only semantic war waged between psychiatrist, ‘patient’ and 
society.  
 
Comprehending the ‘Incomprehensible’: Language Use as a Symptom 
I have already briefly discussed the psychiatric reliance on the speech of the ‘patient’: as 
explained by Lacan, in the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic, this narrative is the ‘single 
medium’.78 Through what the ‘patient’ says or how the ‘patient’ speaks, the psychiatrist is 
able to identify symptoms and apply diagnostic labels. In theory, if the speech of the ‘patient’ 
is a fundamental resource, then the ‘mad’ voice is granted significance: it is important, it is 
relevant, it is listened to. However, the psychiatric approach is less concerned with content of 
speech – the history of the ‘patient’, understanding ‘madness’ in an anthropological and 
personal context – and instead focuses on its anomalies: how ideas are presented, and what 
the ‘patient’ is not doing according to the ‘norm’. Rather than opening up a dialogue, 
psychiatry analyses speech without engaging with what is being said: a manoeuvre which 
clearly signals an entrenched reluctance to listen to those labelled ‘mad’. 
 Before the medicalisation of language use is investigated further, this concept can be 
illuminated by an exploration of Lacanian theory, particularly his premise of the nom du père 
(the Name-of-the-Father). Nom du père refers to ‘the whole complex of rules, interdictions, 
concepts, and words that the child must accept to transit successfully […] into the larger 
practical and social world’.79 This ‘complex of rules’ establishes and maintains the Symbolic 
Order: the social sphere of linguistic communication, conventions and relations with others.  
Lacan described ‘psychosis’ as the antithesis of the nom du père: a deviation from 
conventional language structure, and a rejection of conventions which preserve the status 
                                                          
78 Lacan, Écrits, p. 44. 
79 Louis A. Sass, ‘Madness and the Ineffable: Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Lacan’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and 
Psychology, 4 (2009), 319-24 (p. 321). For a more detailed discussion of nom du père, see Jacques Lacan, The 
Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, trans. by Russell Grigg, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (London: 
Routledge, 1993).  
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quo. According to Lacan, a ‘patient’ may employ ‘new compound words […] governed […] 
by the rules of the patient’s language’.80 A new, independent language is crafted and, with it, 
the autonomy of the individual is developed: they are not subject to the grand Symbolic 
Order but to their own order. This refusal to conform to the ‘complex of rules’ of the nom du 
père ‘is the defining feature of psychosis. As a result of this failure, the madman is incapable 
of experiencing a meaningful world or of having a coherent sense of existing as a subject of 
language or experience’.81 By not being part of the Symbolic Order, the experience of the 
‘madman’ is invalidated. As ‘madness’ does not conform to the conventional language 
structure, its voice is not heard. An inability or reluctance to be subject to the nom du père 
prevents the individual from engaging and being heeded in a social context: ‘The person who 
attempts to turn away from language and social communication [….will] be forfeiting the 
very possibility of access to the external world’.82 Without a langue to grant it meaning, a 
narrative which deviates from orthodox signification is merely ‘empty speech’.83 
According to Lacan, ‘it is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father [during ‘psychosis’ 
which] sets off the cascade of reshaping of the signifier form’.84 Indeed, Hegel argued that 
‘madness’ can be restored to ‘sanity’ once the ‘authority’ of the nom du père – signified by a 
return to conventional language use – is reinstated: ‘cure must be sought in the re-
externalization (rebirth) of the self into relations with others through a path back to 
language’.85 However, when one is discussing seemingly abstract theory, it can be difficult to 
appreciate the true impact such ideas have in practice. Can ‘madness’ really be seen to reveal 
itself in an innocuous ‘reshaping of the signifier form’? 
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According to psychiatry, anomalies which can be identified in the speech of the 
‘patient’ include ‘incoherent speech […] poverty of content of speech or loss of goal […] 
lack of spontaneous, self-initiated speech […] perseveration […] unintelligible speech, with a 
lack of proper connections between words’.86 The symptoms a psychiatrist looks for when 
diagnosing ‘schizophrenia’ include ‘disorganized speech [and] incoherent speech, diminished 
experience and expression of emotions’.87 A ‘manic’ state reveals itself through 
‘circumstantial thinking: a disorder of the form of thought where irrelevant details and 
digressions overwhelm the direction of the thought process. This abnormality may be 
reflected in the resultant speech’ and ‘clang association: an abnormality of speech where the 
connection between words is their sound rather than their meaning’.88 Another psychiatric 
textbook explained that: 
The speech often reflects an underlying thought disorder […] there is a vagueness in 
the patient’s talk that makes it difficult to grasp meaning […] Thought disorder is 
reflected in the loosening of association between expressed ideas […] the structure 
and coherence of thinking is lost, so that utterances are jumbled (word salad or 
verbigeration). Some patients use ordinary words or phrases in unusual ways 
(metonyms or paraphrases), and a few coin new words (neologisms).89 
 
As these extracts demonstrate, psychiatry searches for evidence of ‘madness’ in unorthodox 
language use. ‘Madness’ manifests itself in a deviation from the process of signification – 
using ‘ordinary words’ in ‘unusual ways’, thus disregarding the social practice of applying a 
signifier to the signified in accordance with the langue. ‘Madness’ also transgresses cultural 
codes of the ‘norm’ of communication: rather than expressing experiences in a clear, focused 
and accessible manner, ‘madness’ narratives are apparently rendered ‘incoherent’ by 
repetition, digressions and ‘improper’ connections between words.90 Lacan asserted that ‘as a 
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result of this failure [to conform to conventional language], the madman is incapable of 
experiencing a meaningful world’.91 This medicalisation of language use severely impacts on 
the social identity of those labelled ‘mad’. If mainstream society is informed that ‘madness’ 
is ‘incoherent’ and ‘unintelligible’, then there is no incentive to listen to or acknowledge such 
experiences. Diminishing the perceived value of individual discourse – establishing it as non-
communication – ensures that the ‘mad’ voice is silenced. Porter declared that in ‘mainline 
views in psychiatric medicine […] it became standard to refer to what mad people said […] 
through terms such as “chattering”, “jabbering” and “ranting”’: a manoeuvre designed to 
ensure ‘madness’ narratives remain ‘closed’ texts.92 
This medicalisation of language use also establishes the politics of the 
‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. The psychiatrist acts as an interpreter; a psychiatric 
diagnosis is depicted as ‘a thoroughly semiotic activity: an analysis of one symbol system 
followed by its translation into another’.93 The individual experiencing ‘madness’ is now 
constructed as dependent on psychiatric authority because – apparently – only psychiatry can 
access their narratives (despite, as I mentioned earlier, such access being detached analysis, 
rather than actually listening).94 The narrative of the ‘patient’ is decoded to reveal the 
symptoms of an illness: that is all that the narrative is ‘allowed’ to signify. The experience of 
the ‘patient’ is depicted as having no place outside of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist (and, indeed, 
translator) relationship. ‘Madness’ narratives cannot be socially viable because the ‘authority’ 
has declared them ‘entirely on the side of nonsense’.95  
I discuss the impact that the interpretation of language use as a symptom has on 
‘madness’ narratives in more detail shortly, but before I move on to narratology, the issue of 
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92 Porter, Social History, p. 32. 
93 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p. 18. 
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culpability must be addressed. Who is to blame when language fails? Freud described the 
fraught relationship between ‘madness’ and language as a ‘failure of translation’.96 However, 
is this due to the individual labelled ‘mad’ being unable, or reluctant, to translate their 
experiences into universally known signifiers? Is it the fault of the psychiatrist – assuming the 
role of interpreter – who misunderstands the signifiers of the ‘patient’? Or is this a flaw of the 
dominant language system, which prevents a lived account of ‘madness’ from being a 
socially accessible narrative?  
A Lacanian approach would deem the ‘patient’ culpable for the language problem. 
This is because ‘madness’ lies in a rejection of the nom du père in favour of being 
autonomous – or in the hope of finding an authentic language of ‘madness’, ‘governed […] 
by the rules of the patient’s language’.97 Thus, if society is unable to access or empathise with 
‘madness’ narratives, this is because the ‘patient’ has refused to conform to the overarching 
language system which allows experiences to be understood, recognised, and granted 
meaning. The ‘patient’ has, in effect, chosen to speak – or create – another language, a 
network of neologisms: the resulting narrative is deemed ‘incomprehensible’.  
However, when one discusses poverty of speech, one does not consider poverty of 
listening. Saussure offered a different perspective. When we encounter a language we do not 
understand, we do not blame the speaker for our inability to comprehend. Saussure explained 
that ‘we hear the sounds but we cannot enter into the social reality of what is happening, 
because of our failure to comprehend’.98 This, in contrast, makes the listener accountable: 
there is not a failure in communication, but a failure in translation, in how the narrative is 
received.99 Kraepelin argued that ‘incoherence’ reveals the individual’s inability to procure 
sound judgement: ‘[The ‘patient’] cannot grasp a thought, cannot understand anything: their 
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mind is scattered; their thoughts have flowed away; their brain is no longer competent, is 
enfeebled’.100 However, the inability to comprehend – to ‘understand anything’ – is a 
principal trait of the psychiatrist rather than the ‘patient’.101 This suggests that, as listeners, 
we must adapt to what we hear, rather than expecting narratives to conform to what we 
recognise and are able to ‘understand’ immediately. 
Rather than placing culpability with ‘poverty of speech’ or ‘poverty of listening’, is 
there potential to challenge the assumption that narratives have to be ‘coherent’ and 
conformist in the first place? It seems that the subjectivity of an experience of ‘madness’ 
stands in binary opposition to the neat, regulated structure of signification and conventional 
language use. In the midst of trauma, upheaval, grief and suffering, it is absurd to expect such 
intense and intimate narratives to conform to arbitrary notions of ‘coherence’ or 
‘comprehensibility’. As Cooper asserted: 
The madman will have none of this! [...] He refuses to have his existence reduced to 
nice proper grammar, and has no use for the psychoanalyst three yards away, staring 
into another space, listening only to ‘It’ and not to things said about real collective 
social experience. For the madman it is of no interest that the ‘unconscious is 
structured like a language’ – it is language that must be structured like the 
‘unconscious’.102 
 
That ‘madness’ cannot be articulated or contained in orthodox language does not mean that it 
should be silent. Instead, we should be allowing language to be modified, deconstructed and 
reconfigured – much like the self through an experience of ‘madness’. If society disregards 
everything it does not immediately understand, we are at risk of silencing a multitude of 
vibrant and dynamic alternative narratives, from ‘madness’ and other illness narratives, to 
narratives of drug use, dreams or dream-like states, religious and spiritual experiences, and 
streams of consciousness.  
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The Language of ‘Madness’: Narrating Lived Experiences 
I have investigated the language problem from a semantic perspective. In order to identify the 
obstacles which prevent ‘madness’ from being heard, I will now approach this problem 
through the lens of narrative theory, and consider viable solutions.  
 Of paramount importance is establishing what a ‘narrative’ is, in order to understand 
the interplay between self, narrative and society, and to ascertain where this process fails 
when it comes to narrating ‘madness’. Ochs and Capps argued that narratives ‘interface […] 
self and society, constituting a crucial resource for socializing emotions, attitudes and 
identities, developing interpersonal relationships, and constituting membership in a 
community’.103 Narrative theorist H. Porter Abbott contended that ‘we only know ourselves 
insofar as we are narrativized [as] it is only though narrative that we know ourselves as active 
entities’, thus if an individual is unable or reluctant to share a narrative, they are at risk of 
social and personal estrangement. 104 If one is unable to be part of the communal discourse of 
narrative exchange, one cannot identify as a proactive, social being. 
 However, in addition to social necessity, a narrative is also a vital resource for 
constructing and disseminating identity. The act of narration has been described as 
‘profoundly human’, ‘a transformative force […] provoking self-reflection’.105 It is a space in 
which the self can be assembled and affirmed; it is a reflective medium which can impose 
order onto chaos; it is a way for us to contemplate and communicate our history, our present 
and our future. A narrative ‘give[s] form (or meaning) to the chaos and uncertainty 
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characteristic of the flux of life’.106 Psychiatrist and anthropologist Arthur Kleinman 
explained that, in the event of a distressing experience such as severe illness, ‘we are shocked 
out of our common-sensical [sic] perspective on the world. We are then in a transitional 
situation in which we must adopt some other perspective on our experience’.107 A narrative 
of an illness experience (called ‘pathography’) does not only help us orientate ourselves 
during such trauma, but it can also allow us to communicate our suffering to those around us, 
garnering both support and social validation.108  
 The conventional process of narration can be stripped down to three fundamental 
stages. If any one of these components is not present or does not function, the narrative does 
not serve its purpose of allowing the self to be an active social entity.109 First, it begins with 
the individual: the narrative is an articulation of the experiences of the self. Second, the 
narrative is communicated via a vehicle, most frequently language, varying from speech to 
the written word. Finally, the narrative needs to be delivered to – and validated by – a social 
audience.  
As the final and perhaps most fundamental stage in the process, what does narrative 
validation look like, and what does it mean? Writer Roy Wolcott defines narrative 
communication as ‘the transmission of meaningful messages to someone else with the aim of 
having him believe the information’, which seems somewhat subjective: how does one 
measure what is meaningful or not, or meaningful enough?110 That the recipient must believe 
the information is a problematic assumption: in everyday discourse, we receive a great deal 
of information which we do not believe, and yet this does not make it failed 
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communication.111 However, Wolcott established the crux of the narrative process: 
information is conveyed by one party and then accepted by the other, and this is the essential 
component which validates communication. If the success and significance – how 
‘meaningful’ it is – of a narrative is ascertained by the reaction of the audience (whether or 
not the information is believed, according to Wolcott), then the power of judging narrative 
worth lies entirely with the listener. Once the narrative is delivered to its audience, it falls 
beyond the narrator’s control. Neither the narrator nor the narrative dictates success; only the 
audience has the power of validation. In a psychiatric context, the psychiatrist acts as an 
additional obstacle to this validation process, judging narrative worth and, by virtue of 
assumed ‘authority’, informing the audience (mainstream society) accordingly. 
 
Authentic ‘Madness’ Versus Accessible ‘Madness’: Where the Narrative Process Fails 
Earlier, I used a theoretical lens to reflect on who is deemed culpable for what Freud 
ambiguously termed a ‘failure of translation’.112 A similar investigation needs to identify who 
is responsible when a narrative fails. I have established that a conventional narrative model 
has three stages: an articulation of the self; communication via a vehicle; delivery to a social 
audience. With each step, there is an opportunity for failure, and for the entire process to 
become unravelled. Is the self to blame for attempting to verbalise something inaccessible, 
something which does not fit with the chosen narrative medium, or which does not engage 
the intended social audience? Is the narrative model liable: is the chosen language too 
limited, or does the vehicle prevent mainstream social dissemination?113 Or, is the intended 
social audience liable, for misinterpreting the narrative, not validating it, or just not listening? 
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 A narrative – and the experience of the self it attempts to articulate – can only be 
constructed using the available resources. Psychiatry supplies the mainstream language 
available for talking about ‘madness’. It is a language of categorisation, alienation and 
‘othering’. A personal narrative formulated through these terms is one which falls short in 
communicating an authentic sense of what ‘madness’ is – this discourse speaks of 
psychiatry’s experience of ‘madness’, but not lived experience. Although it is language which 
is socially familiar, to use it to construct an individual narrative is an absurd kind of 
ventriloquism. Such narratives would be socially heeded, but they contribute to the legacy of 
misrepresentation which characterises popular discourses of ‘madness’. This further 
reinforces the status quo which validates one empirical narrative (that of psychiatry) over 
another (personal experience).  
‘The expression of madness exceeds what [it] is possible to talk about using 
conventional psychiatric discourse’, and yet, currently, it is the only language in the 
developed world available to discuss the ‘madness’ experience in a manner which is socially 
validated.114 A narrative must jeopardise an authentic expression of the self in favour of 
being accessible and being heard: the self must be constructed using limited and damaging 
psychiatric terms. The narrative process remains incomplete, as, in order to engage with the 
wider social context of readership and exchange, one sacrifices the self: personal experience 
of ‘madness’, again, remains mute. 
Unable to formulate a narrative divorced from psychiatric rhetoric which ‘shapes 
public discourse on mental health’, the individual experiencing ‘madness’ has two available 
options.115 As I have already established, a narrative may be constructed through words 
which ‘do not exist in a neutral and impersonal language, but in other people’s mouths, in 
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other people’s contexts’.116 Personal experience of ‘madness’ is reduced to limited 
psychiatric lexis. The popular discourse of ‘madness’ continues to be (mis)informed by this 
hegemonic discourse, as lived experience is not always socially validated and therefore not 
known in a mainstream context. 
The alternative is to communicate ‘madness’ through an unorthodox medium which is 
able to accommodate and articulate lived experience. In chapter four, I discuss how art can be 
used as a narrative model divorced from the politics of language. Other options include use of 
self-created language (such as ‘schizophrenese’), postmodern narratives and narratives 
constructed in anti-psychiatric and ‘survivor’ communities.117 Such narratives are able to 
communicate authentic ‘madness’ – an experience not limited to, distorted or censored by 
psychiatric language – and therefore the first two stages of the narrative process are complete. 
However, as these semantics or models deviate from conventional modes of communication, 
the final part of the process – delivery to a social audience – is forfeited. Unorthodox but 
authentic ‘madness’ narratives contradict psychiatric hegemony by refusing to be limited to 
its language. However, because such ‘madness’ narratives are formulated beyond psychiatric 
discourse – the known langue available to discuss ‘madness’ – they are socially unfamiliar. 
Deemed ‘abstract’, or unworthy of interpretation, ‘conceived as unintelligible or non-sense’, 
these narratives cannot be validated by their social recipients.118 As I have already 
established, the perceived ‘incomprehensibility’ of such texts has already been constructed as 
a symptom by psychiatry. Authentic yet unorthodox narratives are permitted to reflect only 
the ‘otherness’ of ‘madness’. Society has been informed that ‘madness’ deviates from 
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conventional models of communication, and that this is a ‘symptom’ rather than a desperate 
attempt to be heard.  
 Unorthodox narrative models and language use – necessities in communicating 
authentic ‘madness’ – do not translate between self and society. These ‘madness’ narratives 
successfully communicate the self through a process of linguistic realisation. Although these 
narratives depict ‘madness’ as a lived and personal experience rather than a psychiatric entity, 
they are unfamiliar and thus invalidated by their social audience. The narrative process 
remains incomplete.  
 
Experience Versus Expectation: Deconstructing Paratexts 
In addition to the struggle between authenticity and accessibility, ‘madness’ narratives also 
expose a conflict between expectation and experience. As Ochs and Capps observed, ‘the 
struggle to reconcile expectation with experience is particularly salient in the narratives of 
sufferers of mental and physical illness’.119 This is, again, a war which began with language. 
Psychiatric discourse – the ‘authority’ on ‘madness’ – has informed society that ‘madness’ is 
a ‘closed’ text: any attempts on the part of the ‘mad’ individual ‘to speak authoritatively 
about their experiences are undermined by the predominant public perception of them as 
“unreliable” witnesses, subject to hallucinations, delusions and violent tendencies’.120 Our 
expectations (that a ‘mad’ narrator is an ‘unreliable’ one) impact on how we interpret the 
experience (a ‘madness’ narrative). 
Psychiatry has established how society views ‘madness’. We have preconceived 
notions and assumptions about what the ‘madness’ experience is, and these expectations are 
superimposed onto ‘madness’ narratives. Psychiatric discourse is, in a sense, the paratext, the 
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‘material that lies somehow on the threshold of the narrative’.121 It is the lens through which 
we interpret ‘madness’ narratives. I have established the narrative process as a pure state but, 
in reality, these accounts exist in correlation with other narratives, as part of a wider social 
context. Any form of narrative framing – albeit literal or something more abstract – has an 
inevitable influence on how we receive the text. These paratexts ‘play critically important 
roles in the interpretation of the narratives they frame’.122 Paratexts lie on the ‘fringe of the 
printed text [and] in reality [they] control […] one’s whole reading’.123 
 An example of the conflict between experience and expectation – and the integral role 
played by paratexts – can be found in The Maniac; A Realistic Study of Madness from the 
Maniac’s Point of View by E. Thelmar (1909) – an autobiographical account of a journalist’s 
experience of ‘madness’. Immediately, the title informs the reader that the narrator is a 
‘maniac’. Psychiatric discourse has already shaped society’s response to this: ‘from a 
mainstream psychiatric perspective, attending or listening to the voice of the mad is pointless 
since, by the virtue of their unreason, their views are worthless’.124 In a psychiatric context, 
‘mania’ is characterised by ‘grandiose delusions’, thus the ‘maniac’ is hardly depicted as a 
reliable narrator.125 The OED defines ‘mania’ as ‘madness, particularly of a kind 
characterized by uncontrolled, excited, or aggressive behaviour’: it is typified by excess and 
extremes which render the ‘maniac’ ‘other’.126  
The first of four prefaces to Thelmar’s narrative establishes a sense of context: ‘[t]his 
true record to my doctor, at whose instigation it was written and to whom it was promised’.127 
This paratext suggests to the reader that the text was produced at the specific request of 
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someone in the psychiatric profession. Here, psychiatric ‘authority’ imposes itself on the 
reading in a more literal sense: psychiatry is identified as the intended audience. This initial 
preface depicts Thelmar’s narrative as part of a conversation between ‘patient’ and 
psychiatrist, a dynamic that further reinforces the belief that a ‘madness’ narrative has little 
worth other than as a tool for psychiatry to interpret as a series of symptoms.  
The reader then encounters a ‘Publishers’ Note’ which reads:  
The Publishers are perfectly satisfied that this book is a genuine record of a case of 
madness from the patient’s point of view, and therefore have no hesitation in 
recommending it as a most valuable psychological study to all interested in such 
subjects, and especially to members of the medical profession. To the General Public 
it is offered as the most weirdly sensational of novels.128 
 
The voice of the publisher attests that the narrative is the product of a genuine ‘maniac’, 
attempting to confirm the authenticity of Thelmar’s ‘madness’. The reader is given insight 
into the perceived worth of the document. Instead of viewing this narrative as something 
which speaks of ‘real collective social experience’, or even as a vitally important narrative 
used to reclaim and reconfigure the self after a traumatic experience of illness, the 
‘Publishers’ Note’ diminishes its worth to that of a ‘psychological study’ for the medical 
profession.129 It may have significance only as a psychiatric case study. The ‘General Public’ 
are invited to view the narrative as ‘the most weirdly sensational of novels’.130 This statement 
trivialises the ‘madness’ experience, reducing it to a curiosity, a form of entertainment. 
Echoing Bethlem hospital staff ‘seiz[ing] a marketing opportunity by allowing the paying 
public entry to the hospital to view the inmates’, ‘madness’ is depicted as a spectacle at the 
expense of Thelmar’s humanity.131 
 Finally, the reader encounters a foreword by the author. The self behind the ‘most 
weirdly sensational of novels’ emerges to declare her narrative ‘a faithful account of a 
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genuine attack of Acute Mania’.132 This demonstrates the struggle of the individual to declare 
the authenticity and worth of her narrative to its intended audience: 
Nothing has been invented – from first to last this is a true record […and ] 
remembrance of [the ‘manic’ episode] as vivid as the actual time of its occurrence 
[…] to transcribe the entire account, verbatim, has been but the smallest effort of 
memory on my part.133 
 
This foreword embodies the conflict between experience and expectation. For Thelmar to 
have felt the need defensively to declare her account ‘true’, there must have been an 
assumption that this would be disputed. The narrator anticipated that psychiatric discourse 
had established her as ‘unreliable’, hence her struggle to emphasise the accuracy of her own 
account. To borrow a term from narrative theory, this foreword also exposes the social 
tendency to construct an ‘implied author’: ‘the mental picture of the author that a reader 
constructs on the basis of the text in its entirety’. 134 However, considering the psychiatric and 
social conviction that the ‘mad’ author is unreliable, it appears that the implied author can be 
superimposed onto a narrative even before the text is opened. When one approaches 
Thelmar’s narrative, one is able to discern from the title alone that this is a ‘madness’ 
narrative. The reader immediately develops expectations – informed by, among other things, 
psychiatric discourse – of who the author is, how she will behave, and, ultimately, whether or 
not the text is worthy of validation.  
 As I establish in chapter two, the construct of the ‘mad’, unreliable narrator is a 
common feature in psychiatric texts. By depicting those labelled ‘mad’ as unable to 
communicate their experiences accurately or coherently, psychiatry rules supreme as the 
‘authority’ on talking about ‘madness’ because of its ability to ‘estrange and muffle alternate 
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perspectives’.135 Psychiatrist Bruce Cohen argued that ‘user stories are disempowered by 
contact with mental health professionals’, but there does not even have to be any direct 
engagement between these narratives: psychiatry has already informed the way that society 
responds to and interprets the ‘madness’ experience.136 In the case of any ‘madness’ 
narrative, the implied author is an unreliable one. 
 To return, briefly, to The Maniac, the author’s foreword directly challenges 
psychiatric ‘authority’, declaring: 
[T]he most highly-trained ‘mental’ doctors and nurses are, evidently, most utterly at 
sea with regard to a lunatic’s Consciousness. The location, the extent, and, above all, 
the limitations of a mad patient’s consciousness are so wholly misjudged and 
misapprehended. That this is so, is indubitably proved to any one [sic] who has 
experienced madness – and will be apparent to any one [sic] who reads this narrative 
[…] Perhaps some of them may even manage to learn something from this ‘Human 
Document’.137 
 
This emotive bid for narrative power stands in contrast to previous paratexts which trivialised 
and dismissed Thelmar’s narrative. Her wish that her narrative be read as a ‘Human 
Document’ has already been destabilised by the ‘Publishers’ Note’; any member of the 
‘General Public’ who encounters this text is first confronted with the ‘Publishers’ Note’, 
which insists they interpret this narrative as a form of cheap entertainment, ‘the most weirdly 
sensational of novels’.138 By the time they are confronted with Thelmar’s plea that her text is 
to be read as a ‘Human Document’, the ‘Publishers’ Note’ has usurped Thelmar’s position as 
the authority on her own experiences. The assumption of Thelmar’s unreliability means that 
the reader relies on the presence of other narrators – in this case, the ‘Publisher’ – as a 
mediating force, as a translator, and as a way of contextualising the narrative as a whole.   
 Thelmar’s narrative is the perfect example of how narrative framing can distort an 
interpretation of a text: it is yet another contributing factor to what Freud termed the ‘failure 
                                                          
135 Ochs, ‘Narrating the Self’, p. 33. 
136 Bruce M. Z. Cohen, Mental Health User Narratives (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 41. 
137 Thelmar, Maniac, p. x. Emphasis in original. 
138 Thelmar, Maniac, p. viii. 
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of translation’ which reinforces the social positioning of the ‘mad’ as ‘other’.139 Narrative 
worth is judged in relation to ‘how people construct and use the text to generate particular 
meanings in specific contexts, and [how] significant others interpret and react to the message 
they receive’.140 Narrative tensions in The Maniac shape the social reception of the ‘madness’ 
narrative which exists at the core of the text. Paratexts act as yet another obstacle which 
prevents lived experience of ‘madness’ from being heard. As with taxonomy, these narratives 
are burdened with the weight of psychiatric and social (mis)conceptions and stereotypes. The 
expectation that Thelmar – as a ‘maniac’ – is unable to narrate accurately and coherently 
clashes with Thelmar’s experience that her account is written ‘with as exact verbal accuracy 
as if they had been taken down by shorthand reporter at the time they were being uttered’.141  
It can be easy to overlook the cost of such politics. If the ‘mad’ self attempts to 
provide a counter-narrative to hegemonic discourse, ‘the unbearable identity of the narrator 
and of the surroundings that are supposed to sustain him can no longer be narrated’.142 When 
it comes to narrating ‘madness’, there is always the very real risk that such narratives will 
result in ‘either stigma or social death’.143 The possibility of social engagement (of a 
validated narrative) also presents the potential for further social alienation (a disregarded 
narrative). To reveal a vulnerable or fragile self to the world is, inevitably, to be laid bare: 
such ‘open communication is often thought of as obscene self-exposure’.144 As Laing invited 
us to ‘be more frank about the judgements we implicitly make when we call someone 
psychotic’, it is essential that, when discussing the issues latent in talking about ‘madness’, 
                                                          
139 Freud, Complete Letters, p. 208. 
140 Migliore, ‘Illness Narratives’, p. 102. 
141 Thelmar, Maniac, p. ix. A contrast can be found when Freud conceded that his reconstruction of ‘patient’ 
narratives was ‘not absolutely – phonographically – correct’. Our expectation of psychiatric ‘authority’ means 
that we are unlikely to challenge Freud’s apparent expertise. By contrast, because of her ‘madness', Thelmar has 
to defend her ability to narrate accurately. See Sigmund Freud, Case Histories I, trans. by James Strachey, ed. 
by Angela Richards and Alan Tyson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 38. 
142 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 141. Emphasis in original. 
143 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p. 26. 
144 Rolf Breuer, ‘Irony, Literature and Schizophrenia’, Psychology and Literature: Some Contemporary 
Directions, 1 (1980), 107-18 (p. 110). 
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we do not lose sight of the devastating impact these language problems have on the 
individual labelled ‘mad’.145 
 
The Language of ‘Madness’: A Person-Centred Approach 
This chapter has established how the language of ‘madness’ became burdened with stigma, 
and how narrative and semantic politics came to prevent ‘madness’ narratives from entering 
the vernacular, to challenge the ‘authority’ of hegemonic discourse. The rest of this thesis 
places the theoretical approach I have outlined into context. I explore how these established 
narrative and language politics directly interfere with the communication of a personal 
experience of ‘madness’. The theoretical ground I have covered in this chapter is the 
foundation: as the following chapters demonstrate, my primary concern is with the status of 
the individual narrative. Thus, I switch from a theoretical to a person-centred approach, in 
order to establish the reality of narrating when language is burdened with expectation and 
stigma.  
 This theoretical underpinning does suggest potential ways – if not possible solutions – 
in which the damage caused by language can be reduced. One must consider the binary 
opposition of ‘insanity’ and ‘sanity’. Saussure, for example, emphasised the ‘linear character 
of language’.146 He argued that ‘one must allow for a faculty of association and coordination 
which comes into operation as soon as one goes beyond individual signs in isolation’.147 
When language functions as a system (langue), the relationship between the signifier and 
signified also accommodates ‘association and coordination’. The psychological imprint left 
by a signified is, in part, constructed using binary oppositions: much as we comprehend 
‘dark’ as an absence of ‘light’, so we understand ‘insanity’ in relation to ‘sanity’. Society 
                                                          
145 Laing, Divided, p. 27. 
146 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 121. 
147 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 13. 
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perceives ‘sanity’ as rational and coherent, thus ‘insanity’ is seen to be a deviation from this 
established ‘norm’.148  
Laing argued that the established ‘sane’/‘insane’ binary (with its concomitant 
assumption that ‘sanity’ is the ‘norm’) is responsible for the alienation of the ‘mad’ from 
mainstream society: 
Sanity or psychosis is tested by the degree of conjunction or disjunction between two 
persons where the one is sane by common consent […] The ‘psychotic’ is the name 
we have for the other person in a disjunctive relationship of a particular kind. It is 
only because of this interpersonal disjunction that we start to examine his urine, and 
look for anomalies in the graphs of the electrical activity in his brain.149 
 
‘Madness’ is judged by how it differs from ‘sanity’, and ‘sanity’ is demonstrated by the 
absence of ‘madness’: each side of the binary opposition stabilises the other. It is divergence 
from ‘sanity’ which society uses as justification for objectification (the transformation into a 
medical spectacle) and for alienation (to be ‘mad’ is to be one of them – an ‘other’ – rather 
than one of ‘us’). However, mainstream society is only ‘sane’ by ‘common consent’.150 
Indeed, the concept of ‘sanity’ is nothing more than a collective assumption. The binary of 
‘sanity’/‘insanity’ appears fragile, and yet it is fundamental to the status quo, the ‘us’-versus-
‘them’ mentality which ‘others’ ‘madness’. Laing elaborated that the ‘sane’/‘insane’ 
opposition enforces silence: ‘madness’ ‘must remain incomprehensible to us. As long as we 
are sane and he [the “madman”] is insane, it will remain so’.151 
Saussure was resolute that ‘a linguistic revolution is impossible’, that neither an 
individual nor society could consciously alter the process of signification.152 However, if 
society cannot amend the relationship between a signifier and a signified, could the 
                                                          
148 The OED lists the definition of ‘sane’ as ‘not mad […] sensible, rational’. See OED, ‘sane’ 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/170606?rskey=47nr9o&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> [accessed 24 
September 2015]. 
149 Laing, Divided, p. 36. Emphasis in original. 
150 This idea of ‘common consent’ significantly overlaps with Saussure’s concept of the langue: we, in our 
Anglophone culture, consent to the signifier ‘c-h-a-i-r’ referring to a piece of furniture. However, our French 
counterparts have consented to using the signifier ‘c-h-a-i-r’ to signify a slab of meat. 
151 Laing, Divided, p. 38. 
152 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 74. 
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‘association[s] and coordination[s]’ attached to signification be revised instead?153 If our 
perception of ‘sane’ is altered or distorted, our understanding of ‘madness’ is transformed 
alongside it. If our idea of ‘sanity’ becomes fluid (as opposed to an absolute, fixed concept, 
as the ‘norm’), then there is potential for the binary opposition of ‘sane’/‘insane’ to be seen as 
a spectrum rather than a dichotomy.154 This negation allows for the possibility of ‘madness’ 
to be coaxed out of social exile, back into the realm of shared discourse as an experience 
which is a variant of ‘sanity’, rather than as an experience which stands in opposition to it. In 
order for ‘madness’ to be something other than ‘other’, we need to challenge the structures 




                                                          
153 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 13. 
154 As I discuss in my conclusion, in gender research, spectra and fluidity have overwritten the orthodox 
dichotomy of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. This rejection of binaries is, gradually, influencing the way gender is 
represented and perceived in popular culture. A homologous model for thinking about ‘madness’ – which 




‘Plundered, Organised and Published’: Constructing the Self 





In psychiatric narratives, the relationship between the ‘patient’ and language is used to judge 
the extent of ‘illness’, and how viable ‘recovery’ might be.2 Throughout Kraepelin’s Lectures 
on Clinical Psychiatry, for example, the language of the ‘patient’ is deemed a clear indication 
of whether or not ‘cure’ is, indeed, possible.3  Kraepelin reflected on the case of one ‘patient’ 
who, despite ‘generally keep[ing] quite quiet’, conversed through a ‘shower of delusionary 
talk’, becoming increasingly ‘incoherent and irritated’.4 Despite the ‘patient’ only being 
incarcerated for three months at the time of writing, Kraepelin concluded: ‘I may say from 
experience that such cases usually present almost exactly the same features for dozens of 
years, and neither recover nor become more mentally dull’.5  
By contrast, Kraepelin described a case whereby a ‘patient’, experiencing 
hallucinations, ‘improved quickly’ after a brief period under the psychiatrist’s jurisdiction.6 
Kraepelin explained that this improvement was evident not only when the hallucinations 
ceased, but when the ‘patient’ ‘took a correct view of those he had previously seen’ – in other 
words, when the ‘patient’ had acceded to the psychiatrist’s discourse, and was thus able to 
                                                          
1 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 12. 
2 According to Hegel, ‘cure must be sought in the reexternalization (rebirth) of the self into relations with others 
through a path back to language’. See Berthold, ‘Talking Cures’, p. 306. Italics added for emphasis. 
3 The concept of ‘cure’ needs to be challenged, or at least complicated. After all, if an acceptance of psychiatric 
language indicates ‘cure’, what about the later examples I discuss whereby this vocabulary is merely 
ventriloquised? Kraepelin described ‘a complete cure’ as a state whereby ‘the symptoms which [were] so urgent 
and important […] disappear entirely’ (see Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 268). However, this is very problematic, 
particularly considering that, in the context of a psychiatric text, there may be a disconnect between that which a 
‘patient’ considers a ‘symptom’, and psychiatric interpretation. Similarly there may be a clash between personal 
and psychiatric understandings of being ‘symptom-free’. The idea of ‘cure’ is also further complicated by how 
many of the case study narratives are left unresolved, without information of how the ‘patient’s’ story ends: is 
this aporia resolved with an assumption of ‘cure’, or ‘relapse’?  
4 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 156. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 188. 
62 
 
‘recognise’ and communicate his previous experience of ‘reality’ as an hallucination.7 The 
‘patient’s’ ‘good insight into his malady’ had transformed him: Kraepelin observed that 
‘there is nothing at this moment to remind us of the illness he has been through’.8 By 
accepting hegemonic language and psychiatric ‘authority’, the ‘patient’ was restored to 
‘sanity’, unlike Kraepelin’s previous ‘patient’, whose recalcitrantly ‘delusionary’ language 
had denied him the same possibility of ‘cure’.  
A return to ‘sanity’ is exhibited by an acquisition of ‘self-awareness, self-control, 
autonomy and recuperation’, signified by a return to conventional language: finding ‘the 
words to say it’.9 If ‘madness’ is ‘a kind of non-knowledge’ defined as ‘a deviation from a 
process of the genesis of knowledge’, then ‘sanity’ can be characterised as a return to 
‘reason’.10 Once the ‘mad’ individual (re)acquires conventional language – the nom du père – 
they are accepting hegemonic narratives of how their experiences should be configured. The 
individual must surrender their personal narrative and formulate it using the terminology 
which identified it as a ‘madness’ narrative in the first place, allowing it to merge with and, 
ultimately, ratify the power of the governing discourse. In the case of ‘madness’, this 
dominant narrative is the language of psychiatry. An inability or refusal to internalise 
psychiatric discourse is to display what Bleuler termed ‘insufficient insight’: a state which 
condemns the ‘patient’ to a ‘revolving door’ relationship with the asylum, and a perpetual 
and encompassing state of ‘madness’ and ‘otherness’.11 
 Academic and writer James Phillips contended that, for prominent psychiatrists and 
psychoanalysts such as Freud and Lacan, ‘the state of reason is the state of language, and 
                                                          
7 Ibid. Italics added for emphasis. 
8 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 188. Here, the politics of performative obedience echo Laing: ‘I must play their game, 
of not seeing I see the game’. See R. D. Laing, Knots (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 1. 
9 Roy Porter, The Faber Book of Madness (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 519.  
10 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
11 Eugen Bleuler, Textbook of Psychiatry, trans. by A. A. Brill (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1924), p. 
353. Thus, paradoxically, the ‘patient’ exhibits ‘insight’ by accepting they lack ‘insight’. In chapter five, I 
discuss twenty-first-century usage of the term ‘insight’ in the mental health system, and how it perpetuates the 
assumption that ‘madness’ cannot recognise and manage itself. 
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madness is associated with failures of development in which the self is not formed through 
language and otherness’.12 If an experience of ‘madness’ is not constructed using designated 
psychiatric vocabulary – language which ‘others’ ‘madness’ – this denotes a ‘failure’ of 
communication, and a failure of the ‘patient’ to submit to psychiatric ‘authority’.13  Once the 
individual internalises this ‘otherness’, and echoes the language associated with it, they are 
able to submit to the ‘patient’/psychiatrist power dynamic.14 There is a necessary surrender 
here. As established in chapter one, this assumption of the ‘patient’ role denotes the 
individual as ‘unreliable’: their command over their own experiences is usurped, their voice 
is ‘plundered, organised, and published’ by psychiatric discourse.15 The individual voice – 
which embodied the potential to offer a counter-narrative, which questions and challenges the 
assumption that psychiatry is the ‘authority’ on ‘madness’ – is consumed by psychiatric 
narratives which reconstruct it. 
In chapter one, I used the example of Thelmar’s ‘madness’ narrative to demonstrate 
the impact the psychiatric presence has on the reading experience, particularly in how readers 
are encouraged to respond to a ‘mad’ narrator. However, far from being unique to this text, 
the narrative politics which prevented mainstream society from accessing and empathising 
with Thelmar’s experience are indicative of a much wider issue. Psychiatric narratives have 
muffled, and continue to muffle, and devalue, the individual experience of ‘madness’. This 
legacy of institutional silencing must have begun somewhere, so this chapter explores the 
                                                          
12 James Phillips, ‘Madness of the Philosophers, Madness of the Clinic’ Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 
4 (2009), 313-17 (p. 315).  
13 As I established in chapter one, an account of ‘madness’ constructed beyond psychiatric vocabulary is not 
recognised and thus validated by a social audience, therefore the narrative process remains incomplete, and 
communication fails. 
14 This surrender can be performative – an illusion of obedience – as I demonstrate shortly. However, to accept 
and echo psychiatric discourse, even superficially, is to gratify and strengthen the ‘authority’ of this hegemonic 
discourse. An acceptance of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist power dynamic perpetuates the myth that ‘madness’ 
requires psychiatric governance, which I explore further in chapter five. 
15 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 12. 
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genesis of the overlap between ‘madness’ narratives and psychiatric narratives, to understand 
the disenfranchisement at the centre of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic.16 
The primary focus of this chapter is to retrieve individual experiences from under 
layers of hegemonic discourse.17 When I use the term ‘case study narratives’, I am referring 
to any narratives salvaged from contact with psychiatry: such texts usually appear in the 
context of psychiatric publications, although not exclusively. My primary focus consists of 
case studies from the birth of psychiatry, as the majority of the terminology available for 
discussing and ‘othering’ ‘madness’ has its origins in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. As this vocabulary has had such a prevailing influence on how we 
(mis)communicate and (mis)understand ‘madness’ in our modern social context, I explore 
how this language is used by psychiatrists, what it signifies and, ultimately, the impact that it 
has had (and still has) on the articulation of lived experience.  
By reclaiming personal voices from the publications of renowned Western 
psychiatrists, such as Freud, Bleuler and Kraepelin, I dismantle and challenge this 
medicalised context. I also explore the conflict between personal experience and psychiatric 
expectation in nineteenth-century ‘madness’ memoirs, such as ‘A Sane Patient’s’ My 
Experience in a Lunatic Asylum and John T. Perceval’s Perceval’s Narrative: A Patient’s 
Account of his Psychosis.18 These texts are used to examine the relationship between the 
‘mad’ self and language in a psychiatric context, as revealed through use of conventional 
discourse, unorthodox narratives or through an absence of engagement (signified by silence). 
                                                          
16 The interplay between ‘madness’ as a personal experience and ‘madness’ as a pathologised phenomenon 
inevitably began with the birth of psychiatry, hence the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century focus of this 
chapter. 
17 ‘Authenticity’ is a term I explored in-depth in chapter one: in this instance, I am referring to a narrative of 
‘madness’ (lived experience) rather than a narrative about it (psychiatric discourse). 
18 In order to be consistent in addressing texts which fit in this medicalised context, my chief criterion for 
selecting memoirs is that the author of such texts has had contact with psychiatry, and thus has been rendered 
into, or has resisted, the role of ‘patient’. 
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This chapter begins by critiquing narrative framing: breaking down the paratexts of 
case study narratives in order to understand how they are used to create an implied, unreliable 
narrator. The language used to anticipate such case studies is examined alongside the voice of 
the ‘patient’: how are our expectations established? How are we encouraged to respond to 
these narratives? This presence of the psychiatric gaze manipulates how the reader receives 
individual narratives in this psychiatric context.19 My primary concern throughout this 
chapter is how this affects the narrative process: how does this framing distort what was 
initially a three-stage process? How does it impact on the individual trying to configure a 
sense of self through language? How does it alter the way in which the narrative is received – 
a process necessary for the ‘patient’ to salvage a sense of self from a traumatic, devastating 
ordeal of illness? I also scrutinise the dual role of the psychiatrist/editor and establish how the 
politics of language and discourse are inevitably linked to power dynamics. To have a 
mastery of language is to have the privilege of voice, and dominion over disenfranchised 
narratives: if one’s language has neither relevance nor purchase, one is reduced to a position 
of silence and of passivity, either reluctantly or voluntarily. 
Freud, in particular, has been criticised for taking liberties with the voices of his 
‘patients’, for ‘edit[ing] or construct[ing]’ narratives.20 He admitted only to offering 
‘fragmentary extracts’: voices edited and recontextualised, stories retold in an ‘imperfect and 
incomplete’ fashion.21 Similarly, a ‘patient’ being observed by Kraepelin complained about 
having his narrative ‘plundered, organised and published’, reframed in a medicalised context 
                                                          
19 My use of the term ‘psychiatric gaze’ is based on feminist Laura Mulvey’s definition of the ‘male gaze’. 
Mulvey describes a ‘split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its 
fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly’ (Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema’, in Visual and Other Pleasures: Language, Discourses, Society, ed. by Stephen Heath, Colin MacCabe 
and Denise Riley (London: Palgrave, 1989), pp. 14-27 (p. 19)). This passage could, with a few minor 
alternations, perfectly express the politics of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic. Consider the ‘split between 
active/psychiatrist and passive/“patient”. The determining psychiatric gaze projects its diagnosis onto the 
“patient” figure, which is styled accordingly’. 
20 Elaine Showalter, Hystories (London: Picador, 1998), p. 84. 
21 Sigmund Freud, Case Histories II, trans. by James Strachey, ed. by Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979), p. 36. 
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which entirely undermined his ability to speak authoritatively of his own experiences.22 The 
psychiatrist occupies a reinforced position of power: enforcer of the nom du père, editor and 
translator. How have these dynamics served to establish psychiatry as the ‘authority’ on 
‘madness’, and simultaneously to allow psychiatric forces to sabotage any potential 
meaningful engagement between ‘madness’ narratives and social audience? 
The case study narrative context is often complicated by the presence of a translator 
as the text moves from one language to another: the ‘mad’ voice becomes increasingly 
remote from the social audience it is trying to engage. Instead of following the traditional 
tripartite model of a narrative which I have already established (an articulation of the self; 
communicated via a narrative; delivered to a social audience), this process becomes 
disjointed. In its place, there is a convoluted procedure: an articulation of the self, 
communicated via a narrative, confined in and limited by the wider paratext of a psychiatric 
document, then translated from one language to another.23 You are then receiving these 
voices through my narrative, although I claim to have taken care not to ‘edit’ such case 
studies.24  The ‘mad’ voice is kept distanced from the reader, obstructed and oppressed by 
these narrative layers. Empathy is impossible; the psychiatric paratext has already omitted the 
possibility of any connection between ‘mad’ narrative and social audience.  
This chapter then explores the language used to construct ‘madness’ narratives, in 
order to investigate the relationship these narratives have with semantics, particularly the 
connection between the ‘mad’ self and psychiatric vocabulary, imposed during psychiatric 
intervention.25 The ‘patient’ is given language – albeit problematic language – by the 
                                                          
22 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 12. 
23 In chapter four, I discuss an equally convoluted narrative process which interferes with the relationship 
between ‘mad’ visual art and social audience. 
24 Occasionally, ellipses are a necessary evil, for the sake of concision. 
25 In this nineteenth-century context, ‘psychiatric intervention’, for the most part, consisted of admittance into an 
asylum, or, for those wealthy enough to confine their ‘mad’ relatives at home, into a pseudo-asylum space. For 
more on the reality of receiving psychiatric ‘treatment’ in the nineteenth century, see Sarah Wise, Inconvenient 
People: Lunacy, Liberty and the Mad-Doctors in Victorian England (London: Random House, 2013).  
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psychiatric presence to articulate their alleged ailment: will they adopt it? What happens 
when the individual accepts, or at least mirrors, this medical terminology? What impact does 
this have on the ‘mad’ individual’s ability to narrate their experiences and communicate their 
sense of self? By exploring narratives which are, at least partly, constructed using psychiatric 
discourse, I examine how these narratives are interpreted, both in the psychiatric framing, and 
how readers are encouraged to respond to these voices.  
As established in chapter one, if an individual wants their experience of ‘madness’ to 
be socially heeded (fundamental to the process of narration and, ostensibly, to ‘healing’) the 
only current option available is to formulate the experience using known terms: limited and 
limiting psychiatric discourse. This language does communicate ‘madness’ in a way which is 
socially familiar and thus the ‘mad’ voice is able to enter collective social discourse, albeit as 
the ‘other’.26 An acquisition, and imitation, of the terminology which was used to categorise, 
label and incarcerate, signifies the ‘patient’ taking a ‘path back to language’, a process 
apparently necessary for ‘cure’.27  
By contrast, I examine narratives which transcend or reject psychiatric terminology. 
Experiences of ‘madness’ which are articulated using unconventional language will be 
explored as an alternative to constructing the self using damaging psychiatric vocabulary. By 
observing these narratives in their psychiatric context, I establish how the ever-present voice 
of the alienist serves to influence our reading and undermine the voice of our narrator, 
declaring such narratives ‘peculiar, distorted turns of speech – senseless playing with 
syllables and words’.28 As discussed in chapter one, an authentic expression of ‘madness’ 
                                                          
26 This is similar to the liminal social role occupied by the Outsider Artist who is simultaneously ‘other’ but also 
an ‘artist’ (and thus granted a narrative platform and a ‘movement’). I discuss this in detail in chapter four. 
27 Berthold, ‘Talking Cures’ p. 306.  
28 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 24. ‘Alienist’ was a nineteenth-century term used to describe a psychiatrist, rooted in 
the assumption that ‘madness’ was an ‘alien’ state: the suffix ‘ist’ denotes ‘a votary of, or expert in’ therefore 
the psychiatrist is considered to be the ‘authority’ on managing the ‘alien’ ‘mad’ (see OED, ‘ist’ 




requires a rejection, or transcendence, of hegemonic narratives, to avoid personal experience 
being censored by the ‘otherness’ latent in psychiatric discourse. However, this is done at the 
expense of social validation, as such narratives represent ‘madness’ in unfamiliar terms. What 
can be salvaged from a narrative which truly articulates what it means to experience 
‘madness’, expressed without the language of ‘otherness’, and yet which cannot be socially 
received because the psychiatrist, always over the shoulder of the reader, has already 
disregarded and dismissed such a text?  
Bleuler conceded that unconventional language has a place in ‘madness’ narratives, 
explaining that, as ‘patients’ experience ‘things which are unknown to normal persons […] 
the patient must create new concepts’.29 However, when the ‘patient’ transcends orthodox 
language, their voice is diminished and devalued, described as ‘nonsense’, ‘gibberish’ and 
made up of ‘empty speech acts’.30 Despite Bleuler acknowledging the need for ‘new 
concepts’ and neologisms, any attempts made by the individual to configure the self in terms 
other than the language of psychiatry are disregarded as ‘silly plays on words’.31 How does 
this relationship with language influence the delivery of these narratives to their intended 
reader? If a personal account of ‘madness’ is perceived as something silly, as ‘wholly 
incomprehensible gibberish’32, as what Lacan termed ‘non-knowledge’, then ‘attending or 
listening to the voice of the mad is pointless since […] their views are worthless’.33  
My first chapter established an enduring ‘language problem’ when it comes to 
communicating ‘madness’, and most of this second chapter will be dedicated to this struggle 
to understand and articulate the self through language in its various forms. However, I also 
explore instances of silence, a complete refusal to engage with language that has the potential 
                                                          
29 Bleuler, Textbook, p. 70. 
30 Lovell, ‘City is My Mother’, p. 356. 
31 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 68. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Allan Ingram and Michelle Faubert, Cultural Constructions of Madness in Eighteenth-Century Writing 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 25. 
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to fracture the ‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship. If one refuses to articulate an experience of 
‘madness’, one is, to an extent, beyond the realms of scrutiny: the silent individual does not 
enter the realm of self-exposure necessary for the role of ‘patient’. Silence can be interpreted 
as passivity, an absence of protest, and a reluctance to enter communal discourse but it is also 
a mute form of power. By not using language, one is unable to configure a sense of self, as 
‘to be a human self is to be a linguistic self’: to be a narrated self is to be a social self.34 
However, the silent individual is also denying the psychiatrist command over their (the 
‘patient’s’) identity: without self-exposure, there is no narrative for the psychiatrist to 
construct or edit, no use of unorthodox language to condemn, no exchange through which the 
process of diagnosis can take place. Labels may be applied, but the ‘patient’ neither confirms 
nor refuses taxonomy. 
The psychiatrist’s ‘authority’ is based on a mastery of language, but silence removes 
the psychiatrist/‘patient’ dynamic from the realm of the written and the verbal. However, this 
is at the expense of an individual narrative and, ultimately, selfhood. I examine instances of 
silence in order to establish how mute narratives are received, with a particular focus on the 
relationship between narrative and readership. How does psychiatric framing encourage us to 
respond to such ‘non-narratives’? Is silence the only available option for liberating the 
inherent ineffability of an experience of ‘madness’ from the language of psychiatry which 
seeks to reduce it? 
 
‘I Cannot Give a Complete History’: Deconstructing Narrative Framing35 
The politics of narrative framing are pervasive, and are apparent in many forms. The initial, 
and perhaps most fundamental, conflict which obstructs the relationship between narrator and 
potential social audience is that ‘madness’ narratives are a battleground for the struggle of 
                                                          
34 Berthold, ‘Talking Cures’, p. 306. 
35 Freud, Case Studies II, p. 36. 
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experience versus expectation, as established in chapter one. The expectations we bring to a 
narrative, as shaped by hegemonic discourse, function as paratexts. This framing has an 
inevitable influence on how a narrative is interpreted: it ‘play[s a] critically important role’.36  
In the context of the case study, these narrative layers become even more influential, 
and take on literal forms: prior to receiving a ‘madness’ narrative, we have a psychiatric 
presence which informs us of the ‘patient’s’ diagnosis, and apparent anomalies. This 
reinforces our assumptions: we understand we are about to encounter the voice of a ‘mad’ 
‘patient’ and we are guided by the dual ‘authority’ of the psychiatrist/editor. Lord 
Shaftesbury, appointed Chair of the Lunacy Commission in 1827, acknowledged the impact 
of such expectations: 
What an awful condition that of a lunatic! His words are generally disbelieved, and 
his most innocent peculiarities perverted […] We know him to be insane; at least, we 
are told that he is so; and we place ourselves on guard – that is, we give to every 
word, look, gesture a value and a meaning which oftentimes it cannot bear, and which 
it would never bear in ordinary life.37 
 
We are told that the ‘patient’ is ‘insane’ by the assumed power of the psychiatrist. Because of 
this, ‘every word’ becomes significant – it becomes a symptom – but the self cannot bear the 
burden of such scrutiny, as ‘the unbearable identity of the narrator […] can no longer be 
narrated’.38 Under the psychiatrist’s dissecting gaze, the ‘mad’ individual no longer has the 
right to a stream of consciousness, a flight of ideas, or indeed any sort of ‘incoherent 
thought’, despite these being fundamental to any interior monologue. These thoughts or 
ideas, framed by a psychiatric context, become ‘riddles unanswered […] totally obscure and 
unilluminated’; symptoms of a mind in a state of disorder.39 In what Shaftesbury termed 
‘ordinary life’, these internal processes would collapse under such constant interrogation, 
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71 
 
however, the ‘mad’ subject is perpetually exposed to the ‘awful condition’ of continuous 
scrutiny. 
 Paratexts can also expose the complicated politics involved in narrative framing. The 
purpose of psychiatric publications – to identify and prove symptoms of ‘madness’ – 
overwhelms the ‘patient’s’ ‘struggle between annihilation and survival to reclaim a sense of 
self’.40 The function of the individual ‘madness’ narrative becomes irrelevant, consumed by 
the motive of the wider psychiatric text. 
Freud, for example, notoriously exercised editorial agency on the narratives of his 
‘patients’, only using ‘fragmentary extracts’, and transcribing their stories in a manner which 
he described as ‘not absolutely – phonographically – correct’.41 Academic and writer Elaine 
Showalter has criticised Freud for taking such liberties with the narratives of ‘patients’, 
describing how he ‘fill[ed] gaps in the hysteric’s interpretations, but also […] overc[a]me her 
resistance to his narrative interpretations. For this therapy to work, the hysteric had to accept 
and believe the analyst’s story’.42 This echoes my earlier assertion that ‘sanity’ can only be 
obtained once hegemonic discourse has been acknowledged and internalised. These politics 
serve to detach the humanity of the ‘mad’ individual from what should be a personal illness 
narrative, and confuse what should be an intimate reading process. The reader receiving the 
text is unable to access the ‘madness’ narrative directly: instead, it is distorted through 
narrative politics and paratexts. The ‘mad’, unreliable narrator is implied – and disregarded – 
before their narrative is even encountered. 
Genette argued that narrative framing occupies a ‘privileged place of a pragmatics and 
a strategy, of an influence on the public’.43 Paratexts represent a conscious process of 
recontextualisation which may be conducted only by those privileged both with a voice, and 
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with an ability to silence others. Thus, when ‘madness’ narratives are framed with 
‘authoritative’, ‘reliable’ accounts of the individual’s unreliability, the reader assumes the 
stance of the psychiatrist: objectively scrutinising and  seeking anomalies, disengaged from 
the human context of such narratives. Kraepelin introduced one case study with the almost 
dismissive declaration that ‘they [the “mad” individual] cannot grasp a thought, cannot 
understand anything: their mind is scattered; their thoughts have flowed away; their brain is 
no longer competent’.44 In making this statement, Kraepelin exploited his position of 
narrative privilege. His analysis, serving as a paratext to the ‘madness’ narrative, imposes a 
set of expectations onto the reader. The reader then anticipates a ‘scattered’ narrative, the 
product of an ‘enfeebled’ brain, and even if this clashes with their interpretation, they are 
often led to invalidate their personal response in favour of Kraepelin’s judgement. After all, 
he still occupies a position of narrative hegemony and represents reason and reliability: the 
binary opposite of the implied, ‘mad’ narrator.  
Another example of this pervasive expectation can be found in the narrative of ‘A 
Sane Patient’ (1879). The identity of the narrator immediately presents a paradox: our 
narrator accepted the submissive role of ‘patient’ and yet simultaneously asserted a state of 
‘sanity’. The pseudonym reveals a liminal identity, caught between an acceptance of 
psychiatric discourse (that which declared him a ‘patient’) and insubordination. Having 
proclaimed a state of ‘sanity’, the narrator has attempted to configure an identity beyond that 
of psychiatric subject. However, the title – My Experiences in a Lunatic Asylum – undermines 
this attempt. The phantom of expectation prevails. The reader understands that this ‘sane 
patient’ has been incarcerated: whether or not the document is validated now rests on whether 
the reader accepts the ‘patient’s’ assertions of ‘sanity’, or the judgement of the psychiatrist 
                                                          
44 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 20. 
73 
 
who detained him.45 Inevitably, psychiatric ‘authority’ reigns supreme. Without any direct 
interference from the psychiatrist/editor, the expectations harboured by society, informed by 
the psychiatric perception of what ‘madness’ is, act as the paratext here, controlling ‘one’s 
whole reading of the text’.46 
This struggle between experience and expectation is evident throughout My 
Experiences in a Lunatic Asylum. For example, the narrator recounted the words of an 
alienist: ‘you are mad; therefore your words and thoughts are inconsecutive’.47 The sense of 
expectation I have already outlined does not only impact on the relationship between reader 
and narrative: it has ramifications for the individual, too. If the notion that one’s thoughts are 
inconsecutive and incoherent is perpetually echoed by a psychiatrist, and that same voice 
restricts one’s identity to that of ‘mad’ ‘patient’, the epitome of unreason, how can it not 
affect how the individual views and articulates the self? Again, the position of the psychiatrist 
is paramount here: the expectations of what ‘madness’ will be struggle against an experience 
of ‘madness’. If a ‘patient’, on admission to an asylum, is informed by the ‘experts’ that, as a 
result of their state of mind, their thoughts will be ‘inconsecutive’ and disordered, could this 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy? Would we not all find evidence of ‘inconsecutive’ 
thoughts in our internal monologue, regardless of our psychiatric history? 
Porter argued that ‘institutional psychiatry physically isolated the mentally sick from 
society, and put obstacles in the way of communication’.48 If an experience of ‘madness’ 
cannot reach an audience, then this further affirms the position of the psychiatrist as 
‘authority’ as no counter-narrative exists to challenge this hegemony. An example of such 
‘obstacles’ can be found in Bleuler’s Textbook of Psychiatry, in which he repeatedly 
recontextualised the voice of his ‘patients’ from an attempt at communication, to proof of 
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‘otherness’. By introducing ‘patient’ narratives as ‘gibberish’, as non-communication, Bleuler 
clearly dismisses their value. Bleuler shared a fragment of a ‘patient’s’ narrative, which he 
prefaced with the claim that the passage displays ‘a weakness in the patient’s reflection and 
judgement’.49 The narrative is described as ‘inadequate [and] lack[ing] in orderly 
arrangement’.50 The ‘patient’ is portrayed as having an unstable relationship with both 
language and reason, while the psychiatrist represents a mastery of (and, indeed, a judge of) 
language and the epitome of objectivity and rationality. A lack of ‘orderly arrangement’ 
suggests a narrative in chaos: an arbitrary stream of consciousness rather than a form of 
communication. By denoting the voice of the ‘patient’ as non-communication, Bleuler’s 
narrative (which ‘effectively’ communicates information) stands in stark contrast to the 
individual experience of ‘madness’.51 This narrative framing establishes a conflict between 
successful (the psychiatrist’s) and failed communication (the ‘patient’s’) before the reader 
has even encountered the case study. The reader expects ‘narrative coherence’ for successful 
communication, and it is no coincidence that the ‘mad’ ‘patient’s’ discourse is presented as 
having none of the consistency and rationality which characterises hegemonic narratives.52 
Now anticipating that the narrative they are about to encounter exists in opposition to 
the one which introduced it, the reader finally receives the voice of the ‘patient’: 
The stimulus word ‘key’ elicited the following: ‘Oh you can have all the keys you 
want, they broke into the store and found peas, what’s the use of keys, policemen, 
watchman, dogs, dog shows, the spaniel was the best dog this year, he is Spanish you 
know […] he drowned them all in the bay, gay, New York bay, Broadway, the White 
Way’.53 
 
Bleuler’s voice is still present here, reminding us of the psychiatric context of this narrative, 
informing us that the narrative was generated from a stimulus word, ‘key’. Again, expectation 
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triumphs over experience. Use of a stimulus word suggests that the psychiatrist was 
encouraging a form of word association; such prompts ‘were carefully selected in order to 
control for associative response frequencies’.54 This context warrants different expectations: 
while the reader would expect some connections to which they could relate, the narrative 
would appear much like a stream of consciousness. However, this context has not been 
established in any detail: any reader unfamiliar with the function of a ‘stimulus word’ 
assumes that the narrative is just an unprompted outburst from the ‘patient’. Bleuler allowed 
his reader to assume that this narrative is representative of all speech and communication 
from the ‘patient’, and thus from anyone who experiences ‘madness’. Dear reader, be 
appreciative that Bleuler, the epitome of reason, master of the nom du père, the absolute 
‘authority’ on ‘madness’, is able to translate and edit the rambling, ‘mad’ voice for us, and 
thus maintain a ‘safe’ distance between society and the incoherent, unpredictable ‘other’. 
 Bleuler’s framing did not explain the context which would salvage a seemingly 
arbitrary narrative from being classified indefinitely as non-communication. Perhaps this was 
simply an assumption on Bleuler’s part that we – or his intended audience – would 
comprehend more than is made explicit. However, an awareness of context does undermine 
the validity of Bleuler’s observations. The stream of consciousness which the psychiatrist 
prompted admittedly does not carry a sense of chronology or order, but such is the nature of a 
stream of consciousness.55 It is ‘experienced subjectively as a continuous flow […] an 
uncontrolled train of thought or association’.56 Bleuler’s suggestion that this narrative 
signified a ‘flight of ideas’ typical of a disordered mind, contradicts the ‘stimulus word’ 
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context: the word ‘key’ was ‘carefully selected’, intended purely to prompt a surge of ideas.57 
Bleuler seeks ‘orderly arrangement’ and has invalidated the narrative of the ‘patient’ when 
none is evident, and yet the nature of the context makes methodical composition nearly 
impossible, even irrelevant. ‘Orderly arrangement’ becomes the unachievable signifier of 
‘sanity’ in a context which demands that the ‘patient’ articulates their ideas in a chaotic 
fashion. 
Kraepelin’s narrative framing also serves to sabotage any potential relationship 
between the ‘mad’ self and reader. By introducing the voice of his ‘patients’ as a ‘mere series 
of letters, syllables or sounds’, Kraepelin has reduced such narratives to the material value of 
the language which shapes it: just letters, just sounds.58 The ‘madness’ narrative is belittled as 
an ‘empty speech act’.59 Psychoanalyst and literary critic Julia Kristeva described the 
narrative of an outsider as ‘a weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing 
insignificant’.60 Psychiatry dismisses ‘madness’ narratives as ‘meaningless’, in a prelude to 
dissecting them in great detail, attributing vast significance to language use which is stifled 
under the weight of such scrutiny: every narrative detail is exposed as proof of ‘otherness’. 
That which is perceived as meaningless speaks of a ‘struggle between annihilation and 
survival to reclaim a sense of self’: a poignant human fight for identity after a disorientating 
experience of illness.61 This instead becomes non-communication, and there is, indeed, 
‘nothing insignificant’ about this process of recontextualisation. The individual, personal 
narrative – which could potentially offer a counter-narrative – is consumed and controlled by 
a totalitarian narrative which reconstructs and devalues it. 
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Delimiting the Limitless: Articulating the Self Through Taxonomy  
The ‘failure of translation’ established in chapter one can, in theory, be resolved – or at least 
assuaged – when the ‘patient’ narrates their experience of ‘madness’ using not their idiolect, 
but approved psychiatric terminology.62 An example can be found in Dementia Praecox and 
Paraphrenia, where Kraepelin observed that, for the most part, ‘patients’ exhibit ‘no real 
understanding of the gravity of the disorder’.63 However, Kraepelin also remarked that 
‘certain insight into their diseased state’ occasionally revealed itself: significantly, this 
‘insight’ is manifest in the ‘patient’ accepting the ‘authority’ of the psychiatrist.64 Kraepelin 
gave the example of a ‘patient’ who, replied ‘to the question whether he was mentally 
affected […] “Yes, of course! If one is sensible, one does not do such things!”’.65 Throughout 
Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, Kraepelin explicitly introduced the narrative of the 
‘patient’ as an example of a symptom, often with a blatant reminder to the reader of the 
‘otherness’ exhibited.66 However, with the insightful ‘madness’ narrative above, Kraepelin 
offered little commentary and no overt judgement. In narrative terms, this allows the 
individual experiencing ‘madness’ to reach a social audience, on the condition that such an 
account ratifies hegemonic discourse.  
 Kraepelin recounted the narrative of a ‘quite sensible and reasonable’ ‘patient’.67 The 
‘patient’ reported how, as their ailment developed, ‘I did not trust myself any longer’, at 
which point a psychiatric intervention took place: the ‘patient’ had submitted the self to 
psychiatric ‘authority’.68 The psychiatrist interpreted this acceptance of hegemonic discourse 
                                                          
62 Freud, Complete Letters, p. 208. 
63 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 151. Emphasis in original. A position of real and comprehensive insight is, 
presumably, reserved solely for the psychiatrist 
64 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 150. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The terms favoured by Kraepelin in Dementia Praecox to introduce and condemn ‘madness’ narratives which 
refuse to conform to or reject psychiatric ‘authority’ include ‘incoherent’ and ‘incoherence’ (which, collectively, 
feature over fifty times); ‘silly’ (used over thirty times); to ‘meaningless’ (employed seven times); to 
‘bewildering’ (which also featured seven times). 




as insight, and he commended the ‘patient’ on how he ‘observed himself most accurately’ 
and ‘recognised quite clearly the morbidity of the disorders’.69 A narrative which affirms the 
expectations established by psychiatric discourse (in this case, the assumption that ‘madness’ 
cannot manage or ‘trust’ itself and therefore requires psychiatric intervention) is familiar and 
thus socially accepted, particularly when such narratives are delivered merged with 
hegemonic voices. Is the case study context a space in which the self can be configured, 
communicated, and, ultimately, ‘cured’? Or does the limited nature of this context – 
particularly the restricted terminology available – damage or misrepresent ‘madness’, further 
disenfranchising those attempting to articulate their experiences beyond the language of 
‘otherness’?  
 In the absence of any absolute sense of self, the psychiatric language imposed on the 
‘patient’ can become an inherent part of the individual’s identity. As Kraepelin stated, the 
individual experiencing ‘madness’ is ‘not a human being any longer’, they are the 
schizophrenic, the manic depressive, the neurotic. 70 ‘Patienthood’ is not transient.  Although 
mirroring psychiatric language potentially bridges the abyss between ‘madness’ narrative and 
mainstream society, it also limits the self to a permanently disenfranchised position.  
A poignant example of this conflict features in Kraepelin’s Dementia Praecox and 
Paraphrenia. A ‘patient’s’ voice emerged: 
My thoughts are directed in the right way […] The arrival [to the asylum] has done 
me good: but I am somewhat weak in my nerves. I shall take pains to direct my 
thoughts […] I am no longer so melancholy, have lost my knowledge terribly.71 
 
There is an evident echo of psychiatric terminology: the ‘patient’ has reflected the language 
of Kraepelin’s diagnosis, configuring the self through phrases such as ‘weak in my nerves’ 
and ‘melancholy’. The language and ideology of psychiatry has been accepted and 
internalised. The ‘patient’ believed that incarceration had instigated improvement and will 
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ultimately lead to recovery: Hegel’s claim that ‘cure’ must be sought through an adoption of 
conventional language seems appropriate here. By embracing the psychiatric model and 
terminology, the ‘patient’ has configured the self by using ‘otherness’.  Twice, the ‘patient’ 
described feeling as though their thoughts were being ‘directed’, and that doing so was a 
conscious, deliberate and uncomfortable process. The ‘patient’ has left dimensions of the 
‘madness’ experience unspoken in favour of adopting psychiatric discourse, thus affirming 
expectations of what ‘madness’ is at the expense of an authentic articulation. Finally, the 
‘patient’ declared that they have ‘lost […] knowledge terribly.’ Lacan characterised 
‘madness’ as ‘a kind of non-knowledge’: it represents an anomaly in the grand narratives of 
reason and conventional language.72 However, this loss of knowledge can instead be 
reclaimed as a struggle to reconfigure the self: the ‘patient’ has experienced a rupture 
between prior assumptions of self and the new identity imposed by psychiatric intervention. 
This loss is ‘terrible’, devastating: struggling to piece together the self from fragments of 
psychiatric language, the ‘patient’ experiences ‘ungrounded identity’.73 
 Often, the ‘patient’ has adopted physical language to articulate an experience of 
‘madness’. This, again, reflects an attempt to echo medical terminology, but also has further 
consequences in terms of reclaiming the self through an ordeal of illness. Another case study 
from Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia demonstrates this: 
Sometimes I am outwardly so animated, so emotional, sometimes again inwardly. My 
blood is always so unfaithful, my animation is, however, different, sometimes inward 
life, sometimes outward life: I feel that so. I am just weak in my nerves, weak and 
weakened in my whole body […] I will yet live.74 
 
The ‘patient’ has mirrored Kraepelin’s diagnosis of a weakness of nerves, and thus has 
internalised a discourse which denotes abnormality in a similar fashion to the previous case 
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study.75 To be weak could denote passivity, suggesting that the ‘patient’ has submitted to 
psychiatric forces. This narrative is articulated in much more physical terms: there is a sense 
of fatigue which extends to their ‘whole body’, attributed to ‘unfaithful’ blood. While this 
demonstrates an acceptance of the role of medicalised subject, the self is not exclusively 
articulated using psychiatric terminology. In fact, the narrative can be read as a statement of 
defiance: the emotional states of the narrator fluctuate – they are transient – and the final 
assertion that the ‘patient’ ‘will yet live’ suggests a tenacious sense of self.  
However, describing an experience of ‘madness’ in terms of ‘life’ and ‘blood’ – 
fundamental components in Western perceptions of humanity – does suggest something 
which has overridden the narrator’s experience of mutable emotional states. These terms 
imply hereditary, and thus inevitable, ‘madness’, rooted in the corporeal self. The narrator 
‘will yet live’, but there is a sense of acceptance that ‘madness’ is a perpetual state of 
emotional and physical ‘otherness’ which results in ‘either stigma or social death’.76 
 The acceptance of psychiatric discourse permeates both the perceived identity and the 
perceived narrative worth of lived accounts of ‘madness’. In the context of case studies, the 
impact of hegemonic discourse on the sense of narrative value, particularly in instances 
where the ‘mad’ self is constructed as an unreliable narrator, can be overwhelming and 
uncomfortable. A poignant example can be found in Kraepelin’s Dementia Praecox and 
Paraphrenia, as a ‘patient’ reflected that ‘when one reads all this [their ‘madness’ narrative] 
it seems to be the greatest nonsense, that was ever written down […] Probably only an expert 
will be able to give further information about it’.77 The ‘patient’ has surrendered any sense of 
dominion over their personal experience: they do not consider themselves an ‘expert’ on their 
selfhood and their experiences. Psychiatry intervened to construct the self through a 
diagnosis, and this ‘expertise’ overwhelms any existing presumptions of identity. This 
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individual has submitted to psychiatric ‘authority’ to the extent that it has influenced the way 
they perceive both their own narrative, and the ‘value’ of such a document.  
However, the ‘authority’ of psychiatric discourse can sometimes be challenged – 
albeit subtly – by the voice of a ‘patient’ who is adamant that they are an expert by 
experience. There are instances where the ‘patient’ adopted hegemonic discourse as a form of 
ventriloquism, but the narrative still functioned as an attempt to protect the self from the 
psychiatric gaze. Kraepelin’s Clinical Psychiatry includes the following case study, with the 
questions of the psychiatrist shown in square brackets: 
[Why are you here?] Because I am the empress […] megalomania, empress 
[Do you feel well?] Oh, thanks very well, since the government has given me 
permission we will be good friends […] Ah, let me write something 
[Why are you here?] Insane. Megalomania. 
[What is that?] Nothing, nothing, at all.78 
 
Defined as ‘delusions of power or self-importance […] lust for power [and] a desire to 
control’, the diagnosis of ‘megalomania’ demonstrates that Kraepelin assigned a label, 
language and a social role to the ‘patient’ in question.79 This narrative exhibits a power play 
true to form from a ‘patient’ who allegedly ‘desires control’ to the extent of it being 
considered a form of ‘madness’.  
 The psychiatrist offered prompts designed to encourage a surrender to the ‘patient’ 
role: by asking ‘why are you here?’ twice, the alienist clearly tried to elicit a form of 
acceptance from the ‘patient’. However, the ‘patient’s’ initial response was defiant, 
signifying a position of supremacy – an empress – rather than an acceptance of the role of 
disenfranchised subject. The ‘patient’ then reflected the language of the psychiatrist, offering 
her diagnosis as her reason for incarceration. On the surface, this was a surrender to the 
psychiatric narrative, an internalisation of ‘I am here because I am insane, as exhibited by this 
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psychiatric label’. However, when the answer is concluded with a return to a perceived 
position of power – ‘empress’ – it renders the relationship between the ‘patient’ and 
psychiatric discourse merely superficial, a form of ventriloquism. The notion of identity 
which endures is that of power, not of submission. 
 This is further emphasised at the end of the exchange. The psychiatrist repeated the 
prompt ‘why are you here?’, creating another opportunity for the ‘patient’ to submit. By 
answering ‘insane’ and ‘megalomania’ in short, staccato bursts, the ‘patient’ has again 
imitated and even debased the language of the psychiatrist. There is no elaboration: the 
answer is merely an echo of taxonomy. The ‘patient’ was asked what that means: an attempt 
by Kraepelin to try and gauge insight, as if the psychiatrist is attempting to ascertain to what 
extent the role has been accepted alongside the taxonomy.  
However, this exchange demonstrates that this assent can actually be superficial. 
Deprived of, or beyond, ‘conventional linguistic abstractions’, the ‘mad’ individual develops 
‘a certain awareness of their arbitrariness and possible absurdity’.80 Language can, to an 
extent, be parroted and performed, its superficiality and contingency exposed. While the 
apparently ‘delusional’ language of this exchange served to disrupt the narrative process and 
inevitably resulted in the narrative being ‘closed to interpretation’ in a wider social context, 
the ‘patient’s’ sense of self has resisted psychiatric forces.81 Enduring despite ‘the 
disfigurements of [psychiatric] language’, the ‘patient’ parodied the language but did not 
accept it. Taxonomy did rupture the sense of self. These classifications have ‘no purchase on 
their object’.82 In terms of the ‘patient’s’ identity, taxonomy means ‘nothing, nothing, at all’. 
 The ‘patient’ recognised, and actively sought, the cathartic effect of formulating a 
narrative, commanding Kraepelin to ‘let [her] write something’. Reminiscent of Perkins 
Gilman’s unnamed narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper, who declared that she ‘must say what I 
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feel and think in some way – it is such a relief’: this desire to write and speak accentuates the 
vital importance of constructing a narrative.83 Even Freud acknowledged that ‘telling things 
is a relief […] If the excitation is denied this outlet it is sometimes converted into a […] 
hysterical phenomena of retention’.84 However, this contradicts the entrenched pattern of 
silencing which dominates the case study context. The role of the narrative is recognised as a 
vital process by both the ‘patient’ and – to an extent – the psychiatrist, at least in the context 
of Freud’s ‘talking cure’. Yet why does the governing psychiatric discourse go to such 
lengths to censor and silence the voice of the ‘patient’, and how does this shape the 
relationship between the ‘mad’ self and the language of ‘madness’? 
 
‘The Consecrated Discourse’: ‘Madness’ beyond Hegemony85 
Hegel and Lacan both argued that ‘the madman is incapable of experiencing a meaningful 
world or of having a coherent sense of existing as a subject of language or experience’: the 
‘madman’ is experiencing something ‘other’ (as in, beyond the realms of conventional 
language) and so he becomes ‘other’.86 Is language malleable enough to accommodate an 
‘othered’ experience, or does any attempt to express ‘an interiority that can never be 
externalized […] to de-limit the limitless’ immediately distort, devalue or miscommunicate 
lived experience of ‘madness’?87 
Kraepelin observed that ‘patients show a tendency […] to play with words, to twist 
them’, describing this process as ‘senseless’.88 However, there is also potential to view this as 
‘taking poetic licence’, an attempt to reconfigure and shape the wider narrative of language in 
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order to find a space for the self in the realm of semantics.89 In the context of the case study 
narrative, this alternative use of language is perceived as a symptom – as ‘delusional’ 
language – rather than a creative endeavour or a struggle to articulate the self. Kraepelin 
illustrated his argument with two examples, both of which transcend conventional psychiatric 
notions of what ‘madness’ is.  
One ‘patient’ described their experience as ‘being punished a little, by my 
imagination’, while another reflected that ‘I’ve got something in my head’.90 The idea of 
‘madness’ as a form of moral punishment is a common theme throughout case study 
narratives, and incorporates ideas of sin, absolution and shame which add another, 
metaphoric, dynamic to the relationship between psychiatrist and ‘patient’. Some ‘patients’ 
use the language of judgement and punishment as a means of understanding their ordeal, 
frequently, and significantly, seeking forgiveness from the force of ‘authority’: the 
psychiatrist.91 Aside from the uncomfortable politics of the alienist occupying a pseudo-deity 
role, the relationship between ‘madness’ and imagination recontextualises the experience 
from the language of ‘otherness’ to one of ingenuity. Someone who is creative to the point of 
‘madness’ (or, indeed, ‘mad’ to the point of creativity) is certainly socially perceived as less 
culpable than someone experiencing a form of ‘madness’ induced by ‘imaginary female 
trouble’, ‘laziness’, ‘masturbation’ or ‘bad whisky’.92 The link between mental illness and 
creativity is socially familiar, to the extent of it having become a cliché. Rather than being a 
‘mere series of letters, syllables or sounds’, unconventional language use can instead be seen 
as an innovative endeavour for semantic self-sufficiency.93  
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To return to the second quotation from Kraepelin’s Dementia Praecox and 
Paraphrenia, the ‘patient’ articulated an experience of ‘madness’ using physical terms (‘I’ve 
got something in my head’). The individual anchored their ailment in the tangible reality of 
the body – the ‘head’ – rather than the abstract realm of the mind: this does not necessarily 
denote an acceptance of psychiatric ‘authority’. Kleinman explained that it is ‘a testament to 
the subtlety of culture that we share such a wide array of understandings of surface meanings 
of symptom terms’.94 Because of this desire for ‘surface meanings’, a complaint such as a 
headache is articulated as an ache of the head – something tangible and literal – rather than 
an abstract ailment of the mind, the unseen and uncontrollable. 
The ‘patient’ who had ‘something in [their] head’ amalgamated the mind with the 
brain. ‘Madness’, no longer an abstract concept, is articulated through physical terms: a thing 
rather than a thought. This stands in opposition to taxonomy, which is formulated with 
prefixes and suffixes which denote deviations of the mind, such as ‘phrenic’ (‘of or relating 
to the mind’)95 and ‘dement’ (‘out of one’s mind’).96 However, ‘madness’ is also portrayed as 
something internal: it is unseen, in the head, rather than something phrenological, apparent on 
the exterior of the body. It is a phenomenon beyond the gaze of the psychiatrist. ‘Madness’ 
explained using quantifiable terms (rather than the ‘vegetal myth[s]’ implied by taxonomy) is 
easier to comprehend, manage and overcome than something which is linked to abstract 
notions of cultural normativity.97 These quotations – although small – demonstrate that 
transcending the psychiatric construct of ‘madness’ can alter how the self understands and 
articulates their experience of ‘madness’. Instead of permanently assuming the role of 
‘othered’ ‘patient’, the individual is able to recontextualise their experience of ‘madness’ 
                                                          
94 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p. 15. 
95 OED, ‘phrenic’. 
96 OED, ‘dement’. 
97 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 194. 
86 
 
from the realm of the abstract and the irrevocable to something tangible and transient, even 
something which is potentially empowering. 
Instead of perceiving ‘madness’ as an ailment, it can instead be transformed into an 
affirming, creative and even spiritual experience. John T. Perceval, a ‘patient’ incarcerated in 
both Brislington House and Ticehurst Asylum between 1830-32, described his experience of 
‘madness’ in a manner much at odds with the psychiatric definition: 
Nature appeared at times renewed, and in a beautiful medium […] I heard the voices 
of invisible agents, and notes so divine, so pure, so holy, that they alone perhaps 
might recompense me for my sufferings. My sense of feeling was not the same.98 
 
Potentially, this ‘madness’ narrative has found a liminal space between the language of 
‘reason, which masters and represses madness’, and ‘science, which transforms it into an 
object’.99 Here, the ‘madness’ experience is divorced from the terminology of judgement and 
stigma enforced by psychiatry. Although ‘otherness’ is still apparent, it is almost embraced: 
Perceval articulated an alternative experience of ‘reality’ with reverential attention to detail; 
something to be celebrated, rather than a narrative couched in the language of abnormality 
and shame.  
Perceval’s narrative challenged the psychiatric hypothesis that ‘madness’ equates to 
‘non-knowledge’.100 ‘Madness’ is instead portrayed as a form of heightened awareness which 
suggests it is actually ‘sanity’ which represents ‘non-knowledge’. Perceval reported being 
able to hear the ‘voices of invisible agents […] divine [and] pure’, suggesting a ‘mystical 
truth’ which lies beyond the boundaries of both psychiatric discourse and ‘sanity’.101 This 
idea is also evident in literary ‘madness’ narratives. Poe explored a similar idea in ‘The Tell-
Tale Heart’: ‘The disease had sharpened my senses - not destroyed - not dulled them. Above 
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all was the sense of hearing acute. I heard all things in the heaven and in the earth’.102 Far 
removed from the psychiatric conviction that such narratives represent ‘nothing more than 
empty speech acts’, ‘madness’ can instead stand as a testament to the infinite dynamics of 
human experience, in addition to challenging the perceived omniscience of the 
psychiatrist.103 However, psychiatric discourse – although not explicitly present – still hovers 
over Perceval’s narrative to interfere with his interpretation and experience of his ‘madness’, 
as Perceval reflected: ‘What I call fancies they call “delusions”’.104 
Post-impressionist Dutch painter Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890) described his 
experience of ‘madness’ in similar terms: ‘I am not ill […] I do not think that my madness 
could take the form of persecution mania, since when in a state of excitement, my feelings 
lead me rather to the contemplation of eternity, and eternal life’.105 Despite being 
incarcerated, Van Gogh did not accept the role of ‘patient’, maintaining that he was ‘not ill’ 
and contending the diagnosis enforced on him. As with Perceval’s narrative, a sense of 
spirituality and affirmation characterised Van Gogh’s experience of ‘madness’. The striking 
juxtaposition of limitless experiences (‘eternity and eternal life’) and an inadequate attempt to 
delineate this experience using taxonomy (‘persecution mania’) serves to highlight the gulf 
between psychiatric construct and personal experience. In a similar fashion, Kraepelin 
examined a case study in which the ‘patient’ declares that ‘I am perfectly sane and feel 
myself treated as a lunatic’.106 Kraepelin, predictably, interpreted this as proof of the 
‘patient’s’ ‘insanity’, observing how ‘foreign’ the ‘extraordinary disorder’ of the ‘patient’ 
is.107 However, it again demonstrates potential for the individual experience to undermine 
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hegemonic narratives: the diagnosis (and thus power) of the psychiatrist can be rejected on a 
personal level. 
Several case studies challenge psychiatric assumptions of what ‘madness’ is, or at 
least offer a different perspective on how it can be understood. Although they are 
unconventional in terms of how ‘madness’ is explained or perceived, they are primarily 
communicated using orthodox language.108 As a result, the ‘madness’ experience is limited to 
conventional discourse, and this inevitably confines the narrative. For example, 
psychopathologist and psychologist Louis Sass asked: ‘Is the true self or subject something 
that precedes or underlies language, or does it only come into being through our acceptance 
and mastery of linguistic forms? What relationship does madness have to that which is (or 
which is experienced as being) inaccessible or inexpressible through the medium of 
language?’109 I have already established a conflict between authenticity and accessibility, but 
Sass suggests this has a wider impact in terms of the self and social identity. Do we only 
conceive of selfhood because we have language to do so? If so, when that language is not 
adequate, is the self obliterated? Or just indeterminately mute? Are these conceptions of the 
self a privilege only available to those who display a ‘mastery’ of language? A Hegelian 
approach would suggest that this is the case: by arguing that ‘to be a human self is to be a 
linguistic self’, Hegel demoted the non-linguistic self to a sub-human position.110 If a 
fundamental component of identity, such as an overwhelming experience of illness, is 
‘inaccessible or inexpressible’ through conventional language, then what happens to the parts 
of the self that cannot be articulated, or even comprehended?  
 The experiences of Anna O. – a ‘hysterical’ ‘patient’ under Freud’s jurisdiction –
exemplify these conflicts. Sadly, we do not have direct access to Anna’s voice, and it seems 
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somewhat absurd to rely on Freud – a ‘master’ of language – to communicate the devastating 
impact of language failing. Freud’s description is our only source of information: 
There appeared a deep-going functional disorganisation of her speech. It first became 
noticeable that she was at a loss to find words, and this difficulty gradually increased. 
Later, she lost her command of grammar and syntax […] In the process of time she 
became almost completely deprived of words. She put them together laboriously out 
of four or five languages and became almost unintelligible […] For two weeks she 
became completely dumb and in spite of making great and continuous efforts to speak 
she was unable to say a syllable.111 
 
The fundamental struggle here is one of articulation. Freud’s interpretation of the situation is 
particularly telling: lexical choices such as ‘command’ suggest that privilege of voice is an 
assumed human trait, and that any deviation from this implies ‘otherness’. Anna was not just 
unable to find the words to articulate her experience: the grand narrative of language, syntax 
and grammar had failed her. She was ‘deprived’ of a functional relationship between 
language and selfhood, and verbalisation became an arduous challenge: formulating a 
narrative became ‘laborious’, requiring a ‘great and continuous effort’. As a result of this 
struggle, she became ‘almost unintelligible’. 
 This conflict is predominantly rooted in politics: Showalter contended that ‘the reason 
why the neurotic fails to produce coherence is that she lacks the power to impose her 
connections on her reader/listener’.112 The concept of ‘coherence’ is also subject to 
interpretation, and, again, this comes down to narrative framing and reader expectations. This 
lack of power suggests that the disenfranchised ‘patient’ has been deprived of the assumed 
mastery of language necessary to ‘impose’ connections and ideas – and, indeed, a personal 
narrative of ‘madness’ over the implied and expected narrative – onto the reader. However, 
what remains particularly poignant about Anna’s struggle is that she did not accept mutism. 
Once conventional language failed, she persisted, ‘laboriously’ amalgamating several 
languages in an attempt to configure selfhood. Although Freud dismissed these attempts as 
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‘unintelligible’, Anna continued to try to construct a narrative to engage with him – to 
become an active entity in her psychiatric ‘treatment’ – rather than compliantly submitting to 
the psychiatrist’s gaze. 
 According to psychiatry, a loss of ‘command’ of grammar and syntax is a recurring 
feature in ‘madness’ narratives which go beyond psychiatric discourse and conventional 
language patterns. Kraepelin introduced the following case study as a ‘mere series of letters, 
syllables or sounds […] here there is perfectly senseless repetition’: ‘Ellio, ellio, ellio, 
altomellio-altomellio – selo, eloo, dello, heloo – f. f. f. dear father, f. f. f. dear father, e. e. f. 
old and new.’113 Kraepelin’s interpretation suggested that this is a non-narrative, permeated 
by gutturals and perfect rhymes, it is ‘merely’ syllables: ‘not “meaningful” since they are but 
casual by-products’ of ‘madness’ and thus ‘otherness’.114 Apparently unworthy of 
interpretation, the supposedly ‘perfectly senseless’ narrative is disregarded, considered 
‘empty’. However, Kraepelin’s conclusion places the blame for this failed narrative on the 
‘patient,’ therefore if one is unable to ‘command’ the grammar and syntax that are necessary 
for articulating a socially accessible narrative, then one (rather than language, translator, 
editor or social audience) has failed.   
 Bleuler’s Textbook of Psychiatry offers a case study which suggests an alternative 
perspective. Bleuler asked the ‘patient’: ‘Who is the president of the U.S.?’ The ‘patient’ 
replied: 
I am the president, I am the ex-president of the United States, I have been a recent 
president. Just at present I was present, president of many towns […] When you are 
president you are the head of all, you are the head of every one of those, you have a 
big head, you are the smartest man in the world […] I am a titled lady by birth of 
royal blood of rose blood (pointing to another patient) he has black blood, yellow 
blood, he is no man, a woman, a woe-man.115 
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Vocabulary such as ‘incoherent’ and ‘incomprehensible’ permeates the framing of case study 
narratives to enforce the idea that to be ‘mad’ is to have no control over – rather than control 
– language. However, the case study above suggests a different relationship with language 
entirely. 
 The blurring of tenses initially disorientates the reader, but once the narrative gains 
momentum, a mastery of language – surely the antithesis of ‘incomprehensibility’ – becomes 
apparent. Not merely content with answering the question of the psychiatrist, the individual 
embarked on a meandering narrative journey which serves to undermine both the 
expectations of what a ‘madness’ narrative is, and also the perceived relationship between the 
‘mad’ self and conventional language. The narrative space became a platform for linguistic 
proficiency as the ‘patient’ seamlessly moved from a half-rhyme (‘president’/‘present’) to a 
double entendre (‘you have a big head’) to esoteric vocabulary and wordplay (‘woe-man’). 
How can this possibly fit with Lacan’s assertion that the ‘madman’ does not even recognise 
the nom du père, let alone embrace it?  
 Although the case studies I have examined all show potential for articulating an 
experience of ‘madness’ beyond hegemony, they do need to be understood in terms of their 
potential for social engagement. In order to function, a narrative must articulate the self to a 
social audience, via a medium. ‘That which is present in the mind has to be re-presented in a 
commonly acknowledged form before it can acquire validity in the shared “real” world’, and 
the only ‘commonly acknowledged form’ available to ‘validate’ the ‘madness’ experience is 
the language of psychiatry.116 Any narrative which is not re-presented in a socially familiar 
form will not be validated, and thus the narrative fails. Although I have established that it is 
possible to discuss and, ultimately, to perceive ‘madness’ in a manner divorced from the 
psychiatric narrative, this can only happen on a personal level. Psychiatry remains the 
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‘authority’ on what ‘madness’ is, and, as this is the only existing ‘commonly acknowledged 
form’, anything which clashes with it is dismissed as ‘nonsense’. However, being able to 
understand ‘madness’ as something other than a state of ‘stigma [and] social death’, such as 
Perceval and Van Gogh’s assertions that it was a heightened state of awareness and 
affirmation, does display potential for the self to be salvaged from the disfigurements of 
psychiatric intervention.117 Although identity cannot be narrated socially, it is a small victory 
to experience the ordeal of ‘madness’ – and the psychiatric gaze – without completely 
submitting to the role of ‘patient’, of medical subject, and thus of ‘other’. 
 
‘A Very Eloquent Response’: Reading Silence118 
Philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle argued that ‘under all speech […] there lies a 
silence that is better. Silence is deep as Eternity; speech is shallow as Time’.119 In the context 
of ‘madness’, to narrate is a form of self-exposure, and thus to be silent is to refuse to engage. 
As I have shown, ‘madness’ narratives which are verbalised are dissected by psychiatric 
forces and socially discarded; the self which is not articulated is protected. 
This refusal to engage with language ultimately destabilises the politics of the 
‘patient’/psychiatrist relationship, which are necessary to reaffirm psychiatric hegemony. In 
some contexts, silence represents submission.120 However, silence can also equate to 
power.121 The psychiatrist’s dominance is based on a mastery of language, but silence 
removes the psychiatrist/‘patient’ dynamic from the realm of the written and the verbal. 
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Although this means the self must remain mute, to be ‘mad’ and to be silent is to deprive 
psychiatry of the tools which perpetuate psychiatric hegemony. 
In the absence of suitable language, is mutism the only way to protect selfhood from 
the psychiatric gaze? For Perceval, silence was an alternative to self-exposure: he believed 
verbalisation would only further alienate his experiences. He explained that neither the 
medical profession nor a wider social audience ‘would understand my motives, or give credit 
to facts they had not themselves experienced’.122 Unable to configure his ordeal into ‘a 
commonly acknowledged form’ necessary to ‘acquire validity in the shared “real” world’, for 
Perceval, silence represented a total refusal to enter into any form of social exchange.123 
Significantly, the psychiatric presence interpreted this silence as a form of submission, even a 
symptom: ‘the first symptoms of my derangement were that I gazed silently on the medical 
men […] My silence, I suppose, gave consent’.124 Perceval also acknowledged a sense of 
isolation in the unarticulated experiences of the self, recalling ‘sorrow debarred from 
expressing itself’.125 Unable – or consciously refusing – to engage with psychiatry does mean 
that the individual is incapable of actively challenging their position of ‘patient’. However, 
silence also means that the individual is not actively conforming to the role of ‘patient’. 
Kraepelin described instances of silence as almost lethargic:  ‘he [the ‘patient’] feels 
no desire to speak at all. He certainly hears and understands what is said to him very well, but 
he does not take the trouble to attend to it’.126 In the context of stimulus words and prompts 
designed to encourage an acceptance of the ‘patient’ role, to be silent is to ‘not take the 
trouble’ to gratify, or even acknowledge, the process of exchange necessary for the 
‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic. It is significant that, to Kraepelin, such a symbolic silence 
denotes only indolence rather than a proactive rejection of psychiatric ‘authority’. This serves 
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to diminish any significance the silence may carry over into a social context: it merely 
indicates ‘no desire to speak’, rather than a mute political protest.  
 In the absence of Anna O.’s narrative, Freud offered one, recounting the case in his 
own words. We are informed that ‘for two weeks she became completely dumb and in spite 
of making great and continuous efforts to speak she was unable to say a syllable’.127 This is a 
different type of silence – at least according to Freud’s interpretation: it represented an 
inability to speak, rather than a conscious decision not to. Freud then reflected that ‘she could 
find no tongue in which to speak’.128 Silence – voluntary or otherwise – signifies a chink in 
the armour of hegemony. Anna O’s mutism unnerved Freud because it recontextualised their 
relationship: the psychiatrist is the master of language, but if the ‘patient’/psychiatrist 
exchange moves beyond the realm of the verbal, then this ‘authority’ is threatened.  
 Dora is perhaps considered Freud’s most controversial case study, and her mutism has 
been read by feminist scholars as a ‘silent revolt’.129 Freud described Dora’s silence as the 
most ‘troublesome symptom’ of her hysteria, culminating in a ‘complete loss of voice’.130 
Her story, transcribed by Freud (although, significantly, ‘not narrated absolutely word for 
word’) is a power struggle from the outset.131 Her father pleaded for Freud to ‘bring her 
round to a better way of thinking’.132 Dora’s ‘hysterical’ thoughts are deemed subversive: 
Freud, with his empirical knowledge and overtly sexual interpretations, apparently represents 
a ‘better way’ of thinking. Freud attempted to superimpose his narrative onto Dora’s 
experiences: ‘he wanted to help [her] by teaching her to talk – to talk about the important 
things he said she repressed: bedwetting, masturbation, lesbianism’.133 Dora’s silence 
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represents a refusal to couch her experience of ‘madness’ in the vocabulary of deviation and 
‘otherness’. Indeed, her mutism epitomises a refusal to attach any language (and thus the 
inevitable stigma and/or social roles latent in such terminology) to her experience.  
Describing Freud’s psychoanalysis as ‘disempowering’, academic and writer Ritchie 
Robertson introduced the case study as a conflict between the governing psychiatrist and the 
disenfranchised ‘patient’. Robertson asserted that ‘Freud applauds his own persistence; he 
speaks of using facts against the patient and reports how he overwhelmed Dora with 
interpretations, pounding away at her argument, until “Dora disputed the facts no longer”’.134 
Freud interpreted Dora’s silence as his victory, and the fact that she ended treatment becomes 
a convenient scapegoat for any criticism Freud may have faced from his contemporaries: ‘the 
treatment did not go on […] but was cut short by the patient’s own wish […] if I had 
continued my work on it I would certainly have reached an ultimate conclusion on all 
points’.135 Dora’s mutism did make her identity vulnerable, as Freud was able to rewrite her 
narrative without resistance: her silence could be interpreted however Freud chose, and, in 
this instance, could be – and was – used to further psychiatric hegemony. Her refusal to 
engage with the psychiatric process becomes ‘transference of her vengeful feelings to me 
[Freud]’, and the reason why Freud’s analysis remains ‘incomplete’.136 Dora’s silence 
deprived Freud of his conclusion and thus his complete case study. Despite the fact that her 
father ‘put her [Dora] in my [Freud’s] hands’, Dora did not submit to this process of 
exchange. Although her silence allowed her to become Freud’s tabula rasa, the language 
used to described Dora’s ‘revolt’ suggests a mute form of power: Freud informed his reader 
of how she ‘rejected medical assistance’, ‘resisted’ the family doctor and that ‘any suggestion 
of consulting another doctor met with opposition from her’.137 Dora endeavoured to protect 
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her sense of self from the psychiatric gaze: refusing to adopt Freud’s language of lesbianism 
and masturbation, she instead opted – resolutely – for silence. 
Silence can result in a personal victory at the expense of the narrative process. There 
is a significant refusal to enter the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic, and thus to submit to 
psychiatric ‘authority’. However, silence and unorthodox language are not a ‘commonly 
acknowledged form’ available to ‘validate’ the narrative in a social context: the only vehicle 
available to articulate the ‘madness’ experience in a manner which is socially validated is the 
language of psychiatry.138 
 
‘How Were the Mad to Speak and by Whom Could They be Heard?’ Concluding 
Statements139 
The case study model potentially offers a vehicle through which a ‘madness’ narrative  can 
be delivered from a microcosmic social exchange (of ‘patient’/psychiatrist) to a wider social 
audience. By containing ‘madness’ narratives, the psychiatric text delivers them to their 
readership, a necessary component of the narrative process. Due to occupying a position of 
absolute power, the alienist can, potentially, use this space to display ‘madness’ narratives 
which speak of the vast diversity of human experience: the assumption that ‘mad’ equates to 
‘otherness’ could, hypothetically, be deconstructed as the ‘madness’ narrative and psychiatric 
discourse meet. Alternatively, by exploiting a position of ‘authority’, the psychiatrist can edit, 
reconstruct and enforce the language of ‘otherness’ onto such narratives, thus further 
affirming the social alienation of the ‘mad’ individual. Lived experience has the potential to 
undermine psychiatric hegemony, by establishing the individual as the ‘authority’ instead. To 
neutralise this threat, the psychiatrist/editor consumes ‘madness’ narratives, recontextualising 
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them from ‘Human Documents’ to non-communication: merely ‘language […] reified as 
symptom’.140  
The presence of narrative framing goes beyond the literal thresholds of the text: the 
ultimate paratexts are the expectations we harbour about what a ‘madness’ narrative will be 
like and what it means, as informed by psychiatry. Narrative framing – in a more literal sense 
– also serves to enforce expectations onto the reader: primarily, that the implied, ‘mad’ 
narrator is unreliable. By introducing ‘madness’ narratives using the language of ‘otherness’, 
the alienist is perpetuating the psychiatric and societal belief that to be ‘mad’ is to be ‘other’, 
‘lacking’, and ‘less than’. All of this serves to undermine the voice of the ‘patient’: the 
narrative has been dismissed before it has even had chance to be accessed by its readership. 
 If any attempt to communicate the self beyond taxonomy results in social alienation, 
configuring the self using psychiatric discourse seems a necessary evil to convey an 
experience in socially accessible form. But mirroring taxonomy immediately signifies an 
acceptance of the ‘patient’/psychiatric dynamic, and results in a necessary surrender. These 
terms represent much more than just a diagnosis: they ‘have a semantic reality and [are] also 
the label for a certain social role [...] a microsocial crisis situation in which the acts and 
experience of a certain person are invalidated by others’.141 ‘Madness’ represents a 
marginalised, (non)social role which is signified by invalidation, and to accept taxonomy is 
also to submit to the dominant myth that ‘mad’ is ‘other’. 
 However, some case studies suggest that this psychiatric language can be mirrored in 
a form of ventriloquism. In such instances, the vocabulary of the psychiatrist is echoed, 
without necessarily internalising the ‘otherness’ and ‘patienthood’ latent in this discourse. To 
an extent, the role of disenfranchised ‘patient’ can be performed to challenge the ‘authority’ 
of psychiatric discourse, albeit subtly. One of Kraepelin’s Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry 
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centred on an eighteen-year-old ‘patient’, who ‘almost has to be carried into the room’ to be 
exhibited before Kraepelin’s students.142 The ‘patient’ displayed an astute awareness of the 
politics of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist (and, indeed, considering the context of the lecture 
theatre, spectacle/audience) dynamic: ‘I tell you who is being measured and is measured and 
shall be measured. I know all that, and could tell you, but I do not want to […] you 
understand nothing’.143 This ‘patient’s’ understanding (contrasted with Kraepelin, who 
‘understand[s] nothing at all’) means he was able to be an active entity – rather than passive 
subject – in the psychiatric ‘game’.144 This allowed the ‘patient’ to exert power by 
paradoxically (albeit superficially) accepting the ‘patient’ role, as explored by Laing: ‘They 
[the psychiatrists] are playing a game. They are playing at not playing a game. If I [the 
‘patient’] show them they are, I shall break the rules and they will punish me. I must play 
their game, of not seeing I see the game’.145  
The ‘patient’ Kraepelin discussed ‘break[s] the rules’ by exposing the politics of the 
‘game’, parodying Kraepelin by mimicking his questions, and refusing to ‘turn whore’ and 
obediently play along for the purposes of Kraepelin’s lecture.146 Ever resourceful, Kraepelin 
denounced the ‘patient’s’ rebellion as ‘degenerated [and] unmeaning abuse’ which reveals 
the ‘patient’s inaccessibility’.147 Kraepelin was quick to invalidate the ‘patient’s’ potential 
counter-narrative which threatens to challenge Kraepelin’s ‘authority’: he encouraged his 
students to dismiss the ‘quite incoherent talk’ of the ‘patient’, deeming it ‘only a series of 
disconnected sentences’.148 It is clear that the psychiatrist’s voice has undermined the 
‘patient’s’ narrative and prevented it from being interpreted as anything other than 
symptomatic of ‘madness’. But, by knowing, exposing or playing at playing along with the 
                                                          
142 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 77. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Laing, Knots, p. 1. 
146 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 77. 




politics of a ‘game’, is there, at least, something of a personal victory to be celebrated when 
the ‘mad’ self can perform the role of ‘patient’, while reducing the damage caused by such a 
role? 
 Transcending taxonomy as a means of communication seems to be the only way to 
articulate an experience of ‘madness’ beyond the deviation and ‘otherness’ which psychiatric 
discourse signifies. In terms of the narrative process, it certainly expresses the ‘true self’ of 
‘madness’, rather than being limited by the finite discourse of conventional, medical 
terminology. 149 Poignantly, these narratives allow ‘madness’ to be verbalised in a way which 
does not necessitate an assumption of the role of ‘other’. Kraepelin observed how, by 
refusing to accept the discourse of ‘otherness’ to articulate what were, after all, their own 
symptoms, some ‘patients’ felt ‘specially privileged’ in their ‘madness’, such as a ‘patient’ 
who declared, ‘I hear from a distance; not everyone can do that’.150 Rather than condemning 
difference, this ‘patient’ celebrated it. ‘Madness’ narratives constructed beyond the 
‘otherness’ of psychiatric discourse  offer innumerable, varied perspectives on how 
‘madness’ can be perceived and understood. ‘Madness’ can be a creative or spiritual 
experience; it can represent a heightened sense of awareness and knowledge; it can be shaped 
using transient language to suggest a less permanent impact on the self. These narratives are 
not configured using a ‘commonly acknowledged form’ necessary for social validation as 
they contradict both the language and the ideology of psychiatric discourse, and therefore 
they fail as narrative models. A similar process occurs with instances of silence: a mute 
narrative is not an adequate conduit between self and social audience, as it is represented as 
non-communication, rather than as a symbolic, powerful silence.  
Although these narratives are not able to reach a social audience, they do represent a 
personal victory: ‘madness’ can be discussed beyond the realm of taxonomy and ‘otherness’, 
                                                          
149 Sass, ‘Ineffable’, p. 319. 
150 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 13. 
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and one can echo the language of psychiatry without having to accept the implied ‘otherness’. 
Psychiatric framing encourages the reader to dismiss such narratives as ‘nonsense’ in order to 
deprive them of any semantic or symbolic significance. But does this not suggest that 
psychiatric discourse is threatened by ‘madness’ narratives? To go to such lengths to 
diminish the reliability – and thus readability – of the narrator certainly implies a knee-jerk 
defensive manoeuvre. Cooper argued that ‘madness’ represents a capacity for ‘the 
destructuring of the alienated structures of an existence and the restructuring of a less 
alienated way of being’.151 Any narrative which refuses to conform to psychiatric discourse 
displays the potential for psychiatric hegemony to be deconstructed. By portraying ‘madness’ 
as something other than ‘other’, such as a spiritual experience or part of a creative process, 
narratives such as those of Van Gogh and Perceval show that it is possible to talk about 
‘madness’ in a way which does not instantaneously signify ‘otherness’. This is further 
reinforced by a rejection of the ‘patient’ role. If the ‘mad’ individual can avoid occupying the 
position of subservient ‘patient’, then is there not scope for the ‘madman’ to find or create a 




                                                          




‘An Illusion of Exteriority’: Rereading Literary ‘Madness’1 
 
 
In society, ‘madness’ plays many roles, the majority of them contradictory: it is the unseen 
spectacle; the absent presence; the voiceless yet ventriloquised. Academic and writer Allan 
Ingram argued that such ‘dizzying paradoxes’ characterise and obscure the way that 
‘madness’ is understood in a social context.2 ‘Madness’ is removed from the social sphere, 
and then returned to it in the form of parody or a neatly controlled psychiatric narrative, 
something which denotes detachment: ‘an illusion of exteriority designed to perpetuate the 
myth of our own objective distance’.3 This (mis)representation or reduction of ‘madness’ 
reflects and reinforces the ideas established by psychiatry. Any potential counter-narrative 
which challenges psychiatric ‘authority’ is disregarded, subdued and reframed. As I 
demonstrated in chapter two, in the realm of hegemonic discourse, the omnipresent 
psychiatrist represents the narrative of reason, of ‘sanity’, of all things tangible and 
explicable: a ‘madness’ narrative is shown to have no authentic space or voice in this 
regulated context.4  
However, narrative boundaries, constructions and expectations in fiction are, by their 
very nature, less regulated. Kraepelin called attention to the ‘peculiar, distorted turns of 
speech – senseless playing with syllables and words’ which apparently render ‘madness’ 
narratives incoherent.5 But what is fiction, or poetry, if not playing with syllables and words, 
                                                          
1 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
2 Ingram, Cultural Constructions, p. 1. 
3 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
4 My use of the term ‘omnipresent’ here refers to the ‘continually encountered’ psychiatric presence which 
overwhelms the ‘madness’ narratives I examined in chapter two. See OED, ‘omnipresent’  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131248?redirectedFrom=omnipresent#eid> [accessed 9 January 2016]. 
5 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 24. 
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reconfiguring language to reflect the innumerable variants of emotion and experience? Could 
it be that literature is a more forgiving medium for narrating ‘madness’? Can poetic licence 
allow for a language of ‘madness’ – the ‘sublimating discourse’ that Kristeva termed 
‘aesthetic’ and ‘mystical’ – to enter social consciousness, in contrast to and to challenge the 
‘scientific or rationalist’ psychiatric language which currently dominates?6  Can literature – a 
medium which aspires to ‘suit the action to the word, the word to the action […] to hold as 
'twere, the mirror up to nature’ – offer a true reflection of ‘madness’?7  
As established in chapter two, in a psychiatric context, to accept hegemonic discourse 
is to submit to its power, and to the inevitable ramifications that it has in terms of identity. 
However, in literature, there is more depth and more room for negotiation. Instead of the 
oppressive psychiatric narrative, with its limited and limiting taxonomy, literature explores 
‘the borderless “state” of madness as a realm of wholly indefinite conceptual latitude and 
longitude’.8 Literature offers ‘an archive of madness […] depict[ing] elements of fantasy, 
resistance, resilience, tenacity, resourcefulness, and creativity that can be labelled, depending 
on context and circumstance, either as positive qualities or as deviant entities’.9 In literature, 
there is the potential to deconstruct the supposed black-and-white binary of ‘madness’ and 
‘sanity’, between ‘positive qualities’ and ‘deviant entities’. Rather than just being a spectacle, 
literary ‘madness’ can be the spectacle in the mirror: ‘madness recognised as the mirror of a 
self’, of human experience, and of society as a whole.10 This is due to a radically different 
relationship between ‘madness’ and readership, necessitated by form: fiction must, indeed, 
‘hold […] the mirror up to nature’, it must reflect and engage the reader, rather than cause the 
reader to dissociate from the ‘mad’ narrator, as I have shown was the case in psychiatric 
                                                          
6 Kristeva, Powers, p. 7. 
7 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, in Complete Works, ed. by Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen (London: 
Macmillan, 2007), III. 2. 12-16. 
8 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 15. 
9 Baker, Madness, p. 2. 
10 Ingram, Cultural Constructions, p. 98. 
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discourses.11 In fiction, the reader is implicit: literary ‘madness’ raises ‘a dualistic concern 
with interpretive as well as representational processes’.12 Although narrative framing still 
exists, in both a literal and metaphorical sense, it is neither as obtrusive nor as straightforward 
as it is in a case study context. 
A reader expects to be drawn from ‘reality’ into the reading experience; to be able to 
immerse him or herself in a fictional world. This requires character development, a plot and, 
crucially, connection between reader and characters. This is a relationship which psychiatric 
narratives purposely avoid, and yet this connection is vital to the literary reading process: 
‘madness’ cannot be only a Sensationalist plot device or a Gothic sub-text in order for this 
emotive bond to develop. Academic and writer Judy Cornes contended that nineteenth-
century literature pandered to ‘an obsession with individual identity [which] pervaded 
Western world thinking’.13 Individual experience is championed over the grand narrative of 
psychiatry: a dramatic reversal of the case study context in which the individual voice was 
merely circumstantial to the purpose of the psychiatric text.  
This chapter explores an array of ‘madness’ narratives, examining their presence in a 
cross-section of texts which inevitably overlap in their interplay between language and 
‘madness’. The range of literary sources is varied, but by no means exhaustive (as limited by 
the confines of this thesis). Each text is representative of a genre or idea which was prevalent 
throughout the nineteenth century, and which is thus able to exemplify the broader discourse 
of ‘madness’ in literature. This chapter, in a similar fashion to my analysis of case study 
narratives, will be structured by how language is used to articulate a ‘madness’ narrative. 
 I begin by examining narratives which incorporate, echo, or rely on, psychiatric 
discourse as a means of communicating ‘madness’, particularly when this language is 
                                                          
11 Shakespeare, Hamlet, III. 2. 12-16. 
12 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 2.  




employed by the ‘mad’ individual. What role do psychiatric narratives play in constructing 
the identity of ‘mad’ characters? Are these semantic choices deliberately employed by the 
author as a means of evoking the stigma that inevitably comes with such terms, conjuring up 
ideas of ‘otherness’ to instigate shock and fear in their readers? Does this language reduce 
‘madness’ to a plot device, a 2D role, much as psychiatry reduces the individual to the 
diagnosis assigned to them? Or is this language used to expose the problematic nature of such 
reductions? Can such discourses function as psychiatry’s prologue; an alternative discourse 
which accepts taxonomy while also acknowledging that there is a narrative – and that there 
are experiences – beyond the confines of a diagnosis?  
In this section, I examine the role of psychiatric discourse in Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The 
Tell-Tale Heart’ (1843), particularly in light of the assumption that a ‘mad’ narrator is an 
‘unreliable’ one, thus requiring psychiatric governance. My textual analysis then covers both 
the Gothic and Sensation genres, with a specific focus on the narrative of Renfield in Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula (1897), and Lady Audley in Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Lady Audley’s 
Secret (1862). Both characters clash with – and inevitably submit to – psychiatric forces, and 
thus both novels contemplate the place and identity of the individual in psychiatric discourse 
(both as a narrative and as an institution). By comparison, I explore representations of 
‘madness’ in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s ‘Maud’ (1855). I examine the portrayal of the ‘mad’ 
narrator before and after a psychiatric intervention, thus deconstructing Tennyson’s use of – 
and portrayal of – psychiatric language and power. 
Psychiatric discourse permeates these texts, both literally and metaphorically. It goes 
far beyond an echo of taxonomy, and its theories resonate in more abstract and pervasive 
ways. The insinuation that ‘mad’ is ‘other’ is psychiatric discourse: the idea that ‘madness’ 
must be removed from the social sphere and incarcerated, managed and made into a spectacle 
is the assumption that ‘madness’ is not part of mainstream society, and should be treated 
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accordingly. Therefore, any descriptions of ‘mad’ as ‘other’ will be deemed part of 
hegemonic discourse of what ‘madness’ is. This ‘otherness’ assumes many forms: it is found 
in the belief that the ‘madness’ narrative is incoherent or worthless, ‘nothing but idiot 
gabble!’14 The use of the individual narrative as a psychiatric tool (to prove a symptom, for 
example, as exhibited in chapter two) can be mirrored in the employment of ‘madness’ as 
nothing more than a plot device. Psychiatric discourse represents much more than a frame of 
language: it is how we understand ‘madness’. It is the foundation on which we construct 
social meanings of ‘madness’. My focus in this chapter lies in how my chosen fictional texts 
acknowledge, mirror or challenge this discourse: is it that these ideas are so firmly embedded 
in the social consciousness that it is impossible to describe ‘madness’ without them? Are 
these stereotypes employed subconsciously, automatically, indulging the reader’s 
expectations of what ‘madness’ is? Or are these assumptions parodied, incorporated merely 
to show their irrelevance in light of the individual experience? 
As a point of comparison, I examine narratives which transcend – or totally reject – 
psychiatric language as a means of communication. Beyond hegemonic discourse, themes 
emerge: ‘madness’ is often described as a creative, spiritual experience characterised by acute 
sensitivity and a new way of seeing the world. ‘Madness’ can function as a form of self-
awareness, as a new identity, or as an affirmation or development of the self (or selves). It 
can be an experience of knowledge, from which other characters, and indeed, the reader, can 
learn: even erudite Professor Van Helsing contemplated that he may ‘gain more knowledge 
out of the folly of this madman than I shall from the teaching of the most wise’.15 Any 
description of ‘madness’ which indicates it can be something beyond ‘non-knowledge’ or 
non-communication, or even just human experience, transcends psychiatric discourse.16  
                                                          
14 Alfred Lord Tennyson, ‘Maud’, in The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1994), II. V. IV. l. 1. 
15 Bram Stoker, Dracula (London: Oneworld Classics, 2008), p. 239. 
16 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
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I also consider overt rejections of taxonomy, and any implication that ‘madness’ can 
be constructed beyond this language. In Poe’s short story, ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and 
Professor Fether’ (1845), Maillard – the apparent psychiatric ‘authority’ – insists that ‘the 
word “lunacy” was never employed’ in the maison de santé he governs.17 This text will be 
analysed in light of its potential to subvert dominant narratives by literally confusing the 
‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic, and therefore blurring the ‘sane’/‘insane’ dichotomy. Further, 
I explore Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s portrayal of ‘madness’ in The Yellow Wallpaper (1892), 
focusing on how the text grants insight into the internal monologue of the ‘mad’ narrator as 
she attempts to comprehend and communicate the self, and simultaneously to reject 
psychiatric and patriarchal forces around her.  
Selected texts which represent ‘othered’ states are examined: each of these narratives 
represents either hallucinatory experiences or multiple selves – subversions of ‘normality’ 
that are ‘irresistible to the literary mind’.18 These experiences transcend the assumption that 
the self is ‘unitary, individualised, permanent […] impermeable to spirituality and 
otherworldliness’.19 I also briefly explore Poe’s short story, ‘William Wilson’ (1839); and 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking-Glass 
(1867). These texts threaten to destabilise the psychiatric concept of an hallucination through 
intimate narrative techniques: after all, what is fiction if not what Foucault termed a ‘common 
hallucination’, another world, the product of an imagination?20 The reader is complicit in the 
apparent delusions of the protagonists: the boundary between ‘reality’ and something ‘other’ 
becomes distorted. These texts which construct ‘madness’ as something other than ‘other’ 
evidently feature a counter-narrative which challenges psychiatric discourse. How are the 
                                                          
17 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether’, in Selected Tales, ed. by David Van Leer 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 269. 
18 Oliver Sacks, Hallucinations (London: Picador, 2012), p. 268. 
19 Lovell, ‘City is My Mother’, p. 355. 
20 Foucault, History of Madness, p. 36. 
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readers encouraged to respond to these narratives: could authors be presenting these ideas as 
a means of introducing a new currency to talk about and understand ‘madness’? 
Finally, I explore narrative gaps or silences. In my previous chapter, I established the 
power dynamics involved in silence, particularly in relation to the ‘patient’/psychiatrist 
relationship. ‘Madness’ narratives inevitably instigate vulnerability, as ‘open communication 
is often thought of as obscene self-exposure’.21 A recurring theme in the literature of 
‘madness’ is the unspeakable which, much like silence in the case study narrative, exposes 
the inescapable instability of language, regardless of context. This, again, is due to the 
assumed omnipresence of the psychiatrist: to go beyond the allocated psychiatric discourse to 
speak of ‘madness’ is to enter the realm of the ineffable. Although poetic licence allows a 
creative approach to verbalising ‘madness’, there is still an expectation that such literature 
will conform to conventional narrative patterns: it needs to be readable in order to be read. Is 
this silence indicative of self-preservation (on the part of the ‘mad’ character, or even the 
author)? Or is it an act of resignation, an acceptance that language just cannot articulate 
‘madness’?  
 
‘Shutting Madness up in Literature’: Echoing and Reinforcing Psychiatric Discourse22 
Academic Valerie Pedlar contended that ‘madness for nineteenth-century writers was [...] an 
alien state of mind’, an ‘otherness’ to be explored or scrutinised through the medium of the 
text.23 This statement, although a problematic generalisation, is illustrative of just how 
                                                          
21 Breuer, ‘Irony’, p. 110. 
22 Shoshana Felman, quoted in Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
23 Valerie Pedlar, The Most Dreadful Visitation: Male Madness in Victorian Fiction (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2006), p. 1. This representation of ‘madness’ as an ‘alien’ state is a common nineteenth-
century trope, with the French term aliéner meaning ‘to become insane’, thus equating ‘insanity’ with 
something unfamiliar and dehumanised (see OED, ‘alien’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4989#eid7109048> 
[accessed 29 January 2016]). This is made manifest in the term ‘alienist’, a nineteenth-century term used to 
describe a psychiatrist: the suffix ‘ist’ denotes ‘a votary of, or expert in’ therefore the psychiatrist is the 
‘authority’ on the ‘alien’ ‘mad’ (see OED, ‘ist’). 
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influential and pervasive psychiatric discourses of ‘madness’ are.24 Pedlar elaborated that 
‘imaginative representations of madness are inevitably influenced by cultural conceptions of 
insanity’, and that the psychiatric insistence that ‘mad’ is ‘other’ is undeniably the prevalent 
discourse which impacts heavily both on literary representations and on cultural 
(mis)understanding.25 The psychiatric narrative permeates social consciousness, from which 
literary depictions are constructed which inevitably corroborate psychiatric discourse: they 
are essentially a repackaging of hegemonic narratives, delivered neatly back into the social 
realm as a reaffirmation of what ‘madness’ is. 26 This narrative reinforces the assumed power 
of psychiatry, and so the cycle continues, perpetually marginalising individual experience.  
 Literary representations of ‘madness’ simultaneously embody the potential to silence 
and to speak for the individual, although that ventriloquism can in itself be a form of 
silencing. It can encourage condemnation, or allow ‘madness’ to be heard. In the realms of 
the literary text, ‘madness’ can be the ‘other’ or it can be reconstructed as a mirror, as our 
abject self. Literary critic Shoshana Felman observed that ‘madness silenced by society has 
been given voice by literature’, championing literature as a space in which the fictionalised 
‘mad’ self can be articulated and thus socially validated.27 However, Felman countered that 
‘that literature itself is obsolete’, so firmly embedded in the process of stigma and ‘othering’ 
– so far removed from the individual voice – that it can never be used as an objective medium 
for talking about ‘madness’.28 It is evident that literature, as the product of a culture, cannot 
wholly escape the hugely influential psychiatric discourse, but to what extent are hegemonic 
narratives actively employed, and their ‘authority’ reinforced? 
 
                                                          
24 I will later discuss how the mirror of the text can actually make ‘madness’ familiar. 
25 Pedlar, Dreadful Visitation, p. 1. 
26 This is a conscious oversimplification which I will later complicate, but I have used it here for the purpose of 
illustrating how damaging a reaffirmation of psychiatric narratives can be. 




‘Why Will You Say That I Am Mad?’ Resisting and Reaffirming Psychiatric Discourse 
in ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’29 
Edgar Allan Poe’s literature and mind have both frequently been the topic of 
psychoanalytical scrutiny: he ‘became, and remains, the most popular subject for 
psychoanalytic criticism’.30 Academic and writer David Galloway described Poe as ‘the most 
perennial victim of the idée fixe, and of amateur psychoanalysis of the most blatant 
variety’.31After the death of his wife, Poe himself observed that he ‘became insane, with long 
intervals of horrible sanity’, experiencing hallucinations that are now believed to have been 
related to excessive alcohol consumption.32 Poe, in theory, was well-placed to offer an 
authentic portrayal of ‘madness’, informed by first-hand experience, rather than shaped by 
psychiatric discourse alone.  
Poe’s short story ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, published in 1843, is ‘founded solidly on 
Gothic tradition’, demonstrating Poe’s attempt to manipulate the genre to ‘create fine 
psychological fiction’.33 By revisiting the existing topography of the Gothic, Poe sought to 
develop it, transforming it into a psychological commentary which reflects the wider milieu. 
Liberated from the ‘mad’ ‘otherness’ latent in the Gothic tradition, Poe could, in theory, 
transcend it and portray ‘madness’ as something familiar, or at least ‘satirize the society 
which has produced the “mad” individual’.34 In light of Poe’s intentions to offer a 
psychological narrative, rather than using ‘madness’ as a superficial plot device, it seems 
contradictory that ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ is a text primarily constructed using psychiatric 
discourse.  
                                                          
29 Poe, ‘Tell-Tale Heart’, p. 193. All further references will be given in the main body of the text. 
30 Ronald C. Harvey, The Critical History of Edgar Allan Poe's The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym: A 
Dialogue with Unreason (Oxon: Routledge, 1998), p. 63. 
31 David Galloway, Introduction, in Edgar Allan Poe, The Fall of the House of Usher and Other Writings, ed. by 
Peter Ackroyd and David Galloway (London: Penguin, 2003), p. xxxiii. 
32 Poe, quoted in Introduction, in Poe, House of Usher, p. xliv. 
33 Benjamin F. Fisher, ‘Poe and the Gothic Tradition’, in The Cambridge Companion to Edgar Allan Poe, ed. by 
Kevin J. Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 72-90 (p. 84). 
34 Branimir M. Rieger, Dionysus in Literature: Essays on Literary Madness (Bowling Green: Bowling Green 
State University Popular Press, 1994), p. 8. 
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 The text itself is concise and therefore necessitates economical character 
development. Use of the first-person narrative ensures that the reader quickly forges a 
connection – however reluctant – with the unnamed narrator, as he is the only source of 
information.35 The narrator immediately constructs and communicates his identity using 
psychiatric discourse, and this has inevitable ramifications for the relationship between ‘mad’ 
self and readership. The opening paragraph reads paradoxically as a defence of selfhood in 
the light of such discourse and as a verification of the narrator’s ‘otherness’: 
True! – nervous – very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am; but why will you 
say that I am mad? The disease had sharpened my senses – not destroyed – not dulled 
them. Above all was the sense of hearing acute. I heard all things in the heaven and in 
the earth. I heard many things in hell. How, then, am I mad? Hearken! and observe 
how healthily – how calmly I can tell you the whole story. (p. 193) 
 
Repetition of terms such as ‘nervous’ and ‘mad’, and the reference to ‘disease’, immediately 
evoke psychiatric discourse.36 However, the narrator accepts his ‘nervousness’ and admits to 
having a ‘disease’, but resists the label of ‘madness’: this term is framed by a rhetorical 
question, as if he is inviting judgement from his readers. The themes of ‘nerves’ and 
‘disease’, although placed in the psychiatric realm in their extreme states, are still 
recognisable traits of the human condition: the reader will undoubtedly have a point of 
reference for one, if not both. However, ‘madness’ is too abstract, too ‘other’, and it 
jeopardises the narrator’s perceived reliability, in addition to his ‘authority’ to speak of his 
own experiences.37 The narrator rejects the label, and yet it lingers in the mind of the reader 
despite his claims that he can recount his version of events ‘healthily’ and ‘calmly’: two 
                                                          
35 There is not actually any explicit reference to the gender of the narrator in the text, but there are subtle 
indications (such as the reference to ‘madmen’ (p. 193)). For the sake of space, I will refer to the narrator in 
masculine terms, although that is not to ignore the ambiguity. 
36 The narrator’s preoccupation with his nerves reflected Poe’s own concern that he had become ‘nervous in a 
very unusual degree’. See David Galloway, Introduction, p. xliv. 
37 ‘Reliability’ refers to whether or not we are believed – and thus acknowledged – as a source of information in 
the context of social exchange and communication.  To be considered or portrayed as an ‘unreliable’ narrator is 
to fail to meet this basic requirement, and therefore the veracity of the subsequent narrative is disregarded. 
However, to have ‘authority’ is to surpass this stance of just being heard: if you are the ‘authority’ on ‘madness’, 
for example, not only is your narrative heard, but it is also the standard against which other narratives are 
validated. To be ‘reliable’ is to be heard; to have ‘authority’ is to be powerful. 
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terms which clash with the psychiatric conviction that ‘madness’ is a state of ‘unreliability’ 
and incoherence. 
 The narrator’s description of his ‘disease’ as entailing ‘hearing acute’ and a 
‘sharpen[ing of] my senses’ does defy psychiatric discourse, insofar as such traits are 
associated with heightened awareness, far removed from the assumption that ‘madness’ 
represents ‘non-knowledge’.38 However, it does imply ‘otherness’ – something beyond 
conventional understandings of the self and human experience – and, as a consequence, the 
narrator is in danger of losing touch with his reader, of being disregarded as ‘unreliable’. 
 Throughout the text, the narrator protests his ‘sanity’ in an incessant manner, 
therefore – paradoxically – constantly reminding the reader to question it. The ‘madman’s’ 
inability to recognise his ‘madness’ echoes the cultural assumption that ‘the one and only 
thing that is typical of all lunatics is their inability to comprehend that they are insane’.39 A 
declaration of ‘sanity’ becomes verification of ‘insanity’, a testament to the apparent need for 
psychiatric intervention. The ‘mad’ self cannot recognise that the self is ‘mad’, and thus an 
apparently objective ‘authority’ must be summoned to categorise and ‘cure’.40 Throughout 
‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, the reader assumes the role of the psychiatrist: the evidence of the 
narrator’s state of mind is displayed before them, awaiting diagnosis. The narrative is 
constructed as a defence, and by making the reader complicit in the labelling and potentially 
‘othering’ process, he or she becomes aware of the arbitrary and complicated nature of such 
demarcation. 
 The defensiveness of the narrator echoes hegemonic discourse: he attempts to 
construct the ‘mad’ as something ‘other’, specifically something ‘other’ than him. For 
example, he declares: ‘you fancy me mad. Madmen know nothing. But you should have seen 
                                                          
38 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
39 H. G. Woodley, Certified: An Autobiographical Study (London: Gollancz, 1947), p. 89. 
40 In chapter five, I discuss how, even in our twenty-first-century context, psychiatric discourses and practice 
still operate on the assumption that ‘madness’ cannot recognise, and thus, manage itself. 
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me’ (p. 193). The italicisation of ‘me’ allows for emphasis, distinguishing the self from the 
earlier mention of ‘madmen’. The narrator goes on to describe the ‘caution’, ‘foresight’ and 
‘dissimulation’ (p. 193) he employed, suggesting that he is a creature of reason, of rationality, 
and of knowledge, and therefore far removed from the contrary states associated with 
‘madness’. This is further reinforced by the narrator demanding: ‘would a madman have been 
so wise as this?’ (p. 193). If he is ‘wise’, he cannot be ‘mad’. If he is capable of articulation, 
sound argument and reason, he is too familiar to the reader to be entirely ‘othered’. 
 The narrator’s attempts to defend his ‘sanity’ become increasingly problematic as he 
describes his apparently motiveless, premeditated murder of ‘the old man’ (p. 193) with 
whom he lives. The narrator argues: ‘if you still think me mad, you will think so no longer 
when I describe the wise precautions I took for the concealment of the body’ (p. 196). His 
defence of the self – evocative of the struggle for identity in the consuming psychiatric 
narrative – has been trivialised, designed to provoke uncomfortable humour. The reader is 
encouraged to think that of course the narrator is ‘mad’: he thinks ‘sanity’ can be proven by 
efficiently disposing of a body. This established union of ‘madness’ and violence reinforces 
the mainstream portrayal of ‘madness’ as a threat which must be contained in order to be 
controlled. The fact that the narrator is a murderer – however meticulous or methodical – 
ratifies the label of ‘madman’ which he so vehemently resists.  
 It is no surprise that, after the details of the murder have been revealed, the narrator’s 
actions – and therefore his identity – are reduced to stereotypical traits associated with 
‘madness’, such as ‘foam[ing]’ and ‘rav[ing]’ (p. 197). His auditory hallucination, centred on 
his conviction that he can hear ‘the beating of his [the old man’s] hideous heart’ (p. 197) 
under the floorboards, is the final verification that he is the ‘mad’, ‘unreliable’ narrator. On 
the surface, ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ conforms to psychiatric discourse: the narrator is 
constructed using these terms, and, although he resists them, the sense of ‘otherness’ and 
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violence is so prevalent in the text that the reader cannot help but decide he must be ‘mad’. 
Poe is reinforcing the stereotype that ‘madness’ is inextricable from criminality: something to 
be feared and removed from the social landscape. The reference to the narrator’s 
hallucinations further portrays him as fallible, enforcing the psychiatric hypothesis that the 
‘mad’ are ‘“unreliable” witnesses, subject to hallucinations, delusions and violent 
tendencies’.41 This not only damages the relationship between ‘mad’ self and reader in the 
context of the short story, but also beyond that. ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ offers a ‘madness’ 
narrative (albeit a fictional one) which allows society insight into the mind of the ‘other’. The 
fact that only ‘otherness’ can be found verifies the social and psychiatric marginalisation of 
‘madness’. 
 Although the ‘otherness’ of the narrator threatens to reinforce the psychiatric tradition 
of silencing and alienation, there are subtleties in the text which imply that things are more 
complicated. The presence of hallucinations – which establishes the narrator as ‘unreliable’ – 
could also indicate that no murder took place at all. If the narrator can imagine a heart beating 
under the floorboards, and an ‘Evil Eye’ (p. 193), could he not also have hallucinated the 
murder scene? Although the prevailing message from the text is still that the ‘mad’ individual 
is not a reliable source of information (particularly damaging in light of a struggle to 
communicate the self as an alternative to the governing discourse), the possibility of 
hallucinated violence is less of a threat than perpetrated violence. Although the ‘mad’ 
narrator is still irredeemably ‘other’, he is less likely to be perceived as an active threat. 
 Notably, the protagonist also exerts narrative control. Pleading his ‘sanity’ to the 
reader, the ‘mad’ character is in a position of power and knowledge. He not only addresses 
the reader – a connection impossible in the bounds of the conventional psychiatric text – but 
he is also able to pre-empt their thoughts and assumptions (‘you fancy me mad’ (p. 193)) and 
                                                          
41 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33. 
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actively imagine them as part of the proceedings (‘Oh, you would have laughed’ (p. 193)). 
Although Poe leaves the final judgement to the reader, allowing the verdict of ‘insanity’ to be 
reached, there is the uncomfortable sense that the reader has been part of it all, both of the 
events of the text, and of psychiatric ‘othering’. Although ‘madness’ is portrayed as 
something ‘other’, the events articulated in the text have been experienced by both reader and 
‘madman’ – even the hallucinations. Can we really condemn the narrator as a homicidal, 
hallucinating ‘madman’ when we were complicit all along?  
 
Blabbing Physicians and Idiot Gabble: Deconstructing Hegemony in ‘Maud’ 
In theory, Alfred Lord Tennyson’s capacity as poet laureate gave him a universally 
acknowledged status, through which he could offer a powerful counter-narrative to 
psychiatric discourse. Holding the position from 1850-92, his laureateship coincided with the 
construction of over 20 large asylums, the passing of the 1853 County Asylums Act and the 
1890 Lunacy Act: an array of socio-political changes which contributed to the wider 
(mis)understanding of ‘madness’.42 Tennyson’s laureateship afforded him a mainstream 
platform, from which he could offer narratives which addressed and continued debates about 
how ‘madness’ should be represented and dealt with. However, this position also tied him to 
convention, forcing him to ensure that his poetry was accessible, readable and relatable.  
‘Maud’ is the product of this conflict. Published in 1855, it was part of Tennyson’s 
first collection as poet laureate, and it embodies opposing desires to speak about ‘madness’ 
and to be heard. Therefore, ‘Maud’ had to present ‘madness’ as something relatable while 
simultaneously trying to conform to the hegemonic agenda that characterised psychiatric 
discourse. This ensured that ‘madness’ was presented in its socially accessible semantic form, 
guaranteeing readability and appeasing the poet’s audience.  
                                                          
42 Information taken from Andrew Roberts, ‘Mental Health History Timeline’  
<http://studymore.org.uk/> [accessed 9 September, 2014]. 
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Offering an intimate first-person narrative which exposes the internal monologue of 
an unnamed protagonist, ‘Maud’ is an amalgamation of various poetic conventions. It 
incorporates ‘the monodrama, the mad song, and the dramatic monologue [and] is 
constructed from vividly contrasted sections, narrative and lyric’.43 It is both a pastiche of 
literary traditions and something entirely original: a body of text which is familiar, yet which, 
as a whole, surpasses the sum of its parts. This is a fitting analogy for its use of psychiatric 
discourse. It is the foundation on which the poem is constructed and yet the end result is 
somehow beyond its realm. 
The primary theme is one of unrequited love which appears to destabilise the identity 
of the narrator, as he struggles to ‘keep a temperate brain’.44 There is an inescapable sense of 
alienation and isolation. The narrative explores the protagonist’s failed romance, his liminal 
social role as a fugitive when the narrator is forced to flee following a violent altercation with 
Maud’s brother, and the death of the protagonist’s father. These events culminate in total 
marginalisation when he is incarcerated in an asylum. The protagonist resolves to ‘bury 
myself in myself’ (I. XIX. l. 4) long before the ‘grave’ (II. XI. l. 2) of the asylum. The final 
act of incarceration not only forces a commentary on the psychiatric process, but also creates 
a direct conflict between psychiatric narrative and the individual voice. It allows a direct 
point of comparison for the configuration of the protagonist’s identity prior to, and during, his 
contact with psychiatry. 
The psychiatric presence in the text is not made explicit until the end of the second 
section. In theory, this means that, for the majority of the poem, the identity of the narrator is 
constructed by, and for, the self, without intervention. However, due to its pervasive nature, 
psychiatric discourse has inevitably influenced the lexical choices made by Tennyson, and 
thus his narrator, as a means of articulating the ‘mad’ self. The melodramatic language used 
                                                          
43 Pedlar, Dreadful Visitation, p. 69. 
44 Tennyson, ‘Maud’, I. VII. l. 4. All further references will be given in the body of the text. 
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throughout the first section of the narrative allows ‘Maud’ to function as a prelude to the 
Sensation genre, with the overwhelming sense of tension and mystery drawing the reader in: 
‘the roots of my hair were stirr’d/ […] my pulses closed their gates with a shock on my heart 
as I heard/ The shrill-edged shriek’ (I. IV. ll. 1-4).45 This dramatic opening evokes heightened 
emotions and a sense of spectacle, and this correlation between ‘madness’ and the extreme 
(anger, violence, the ‘vitriol madness’ (I. X. l. 1)) reaffirms it as the binary opposite of 
reason.46 With the grand narratives of the nineteenth century shifting towards rationalism, 
industrialisation and secularism – championing scientific discourse (the objective) over the 
spiritual and emotive (the subjective) – to represent reason is to be part of mainstream 
society. To represent ‘unreason’, then, is to be excluded. ‘Madness’ is perceived as a contrary 
state.47 The narrator of ‘Maud’ is immediately constructed in terms of his ‘otherness’, 
primarily his emotive subjectivity in the face of a progressively objective society. By 
depicting ‘madness’ as a deviation from cultural normativity, psychiatric discourse can be 
incorporated – and further reinforced – without it even being directly manifested.48  
Repeated words like ‘rave’ (I. XV. l. 4), ‘sick’ (I. XVI. l. 1) and ‘nerves’ (I. XVI. l. 3) 
evoke psychiatric discourse. The term ‘rave’ has Anglo-Norman and Old French origins, 
denoting an ‘other’ state of mind: ‘to be mad, to behave as if delirious […] to wander in one's 
mind’, later encompassing the elemental49 and the bestial.50 However, ‘rave’ also implies a 
                                                          
45 Tennyson’s marriage of terror and ‘roots of […] hair [which] stirr’d’ reflect the Latin etymology of ‘horror’: 
originating from the Latin term ‘horrēre’, meaning ‘to stand on end (as hair), to bristle. See OED, ‘horre’ 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/88553#eid1282175> [accessed 9 January 2016]. 
46 Tennyson’s focus on the corporeal experience echoes contemporary phrenological discourse, which sought to 
‘discern the outward marks of a mind’ on the physical self. See John Conolly, ‘The Physiognomy of Insanity’, 
in Embodied Selves, ed. by Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 18-21 (p. 20). 
47 As Lewis Carroll explained through the voice of the Cheshire Cat: ‘You see a dog growls when it’s angry, and 
wags its tail when it’s pleased. Now I growl when I’m pleased, and wag my tail when I’m angry. Therefore I’m 
mad’. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, ed. by Roger Lancelyn Green (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) , p. 58. 
48 At this point in the text, there is no explicit psychiatric presence, but hegemonic discourse is still relied on to 
describe ‘madness’. 
49 ‘Of the sea, the wind, a storm […] to rage; to rush or roar furiously’. OED, ‘rave’  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/158622?rskey=u38qTF&result=4#eid> [accessed 9 September 2014]. 
50 An example of usage from 1848 describes how ‘that sow’s always raving and revelling so’. Ibid. 
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problematic relationship with language and communication. To ‘rave’ is to ‘to speak or 
declaim wildly, irrationally, or incoherently’.51 It is reminiscent of Porter’s declaration that in 
‘mainline views in psychiatric medicine […] it became standard to refer to what mad people 
said […] through terms such as “chattering”, “jabbering” and “ranting”’.52 Implications of 
incoherence and unknowability are prevalent throughout psychiatric discourse, enforcing the 
idea that to be ‘mad’ is to have no control over language. According to Sass, the ‘mad’ 
individual ‘is psychiatry’s quintessential Other – the patient whose very essence is 
“incomprehensibility” itself’.53  
Tennyson’s repetition of ‘rave’ evokes a form of ‘madness’ so divorced from reason 
that the individual’s speech and manner become ‘wild’, ‘irrational’, and bestial. It also 
depicts a human experience which is so ineffable that it cannot be contained in conventional 
language: Tennyson leaves the reader to decide where the fault lies. Should an experience 
beyond orthodox language be disregarded as ‘incomprehensible’ and thus not allowed to 
enter popular currency? Or should language be required to change in order to accommodate 
the vast array of human experience which is currently silenced by its rigid and limiting 
structure? 
The term ‘nerves’ suggests the nineteenth-century discourse of hysteria, particularly 
neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s hypothesis that ‘madness’ signified a ‘weakness of the 
nervous system’.54 Repetition of both ‘nerves’ and ‘sick’ alludes to a deviation from health, 
but also enforces the idea that ‘madness’ is an inherent lack or difference which overwhelms 
the body and mind. This ‘otherness’ is fundamental to psychiatric discourse: psychiatric 
language apparently identifies ‘marked deviation from conventional or normal ways of 
acting, or thinking, or feeling [...] to make it appear that there must be something lacking in 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 
52 Porter, Social History, p. 32. 
53 Sass, ‘Introspection’, p. 4. 
54 Stone, Healing the Mind, p. 101. 
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the constitutional makeup of the individual’.55 Charcot’s construction of hysteria works on 
the assumption of weakness in the ‘mad’ individual, continuing the theme of ‘mad’ as ‘other’. 
Tennyson employs this hypothesis in his characterisation by mirroring language which 
equates ‘madness’ with an absence or an inherent lack – a deviation from the ‘norm’. 
However, by evoking contemporary discourse of nerves and ‘otherness’, is Tennyson 
reaffirming or challenging psychiatric hegemony?  
The unconventional representation of ‘madness’ in ‘Maud’ implies that Tennyson was 
providing an alternative discourse through which ‘madness’ can be articulated, but it sits 
uncomfortably alongside the running theme of ‘otherness’ in the poem. The isolation of the 
protagonist allows for a feeling of transcendence, as he describes his ‘philosopher’s life in the 
quiet woodland ways’ (I. VIII. l. 1), removed from the ‘clamour of liars belied in the hubbub 
of lies’ (I. VIII. l. 3). Reminiscent of Emily Dickinson’s declaration that ‘much Madness is 
divinest Sense -/To a discerning Eye’, there is a suggestion that this self-imposed alienation 
from a society ‘where each man walks with his head in a cloud of poisonous flies’ (I. VIII. l. 
6) is actually a logical choice motivated by self-preservation.56 It could be argued that the 
‘madness’ of Tennyson’s protagonist, epitomised by alienation and ‘otherness’, is the only 
‘sane’ response he has available; the only active way to demarcate the self from a corrupt 
milieu. 
Tennyson’s construct of the philosophical ‘mad’ self is fundamental to the 
relationship between protagonist and reader. In ‘Maud’, this representation offers an 
alternative to Voltaire’s assumption that alienation occurs merely because the ‘mad’ 
individual has no place: ‘incapable of ideas suitable for society, he is excluded [from it]’.57 
Psychiatric discourse actively and literally removes the ‘mad’ from the social landscape 
                                                          
55 Faris, ‘Cultural Isolation’, p. 156. 
56 Emily Dickinson, ‘435’, in Emily Dickinson Everyman’s Poetry, ed. by Helen McNeil (London: Everyman, 
1997), ll. 1-2. 
57 M. De Voltaire, The Philosophical Dictionary (George H. Evans: New York, 1835), p. 151. 
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under the vague premises of safety, management and ‘cure’. However, the desired place for 
the ‘mad’ self is never really acknowledged.58 The idea of ‘madness’ being shunned by 
society is a customary theme in any narrative which speaks about it, but Tennyson’s 
intimation that the ‘mad’ individual could actively refuse a social role is certainly radical. If 
the ‘mad’ (‘other’) rejects society (‘us’), the presumed binary of ‘us’/‘other’ is entirely 
subverted, and society becomes the ‘other’s’ ‘other’. As philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche 
contended, ‘when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you’.59 Society and 
psychiatry may feel that it has successfully neutralised the threat of Tennyson’s ‘mad’ 
protagonist by incarcerating and containing him. However, the ‘babble’ (II. V. IV. l. 6) of the 
‘mad’ is indistinguishable from the ‘blabbing’ of the ‘vile physician’ (II. V. III. l. 7): the roles 
of ‘us’/‘other’, rational/incoherent, ‘patient’/psychiatrist and, as Nietzsche would argue, 
gazer/abyss are exposed to the reader as fluid. 
Towards the end of its second section, ‘Maud’ focuses on the incarceration of the 
protagonist, and therefore his identity is reconstructed by a more explicit psychiatric 
presence. Throughout these stanzas, his incarceration is described as a ‘shallow grave’ (II. V. 
I. l. 6): a liminal state which encompasses both life and death, and the absent and the present. 
It also evokes the inevitable ‘social death’ the individual experiences once hegemonic 
discourse allocates to them the role and language of ‘patient’.60 In this instance, Tennyson 
conforms to psychiatric discourse insofar as the metaphor of living death denotes a state of 
difference – something that exists in between life and death.  
However, the depiction of incarceration as a purgatorial state of living death is also 
emotionally loaded, and is therefore Tennyson’s conscious attempt to forge sympathy from 
                                                          
58 Porter described the rise in asylum culture and incarceration as a process whereby the ‘otherness’ of 
‘madness’ could be contained and handled in a marginalised, pseudo-quarantined space: ‘the instituting of the 
asylum set up a cordon sanitaire delineating the “normal” from the “mad”, which underlined the Otherhood of 
the insane and carved out a managerial milieu in which that alienness could be handled’. See Roy Porter, 
Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 122. 
59 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 102. 
60 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p. 26. 
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his readers. Evoking Perceval’s description of the ‘death-in-life of a lunatic asylum’, death 
obviously implies trauma and grief, but the idea of being buried alive taps into a latent 
anxiety.61 The fear of premature burial was further embedded into social consciousness by 
the cholera outbreaks of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the invention of the 
‘safety coffin’ illustrates just how entrenched this anxiety was. The mechanics of this device 
are best described by Poe in the short story ‘The Premature Burial’: ‘there was’, he wrote, 
‘suspended from the roof of the tomb, a large bell, the rope of which, it was designed, should 
extend through a hole in the coffin, and so be fastened to one of the hands’.62 The process of 
incarceration is presented to Tennyson’s readers as a horrifying premature burial, made even 
more menacing by the silencing force of psychiatry: Tennyson illustrates incarceration as the 
equivalent of being buried alive, heard but left. This image also alludes to the fallibility of 
psychiatric judgement. To be buried alive is either to be the victim of someone’s error – 
wrongly assumed to be dead and thus buried – or to be purposefully entombed. Whether 
malevolent or mistaken, the agency which confined the individual, in the grave or in the 
metaphorical burial of the asylum, is depicted as problematic and fallible. 
The use of the first-person narrative ensures this metaphor goes beyond the realm of 
the unsettling, towards the truly disturbing. Emotive language and onomatopoeia hijack the 
reading experience, forcing the reader to empathise with the experience of the narrator: 
The wheels go over my head, 
And my bones are shaken with pain, 
For into a shallow grave they are thrust, 
Only a yard beneath the street, 
And the hoofs of the horses beat, beat 
[…] 
I thought the dead had peace, but it is not so; 
To have no peace in the grave, is that not sad? (II. V. I ll. 4-16)  
 
                                                          
61 Perceval, Perceval’s Narrative, p. 3. 
62 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Premature Burial’ (Chester: NetLibrary, [n.d.]) [accessed 17 September 2014], p. 8. 
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This conflict between language of ‘otherness’ (of dissociation) and language of human 
experience (and thus of familiarity) underscores the entire text, but is foregrounded during the 
consecutive stanzas. The ‘us’/‘other’ distinction is further complicated, with the narrator 
describing the sense of unity among ‘patients’, as indicated by the first person plural pronoun 
‘us’ (II. V. III. l. 1). This constructs the asylum as a social microcosm, where the ‘vile 
physician’ (II. V. III. l. 7) is the ‘other’ because of his ‘sanity’.  
 By contrast, psychiatric language is used to depict the other characters in the asylum, 
indicating Tennyson’s reliance on this discourse in order to construct the identity of a ‘mad’ 
character. Dramatic, emotive terms such as ‘sobbing’ (II. V. III. l. 1) and ‘distress’ (II. V. III. 
l. 2) evoke an absence of rationalism and reason which portray ‘madness’ as ‘other’. The 
psychiatric assumption that ‘madness’ is a ‘kind of non-knowledge’ is evident in semantic 
choices such as ‘fool’ (V. I. III. l. 6) and ‘idiot’ (II. V. IV. l. 1).63 Reference to hallucinations 
and delusions reflects the psychiatric contention that the ‘mad’ are ‘“unreliable” witnesses’ 
which serves to undermine the perceived worth of the ‘madness’ narrative.64 The mention of 
a ‘patient’ who considers himself ‘lord of all things’ (II. V. III. l. 3) inevitably instigates 
doubt (were it not already present) in the mind of the reader concerning the ‘reliability’ of our 
narrator. The narrative has been reconfigured in the space and language of psychiatry so the 
reader is reoriented and the power of the dominant narrative is reinstated. The foregrounded 
identity of the protagonist is no longer that of grieving son, of spurned lover, of philosopher 
or even that of narrator: he is a ‘patient’. He is ‘mad’, no longer deemed a reliable or valid 
source of information. The ‘madness’ narrative becomes ‘nothing but idiot gabble’ (II. V. IV. 
l. 1), ‘merely […] babble’ (II. V. IV. l. 6) and it is no coincidence that the entire narrative 
concludes shortly afterwards. 
                                                          
63 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
64 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33. 
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 Although this conscious employment of psychiatric language does impact on the 
relationship between ‘madness’ narrative and reader by evoking ‘otherness’, Tennyson does 
not construct ‘madness’ solely in these terms. By providing an insight into the identity of the 
‘mad’ self prior to contact with psychiatry, the reader is shown that there is an alternative 
(albeit one which is later consumed by ‘otherness’).65 Throughout the penultimate stanza of 
the poem, the protagonist muses: ‘still I am but half-dead;/Then I cannot be wholly dumb’ (II. 
V. XI. ll. 4-5). This is a fitting summary of the conflicting ‘madness’ discourses in the text. 
The narrator is ‘half-dead’; his previous identity has been usurped by taxonomy and 
‘otherness’ and he is caught in a purgatorial alive/dead, absent/present state. The worth of his 
narrative has been disregarded by psychiatry, by the assumption of his ‘unreliability’. 
However, to be ‘half-dead’ is also to be ‘half-alive’, and so he still has a voice, albeit one 
stifled by hegemony. By granting the ‘mad’ character narrative space, Tennyson has ensured 
that his protagonist ‘cannot be wholly dumb’, despite the individual text being both produced, 
and consumed, by psychiatric discourse. 
 
The Pet Lunatic versus the Philosopher: Reading ‘Madness’ through Dracula’s 
Narrative Layers 
Written in 1897, Dracula examines the intersection between the supernatural and the 
scientific. By focusing on the unnerving ‘total lack of human control over a powerful and 
overwhelming universe’, Bram Stoker explores the terrain of the geographically, spiritually 
or mentally ‘other’.66 The assumption of Stoker as a Gothic writer – a genre comprised of 
‘tales of mystery and horror […] intended to chill the spine and curdle the blood’ – seems 
incompatible with Dracula’s narrative focus on the scientific, the medical and the 
                                                          
65 Shortly, when I discuss Poe’s ‘Tarr and Fether’, I explore the idea that ‘madness’ only becomes ‘other’ in the 
presence of psychiatry, which enforces this marginalisation. In ‘Maud’, the narrator’s ‘madness’ is only 
explicitly ‘othered’ after he has been incarcerated. 
66 Carol A. Senf, Science and Social Science in Bram Stoker’s Fiction (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 19. 
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technological.67 Between these apparently paradoxical discourses of the rational and the 
spiritual, Stoker’s representations of ‘madness’ could either be pathologised or demonised: 
either way, in the realm of a novel which handles both Gothic and scientific materials, 
‘madness’ seems destined to be ‘other’.  
 Dracula’s fragmented narrative form immediately signifies a different reading 
approach: the reader is expected to be an active entity, piecing together the story themselves 
from diary entries, letters, and newspaper articles. Dr Seward’s narrative not only allows for a 
nod to technological advancements (‘Kept in phonograph’ – a narrative style later echoed by 
Freud): it also provides intimate insight into Seward’s interior states.68 Seward’s narrative is 
an oxymoron: it is both an objective, psychiatric text and an emotive, subjective diary. 
Seward’s account is far removed from apparently impartial psychiatric narratives. The form 
is also used by Stoker to invite doubt in his readers: we are encouraged to challenge the 
supposed reliability of our various narrators, as we never receive the whole picture. This 
narrative medium represents an opportunity to question the ‘reliability’ of all narratives, both 
in the microcosm of the text, and in grander societal discourses, including psychiatry. 
However, Stoker’s employment of psychiatric discourse indicates that hegemonic narratives 
are being endorsed, rather than disputed. 
 Stoker continues to ventriloquize ‘madness’ through psychiatric discourse, as the 
reader only accesses Renfield’s (the ‘mad’ individual, and the object of Seward’s almost 
monomaniacal study) narrative through Seward’s diary. Renfield’s ‘madness’ represents 
more than one function for Seward. Not only is he ‘a study of much interest’ (p. 60), but he is 
also a distraction for Seward, a ‘cure’ (p. 60) for the turmoil presented by issues in his private 
life.69 Renfield is introduced as ‘so unlike the normal lunatic’ (p. 60), thus immediately 
reducing him to psychiatric discourse, both in the form of taxonomy, and the 
                                                          
67 J. A. Cuddon, Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 356. 
68 Stoker, Dracula, p. 60. All further references will be given in the main body of the text. 
69 At this point in the narrative, Seward has just had a proposal of marriage refused by Lucy Westenra. 
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‘patient’/psychiatrist power dynamics evident throughout my analysis of the case study 
context. Renfield’s narrative is consumed in Seward’s. 
 Seward desires to make himself the ‘master of the facts of his [Renfield’s] 
hallucination’ (p. 60). On the one hand, this demonstrates the psychiatric aspiration not only 
to understand (or, indeed, (mis)understand) ‘madness’ but to govern it, to establish political 
control. It is an abstract form of colonisation: the psychiatrist apparently represents reason, 
knowledge and coherence, and attempts to enforce these values onto the unknowable ‘mad’ 
topography – or, at the very least, to initiate the ‘mad’ self into a langue which articulates 
‘otherness’. However, Seward’s aspiration to be the ‘master’ of Renfield’s ‘madness’ 
suggests that he is not yet the ‘master’. This depicts psychiatric ‘authority’ as a process – 
something that has to be achieved – rather than an automatic privilege.70 Despite being 
contained and reduced in psychiatric discourse and its institution, Renfield is the ‘master’ of 
his own ‘madness’, blurring any established or expected power dynamics, and denying 
psychiatry power. He is the autonomous ‘madman’, governing and protecting the self in the 
face of psychiatric forces which seek to usurp his identity. In the same paragraph, Renfield’s 
‘madness’ is referred to as ‘his madness’ (p. 60): an experience demarcated as his, not 
surrendered to hegemony, or reclaimed by the psychiatric presence.  
 However, Seward continues to discuss Renfield using psychiatric terminology, and in 
the absence of Renfield’s counter-narrative, this becomes the sole point of reference the 
reader has for characterising him. By describing Renfield in terms of ‘otherness’, Seward 
reinforces the power of the dominant narrative, and tries to obstruct the relationship between 
                                                          
70 Kraepelin described the politics of the psychiatric environment as requiring ‘patient’ passivity. This enforces 
a clear hierarchy, enhanced by the culture of institutionalisation, designed to establish psychiatric ‘authority’ 
and ‘patient’ disenfranchisement automatically. See, for example, his claim that ‘the patients have lost every 
independent inclination’ (p. 37), interpreting this, of course, as a symptom of ‘madness’ rather than the result of 
totalitarian asylum culture. Kraepelin elaborated that ‘as the inner activity of volition fails, the resistance which 
outside influences meet within us is […] easily lost. The patients therefore are usually docile, let themselves be 
driven as a herd, so that they form the necessary nucleus of those crowds which conform willingly to the 
monotonous daily rounds’.  See Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 37. As discussed in chapter five, this presents 
‘madness’ controlled by psychiatric forces as neutralised; a stark contrast to ‘free’ and ‘autonomous’ ‘madness’. 
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Renfield’s voice (albeit ventriloquised) and reader, lest Renfield should be heard. Seward 
observes how ‘[Renfield’s] face fell, and I could see a warning of danger in it, for there was a 
sudden, fierce, sidelong look which meant killing. The man is an undeveloped homicidal 
maniac’ (p. 68). This sinister, bestial portrayal – alongside the explicit inclusion of 
psychiatric terminology – constructs Renfield as the ‘mad’, violent ‘other’ who is far 
removed from the supposed reason represented by psychiatry. This depiction relies on 
‘otherness’ to portray Renfield as an antagonist both in Seward’s text, and in the wider novel. 
Stoker has employed the psychiatric hypotheses that ‘madness’ is something threatening and 
alien to ‘chill the spine and curdle the blood’ of his readers – thus the text relies on ‘madness’ 
as a plot device.71 
 However, Stoker’s lexis complicates this. Seward’s declaration that Renfield is an 
‘undeveloped homicidal maniac’ (p. 68) is multifaceted. Seward echoes eighteenth-century 
discourses which employed almost interchangeably terms such as ‘idiots’, ’imbeciles’ or 
‘feeble minded’ in place of a rigid structure of taxonomy.72 This language denotes an 
individual who is ‘not fully developed’, thus indicating that Renfield is undeveloped, ‘other’, 
less than, encompassed in the twin nineteenth-century discourses of degeneracy and 
phrenology.73 However, an alternative reading would insinuate that it is Renfield’s capacity 
as a ‘homicidal maniac’ which is undeveloped: Seward is observing its potential but not its 
presence. What Seward is actually saying is that Renfield is not yet a ‘homicidal maniac’, 
and, therefore, not actually a ‘homicidal maniac’ at all. This theme of ‘otherness’, although 
very much present and pervasive, backfires. Could society, in its entirety, not be reduced to 
such labels, the not quite schizophrenic, the possible neurotic? It is an argument reminiscent 
                                                          
71 Cuddon, Dictionary, p. 356. 
72 Thomas Bewley, ‘Madness to Mental Illness’  
<http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/samplechapter/MadnesstoMIllnessSChap.pdf> [accessed 14 May 2012], p. 4. A 
legal distinction between ‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’ and ‘imbeciles’ was not made until the 1886 Idiots Act (later 
repealed by the Mental Deficiency Act in 1913). 
73 OED, ‘imbecile’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91681?rskey=U9gp9Q&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> 
[accessed 14 May 2012]. 
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of Dr Mosgrove’s diagnosis in Lady Audley’s Secret that ‘there is latent insanity!’74 Use of 
psychiatric language serves only to expose the fluidity of such terminology by revealing the 
potential for us all to be scrutinised and categorised. 
 Seward endeavours to create a new taxonomy in which Renfield can be contained, 
and the reader is granted insight into this process: ‘my homicidal maniac is of a peculiar kind. 
I shall have to invent a new classification for him, and call him a zoophagous (life-eating) 
maniac’ (p. 69). Use of the possessive determiner – ‘my homicidal maniac’ – implies that 
Renfield’s ‘madness’ has been conquered and is therefore now mastered and managed by 
Seward. Psychiatry has subjugated Renfield’s ‘madness’, and usurped his identity: his self is 
now owned by psychiatric forces. Once language exists to demarcate and diagnose Renfield, 
he becomes Seward’s ‘own pet lunatic’ (p. 219): he belongs to psychiatric ‘authority’. Pedlar 
argued that Renfield’s ‘diagnosis’ ‘is borrowed from natural science, and the transference 
underlines the degree to which Renfield is seen as an animal, a specimen for the scientist to 
observe and catalogue’.75 As with all psychiatric taxonomy, this is language designed to 
denote ‘otherness’ and difference. At this point in the plot, Seward’s terminology reinforces 
the idea that Renfield is just a spectacle, a psychiatric subject. The violent episode which 
follows Renfield’s escape verifies this: 
My patient is too dangerous a person to be roaming about. Those ideas of his might 
work out dangerously with strangers […] When we closed in on him, he fought like a 
tiger. He is immensely strong, and he was more like a wild beast than a man. I never 
saw a lunatic in such a paroxysm of rage before, and I hope I shall not again. It is a 
mercy that we have found out his strength and his danger in good time. With strength 
and determination like his, he might have done wild work before he was caged. (p. 
97-98) 
 
This establishes an ‘illusion of exteriority’, allowing Seward – and the reader – to construct 
Renfield’s identity in a way which demarcates him from mainstream society.76 Seward is 
                                                          
74 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Lady Audley’s Secret, ed. by David Skilton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 379.  
75 Pedlar, Dreadful Visitation, p. 138. 
76 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
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made uncomfortable by the idea of Renfield ‘roaming about’ and reintegrating with society 
because it would distort the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘other’. Renfield’s physical strength, 
echoing Poe’s description of ‘an energy superhuman’, is bestial, predatory, it must be 
‘caged’.77 This familiar assimilation of ‘madness’ and violence is prevalent in psychiatric 
discourse, and it reaffirms the idea that there is no place for ‘madness’ with the social 
landscape. 
 It is ironic that the governing narrative must theoretically empower ‘madness’ (by 
constructing it as a violent, physical force) in order ultimately to disenfranchise and silence it 
(to ensure it remains ‘other’). However, Stoker grants Renfield space to manoeuvre in this 
prescriptive, designated role. Renfield’s alleged violence (we must, of course, remember that 
we have only received this account from Seward) which estranges him from society and from 
his readers, is internalised and, to an extent, does empower him. Towards the end of the 
novel, during an altercation with the Count, the reader is presented with an account (albeit 
second-hand) of Renfield’s thought process: ‘I had heard that madmen have unnatural 
strength, and as I knew I was a madman – at times, anyhow – I resolved to use my power’ (p. 
263). The discourse intended to subdue Renfield is actually one which gives him strength, 
both literally and metaphorically, allowing for an alternative discourse which equates 
‘madness’ with autonomy and power. 
Although Stoker primarily relies on psychiatric language, it is not meekly accepted: 
lexical details serve to undermine and challenge Seward’s psychiatric ‘authority’. There are 
two other representations of ‘madness’ in the text which need to be analysed in order to 
comprehend Stoker’s overall commentary and, ultimately, the conclusion Stoker encourages 
his readers to reach. 
                                                          
77 Poe, ‘Tarr and Fether’, p. 280. 
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 Renfield’s role in the text needs to be deconstructed. Despite the psychiatric presence 
attempting to dictate otherwise, Renfield is not a character in isolation. He does have a 
relationship with the wider context of the novel; he is not merely Seward’s distraction or 
study: he is able to transcend the identity of psychiatric subject. Renfield’s apparent 
‘hallucinations’ are actually sources of insight to the reader and to the other characters, as 
‘Renfield’s every utterance and movement is a clue to happenings in the larger world of 
Dracula’s invasion’.78 Renfield is aware of the threat Dracula poses long before the majority 
of the other characters are and, significantly, before Seward: in this sense, ‘madness’ is no 
longer ‘non-knowledge’, it is a state of knowledge to which not even psychiatry or 
mainstream society have access.79 When searching for the Count, Seward reflects: ‘goodness 
knows that we had enough clues from the conduct of patient Renfield’ (p. 211). However, the 
assumption that ‘madness’ speaks no wisdom results in Renfield being ignored, and this 
delays the protagonists in their attempts to track down the Count and destroy him. 
The most significant passage (insofar as Stoker’s representation of ‘madness’ is 
concerned) is instigated by this conflict between knowledge and ‘non-knowledge’. Renfield 
understands the imminent threat posed by the Count, and pleads for Seward to move him 
from the asylum so the Count cannot find him: 
Let me entreat you, Dr Seward, oh, let me implore you, to let me out of this house at 
once. Send me away how you will and where you will; send keepers with me with 
whips and chains; let them take me in a strait waistcoat, manacled and leg-ironed, 
even to a jail – but let me go out of this. You don’t know what you do by keeping me 
here. I am speaking from the depths of my heart – of my very soul. You don’t know 
whom you wrong, or how, and I may not tell. Woe is me! I may not tell! […] Can’t 
you hear me, man? Can’t you understand? Will you never learn? Don’t you know that 
I am sane and earnest now; that I am no lunatic in a mad fit, but a sane man fighting 
for his soul? Oh, hear me! Hear me! Let me go! (p. 231) 
 
                                                          
78 Pedlar, Dreadful Visitation, p. 143. 
79 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
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Renfield possesses knowledge which he ‘may not tell’, thus subverting the established power 
dynamics of ‘patient’/psychiatrist.80 This emotive and urgent plea for protection allows for 
the reader to empathise with Renfield, although obviously he must declare himself a ‘sane 
man’ in order to have his voice acknowledged. His appeal to be heard (‘Oh, hear me! Hear 
me!’) extends beyond the context of the novel and allows Stoker to encourage his readers to 
hear, particularly as Renfield does represent a form of knowledge of which the other 
characters are ignorant. He addresses Seward as ‘man’ and later refers to himself as a ‘sane 
man’, consequently describing ‘us’ and ‘other’ in identical terms. This forces the reader to 
revaluate their relationship with Renfield: if both ‘patient’ and psychiatrist are just ‘men’, 
why should one voice be championed over the other?  
 The sympathy of the reader is manipulated further when Seward refuses Renfield’s 
request, attempting to demote him from his newly-articulated identity as Seward’s equal and 
return him to his passive role as ‘zoophagous patient’ (p. 109). Seward counters: ‘“Come,” I 
said sternly, “no more of this; we have had quite enough already. Get to your bed and try to 
behave more discreetly”’(p. 232). Later, Renfield is found horribly injured after he is attacked 
by the Count, just as he had predicted. This knowledge/‘non-knowledge’ conflict is used by 
Stoker to reveal ‘the stranglehold that the label of madness exerts’.81 By granting Renfield 
knowledge which surpasses both that of the other characters and of the reader, Stoker is 
subverting psychiatric assumptions that ‘attending or listening to the voice of the mad is 
pointless since, by the virtue of their unreason, their views are worthless’.82 That Renfield is 
both dismissed and ignored by Seward forces the reader to reflect on the nature of hegemonic 
narratives which encourage such silencing. Further, Van Helsing – another psychiatric 
presence in the text – reflects that ‘[Renfield’s] words may be worth many lives’ (p. 260). 
                                                          
80 Particularly topical in light of the growing popularity at the fin de siècle of Freud’s ‘talking cure’ which relied 
on the verbal information of – and emotional vulnerability of – the ‘patient’. 
81 Pedlar, Dreadful Visitation, p. 143. 
82 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 25. 
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However, that Renfield’s knowledge is only recognised after he is violently attacked, after 
there is physical proof of his claims, and after he describes himself as a ‘sane man’ (p. 231), 
allows Stoker to suggest that psychiatric (and social) attitudes towards ‘madness’ are not only 
tremendously misinformed but also, ultimately, inhumane. 
 Finally, there is a running theme which confuses – and destabilises – the distinction 
between ‘sanity’ and ‘insanity’. This technique is threefold. First, Stoker constructs Renfield 
as a character who may not be contained exclusively in psychiatric discourse. The reader 
expects a certain performance of ‘madness’ and, although Seward’s narrative attempts to 
diagnose and detail anomalies, Renfield resists being entirely ‘othered’ and therefore is not 
totally estranged from the reader. Evidence of this can be found in Stoker’s depiction of 
Renfield as ‘a lunatic who will talk philosophy, and reason so sound’ (p. 239). Although 
Renfield is still primarily described in terms of his perceived ‘otherness’ – his ‘lunacy’ – he 
has the capacity for knowledge and cogent articulation. Since ‘madness’ is supposed to 
represent antithesis of reason, it is something of a contradiction for Van Helsing (emblematic 
of psychiatric discourse) to describe a ‘patient’ both in terms of his ‘lunacy’ and his capacity 
for ‘sound’ judgement, since it implies that psychiatric discourse is misinformed, and 
needlessly limiting. Seward marvels at Renfield’s ‘unusual understanding of himself, which 
was unlike anything I had ever met with in a lunatic’ (p. 228). These depictions are still 
punctuated by psychiatric vocabulary, but they indicate that such terminology is not the full 
extent of Renfield’s identity. His self-awareness prevails despite the presence of psychiatry. 
Seward’s inability to limit Renfield’s identity to the role of ‘patient’ – and Renfield’s refusal 
to submit – belittle the perceived ‘authority’ of psychiatry, and so leaves the reader 
questioning why that assumption of ‘authority’ existed in the first place. 
Second, the ‘sanity’ of the other characters is challenged. By deconstructing 
Renfield’s ‘madness’ and questioning the presumed ‘sanity’ of the other protagonists, Stoker 
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is presenting ‘madness’ as a spectrum, rather than a Kraepelinian dichotomy. Van Helsing 
informs Seward that ‘all men are mad in some way or the other’ (p. 113) referring to 
members of mainstream society as ‘God’s madmen’ (p. 113). This normalisation of 
‘madness’ defuses the sense of ‘otherness’ prevalent in psychiatric discourse. Seward later 
questions Van Helsing’s ‘sanity’, directly asking ‘Dr Van Helsing, are you mad?’ (p. 182), 
and wondering ‘if his mind can have become in any way unhinged’ (p. 191). Seward, despite 
being the force which demarcates ‘madness’ from ‘sanity’, grows uncertain of such a binary 
distinction: ‘I sometimes think that we must be all mad and that we shall wake to sanity in 
strait waistcoats’ (p. 257). By granting Renfield elements of reason, knowledge and 
autonomy (and thus ‘sanity’), and forcing Seward and Van Helsing to contemplate the 
possibility of their own ‘madness’, Stoker exposes the fragility and fluidity of the ‘us’/‘other’ 
distinction. If the psychiatrist can see himself in the ‘patient’, then the ‘mad’ self is not the 
psychiatrist’s ‘other’ but his echo, his mirror image. 
Finally, Stoker merges the characterisations of Renfield, Seward and Van Helsing to 
challenge the supposed ‘sane’/‘insane’ binary further. Seward and Renfield are twinned from 
the opening of the novel, with both men relying on diaries as a means of self-expression. The 
psychiatric assumption that the ‘mad’ voice is ‘worthless’ is subverted alongside the 
established power dynamics. Renfield belittles Van Helsing’s ‘authority’, declaring ‘you are 
the old fool Van Helsing. I wish you would take yourself and your idiotic brain theories 
somewhere else’ (p. 240).83 Terms such as ‘fool’ and ‘idiotic’ evoke eighteenth-century 
discourses of ‘madness’, and so Van Helsing (despite his ‘brain theories’, and his perceived 
knowledge and power) is reconstructed by Renfield in Renfield’s terms. Taxonomy has been 
reversed: the psychiatrist has become the ‘patient’. Psychiatry is portrayed not as Renfield’s 
                                                          
83 Van Helsing’s ‘idiotic brain theories’ echo Voltaire’s claim about doctors: ‘Why a brain has incoherent ideas, 
is above their comprehension; and they little comprehend why, in another brain, the ideas are regular and 




‘other’ but his other self, his doppelgänger.84 Renfield challenges Seward, diminishing 
Seward’s perceived reason and power: ‘What ridiculous nonsense you are talking!’ (p. 254). 
The ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamics have been subverted. The lunatic has taken over the 
asylum – or at least its discourse.  
 
‘Diagnostics of Madness’: Speaking and ‘Othering’ ‘Madness’ in Lady Audley’s Secret85 
In fiction, the role of ‘madness’ is also subject to expectations of genre. The tremendously 
popular Sensation genre, which gathered momentum in the 1860s, aimed to ‘keep readers at a 
fever-pitch of suspense’, and frequently incorporated ‘madness’ as a theme.86 According to 
Punch magazine, it was concerned with ‘Harrowing the Mind, Making the Flesh Creep, 
Causing the Hair to Stand on End, Giving Shocks to the Nervous System, Destroying 
Conventional Moralities, and generally Unfitting the Public for the Prosaic Avocations of 
Life’.87 It could be argued that ‘madness’ was thus demoted to a plot device, functioning only 
to ‘creep’ the flesh of its Victorian audience. Although the Sensation genre offered ‘madness’ 
a ‘textual display’, it was also voyeuristic, ‘exploit[ing] the taste for representations of the 
horrors of the madhouse’.88 
However, ‘madness’, ever irreducible, could not be constricted to such a superficial 
role. ‘Madness’, once ‘confined to the Gothic subplot – to the narrative and domestic space 
that Charlotte Brontë call[ed] “the third story”’, had taken up a significant space in the centre 
of the plot and was therefore able to occupy the foreground of the narrative.89 The 
oversimplification of ‘madness’ as a function (much like the belief that a ‘madness’ narrative 
has no value other than as a psychiatric tool) still meant that it was permitted narrative space, 
                                                          
84 Later in this chapter, I discuss the motif of the doppelgänger further in light of Poe’s short story ‘William 
Wilson’. 
85 Braddon, Lady Audley’s Secret, p. 287. All further references will be given in the main body of the text. 
86 Deborah Wynne, The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family Magazine (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 2. 
87 Anon, ‘Sensation Times’, Punch, 9 May 1863, pp. 178-96 (p.193). 
88 Wynne, Sensation Novel, p. 48. 
89 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady (London: Virago, 1987), p. 52. 
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and granted a voice through literature. Although not necessarily offering a sympathetic 
portrayal, Sensation literature opened up a dialogue between ‘madness’ and readership.  This 
relationship had previously been sabotaged in psychiatric discourses to enforce ‘otherness’, 
an ‘illusion of exteriority’, or a disconnect between reader and ‘madness’ narrative.90 
 To what extent is Lady Audley’s supposed ‘madness’ (or, indeed, her ‘sanity’) used 
by Braddon as a plot device to provoke outrage, shock or – radically – sympathy in her 
nineteenth-century readership? Lady Audley’s relationship with hegemony is complex: it is 
the foundation on which she communicates her personal and family identity; it is internalised 
as means of justifying her supposed crimes; she is liberated from it by being declared ‘sane’; 
and yet she is detained in it anyway when incarcerated. Lady Audley’s unstable relationship 
with psychiatric discourse (and its institution) is explored by Braddon as a means of 
portraying ‘madness’ as a spectrum on which we are all contained, rather than a binary 
opposition which marginalises ‘madness’ as a form of deviation and venerates ‘sanity’ as the 
‘norm’. 
 Immediately, the narrative voice complicates the assumption that Lady Audley’s 
‘madness’ is visibly apparent, commenting that ‘all mental distress is, with some show of 
reason associated in our minds with loose, disordered garments, and dishevelled hair, and an 
appearance in every way the reverse of my lady’s’ (p. 338). Although this is a commentary 
very much rooted in the nineteenth-century hypothesis – borne out of theories of phrenology 
and degeneration – that ‘madness’ is associated with discernible ‘otherness’, it has wider 
ramifications, both in the text and in mainstream society. Braddon is acknowledging the 
‘wide spectrum of visual stereotypes’ which supposedly characterise ‘madness’, and is 
demythologising them, exposing the potential for psychiatric discourse to be misinformed, 
                                                          
90 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
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and for it to misinform society in turn.91 By challenging part of the ruling narrative by 
revealing it to be flawed, Braddon is opening up the potential for all of the assumptions it 
makes about ‘madness’ to be questioned. 
 Psychiatric discourse, embodied by Dr Mosgrove, is a commanding force in the text. 
It is enforced by the majority of the characters (symbolically, those who have power, 
primarily the patriarchal figures in the novel). It is used to subdue Lady Audley, to 
reconstruct her identity as ‘asylum patient’ rather than ‘patriarchal threat’ (indicated by her 
bigamy and alleged violent behaviour). Robert Audley uses her supposed ‘madness’ as a 
means of dissociation, declaring: ‘henceforth you must seem to me no longer a woman […] I 
look upon you henceforth as the demoniac incarnation of some evil principle’ (p. 345). There 
was – and still is, to an extent – an entrenched cultural legacy which amalgamated ‘madness’ 
with possession and supernatural forces. Although somewhat displaced by the ‘rationality’ 
and ‘objective’ discourse of nineteenth-century psychiatry, it was still a manoeuvre designed 
to demarcate the ‘other’, and thus inevitably formed part of that discourse. Eighteenth-
century theologian Hugh Farmer described how demons were perceived to ‘deprive men of 
their reason’, and ‘madness’ lies in this absence of reason.92 Although pronouncing such 
demons to be allegorical rather than literal, the cultural marriage of the two endured, finding 
its way into Robert Audley’s understanding of ‘madness’ in a novel written over eighty-five 
years later. Lady Audley can no longer be perceived as a woman because she is ‘mad’ and 
therefore must be less-than, something ‘other’. She is literally demonised by Robert so he can 
construct an ‘illusion of exteriority’ to distance himself from her.93 
 Lady Audley does not reject psychiatric discourse, and, in a melodramatic fashion 
true to Sensational conventions, reveals her ‘mad’ identity during a heated altercation with 
Robert. Referring to herself as ‘a MADWOMAN!’ (p. 345), she offers her supposed 
                                                          
91 Sander L. Gilman, Seeing the Insane (New York: Bison Books, 1982), p. 116. 
92 Hugh Farmer, An Essay on the Demoniacs of the New Testament (London: G. Robinson, 1775), pp. 2-3. 
93 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
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‘madness’ as means of  justification as Robert accuses her of murdering her previous 
husband: ‘I killed him because I AM MAD’ (p. 346). This apparent internalisation of the 
language about ‘madness’ reveals numerous conflicts, not least the now-familiar trope of the 
powerful woman being understood as ‘mad’ as a means of controlling the threat she poses to 
established societal conventions and assigned gender roles.94 Braddon is demonstrating Lady 
Audley’s inability to think of herself as anything beyond the realm of ‘other’, which is 
particularly insightful given her relationship with her incarcerated mother and her assumption 
that she will inherit her ‘madness’, which I will discuss later. Foregrounded in this theatrical 
dispute between Robert and Lady Audley, ‘madness’ functions as the ‘grand reveal’ 
(arguably the ‘secret’ to which the title of the novel refers); the climax of the scene; the twist 
to elicit shocked gasps from the reader. Lady Audley uses it to absolve herself of any 
criminal responsibility, declaring a defence of ‘insanity’, reflecting an ongoing social debate 
borne out of the 1843 Daniel M’Naghten case which instigated a standard test by which the 
criminal liability of an individual could be assessed.95 Braddon’s use of psychiatric discourse 
also encourages the reader to question its true application to Lady Audley’s identity. If 
taxonomy is exposed as having a negative, limiting effect on the self, particularly when the 
supposed distinction between ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ is obscured, could hegemonic narratives be 
revealed as an oppressive, damaging forces, and therefore something to be challenged, rather 
than venerated?  
 Despite the dichotomy of ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’ which are inevitably conjured up by 
the use of psychiatric discourse, Lady Audley’s articulation of her experiences denotes 
                                                          
94 Academic trends have done a thorough job of championing Braddon’s feminist agenda and liberating Lady 
Audley from the oppressive patriarchal forces around her, and so this argument does not need to be covered here 
in any detail. See, for example, Beyond Sensation: Mary Elizabeth Braddon in Context, ed. by Marlene Tromp, 
Pamela K. Gilbert, Aeron Haynie (New York: University of New York Press, 2000) and Lyn Pykett, The 
‘Improper’ Feminine: The Women’s Sensation Novel and the New Woman Writing (Oxon: Routledge, 1992). 
95 For more information, see J. Thomas Dalby, ‘The Case of Daniel McNaughton’, American Journal of 




changeability: this represents ‘madness’ as a continuum rather than a black-or-white 
distinction. Initially, she describes how she perceives her ‘intellect [as] a little way upon the 
wrong side of that narrow boundary-line between sanity and insanity’ (p. 346), a liminal 
position for which the psychiatric discourse has no language. Throughout her narrative, her 
mental state is portrayed as fluid, but not in an erratic manner: any transgressions of that 
‘narrow boundary-line between sanity and insanity’ are depicted as a response to her wider 
social context. When describing her first unhappy marriage – during the course of which she 
is abandoned and left to raise a child alone – she explains how this desertion acted as a 
catalyst: ‘I think my mind first lost its balance, and for the first time I crossed that invisible 
line which separates reason from madness’ (p. 353). Although the psychiatric distinction 
between reason and ‘madness’ is employed – and thus the primary narrative is upheld – the 
possibility that the individual can move fluidly from ‘madness’ to ‘sanity’, that the self can 
return to reason after a transgression, represents ‘madness’ as a transient state, rather than a 
permanent condition. If an individual is capable of being both ‘mad’ and ‘sane’, then they can 
never truly be ‘other’. To be ‘mad’ and ‘sane’ means that one is not beyond relatability: there 
are parts of the self with which mainstream society can empathise. Psychiatric language, 
which affixes an enduring label on the individual, has no relevance if an experience of 
‘madness’ is ephemeral: through this, Braddon reveals the dissonance between psychiatric 
hypotheses of ‘madness’ and lived experience. 
 Lady Audley describes how her ‘mind regained its just balance. I had watched myself 
very closely’ (p. 354), demonstrating both the potential for ‘madness’ to be a transitory state, 
and also the ability for the individual to manage and understand ‘madness’ without 
psychiatric intervention. Much like Renfield’s ‘mastery’ of his ‘madness’, Lady Audley has 
autonomy insofar as she is the active force (the observer), rather than the passive spectacle 
(the ‘mad’ ‘patient’). Psychiatry conquers in the end, incarcerating her, but not before 
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Braddon is able to insinuate to the reader that there is potential for ‘madness’ not only to be 
configured – but also controlled – beyond the psychiatric realm. The illegitimate nature of 
Lady Audley’s incarceration further challenges the social assumption that an asylum is the 
just place for the ‘mad’ individual.  
 Lady Audley is haunted by her belief that she will inherit her mother’s ‘madness’, and 
this hypothesis is firmly embedded in nineteenth-century psychiatric discourse.96 The idea 
that ‘madness’ could be transmitted from parent to child ‘passed from the level of hunches 
and prejudice […] to that of scientific endeavour’, as psychiatrists sought to locate hereditary 
influences in the aetiology of ‘madness’.97 Psychiatric discourses could use this theory to pre-
empt ‘madness’, to identify and control it in the individual before it had even been proved.98 
However, Braddon’s exploration of innate ‘madness’, transmitted from mother to child, 
provokes a sense of empathy from the reader: Lady Audley is deemed helpless as she is 
unable to escape her legacy. Her troublesome diagnosis of ‘latent insanity’ (p. 379) (which I 
shall examine in more detail shortly) ridicules the psychiatric hypothesis of hereditary 
‘madness’: it is too imprecise, too abstract.  
 Lady Audley is convinced that she will inevitably experience ‘madness’: the 
psychiatric assumption of innate ‘madness’ has clouded her self-perception. She describes 
how she envisioned her mother, whom she imagines is a prophecy of her future: 
I brooded horribly upon the thought of my mother’s madness. It haunted me day and 
night. I was always picturing to myself this madwoman pacing up and down some 
prison cell, in a hideous garment that bound her tortured limbs. I had exaggerated 
ideas of the horror of her situation. I had no knowledge of the different degrees of 
madness; and the image that haunted me was that of a distraught and violent creature, 
                                                          
96 Indeed, the possibility of a genetic aetiology for ‘madness’ still features prominently in hegemonic psychiatric 
narratives. See, for example, Michael Stone’s argument that ‘relatives of schizophrenics were [found to be] 
more likely to develop schizotypal personality […and] a family history of depression doubles or triples the risk 
for bout(s) of depression’. See Stone, Healing the Mind, p. 367-68. The fact that this conversation is still 
ongoing is particularly significant in light of my later argument that psychiatric discourse has not ‘progressed’ 
since the nineteenth century. 
97 Stone, Healing the Mind, p. 113. 
98 An idea similar to the objective of phrenologist Cesare Lombroso to diagnose and demarcate those 
‘predisposed’ to crime before they actually display criminal tendencies. See Cesare Lombroso, Criminal Man, 
trans. and ed. by Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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who would fall upon me and kill me if I came in her grasp […] and heard her ravings 
in my ear. (pp. 348-49) 
 
The familiar tropes which portray ‘madness’ as something ‘other’– the violence, the 
dishevelled appearance, the incoherent ravings – sit uncomfortably alongside Lady Audley’s 
understanding that such preconceptions were merely ‘exaggerated’ ideas. The 
acknowledgement that there are ‘different degrees’ of ‘madness’ further reinforces the earlier 
suggestion that such mental states can be viewed aside from the ‘sane’/‘insane’ binary 
instigated by psychiatry. Braddon is playing with the expectations of her readers, and 
allowing Lady Audley – the supposedly ‘mad’ individual – to voice psychiatric assumptions 
of what ‘madness’ is. By acknowledging the expectation on the part of her readers that 
‘madness’ encompasses a ‘wide spectrum of […] stereotypes’, Braddon is then able to 
deconstruct these assumptions, not least because the reader’s (mis)understanding of 
‘madness’ has been pre-empted and ventriloquised through the ‘mad’ character who should 
be disenfranchised by such stereotypes.99  
 When Lady Audley finally comes face to face with her mother, she learns that the 
reality of ‘madness’ clashes with psychiatric discourse:  
I saw no raving, strait-waistcoated maniac, guarded by zealous gaolers; but a golden-
haired, blue-eyed, girlish creative, who seemed as frivolous as a butterfly, and who 
skipped towards us with her yellow curls decorated with natural flowers [...] her 
madness was an hereditary disease transmitted to her from her mother, who had died 
mad. She, my mother, had been, or had appeared, sane up to the hour of my birth; but 
from that hour her intellect had decayed. (p. 350) 
 
Her mother is vulnerable, child-like, a far cry from the anticipated figure of danger and 
violence. Dressed in flowers, she is an image of pre-Raphaelite femininity: she ‘skipped’ 
rather than ‘pacing’ like the trapped animal which Lady Audley expected. The explanation 
that her mother’s ‘insanity’ – just like her own – remained latent up until a moment of 
pressure (in this instance, giving birth) again implies that ‘madness’ does not have to be a 
                                                          
99 Gilman, Seeing the Insane, p. 116. 
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designated identity, but is, instead, a fluctuating and reactive state. By deconstructing Lady 
Audley’s preconception of ‘madness’ – which mirrors societal and psychiatric assumptions of 
what ‘madness’ is – Braddon is forcing the reader to reflect.  
 Lady Audley’s identity is constructed both by psychiatric narratives (particularly her 
own description of herself as ‘mad’, and her conviction that she will inherit her mother’s 
‘madness’) and beyond it (by suggesting that ‘madness’ is transient and can be managed by 
the self). The presence of Dr Mosgrove complicates her perception of self further. Robert 
Audley calls on psychiatric ‘authority’ to diagnose and detain Lady Audley, and to remove 
the threat she allegedly poses both to his family sphere and the wider social body. The 
character of Mosgrove is contradictory, allowing psychiatry to be represented as fallible. On 
hearing her story (albeit second-hand, through Robert), he declares ‘there is no evidence of 
madness in anything that she has done’ (p. 377), explaining how her actions were dictated by 
her situation. Once Mosgrove actually encounters Lady Audley, he concludes: 
There is latent insanity! Insanity which might never appear; or which might appear 
only once or twice in a lifetime. It would be dementia in its worst phase perhaps: 
acute mania; but its duration would be very brief, and it would only arise under 
extreme mental pressure. The lady is not mad; but she has the hereditary taint in her 
blood. (p. 379) 
 
The diagnosis of ‘latent insanity’ – specifically when it arises ‘under extreme mental 
pressure’ – is too broad to have any real relevance. It is an umbrella term which threatens to 
encompass any and everyone, as a temporary extreme of emotion in the face of tremendous 
pressure is part of the human condition. Her ‘latent insanity’ – strong emotional responses 
indicative of an instinct for self-preservation – actually makes Lady Audley familiar, rather 
than ‘other’. The reader recognises him or herself in this ‘latent insanity’ which means that 
either society, in its entirety, is ‘mad’, or that psychiatric understandings of ‘madness’ create 
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an ‘illusion of exteriority’ – of dissociation – when actually there is nothing but an arbitrary 
label to draw the line between what is ‘sane’ and ‘insane’.100 
 Despite Mosgrove declaring her ‘sane’, this potential for ‘madness’ is apparently 
enough to warrant her incarceration, and she is detained indefinitely in the maison de santé in 
Villebrumeuse. Mosgrove assures Robert Audley: ‘if you were to dig a grave for her in the 
nearest churchyard and bury her alive in it, you could not more safely shut her from the world 
and all worldly associations’ (p. 381). Echoing ‘Maud’, the reoccurring image of premature 
burial further encourages the empathy of the reader:  the chapter of Lady Audley’s 
detainment is entitled ‘Buried Alive’, and she later exclaims to Robert that he has ‘used […] 
power basely and cruelly, and […] bought me to a living grave’ (p. 391). The implication that 
psychiatry is a force that can be used ‘basely and cruelly’ rather than for the perceived benefit 
of society is a disconcerting one. The reader is again reminded of Lady Audley’s ‘sanity’, as 
Mosgrove maintains that ‘she was not to be called “mad”’ (p. 389): a bizarre insistence 
considering she has just been incarcerated. By undermining the apparent objectivity of the 
diagnostic process through this act of unjust confinement, Braddon is again highlighting a 
disconnect between psychiatric ‘authority’ and the individual. The reader is forced to reflect 
on this process, particularly as George Talboys – allegedly murdered by Lady Audley – 
reappears unscathed at the end of the novel after a brief sojourn in New York, and enjoys a 
peaceful life with his friends and son while the wife he abandoned to poverty dies alone in an 
asylum.   
 
‘I’ve Got Out At Last’: Articulating ‘Madness’ Beyond Psychiatric Discourse in The 
Yellow Wallpaper101 
                                                          
100 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 17. 
101 Perkins Gilman, Yellow Wallpaper, p. 36. All further references will be given in the main body of the text. 
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Although psychiatric narratives are perceived to be the ‘authority’ in terms of articulating and 
explaining ‘madness’, and despite them traditionally being the only way ‘madness’ can be 
discussed in a socially accessible context, they are, as I demonstrate, not the only available 
means of expression. Communicating ‘madness’ through unconventional narratives – such as 
portraying ‘madness’ as a state of knowledge, of heightened awareness, of creativity or 
spirituality – threatens to destabilise the relationship between ‘madness’ narrative and reader. 
‘Madness’ articulated beyond psychiatric discourse offers an entirely different perspective, 
liberating the ‘mad’ self from the limited and limiting pattern of taxonomy and instead 
moving it towards a state of linguistic ‘free play’.102 Cross contended that ‘the expression of 
madness exceeds what is possible to talk about using conventional psychiatric discourse’.103 
Finding another semantic framework to communicate ‘madness’ would allow the experience 
to be liberated from a hegemonic narrative which has so little relevance but such an enduring 
influence on individual experience. 
Published in 1892, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper functions both 
as a scathing social commentary on the treatment of ‘madness’ – particularly in light of 
gender dynamics present in the text – and as a cathartic, semi-autobiographical narrative 
following Gilman’s own contact with the psychiatric profession. Offering a first-person 
narrative and an intimate journal format, The Yellow Wallpaper grants insight into the 
internal monologue of the ‘mad’ narrator as she attempts to comprehend the self in defiance 
of psychiatric and patriarchal forces around her, and through this, the text offers alternative 
semantic frameworks to communicate the ‘mad’ self As with Poe’s short story ‘The Tell-Tale 
Heart’, the reader immediately connects with the ‘mad’ narrator because the narrator, as the 
only available source of information, is an essential part of the reading process. 
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 Although the narrator’s experience of ‘madness’ is primarily articulated beyond 
hegemonic discourse, there is an intrusive psychiatric presence in the text. Both the narrator’s 
husband and brother are ‘physician[s] of high standing’ (p. 10), who attempt to reduce the 
identity of the narrator to that of passive ‘patient’, despite her protestations. She performs the 
role of psychiatric subject – ‘I take phosphates or phosphites – whichever it is, and tonics, 
and journeys, and air, and exercise, and am absolutely forbidden to “work” until I am well 
again’ (p. 10) – without internalising it, as she actively defies John’s instruction in secret. 
Despite writing being ‘forbidden’, the narrator seeks release and self-expression in the ‘dead 
paper’ (p. 10) of her journal, and reconstructs her identity in her own terms, hidden from 
John’s gaze. In these pages, the narrator is able to undermine psychiatric hegemony: ‘John is 
a physician, and perhaps […] – perhaps that is one reason I do not get well faster’ (p. 10). 
She explains further: ‘Personally, I disagree with their ideas […] I did write for a while in 
spite of them; but it does exhaust me a good deal – having to be so sly about it, or else meet 
with heavy opposition’ (p. 10). The psychiatric conviction that ‘madness’ should be forced 
into the ‘patient’ role is portrayed as damaging, limiting. The narrator crafts a silent rebellion 
on ‘dead paper’ (p. 10): unable to articulate her resistance for fear of ‘heavy opposition’, she 
has found a self-forged space in which she can protect her identity and undermine John’s 
‘authority’. 
 John is cautious of the narrator’s capacity for self-expression, informing her that ‘the 
very worst thing [she] can do is to think about [her] condition’ (p. 10). Her identity is not hers 
to construct: it belongs to psychiatric hegemony, and thus she has no need for self-reflection 
or autonomy, lest it challenge the ‘authority’ of psychiatric discourse. The narrator’s strong 
sense of self, and instinct for creativity, articulation and self-preservation, allow her to 
recognise her ability to manage her ‘madness’, as if she were allowed to ‘write a little it 
would relieve the press of ideas and rest [her]’ (p. 16). However, psychiatry – the ‘heavy 
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opposition’ – aspires to be the managing force, the ‘master’ of her ‘madness’. Her domestic 
environment becomes a make-shift asylum, with her husband and his sister as her gaolers. 
The home has been reconstituted as a psychiatric space: ‘the windows are barred for little 
children, and there are rings and things in the walls’ (p. 12). Imprisoned in an improvised 
panopticon, she is forced into ‘permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
[psychiatric] power’.104 The narrator may resist psychiatry, but she is still subject to it. 
 Despite this, the narrator remains resolute in her sense of self, resisting ‘otherness’ by 
referring to her ‘normal mind’ (p. 25). Her narrative also stands as a testimony to, if not her 
‘sanity’, then at least to her coherent ‘madness’. Exerting control over her journal, managing 
her thoughts, the narrator composes her experiences in ‘simple but tightly controlled prose 
which shifts, almost imperceptibly […] only at the very nadir of her psychosis’.105 The 
uncanniness of the text does not lie in its unnerving portrayal of an ‘alien’ mental state, but in 
its ability to represent ‘madness’ in a way which makes it seem like the only possible ‘sane’ 
response. Trapped in a claustrophobic pseudo-asylum space, controlled and studied by her 
husband/physician, the narrator sees her ‘madness’ as her only chance for liberation from 
these governing forces.  
The narrator, confined to the bedroom, creatively restricted and socially isolated, 
begins to observe the ‘hideous […] unreliable […] infuriating’ (p. 25) pattern of the yellow 
wallpaper which surrounds her. Initially, it is merely an object of aesthetic displeasure, a 
‘sprawling flamboyant pattern […] committing every artistic sin’ (p. 13). But it soon 
becomes the focal point of the narrative, as the protagonist resolves to ‘follow that pointless 
pattern to some sort of a conclusion’ (p. 19). Using the maze of patterns as a form of mental 
‘gymnastics’ (p. 19), the narrator imagines that she is able to move in the wallpaper, despite 
her physical confinement. It becomes a symbol of liberation, as Perkins Gilman establishes a 
                                                          
104 Foucault, Discipline, p. 201. 
105 Wiesenthal, Figuring Madness, p. 24. 
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contrast between the ‘sprawling’ wallpaper (p. 25) and the immobility of the narrator (‘I lie 
here on this great immovable bed – it is nailed down, I believe’ (p. 19)). 
The yellow wallpaper becomes a projection of the protagonist’s interior state, 
externalised as a means of making sense of it.106 It becomes a puzzle to be ‘mastered’ (p. 25), 
much like the narrator’s desire to manage her own ‘madness’ away from the prying eyes of 
her psychiatrist/husband/gaoler. Symbolically, it is hers alone: ‘no person touches this paper 
but me, - not alive!’ (p. 33). When her other self becomes manifest in the paper (‘that dim 
sub-pattern […] I am quite sure it is a woman’ (p. 26), she is shielded from the psychiatric 
gaze: developing a self that is reconstructed beyond psychiatric ‘authority’. This other self is 
fiercely protected: the narrator is ‘determined that nobody shall find it out’ (p. 27). 
The narrator displays external signs of recovery – of what John terms ‘flourishing in 
spite of [the] wall-paper’ (p. 28) – although she discloses to her journal that it is ‘because of 
the wall-paper’ (p. 28). To read the wallpaper as a metaphor for freedom is to shed significant 
light on the ‘patient’/psychiatric dynamic. The other self in the wallpaper should, according 
to John, be a symptom of ‘otherness’ and illness. However, for the narrator, this projection of 
selfhood is an act of healing, of comprehending the self, of the potential for liberation despite 
the metaphorical straitjacket of her diagnosis and her claustrophobic marriage.  
The narrator’s ability to control her narrative – for the most part – allows her 
experience to remain accessible despite its deviation from established discourse of what 
‘madness’ is. However, towards the end of the text, this control is jeopardised as it becomes 
irrelevant. Kristeva described the conflict between articulation and acknowledgement – the 
struggle both to speak and be heard: 
The narrative web is a thin film constantly threatened with bursting. For, when 
narrated identity is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object is 
shaken, and when even the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the 
                                                          
106 This physical manifestation of internal distress is echoed in the literary device of multiple or other selves, 
which I will discuss shortly. 
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narrative is what is challenged [...] its linearity is shattered, it proceeds by flashes, 
enigmas, short cuts, incompletion, tangles, and cuts [...] the unbearable identity of the 
narrator and of the surroundings that are supposed to sustain him can no longer be 
narrated.107 
 
Kristeva was not implying, here, that ‘madness’ is ineffable, but that the narrative model – 
which must reach a social audience or reader in order to function as a narrative – has a finite 
capacity to communicate an experience which transcends  hegemonic discourse. Towards the 
end of The Yellow Wallpaper, the narrative destabilises. Desperate to free her other self 
confined in the wallpaper, the protagonist begins to tear it off, and the sequence of events 
loses clarity: 
I don’t like to look out of the windows even – there are so many of those creeping 
women, and they creep so fast. 
I wonder if they all come out of the wall-paper as I did? 
[…] 
I suppose I shall have to get back behind the pattern when it comes night, and that is 
hard! 
It is so pleasant to be out in this great room and creep around as I please! (p. 35)  
 
The literal limit between inside and outside is distorted; the identity of the protagonist is 
irrevocably blurred with her other self. The linearity of the text is splintered, and who is 
speaking and who is observing becomes ambiguous, or, in a sense, irrelevant. The narrator’s 
identity becomes uncertain: multiplied, reflected, obscured. For the protagonist, this is a bid 
for power, and for liberation: freedom is achieved in a form of ‘empowering and violent 
madness’.108 However, her narrative defies Western assumptions that the self is ‘unitary, 
individualised, permanent […] impermeable to spirituality and otherworldliness’.109 By 
transcending this established discourse of selfhood, ‘the unbearable identity of the narrator 
[…] can no longer be narrated.’110 ‘The strange appears as a defense put up by a distraught 
                                                          
107 Kristeva, Powers, p. 27. Emphasis in original. 
108 Showalter, Female Malady,  p. 14. 
109 Lovell, ‘City is My Mother’, p. 355. 
110 Kristeva, Powers, p. 141. 
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self’ and yet it is this strangeness – despite its urgency to be heard – which enforces the 
narrator’s social position as ‘other’.111  
Perkins Gilman presents a narrative which primarily constructs ‘madness’ as a 
coherent and familiar state. ‘Madness’ is even portrayed as a justified response to the 
narrator’s oppressive social conditions; it is the only way she can bid for creativity and 
autonomy in the face of psychiatric and patriarchal forces.112 The narrator’s ‘madness’ is one 
which literally overpowers psychiatry: the conclusion of the text reveals John ‘fainted’ (p. 36) 
at the sight of his wife who ‘got out at last’ (p. 36) – although the presence of the axe could 
imply something much more sinister. Her powerful declaration that ‘you can’t put me back!’ 
(p. 36) subverts the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic: the narrator is the ‘master’ of her own 
‘madness’, and psychiatric discourse has no purchase or control. Although the confusion and 
multiplication of selves present a barrier between ‘madness’ narrative and reader, the narrator 
can claim a victory nonetheless. The psychiatric narrative has been triumphantly rendered 
irrelevant, but its legacy – the assumption that ‘mad’ is ‘other’ – endures. The protagonist 
continues to move around the room despite John’s presence, ‘creep[ing] over him every time’ 
(p. 36): psychiatric hegemony prevails, although it has been surpassed by the individual. It 
still must be negotiated, much like the narrator must alter her path to ‘creep’ over John’s 
body.  
                                                          
111 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991), p. 183. 
112 Academic Robert J G Lange observed that ‘during the nineteenth century, it would have been considered 
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to destroy her claustrophobic domestic environment, rather than embrace the role of homemaker. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the aetiology of the narrator’s ‘madness’ – at least from the perspective of the patriarchal 




‘The Word “Lunacy” Was Never Employed’: Unconventional Semantics and Radical 
Politics in ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether’113 
Another nineteenth-century text which foregrounds psychiatric narratives – and yet 
transcends them – is Poe’s short story, ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether’, 
published in 1845. The unnamed narrator represents the presence of alleged ‘sanity’ in an 
‘insane’ place. During his travels, the narrator nears a ‘private Mad House, about which I had 
heard much, in Paris, from my medical friends. As I had never visited a place of the kind, I 
thought the opportunity too good to be lost’ (p. 266). ‘Madness’ is deemed a spectacle: an 
idea furthered by the reluctance of his companion, who pleads ‘a very usual horror at the 
sight of a lunatic’ (p. 266), and refuses to accompany him. The opening of the text demotes 
‘madness’ to an object of ‘horror’, much like the role it primarily plays in ‘The Tell-Tale 
Heart’. By referring to this merging of ‘madness’ and horror as ‘very usual’, Poe is drawing 
attention to this reaction, thus forcing his reader to reflect. The first glimpse of the maison de 
santé is described in terms of the terror it provokes in the narrator: it ‘was a fantastic château, 
much dilapidated, and indeed scarcely tenantable through age and neglect. Its aspect inspired 
me with absolute dread’ (p. 266). However, having heard of the radical ‘system of soothing’ 
(p. 267) implemented, the narrator is overcome with curiosity. 
 The narrator introduces the reader to Monsieur Maillard – the man famed for creating 
the new ‘system of soothing’ – as ‘a portly, fine-looking gentleman of the old school, with a 
polished manner, and a certain air of gravity, dignity, and authority which was very 
impressive’ (p. 267). The notion of ‘authority’ is particularly salient, and it is something I 
will discuss in detail shortly. Maillard explains that the system he employs is founded on the 
following principles: ‘that all punishments were avoided – that even confinement was seldom 
                                                          
113 Poe, ‘Tarr and Fether’, p. 269. All further references will be given in the main body of the text. 
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resorted to – that the patients, while secretly watched, were left much apparent liberty […] in 
the ordinary apparel of persons in right mind’ (p. 267). The narrator thus takes it on himself 
to ‘diagnose’ the other characters he encounters, as there is no apparent demarcation between 
‘madness’ and ‘sanity’. 
 On meeting a ‘young and very beautiful woman’ (p. 267) whom Maillard later 
introduces as his niece, the narrator contemplates:  
I could not be sure that she was sane; and, in fact, there was a certain restless 
brilliancy about her eyes which half led me to imagine she was not […] She replied in 
a perfectly rational manner to all that I said; and even her original observations were 
marked with the soundest good sense; but a long acquaintance with the metaphysics 
of mania, had taught me to put no faith in such evidence of sanity. (p. 267) 
 
Seeking any evidence to ‘diagnose’ her, he is convinced that her ‘perfectly rational manner’ 
and ‘soundest good sense’ are not absolute indicators of ‘sanity’. There is something 
indefinably ‘other’ about her – much like psychiatrist Manfred Bleuler’s description of 
‘madness’ as ‘totally strange, puzzling, inconceivable, uncanny’ – although the narrator 
cannot quite detect what it is.114 Rather than relying on the familiar trope of ‘otherness’ as a 
deviation from rationality (which the young woman could not be accused of, being ‘perfectly 
rational’), the narrator describes ‘a certain restless brilliancy about her eyes’ which he 
interprets as reason to doubt her ‘sanity’. However, this is not really a discourse which 
‘others’ ‘madness’, which is, instead, portrayed as a force of energy and luminosity. 
 Immediately, the text blurs the boundaries between ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’, despite 
psychiatric and social hypotheses that such a distinction should be straightforward. The 
narrative then focuses on a dialogue between the narrator and Maillard, as the latter explains 
the mechanics of the ‘soothing system’ (p. 268): 
We contradicted no fancies which entered the brains of the mad. On the contrary, we 
not only indulged but encouraged them; and many of our most permanent cures have 
thus been effected […] We have had men, for example, who fancied themselves 
                                                          
114 Sass, ‘Introspection’, p.  4. Wherever possible, I have gone to the original of all sources used. However, on 
occasion, despite thorough research, the original has not always been accessible. 
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chickens. The cure was, to insist upon the thing as a fact – to accuse the patient of 
stupidity in not sufficiently perceiving it to be a fact – and thus to refuse him any 
other diet for a week than that which properly appertains to a chicken. (pp. 268-269) 
 
Despite the obvious, dark humour throughout this passage, there is a crucially important 
undertone here: a suggestion that ‘madness’ does not have to be perceived as non-sense. It 
shows the potential for psychiatric discourse to be reconstructed around the idea that the 
‘fancies […] of the mad’ do not have to be disregarded, but instead heard.115 Maillard’s 
system is based on the idea that the individual should dictate the treatment, rather than the 
treatment controlling – and governing – the identity of the individual.  
 Radically, Maillard, apparently representing psychiatric ‘authority’ (p. 267), explains 
how ‘we affected to treat each individual as if for some ordinary physical disorder; and the 
word “lunacy” was never employed’ (p. 269). Although the ‘patients’ are still removed from 
the social sphere and incarcerated, there are no straitjackets, no individual confinement, and – 
significantly – there is no need for taxonomy. No language is necessary to demarcate the 
‘patients’ because they are not perceived as totally ‘other’: they represent a variant on ‘sanity’ 
but not its antithesis. The use of the past tense is significant, as Maillard explains that the 
system has been superseded, although he does not disclose any details about the new 
methods: he merely boasts that it ‘is incomparably the most effectual as yet devised’ (p. 269).  
 The narrator is invited to a dinner party with Maillard and ‘a very numerous 
company’ (p. 270) comprised of ‘apparently people of rank – certainly of high breeding […] 
bedecked with a profusion of jewelry’ (p. 270). Although there is something indefinably 
‘bizarre’ (p. 271) about the atmosphere, the narrator dismisses it as his own cultural 
ignorance, musing: ‘the world is made up of all kinds of persons, with all modes of thought, 
                                                          
115 Michael Stone recounted a similar anecdotal tale ‘of a deluded prince […] in a distant land […who] had lost 
his mind and imagined himself a rooster’ from the early nineteenth-century. The ‘best physicians, the most 
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for humans and yet remain the rooster you are’. See Stone, Healing the Mind, pp. xvii-xviii. 
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and all sorts of conventional customs’ (p. 271). Tolerant and apparently open-minded, and 
accommodating of ‘conventional customs’ which appear alien to him, it seems somewhat 
contradictory that the narrator should experience panic and alarm when he learns that he is 
breaking bread with a ‘lunatic’. His immediate question – ‘I take it for granted that she is not 
particularly – not dangerously affected, eh?’(p. 277) – reveals a latent prejudice which 
threatens to expose his veneer of liberalism.  
 The general talk at the dinner table preaches the humanity of ‘madness’, addressing 
individual experiences, rather than homogenised psychiatric constructs. The ‘patients’ are 
described beyond the terms of taxonomy, instead referred to as ‘our gentleman’ (p. 272); ‘a 
very singular genius’ (p. 274); ‘extraordinary personage’ (p. 274) and ‘a more sensible person 
[who] gave pleasure to all who had the honor of her acquaintance’ (p. 275). The diverse range 
of human experience, liberated from limited and limiting psychiatric discourse, is celebrated. 
However, the reason for such tolerance is soon revealed, as the narrator realises that the ‘set 
of reasonable people’ (pp. 275-76) with whom he is socialising are, in fact, the ‘patients’. Of 
course, this social microcosm must be ‘mad’ even to entertain the possibility that ‘madness’ 
can be viewed in human rather psychiatric terms. The narrator’s ‘nerves were very much 
affected’ (p. 275) by this uncomfortable disclosure – a curious employment of psychiatric 
discourse which blurs notions of who and what it really applies to – but he continues to 
converse with Maillard, the ‘authority’ (p. 267), the epitome of reason against a backdrop of 
unreason.  
 Maillard finally begins to divulge details of the new system of treatment, explaining 
how it is ‘agreeable’ (p. 277) to the ‘patients’ despite the ‘necessarily close’ (p. 277) 
confinement it requires. He explains why the ‘soothing system’ had been rejected: 
The ‘soothing system’, you know, was then in operation, and the patients were at 
large […] the fellows behaved so remarkably well […] sure enough, one fine morning 
the keepers found themselves pinioned hand and foot, and thrown into the cells, 
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where they were attended, as if they were the lunatics, by the lunatics themselves, 
who had usurped the offices of the keepers. (p. 279) 
 
On the one hand, Maillard is depicting ‘madness’ as a devious force which must be 
controlled: the leniency provided by the ‘soothing system’ merely presented the ‘lunatics’ 
opportunity to display their latent ‘cunning [and] dexterity’ (p. 278) and orchestrate their 
escape. On the other hand, the literal inversion of keeper/lunatic – of psychiatrist/‘patient’, 
and of ‘madness’/‘sanity’ – exposes just how tenuous these binary oppositions are. 
Maillard then describes the desire of the ‘head rebel’ (p. 279) to coordinate a ‘lunatic 
government’ (p. 279), designed to ‘overthrow […] the reigning powers’ (p. 279). Not only 
providing a platform for a narrative that counters psychiatry, a ‘lunatic government’ – 
however metaphorical – harbours the potential to stage a revolution that literally overpowers 
psychiatry. It is an individual-focused narrative, rather than limited and limiting psychiatric 
discourse: created by the ‘mad’ for the ‘mad’, the apparent ‘authority’ of psychiatry is 
rejected, made irrelevant. It is no coincidence that the first act of this rebellion is to 
deconstruct the ‘mad’/‘sane’ dichotomy by subverting it: it is exposed as an arbitrary process 
of demarcation.  
The ‘head rebel’ (p. 279) becomes the ‘master’ of the psychiatric space, controlling 
admittance and ‘othering’ the keepers by tarring and feathering them until they resemble ‘a 
perfect army […] of Chimpanzees’ (p. 281). They are dehumanised, and made subject to the 
discourse which they enforced. The ‘lunatic government’ ‘lived well’ (p. 280) in their self-
forged social microcosm, managing their own ‘madness’ once the reigning forces had been 
overthrown. Maillard – the ‘authority’ (p. 267) – comments that this new system was ‘very 
capital […] simple – neat – no trouble at all’ (p. 280), before the narrative is interrupted by a 




The violent altercation which follows – punctuated by the door being ‘beaten with 
what appeared to be a sledgehammer […] wrenched and shaken with prodigious violence’ (p. 
280) – is enough for the narrator to comprehend what is really going on around him. The 
escaped ‘lunatics’ of ‘prodigious violence’ (p. 280) are, in fact, the keepers, who have broken 
free and are attempting to reclaim the psychiatric space. It is finally revealed that Maillard – 
the ‘authority’ (p. 267) – was indeed ‘the superintendent of the establishment; but grew crazy 
himself, and so became a patient’ (p. 281), instead taking on the role of ‘head rebel’ (p. 279) 
during the insurgence. When describing the ‘lunatic government’, he was ‘merely relating his 
own exploits’ (p. 281). Maillard’s meandering identity – psychiatrist/‘patient’/psychiatrist – 
is employed by Poe to expose just how fluid and haphazard such categories are. The narrative 
closes with a reinstatement of Maillard’s ‘authority’ despite his ‘madness’, as the narrator 
reflects that ‘I cannot help agreeing with Monseiur Maillard, that his own “treatment” was a 
very capital one of its kind. As he justly observed, it was “simple – neat – and gave no 
trouble at all”’ (p. 282).  
Although the confusion of ‘madness’/‘sanity’ is enough to force the reader to question 
such problematic demarcations, Poe’s commentary on psychiatric politics does not end there. 
A reader could interpret the chaos of the final scene as verification that ‘madness’ is 
inherently ‘other’ and should be treated as such: 
A scene of the most terrible confusion ensued […] the orchestra […] broke out, with 
one accord, into ‘Yankee Doodle’, which they performed […] with an energy 
superhuman, during the whole of the uproar. [T]he man with the tee-totum 
predilections, set himself to spinning around the apartment, with immense energy […] 
the frog-man croaked away […] the continuous braying of a donkey arose over all. 
(pp. 280-81) 
 
The climax of the text depicts ‘madness’ as a form of carnivalesque pantomime: animalistic, 
raucous and absurd, it is the antithesis of reason and ‘civilised’ behaviour. It is also depicted 
as dangerous, as the narrator ‘received a terrible beating’ (p. 281), although the perpetrator of 
the act of violence, whether ‘patient’ or keeper, is – significantly – not revealed. 
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This melodramatic passage threatens to undermine Poe’s subtle yet persistent 
insinuation that ‘madness’ does not have to be ‘othered’ and limited to psychiatric discourse. 
However, it is only after the appearance of the keepers – and thus the reinstatement of 
psychiatric hegemony – that ‘madness’ becomes ‘other’. ‘Madness’ is a phenomenon of 
context: what is ‘sane’ in one situation (the scene at the dinner table, for example) can be 
perceived as ‘insane’ under the psychiatric gaze. The presence of the keepers instigates a 
parody of ‘otherness’ because that is all that psychiatry comprehends it to be. However, the 
structure of the story and narrative voice ensures that the reader has glimpsed ‘madness’ 
beyond the lens and language of psychiatry. Poe’s ‘reversal of reason and unreason 
[instigates] the reader’s awareness of the arbitrary element structuring [of] such tactical 
oppositions’.116 The fact that this ‘element structuring’ is the foundation of psychiatric 
language ensures that the enduring impression left in the mind of the reader is that hegemonic 
narratives are fallible. Psychiatric discourse is shown to condemn ‘madness’, rather than 
communicate it.  
 
 ‘Who in The World Am I?’ Reading Other Selves and Other Worlds117 
Neurologist and author Oliver Sacks, when reflecting on the medicalisation of hallucinogenic 
states, commented that ‘hallucinations are more often considered to portend […] something 
dire happening in the brain […] there is great stigma here’.118 Kraepelin described an 
hallucination as evidence of how ‘profoundly disturbed’ a ‘patient’ was.119 Psychiatric 
discourse has established an experience of another ‘reality’ or another self as an anomaly – an 
unconventional way of experiencing the world which deviates from the ‘norm’ – to be 
condemned rather than understood. Hallucinations and multiple selves have become central 
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117 Carroll, Alice’s Adventures, p. 18. 
118 Sacks, Hallucinations, p. xiv. 
119 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 7. 
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to psychiatric and therefore social conceptions of ‘madness’: psychiatric labels such as 
‘dissociative identity disorder’ and ‘schizophrenia’ are founded on a point of departure from 
prescribed ways of viewing and understanding ‘reality’ and identity.120 Psychiatric 
terminology relies on such states being viewed as ‘other’.  
 But what if hallucinations and multiple experiences of selves were granted narrative 
space? What if they could be understood as alternative perspectives, rather than as total 
detachments from ‘reality’? Literature, in creating a fictitious world and immersing the reader 
in it, is itself a form of hallucination, therefore the presumed ‘otherness’ of an hallucinatory 
experience is already challenged. An hallucination, described as ‘entertaining unfounded 
notions’, perfectly articulates the reading process.121 The reader suspends disbelief and 
temporarily abandons notions of ‘reality’ in order to ‘entertain’ the ‘unfounded notions’ 
constructed by the imagination of the author. Fiction is, inevitably, a projection of the self. 
Although this interplay is not always explicit, ‘the pathology of a literary character is often 
used to account for the pathology of its author’.122 Fiction’s primary function to ‘hold […] 
the mirror up to nature’ leads to an inevitable blurring of selfhood: the self (the author) 
constructs selves (the characters), an unavoidable manifestation of him or herself, to be 
interpreted by the reader, who understands the characters in terms of his or her own 
experiences of self, their ego-centred points of reference.123 By distorting the real and the 
imaginary, and representing a myriad of selves as a mise en abyme, fiction challenges the 
‘otherness’ of hallucinations and experiences of multiple selves before they are even 
                                                          
120 Despite claiming to offer a ‘natural history or anthology of hallucinations’, Sacks distanced himself from the 
‘profoundly altered’ experience of ‘those with schizophrenia’. Although Sacks championed the ‘power of 
hallucinations’ and the value of ‘first person accounts’, a ‘schizophrenic’ hallucination was clearly deemed too 
‘other’ for a popular science publication. Significantly, the synopsis of Hallucinations opens by assuring the 
reader that ‘Hallucinations don’t belong wholly to the insane’. See Sacks, Hallucinations, pp. xiii-xiv. 
121 OED, ‘hallucination’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/83613?redirectedFrom=hallucination&> [accessed 
16 September 2014]. 
122 Martin S. Lindaver, ‘Are Creative Writers Mad? An Empirical Perspective’, in Dionysus in Literature: 
Essays on Literary Madness, ed. by Branimir M. Rieger (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University 
Popular Press, 1994), pp. 33-48 (p. 33). 
123 Shakespeare, Hamlet, III. 2. 12-16. 
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represented in the text. It reclaims such states from the alienation imposed by psychiatry into 
the realm of the familiar, as a variant of ‘reality’ rather than its antithesis. 
 As fiction inherently obscures the binary oppositions of ‘reality’/imaginary and 
fixed/permeable selfhood, it is unsurprising that it has been employed as a vehicle to explore 
and articulate experiences which fall between these apparently absolute binaries. Can literary 
representations of hallucinations and multiple selves reclaim them from the silence and 
‘otherness’ enforced by psychiatry? 
 In rounding off this chapter, my chosen texts – Poe’s short story, ‘William Wilson’ 
(1839); and Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the 
Looking-Glass (1867) – explore the point of departure from ‘reality’ and/or fixed perceptions 
of selfhood which dominates mainstream conceptions of ‘madness’. In a similar fashion to 
The Yellow Wallpaper, other selves can be used to represent a physical manifestation of 
‘madness’. Unlike psychiatric discourse, however, which applies taxonomy to delimit the 
identity of the individual, these literary depictions demonstrate ‘madness’ to be one aspect of 
selfhood, rather than its entirety. ‘Madness’ is not always all-encompassing: it can be 
separated from the individual. By creating a self which represents a literal embodiment of 
‘madness’, this doppelgänger becomes a mirror image through which the individual can 
study, understand and, ultimately, manage their interior state. This doubling can also be 
interpreted as a rebirth of the self after contact with psychiatry.  
 Elsewhere in his work, Poe relied on the doppelgänger as a literary motif to evoke a 
sense of the uncanny.124 However, in ‘William Wilson’, this replication of selves becomes 
symbolic of the protagonist’s desire to comprehend his own ‘madness’. Wilson’s narrative 
begins with a sense of despair, instigated by social exclusion: ‘Oh, outcast out of all outcasts 
                                                          
124 This trope features heavily in, for example, ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’. 
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most abandoned – to the earth art thou not forever dead?’125 Mirroring psychiatric discourse, 
he discloses to the reader that he is ‘the descendant of a race [with] imaginative and easily 
excitable temperament […] weak-minded, and beset with constitutional infirmities’ (p. 67). 
Wilson can only articulate his experiences in terms of ‘otherness’, as it is the only discourse 
available in popular currency: he has no other language. However, the emergence of his 
doppelgänger grants him a new perspective on his ‘madness’. Wilson’s double is 
undoubtedly an externalisation of the self: ‘The same name! the same contour of person! the 
same day of arrival at the academy! And then his dogged and meaningless imitation of my 
gait, my voice, my habits and my manner!’ (p. 75). This other (and, indeed, ‘other’) self 
offers an alternative to psychiatric discourse as the foundation for his narrative and his 
identity. 
 Wilson’s double becomes a projection of his apparent ‘otherness’. Reluctant to 
internalise it, Wilson creates a new self who can be ‘other’ so he can remain familiar: the 
double becomes Wilson’s ‘madness’, allowing him to detach himself from it. However, 
Wilson’s double shoulders the burden of ‘otherness’ so that Wilson can remain part of 
mainstream society. The double is silenced – unable to raise his voice ‘above a very low 
whisper’ (p. 72, emphasis in original) – because psychiatric discourse has stifled his 
narrative, declared it a ‘closed’ text.  The ‘mad’ Wilson’s presence in the text wanes, 
portraying ‘madness’ as a transient and fluctuating state, but his final reappearance at the end 
of the narrative serves to reintegrate the two selves. Although ‘other’, the ‘mad’ Wilson 
represents ‘omnipresence and omnipotence’ (p. 82): he is empowered, as this separation of 
selves grants one a voice at the expense of the other’s silence. 
 Similarly, Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-
Glass make ‘othered’ states tangible and familiar. These texts explore hallucinogenic 
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experiences through the presence of an alternative world in which the protagonist is 
immersed. This universe exists through the looking-glass, ‘the glass has got all soft like 
gauze, so we can get through’, merging ideas of selfhood by displaying the potential for the 
mirror to present not just the self but selves: not just the world but worlds.126 Rather than 
reflecting and thus reinforcing Alice’s identity, the microcosm in the looking-glass fractures 
and distorts the self: ‘“Who are you?” said the Caterpillar […] Alice replied, rather shyly, “I- 
I hardly know, Sir, just at present […] I ca’n’t [sic] explain myself […] because I’m not 
myself”’.127 Alice’s hallucinatory experience is initially disorientating, and she struggles to 
anchor the self in the strange world around her. The vivid and bizarre wonderland is an 
embodiment of her ‘madness’: it is a place to which she has access only because of her 
‘madness’. The Cheshire Cat informs her that she must be ‘mad’ ‘or you wouldn’t have come 
here’.128 Her alternative experience of ‘reality’ has literally opened up new worlds, and new 
perspectives, and eventually it functions as a space in which her identity can be reconstructed 
and self-governed. 
 Alice’s wonderland is a space in which her ‘madness’ can be hers, to explore and to 
understand, divorced from psychiatric discourse. This image echoes earlier ideas of 
‘madness’ as a state of creativity and knowledge which surpasses mainstream consciousness. 
In this world, created by and for the self, language becomes malleable: it is destabilised in 
order to accommodate the self. Humpty Dumpty observes: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all’.129 
 
                                                          
126 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, ed. by Roger Lancelyn Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 127. 
127 Carroll, Alice’s Adventures, pp. 40-41. 
128 Carroll, Alice’s Adventures, p. 58. 
129 Carroll, Looking-Glass, p. 190. 
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Humpty Dumpty exposes language in a Saussurean vein as merely a construct – a system that 
can therefore be deconstructed to contain the individual experience. Humpty Dumpty is the 
‘master’ of language: it becomes a tool at his disposal, which he can make ‘mean just what I 
choose it to’.130 Despite this semantic power, he does not represent hegemony because he 
encourages Alice to ‘master’ language in turn: a Saussurean apprenticeship. Alice’s self-
contained, self-created world allows her to be the ‘master’ of her ‘madness’ because the self 
is reconstructed beyond psychiatric discourse. She makes sense of her ‘madness’ on her own 
terms, rather than through taxonomy. If Alice’s hallucinatory discourse can become socially 
accessible, it can function as a counter-narrative. If psychiatry’s power is destabilised by this 
counter-narrative, then there is potential for the ‘mad’ individual to reclaim ‘mastery’ of 
language: not by conforming to it, but by recreating it.131 Language is not inherently a 
psychiatric weapon: the prison-house of language can, instead, be a wonderland – it can 
belong to the individual, rather than function as a device used solely to demarcate and 
condemn. 
 These depictions of other selves and hallucinatory experiences are inevitably ‘other’ 
because they transcend ‘the Western conception of the person […] organized into a 
distinctive whole’.132 However, both the nature of the literary form (which blurs apparently 
fixed ideas of ‘reality’/the imaginary, the self/selves) and the accessibility of such 
experiences intimate that this ‘otherness’ does not necessarily have to induce silence. Far 
                                                          
130 Carroll’s playful approach to ‘mastery’ of language could reflect his own tumultuous relationship with 
conventional language as, according to literary biographer Roger Lancelyn Green, due to an ‘incurable stutter’, 
Carroll sought the less judgemental company of children – enjoying ‘freedom in the society of children’ – which 
resulted in ‘unusually deep knowledge of their modes of thought and imagination’. See Roger Lancelyn Green, 
Introduction, in Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. xxi. 
131 Alice’s preoccupation with ‘madness […] freedom and rules, authority and identity’ inevitably offers a 
commentary on how the self is constructed – and can be ‘othered’ – using language (see Hugh Haughton, 
Introduction, in Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass (Penguin: 
London, 2003), p. lx. This focus, combined with Carroll’s representation of hallucinogenic states, offers a 
commentary on ‘madness’ by virtue of representing it. When the Cheshire Cat claims that ‘we’re all mad here. 
I’m mad. You’re mad’ (p. 58), Carroll cannot avoid exploring what it means to be ‘mad’, or at least labelled 
‘mad’. 
132 Sass, ‘Introspection’, p. 1. 
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removed from psychiatric discourse which granted ‘madness’ narratives space merely to 
apply taxonomy, demonstrate anomalies and enforce alienation, these literary representations 
encourage the reader to immerse themselves in these ‘other’ experiences. The hallucination 
of the ‘mad’ self or selves becomes the hallucination of the reader.  
 
‘We Can Talk […] When There’s Anybody Worth Talking To’: That Which Still 
Remains Unspoken133 
I have shown that the literature of the nineteenth century provided ‘madness’ with a voice. 
Rescued from the disenfranchisement of psychiatric texts, the ‘madness’ experience could 
present itself to mainstream society in a literary narrative in order for it to be heard. Such 
literature employed a variety of semantic patterns through which ‘madness’ could be 
constructed, both in and beyond hegemonic discourse. Psychiatric terms and concepts, and 
the prevalent assumption  that ‘madness’ is a state of unreason, of violence, of ‘otherness’, 
were a familiar trope in nineteenth-century literature, used as a foundation to communicate 
‘madness’ in a socially familiar way. However, by exposing the fallibility of such language – 
by juxtaposing the psychiatric construction of ‘madness’ with individual experience – such 
texts challenge the very narrative they employ. Literature cannot represent ‘mad’ as ‘other’ 
without inevitably portraying the agencies that work to enforce marginalisation, and thus the 
‘authority’ of psychiatry is thrown into question because the reader is encouraged to be an 
active entity in this debate.  
 The inclusion of a psychiatric presence – such as the characters of Dr Mosgrove, Dr 
Seward, and John in The Yellow Wallpaper – allows for texts to ventriloquise psychiatric 
narratives while also exposing their arbitrary and flawed assumptions. The ‘authority’ of 
Seward, for example, is challenged as the plot is stalled due to his inability to heed Renfield’s 
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wisdom. The two characters are merged throughout the text to demonstrate how thin the 
dividing line is between the epitome of ‘sanity’ and reason (the psychiatrist) and the 
‘homicidal maniac’.134 Mosgrove, although initially sympathetic to Lady Audley’s situation, 
is portrayed as corrupt, incarcerating her despite declaring her ‘sane’. John’s domestic sphere 
acts as an improvised asylum which oppresses his wife, who merely desires a creative outlet 
to ‘relieve the press of ideas and rest me’.135 Psychiatry – the supposed ‘authority’ on 
‘madness’ – is deemed to be out of touch with it: its ideas are exposed as having little or no 
application to the individual. The ‘mad’ self survives and narrates despite psychiatry, not 
because of it.  
 Further, far from being a haven of moral management and a place of ‘cure’, the 
psychiatric space is repeatedly portrayed as a premature burial: a purgatorial life/death, 
absent/present state. From the ‘shallow grave’136 which detains the narrator in ‘Maud’, to 
Lady Audley’s contention that ‘you have brought me to my grave’: this persistent image of 
being buried alive is particularly uncomfortable.137 It suggests the inevitable ‘social death’ 
which the individual experiences once psychiatric ‘authority’ allocates the role of ‘patient’.138 
It also forces the reader to reflect on the reality (albeit fictionalised) of asylum life. Is the 
asylum really the just space for the ‘mad’ if it is not a place of compassion and ‘cure’ but 
merely a ‘literal “shutting up”’?139 
 Literature also allows hegemonic narratives to be superseded, as the expectation of 
poetic licence allows for the formulation of an alternative relationship with language and 
expression: the self can be constructed beyond the realm of psychiatric terminology. This 
transcendence of the governing discourse allows ‘madness’ to be portrayed as a creative, 
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spiritual force: a state of knowledge which directly contradicts psychiatric assumptions. 
Perkins Gilman, for example, was able to construct a new semantic pattern to discuss 
‘madness’ by implying that it could be something other than ‘other’. However, the chaotic 
blurring of selves at the end of The Yellow Wallpaper rendered the text inaccessible. The 
narrator of The Yellow Wallpaper found herself ‘shut […] up in Prose’, let down by her 
narrative model.140 As Kristeva observed, ‘the unbearable identity of the narrator […] can no 
longer be narrated’ when the linearity and coherence of the text are jeopardised.141  
 Finally, literature can also be a medium which surpasses the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
dichotomy by celebrating diversity of human experience, rather than condemning it. By 
guiding the reader through experiences of multiple selves and hallucinatory states, the 
strangeness of ‘madness’ is made available to the reader, rather than kept at a ‘safe’ distance. 
This allows the reader vicariously to experience these states, and, consequently, they are no 
longer ‘other’: deemed as variants of ‘reality’, these discourses threaten to undermine ‘the 
social invalidation of such experiences’ which psychiatry encouraged.142 
 Despite offering an accessible medium for articulating and exploring selfhood, 
literature cannot escape the tumultuous relationship between ‘madness’ and language. 
Paradoxically, each text featured in this chapter uses language to make reference to the 
ineffability of ‘madness’. Although literary narratives offer a voice and the potential for new 
semantic structures, ‘madness’ resists articulation: language is inadequate or irrelevant, ‘the 
words don’t fit’.143  
 A Foucauldian interpretation would suggest that this evasion of language is merely 
the nature of ‘madness’: ‘it cannot be expressed in any speech, no limit to such modes of 
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expression can be grasped’.144 ‘Madness’ defies orthodox language because the process of 
signification is too absolute, too rigid to allow for malleability: conventional vocabulary has 
no purchase. As William Wilson asks ‘what human language can adequately portray that 
astonishment, that horror?’145 Although the form may be accommodating, the language is 
not: reducing ‘madness’ to a limited and limiting frame of conventional vocabulary is merely 
what David Cooper termed the ‘perpetual slipping over of words’. 146  
The absence of adequate and neutral language continues to deprive ‘madness’ of a 
narrative vehicle which can truly articulate the experience, and therefore provide society with 
an authentic semantic frame in which it can be communicated. If a verbalised ‘madness’ 
narrative cannot avoid censorship, distortion or stigma, what is the alternative? For those 
desperately requiring a voice but unable to negotiate the politics of language, what is the 
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From the ‘Meaningless’ to the Mythologised: ‘Madness’ 





I have exposed the politics and problems inherent in the employment of language to construct 
and communicate an experience of ‘madness’. Language is an insurmountable barrier: it is a 
tool used to ‘other’ and disenfranchise, yet it is relied on for narration and social engagement. 
‘Madness’ lies in a purgatorial state between the spoken (the existing psychiatric discourse 
which provides a limiting and damaging lexical framework for ‘madness’ narratives) and that 
which cannot be heard (narratives which transcend hegemonic discourse but which are unable 
to reach, or engage, a social audience). A semantic account of ‘madness’ cannot be neutral, as 
it is either couched in psychiatric language (which denotes the individual as a ‘patient’ and 
restricts identity to an arbitrary label), or it is received as irredeemably ‘other’ (because it 
rejects or ignores hegemonic discourse). 
 A ‘madness’ narrative constructed by language cannot escape this conflict: to 
verbalise ‘madness’ is to enter this battleground, reluctantly or otherwise. Until there is 
change, there will be silence. In chapter five, I discuss the necessity for this change but, in 
this present chapter, I explore the viability of alternative narrative forms: those which 
transcend semantics and avoid being dragged into the inescapable politics of language. 
Continuing my primary focus on nineteenth-century texts, this chapter will explore the work 
of artists experiencing ‘madness’ in order to establish the extent to which these narratives can 
be acknowledged and accepted by a mainstream audience. American philosopher John 
Dewey believed that, although visual art is ‘a language’, it offers a less rigid – and thus more 
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accessible – structure in which a narrative can be constructed.2 Dewey argued that art is the 
only medium ‘of complete and unhindered communication’ which could offer a solution to 
the ‘madness’ and language problem which has historically enforced silence.3  
 In order to cover a variety of texts, I have chosen to focus on the work of both 
canonical and less familiar artists. My only criterion is that the individual has experienced – 
or has been told they experience – a form of ‘madness’ in the course of their lives. I have 
narrowed my focus down to the following six artists: Richard Dadd (1817-1886); Vincent 
Van Gogh (1853-1890); Louis Wain (1860-1939); Adolf Wölfli (1864-1930); August Klett 
(given the pseudonym ‘August Klotz’ by Prinzhorn, 1864-1928); and Hyacinth Freiherr von 
Wieser (granted the pseudonym Heinrich Welz by Prinzhorn: born in 1883, year of death 
unknown).4 All of these artists had contact with psychiatry and asylum culture, with periods 
of incarceration ranging from twelve months (Van Gogh) to forty-three years (Dadd). 
Diagnoses range from ‘schizophrenia’ to ‘generalised delirium’. However, despite these 
contextual differences, their art has a common strand: the artists use it as a narrative platform 
to communicate their experiences, and so an analysis of it can illuminate the fraught 
relationship between a ‘mad’ self, ‘reality’ and mainstream society. My methodology in 
approaching ‘mad’ art is both to acknowledge how such texts are interpreted by a mainstream 
audience, and to unpick the politics which influence and manipulate this response. 
 In order to investigate the place of ‘mad’ art in the broader art world, it is necessary to 
ascertain what the standard of art was for nineteenth-century artists. What criteria did one 
need to fit to be an Artist? A brief excursion into the ideologies and exhibitions of the Royal 
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Academy of Arts can be used to establish canonicity: from this, the relationship between 
‘mad’ art and the broader art world can be further explored.  
The Royal Academy was established by architect Sir William Chambers, who 
petitioned George III in 1768 to be allowed to ‘establish a society for promoting the Arts of 
Design’.5 Dedicated to publicising the art of its Academicians, the Royal Academy 
inaugurated a tradition of annual exhibitions: the first Royal Academy Summer Exhibition 
opened in 1769, and, to the present day, has been held every year since without exception. 
One of the founders of the Royal Academy, influential English painter Joshua Reynolds, 
expressed how the establishment of the Academy was ‘in the highest degree interesting, not 
only to the Artists, but to the whole nation’.6 The popularity of these exhibitions with the 
general public was recorded when a writer for The New Sporting Magazine observed how 
‘the rooms [in the exhibition] were most unpleasantly crowded’ due to the sheer volume of 
visitors.7 
Historian Holger Hoock reflected on the role academies played in circulating and 
standardising art: ‘[they] affect artists and art through education, competitions, and exhibition 
spaces; by mediating between artists […] and public opinions; and by setting and enforcing 
standards of taste and professional practice’.8 Hoock’s argument that the Royal Academy 
served to establish expectations of what art was is echoed in art historian Jason Rosenfeld’s 
claim that the Royal Academy had ‘virtual monopoly on public taste’.9 If the Royal Academy 
were responsible for ‘forging a native artistic tradition’, how did their exhibitions shape the 
                                                          
5 Information taken from the Royal Academy of Arts, ‘About Us’ <https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/about-the-
ra> [accessed 12 February 2016]. 
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social expectations of what art is, and should be?10 What standards were being set for 
canonical art by the ‘professional ideology’ of institutional art?11 
In 1847, the Royal Academy relocated their exhibition space from Somerset House, 
located in the Strand, to a new site in Trafalgar Square. In light of this relocation, press 
interest had peaked, and the exhibition was covered in meticulous detail by popular 
periodicals and magazines. The overarching theme of these reviews is the search for truthful 
representation. A writer for The New Sporting Magazine praised the level of realism on 
display: ‘these pictures are all painted with great power and truth […] the modesty of nature 
is never sacrificed for the sake of effect. The colours are pure’.12 A review in The Spectator 
discussed the ‘national excellence’ on show, commenting how this ‘excellence’ ‘consists 
mainly in the power of imitating’.13 The Gentleman’s Magazine commended the work of Sir 
Edwin Henry Landseer in particular, describing his representation of animals as ‘perfect’.14 
The Literary Gazette championed the ‘fidelity’ of the art exhibited, describing how the 
subject matters were ‘very naturally portrayed’.15 
Simultaneously, these reviews critique details of work which did not match this trend 
for imitative art. Two of Edwin Landseer’s pieces – depicting falcons – were disparaged: ‘the 
eye of the bird […] seems rather too quiet; and the plumage of both birds is too much like 
smooth silky fur’.16 Spaniel and Game by A. D. Cooper also failed to live up to the realism 
exhibited elsewhere: ‘the leaves of the fir tree appear too sooty, and the hare rather too 
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Hawking. Landseer’s legacy as an artist endures: perhaps his best-known work is the four large bronze lion 
sculptures which guard Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square.  
15 Anon, ‘Fine Arts: Exhibition of the Royal Academy Second Notice’, The Literary Gazette, 6 May 1837, pp. 
314-15 (p. 314).  
16 Anon, ‘Exhibition’, New Sporting Magazine. 
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light’.17 The Royal Academy’s celebration of art which is ‘beautifully true’ encouraged its 
audience to challenge work which did not match this expectation: that which was considered 
accomplished art ‘imitate[d] to perfection’.18 The ‘aesthetic authority’ and hegemony of the 
Royal Academy enforced standards of what art should be to the extent that when reviewers 
were discussing the credibility and merit of the art on show, the primary criterion was its 
ability to imitate the subject matter flawlessly.19  
 This assumption that art should be realistic was not a new concept in the nineteenth 
century: Plato observed how the ‘correctness’ of art ‘lies in the imitation and successful 
reproduction’.20 If an audience solely expects art to imitate, this threatens to render ‘mad’ art 
inaccessible. If art does not represent something familiar, if it offers a new or alien 
perspective of ‘reality’ or human experience, then it is unable to imitate. Something ‘other’ – 
which transcends orthodox understandings of the self – cannot be classed as imitative art: it is 
not ‘the action or practice of […] copying’ because the object being reproduced (lived 
experience of ‘madness’) is not universally known.21 The historic practice of silencing the 
individual experience of ‘madness’ continues: because ‘madness’ narratives are not socially 
acknowledged, they remain unspoken. Because they are unspoken, they are unfamiliar, and 
thus ‘mad’ art is excluded from this tradition of imitative art. This trend for realism would 
suggest that there is little place for anything ‘other’ in the canon of the art world: it must 
reproduce that which is known, rather than delving into the world of the unfamiliar. 
 However, Turner prize-winning artist Grayson Perry identified a shift in the mid-
nineteenth century which complicated orthodox understandings of what art was, and how it 
should be approached. Describing this change as a rise in self-consciousness, Perry argued 
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20 Plato, The Laws, trans. by Trevor Saunders (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 63. 




that ‘the definition of art started being challenged’.22 Expectations and interpretations of art 
were becoming less absolute, as documented by Russian philosopher and novelist Leo 
Tolstoy in 1897: ‘art is becoming something more and more vague and indefinite in people’s 
minds’.23 This was exemplified by the rise of ‘alternate exhibition venues [which] challenged 
the […] hegemony’ of the Royal Academy and other esteemed academies24, and growing 
criticism of artistic institutions which ‘failed to represent all genre, media, and styles of 
“national art”’.25 By the end of the century, ‘the utopia (or dystopia) of aesthetic 
experimentation’ eventually paved the way for the rise of Modernism, Surrealism, Abstract 
Expressionism, and the Art Brut/Outsider Art movement.26 
The trend for art which ‘imitated to perfection’27 gradually declined: Tolstoy 
explained how ‘people will understand the meaning of art only when they cease to regard 
beauty – that is, pleasure – as the aim of the activity’.28 In the mainstream art world of the 
late nineteenth-century, Realism gave way to increasingly abstract trends, such as 
Impressionism, Post-Impressionism and Expressionism. Beauty and imitation – being 
‘beautifully true’ – were no longer deemed the sole purpose of art.29 Previously, canonical art 
had been a self-referential rhetoric – particularly in the elite microcosm of academy culture – 
which presented the beautiful because it was the expected and the expected because it was the 
familiar. Perry observed that ‘beauty [was] very much about familiarity, reinforcing an idea 
we have already’.30 However, instead of art’s primary focus being representation with the 
‘greatest fidelity’ – a trope championed by the Royal Academy and the Salon – expectations 
                                                          
22 Grayson Perry, Playing to the Gallery (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 71. 
23 Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, trans. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 8. 
24 Rosenfeld, ‘Salon’. 
25 Hoock, The King's Artists, p. 299. 
26 Sander Gilman, ‘The Madman as Artist: Medicine, History and Degenerate Art’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 4 (October, 1985), 575-97 (p. 581).  
27 Anon, ‘Exhibition’, Spectator, p. 498. 
28 Tolstoy, What is Art?, p. 35. 
29 Anon, ‘Exhibition’, Spectator, p. 498. 
30 Perry, Playing, p. 14. 
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of art were broadening.31 On the horizon of the fin de siècle, there were a growing number of 
mainstream movements that established art as medium of experimentation through which 
variants of human experience and emotion could be explored. 
 These changing perceptions of art championed ideas of innovation and 
defamiliarisation over schools of realism and imitation: Modern art is now valued by its 
originality rather than its ability to represent something known.32 Perry elaborated further, 
dismissing anything which is ‘a boring version of something else’ as non or failed art.33 This 
is reminiscent of Modernism’s call to ‘make it new’, as ‘the old models were thrown out. 
Function defined form’.34 By dismissing the ‘old models’ – traditional perceptions and 
patterns of art – there is potential that the ‘old models’ of understanding the self could also be 
‘thrown out’ in favour of diversity, along with the ‘old masters’. ‘Madness’ defamiliarises: it 
offers new and alternative perspectives on the world, selfhood, and ‘reality’. Art movements  
such as Outsider Art, Post-Impressionism and Modernism which champion ‘function’ (art as 
a form of communication) over ‘form’ (being ‘beautifully true’) could offer a sustainable 
platform for ‘madness’ narratives.35  Indeed, as Tolstoy argued, ‘the only true work of art is 
one that conveys a new feeling (however insignificant) into the general usage of human 
life’.36 
 Were Tolstoy correct, these broadening expectations of art would offer not only a 
voice to the individual experience of ‘madness’, but might also allow this alternative 
representation to enter ‘general usage’, thus challenging hegemonic narratives. According to 
                                                          
31 Anon, ‘Exhibition’, New Sporting Magazine. The Salon was the official art exhibition of the Académie des 
Beaux-Arts in Paris. 
32 My use of the term ‘defamiliarisation’ here and elsewhere refers to the artistic process ‘of rendering 
unfamiliar’. See OED, ‘defamiliarisation’  
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/48712?redirectedFrom=defamiliarisation#eid> [accessed 12 February 2016]. 
33 Perry, Playing, p. 61. 
34 J. G. Ballard, ‘A Handful of Dust’, The Guardian, 20 March 2006  
<http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/mar/20/architecture.communities> [accessed 22 January 
2015]. 
35 Anon, ‘Exhibition’, Spectator, p. 498. 
36 Tolstoy, What is Art?, p. 59. Italics added for emphasis. 
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Tolstoy, art is concerned with ‘making understandable and accessible that which might be 
incomprehensible’, and so there is potential for it to articulate ‘madness’ without 
simultaneously rendering it ‘other’ and mute.37 However, considering the complex politics 
involved with verbalising ‘madness’, it does seem a little naive to assume that visual art 
offers a simple alternative. In addition to the changing perceptions of the nature and the 
construction of art, we must also consider the other, perhaps most problematic, variable: 
social reception.  
 The idea that art could be ‘a communicator of uncovered deep determinants of human 
behaviour’ suggests that movements such as Outsider Art and Symbolism not only offered 
radical understandings of what art could be, but also reflected and revealed different ways of 
perceiving the self.38 The audience were presented with a narrative which not only offered an 
alternative experience of ‘reality’, but which also, potentially, explored universal ideas of 
human identity.39 Although audience engagement offers the possibility of connection and 
empathy, the text (in this case, the piece of visual art) is both received and inevitably 
reconstructed by the viewer. The eye of the viewer ‘selects, organises, discriminates, 
associates, classifies, analyses, constructs. It does not so much mirror as take and make’.40 A 
‘madness’ narrative – expressed through art – escapes the gaze of the psychiatrist, only to be 
‘classified’ and ‘analysed’ by the viewer instead. Although ‘symbols are media of 
communication’, they are also vulnerable to misunderstanding and deconstruction: in an 
attempt to relate to a piece of art, the viewer is likely to reinterpret the image in order to allow 
it to fit with their experience of identity, or ‘reality’.41 Art offers no paratext, no preface: 
                                                          
37 Tolstoy, What is Art?, p. 121. 
38 Vernon McKay and Marjie L. Baughman, ‘Art, Madness and Human Interaction’, Art Journal, 4 (Summer, 
1972), 413-20 (p. 418). 
39 This changing nature of art allowed art which was traditionally marginalised by the hegemony of the academy 
to be viewed beyond its ‘otherness’, thus – in theory – preventing its immediate dismissal. This opened up the 
potential for art to be considered what Thelmar termed a ‘Human document’ – having credibility by virtue of 
representing human experience, rather than being art which should be judged merely on its ability to imitate. 
40 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indiana: Hackett, 1976), pp. 7-8. 
41 Goodman, Languages, p. 257. 
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there is room for introduction (in the form of a title) but, other than that, the image must hold 
its own. The artist has little control over social interpretation.42 ‘The eye comes always 
ancient to its work’, and therefore different perspectives and receptions are inevitable.43  
The variables here are endless: we are influenced, for example, by our experience; our 
identity (or our perceptions and assumptions of selfhood); our mood; the context in which we 
view the image; the information we are given about the artist (or have absorbed by social 
osmosis); or our relationship with the art world more generally. When one approaches the 
work of Van Gogh, for example, one may recall the infamous anecdote about his self-
mutilation, and thus the reception of the text is inevitably altered by this pre-existing 
knowledge. When encountering art in Prinzhorn’s The Art of Insanity, the viewer’s 
interpretation is coloured by context. If we are told a piece of work belongs to a certain genre, 
we may respond differently: we might have decided we prefer Realism and so respond 
negatively to something abstract (or vice versa). Someone ignorant of Louis Wain’s earlier 
work may celebrate the originality and vibrancy of his art, without being aware of the radical 
shift in style which coincided with his incarceration. How can ‘mad’ art be understood as a 
vitally important bid to be heard when it is subject to dismissal due to something as trivial as 
taste? 
When approaching ‘mad’ art, we are also exposed to an enduring social cliché which 
marries creativity and mental illness, and which dates as far back as Aristotle. He mused that 
‘melancholy is due to their [the ‘melancholic’] responding too quickly to the imagination’, 
reflecting an assumption that the ‘mad’ artist is expected to exhibit heightened senses and 
                                                          
42 Of course, this is not a phenomenon unique to visual art: a literary text is also susceptible to the 
reinterpretation of the reader. However, as a general rule, due to form, the connection between audience and 
visual art can be fleeting – perhaps limited to a glimpse – and this sense of immediacy can render the 
art/audience relationship particularly fragile. By comparison, a literary text – even something fairly short such as 
a poem – requires relatively prolonged engagement on behalf of the reader: the literary text has to be read, 
whereas visual art can be seen. This makes immediate dismissal less likely, as the reader – by virtue of 
experiencing the text – is invested in it. 
43 Goodman, Languages, p. 7. 
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creativity and, above all, artistic and technical ability.44 It may seem obvious to expect artistic 
ability from artists, however, in order to consider the credibility of art as a universal narrative 
model, there are two forms of accessibility which need to be considered.45 It is vital that the 
text is made accessible to a social audience in order to render the narrative process complete. 
However, this is of little use if the individual is not able to use art to construct a narrative as 
they are not deemed to display technical artistic ability, an admittedly arbitrary criterion and, 
again, one subject to audience interpretation. It is expected that the ‘mad’ artist ‘sees more 
deeply and is able to articulate this perception’: this stereotype imposes itself onto the 
viewer.46 Anticipating a grand, complex masterpiece which will offer insight into the intense 
creativity and ‘alien’ mind of the ‘madman’, a viewer may be disappointed and thus 
dismissive of Wieser’s stark sketching or Wain’s cartoonish anthropomorphism.  
The anti-psychiatric movement further reinforced ideas of ‘madness’ and heightened 
creativity: Laing explained how ‘the [‘mad’] self […] is free to dream and imagine anything 
[…with] unconditioned freedom, power, creativity’.47 This movement saw ‘madness’ as a 
creative response to the world, and this point of departure from ‘sanity’ was encouraged, 
rather than oppressed. The case of English artist and writer Mary Barnes – who entered 
Laing’s therapeutic community at Kingsley Hall in 1965, and underwent Laing’s regression 
therapy – reinforced the merging of ‘madness’ and creativity. Barnes herself, and Joseph 
Berke, document her experience of ‘schizophrenia’ as ‘a step on the way to truth’.48 On 
discovering that she ‘was quite unable to express any feelings in words’, Barnes was 
encouraged to use visual art as a communicative tool.49 Told to ‘be as a child. Go mad. 
                                                          
44 Aristotle, Problems, ed. by E. S. Forster (London: Aeterna Press, 2015), p. 127. 
45 By ‘universal’, I am referring to art’s ability to be available to all who require it as a narrative model, and art’s 
ability to be accessible to a social audience. 
46 Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 221. 
47 Laing, Divided, p. 89. As stated earlier, although I refer to Laing as a part of the anti-psychiatry movement, 
this is something of an oversimplification. Laing himself rejected the label, although it has been retrospectively 
applied to him and his work. 
48 Barnes, Mary Barnes, p. 17. 
49 Barnes, Mary Barnes, p. 51. 
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Regrow’, Barnes’s ‘madness’ was not oppressed or silenced in the walls of Kingsley Hall, but 
liberated.50 She described how ‘painting […] got me together, my body and soul. All my 
insides come out through my hands and my eyes and all the colour. It was free and moving, 
loving and creative’.51 Rather than experiencing her ‘madness’ as something to be confined 
and controlled, Barnes’s journey through (rather than against) her ‘schizophrenia’ resulted in 
freedom, fluidity and creativity.  
Barnes’s paintings, first put on public display in 1969 at the Camden Arts Centre, 
have now been exhibited all over the world, and have been hailed for their use of ‘vivid 
colour [and] religious imagery’.52 Since her death in 2001, recent exhibitions have led 
reviewers to conclude that ‘Barnes is the best contemporary British artist not working 
today’.53 However, Barnes’s profile as an artist is inextricable from her identity as a 
‘schizophrenic’: reviewer George Barber commented that ‘because Barnes’ life hangs so 
heavily over her art, one feels somewhat constricted as a viewer’.54 Barnes is understood to 
be an artist because of her ‘madness’, and so her treatment at Kingsley Hall (and subsequent 
account) further ratifies the societal assumption that an unsound mind is also a creative one. 
Writer and art therapist David Maclagan argued that this merging of self/art is characteristic 
of the Outsider Art movement, as ‘the story behind it [the art] is intimately involved in 
establishing its authenticity’.55 
Although the ‘mad’ self may be inextricable from its projection (in this case, the 
artwork), there is a suggestion that art is still able to offer an accessible narrative, even to the 
‘other’. Tolstoy argued that ‘the activity of art is based on the fact that man, as he receives 
                                                          
50 Barnes, Mary Barnes, p. 109. 
51 Barnes, Mary Barnes, p. 145. 
52 Obituary of Mary Barnes, The Guardian, 13 July 2001  
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/jul/13/guardianobituaries.books> [accessed 24 January 2015]. 
53 George Barber, ‘Mary Barnes’, Frieze Magazine, issue 138, April 2011 
<http://www.frieze.com/issue/review/mary-barnes/> [accessed 24 January 2015]. 
54 Barber, ‘Mary Barnes’. 
55 David Maclagan, Outsider Art: From the Margins to the Marketplace (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), p. 11. 
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through hearing or sight the expressions of another man’s feelings, is capable of experiencing 
the same feelings as the man who expresses them’.56 The activity of art is empathy.57 If a 
viewer is able to reflect on, for example, not only Louis Wain’s evident disconnection from 
orthodox perceptions of ‘reality’ in his later work, but also experience the emotions and 
immerse themselves in the microcosm of a new or unfamiliar ‘reality’, then Wain’s narrative 
is socially received. If the viewer can be temporarily ‘other’ enough to experience Wain’s 
‘madness’, then Wain is no longer ‘other’. The idea that art has this capacity to ‘infect 
people’, to allow them to align themselves with an experience of ‘otherness’, however 
briefly, inevitably blurs the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘other’, between ‘madness’ and 
‘sanity’.58 If the viewer can momentarily experience ‘madness’ in order to empathise with the 
artist, then they do not fit into either side of these binary oppositions. If the artist’s experience 
of ‘madness’ can be understood as a variant of ‘sanity’ rather than its antithesis, then these 
binary oppositions which have enforced silence can, potentially, be entirely deconstructed.59 
Tolstoy contended that because of this ability to ‘infect’, visual art is a much more 
powerful tool than language: ‘art, unlike the word, to which one need not listen, is so highly 
dangerous in its capacity for infecting people against their will’.60 Dewey believed that ‘each 
art speaks an idiom that conveys what cannot be said in another language’.61 Art compensates 
for – or reacts to – the inadequacy of language by taking narratives into a realm almost 
entirely divorced from it. Stripped away from semantic politics which inevitably ‘other’ the 
narrator, ‘mad’ art instead projects a narrative which can be ‘recognised as the mirror of a 
                                                          
56 Tolstoy, What is Art?, p. 38. 
57 Again, this is not exclusive to visual art: as demonstrated in chapter three, literature can also be used to 
provoke empathy from the reader. However, the immediacy of visual art – as detailed earlier – means that a 
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58 Tolstoy, What is Art?, p. 41. 
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self’.62 However, the human tendency to categorise using language prevents art from being 
an experience entirely detached from semantics. Labels used to disrupt the absence of 
language – such as ‘Outsider Art’ – are evidence of a wider social inability to surrender to a 
narrative model which transcends or rejects lexical classifications and hierarchies. 
Conversations about the nature of art stress its universality. Academic and writer 
Hester Parr observed the ‘potential role of the arts in minimizing difference – through helping 
to ensure communication […] and inclusion’, highlighting the accessibility of art and its 
concomitant merits as a narrative model.63 To an extent, visual art is above and beyond 
language (and its politics) and, as a medium which provokes recognition and empathy; it 
seems a well-suited platform for ‘madness’ narratives. However, assumptions of how art will 
be received can, indeed, be far removed from the practice.  
Kraepelin declared that ‘mad’ art was characterised by a ‘startling senselessness and 
tastelessness’, devaluing and dismissing this narrative model.64 Described as ‘peculiar’ and 
‘queer handiwork’, ‘mad’ art was pathologised: it was a symptom rather than a narrative.65 
Perceived as merely a by-product of ‘otherness’, ‘mad’ art was dismissed and thus silenced 
by psychiatry, much like the verbal narratives I have previously explored. If society is 
informed that ‘mad’ art is nothing more than a symptom, a rejection of its perceived worth 
becomes a self-defence mechanism, an intuitive reflex. It will remain ‘other’, lest the viewer 
have empathy and be ‘othered’ in turn: ‘madness’ by proxy. This medicalisation of ‘mad’ art 
continues the traditional silencing of ‘madness’ narratives: deemed ‘meaningless smears’66, 
‘incomprehensible computations’67, merely ‘characteristic of the schizophrenic imagination’, 
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rather than discussed in human terms.68 Despite the theory that art offers a universally 
accessible platform, is there really any space in this realm for a narrative declared 
‘incomprehensible’ by psychiatric hegemony? 
Despite arguing that the main activity of art was empathy, Tolstoy believed that that 
which is pathologically ‘incomprehensible’ (to the point of ‘otherness’, thus apparently being 
beyond mainstream ‘comprehension’) has no place in the sphere of mainstream art. The 
comparison of ‘incomprehensible’ art to ‘some kind of food that is very good but people 
cannot eat it’ overtly suggests that such art does not serve its perceived purpose (much like 
the food that cannot be eaten), and so has little value.69 Paradoxically, Tolstoy expected art to 
be ‘accessible and comprehensible to everyone’70, despite the ‘business of art consist[ing] 
precisely in making understandable and accessible which might be incomprehensible and 
inaccessible’.71 There seem to be degrees of inaccessibility. Some ‘incomprehensibility’ 
results in ‘successful’ art (because of its ability to ‘convey a new feeling’), while other 
‘inaccessible’ art is disregarded (deemed to serve no purpose, much like the food that cannot 
be eaten).72 So where is this arbitrary line drawn? Despite its premise of universal 
accessibility, it would appear that art’s manifesto – that everyone has ‘complete and 
unhindered communication’ – remains more theory than practice.73 
 
‘Audacity and Inventiveness Beyond the Familiar’: Outsider Art74 
It has been suggested that a position of ‘otherness’ is a sort of prerequisite for the figure of 
the artist. Dewey believed that the nature of art demands ‘some measure of “abstraction” 
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from physical existence’, as this external perspective allows for a different – and thus 
innovative – view of the world.75 The idea of the creative outsider is not far removed from 
the stereotype of the ‘mad’ artist: ‘otherness’ invariably offers a new perspective. Adolf 
Wölfli, for example, has been described as presenting an ‘encyclopaedic view of the world’ 
through his art, by virtue of his marginalised vantage point.76 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that such art is accessible. Cultural historian Sander Gilman describes this 
positioning as the ‘persona of the outsider, which he [the artist] dons like a helmet to do 
battle with society’.77 The idea that this must be a persona silences lived experiences of the 
outsider. If it is merely a performance of ‘otherness’, it is not ‘otherness’. Only those 
included in society may engage with it, or ‘battle’ with it, even if this is done through a 
performance of marginalisation. For the truly marginalised, any form of social engagement – 
even a critique – is all but impossible. 
The art world may feel that it is including the perspective of the outsider, but only if it 
is not too ‘other’. In this limited criterion, there seems to be little space for the raw art 
exemplified by Barnes painting with excrement and August Klett impressing symbols on 
walls using fat. However, the Outsider Art movement offers the potential for such art to be 
accepted, as long as it simultaneously acknowledges its own ‘otherness’.78 Outsider Art has 
been described as a genre which ‘encompasses individuals who belong to no movement or 
school, who are mainly self taught, have no knowledge of other art or artists and are adept at 
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exploring their own psyche’.79 In this realm, art owes no debt to history or artistic traditions. 
A defining feature of Outsider Art is a subversion of traditional concepts of art: compare the 
culture of ‘professional’ Royal Academy artistry with the Outsider Artist who ‘is unaware 
that he operates in the domain of artistic creation’.80 
Of primary significance is the idea that artists in the movement ‘are adept at exploring 
their own psyche’.81 This is particularly important when understood in a psychiatric context. 
In this movement, a ‘mad’ artist can be the master of their own psyche. Although the artist 
must be the ‘outsider’ (and thus ‘other’) in order to gain this freedom, they are 
simultaneously an ‘outsider’ to hegemony. Psychiatry cannot ‘other’ them but, in order to be 
liberated from psychiatric classifications, they must first ‘other’ themselves by becoming the 
‘outsider’ – and, of course, exposing the self to new labels, not least that of ‘Outsider Artist’. 
Outsider Art offers a platform for ‘untrained artists […] who are not part of the 
mainstream tradition’: it is a microcosm divorced from the canon which allows ‘mad’ art to 
sustain its own rhetoric.82 However, it does not allow for a socially viable narrative. Imagine 
a viewer – fed on a diet of Royal Academy Realism – encountering a wall, exhibiting 
Barnes’s representation of a pair of breasts, painted with her excrement. The viewer is 
unsettled, perhaps repulsed.  
They declare: ‘this is not Art!’  
We reply: ‘yes it is. It is Outsider Art’.  
The viewer nods knowingly and is likely to dismiss the art.  
By creating a niche for less orthodox art, Outsider Art offered the potential for a 
narrative without forcing the artist to pander to artistic traditions, or negotiate the politics of 
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canonicity. However, the necessary acceptance of the ‘outsider’ position obstructs the third 
stage of the narrative process: delivery to a social audience. Although the individual may be 
empowered by the ability to ‘other’ themselves, rather than be marginalised by psychiatry 
(although this may have already happened), the narrative is still ‘other’, and thus is likely to 
be disregarded by a mainstream audience. Delivery to an audience is possible, as the genre of 
Outsider Art offers a medium suited to unconventional art, however – paradoxically – 
inclusion in this bracket requires an acceptance of ‘otherness’. Any Outsider Art which 
merges with popular culture does so under a label which clearly demarcates an assumption of 
difference. Can a narrative which is introduced as ‘other’ ever be socially familiar? Can an 
experience demarcated as that of the ‘outsider’ be validated by the ‘insiders’? 
I have displayed how just a brief glimpse into the politics of producing, categorising, 
and viewing art can, indeed, deconstruct the idea that art is the only medium ‘of complete and 
unhindered communication’.83 I have established the impact that such politics could have on 
‘mad’ art. I will now take this theory into the practical realm, by using it as a foundation to 
explore the (in)accessibility of  ‘madness’ narratives by my chosen artists. Will this 
application reveal that art is a universal narrative platform, and therefore a suitable medium 
for the narration of ‘madness’? Or will the reality undermine this hypothesis? Most 
importantly, what impact do these politics have on the accessibility of ‘madness’ narratives? 
If art is not available, what is? 
 
‘I Shall Change the Position of the Stars by an Act of Will’: Hyacinth Freiherr von 
Wieser84 
Little is known about Hyacinth Freiherr von Wieser: he remains as a reconstruction: his only 
enduring narrative exists in Prinzhorn’s study of ‘schizophrenic’ art.85 His experiences have 
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been employed by Prinzhorn as a psychiatric tool, and his art has been viewed merely as a 
symptom of ‘madness’, rather than as a bid for narrative power. However, by examining 
Prinzhorn’s text in order to deconstruct psychiatric politics and access individual experience, 
I reread Wieser’s ‘madness’ narrative. Through the lens of art theory, I explore the potential 
for Wieser’s narrative to be accessed by a mainstream audience, and assess the credibility of 
visual art as a narrative model. 
Born in 1883, Wieser was described as ‘sensitive and idealistic’ as a teenager.86 His 
date of incarceration was not recorded, however, it allegedly followed a period in which he 
‘hallucinated more and more, talked nonsense, and suffered from hypochondria, a fear of 
being poisoned, and sudden excitements’.87 Throughout the entirety of Prinzhorn’s 
significantly brief account of Wieser’s incarceration, there is a running theme of Wieser 
resisting medicalisation. He displays ‘an urge to discover magic, supernatural relationships 
for all external events and especially for his own strange experiences’.88 Justified as a quest 
for ‘new and real knowledge’, Wieser resists psychiatric ‘authority’ by trying to obtain real 
knowledge (thus exposing psychiatric knowledge as fake: a language about ‘madness’ and 
not of it).89  
For answers, Wieser explored supernatural discourses rather than the scientific one 
which was being imposed on him. Predictably this rejection of hegemony is deemed ‘absurd’ 
and ‘grotesque’ by the psychiatric report.90 However, it empowers Wieser. In the microcosm 
of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic, Wieser has disregarded the power of the psychiatrist 
and, by association, rejected the role of ‘patient’. The account records Wieser standing at the 
window of the asylum (and thus symbolically turning his back on the environment which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
85 In order to view Wieser’s account as a human narrative rather than a psychiatric one, I will refer to him as his 
real name rather than his pseudonym. I will also do the same with August Klett.  
86 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 123. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 124. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 124. 
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attempts to control him): ‘he stands for hours at an open window with a spoon in his hand and 
stares into the sky, saying, “I shall change the position of the stars by an act of will”’.91 In an 
environment which serves to remove his authority, Wieser is resolute in his desire to be the 
master of his experiences. It is, of course, no coincidence that Wieser goes beyond the walls 
of the asylum to find answers – real knowledge. This is to be found in the sky, the stars, the 
trees in the garden: anywhere but in the mind and language of the psychiatrist.92 
Before we engage with a specific example of Wieser’s art, we must first unravel the 
art – Wieser’s narrative – from a context which medicalises and dehumanises his experiences. 
Prinzhorn himself was both a psychiatrist and art historian, and had taken on the task of 
‘expanding an existing collection of art and artefacts crafted by the mentally ill, which was 
initially inaugurated by Kraepelin’.93 This was not a project he started of his own volition 
because of his interest in art. Prinzhorn often did not have contact with the ‘patients’ he 
discussed, instead inviting colleagues to send accounts and artwork. Thus, the narratives we 
receive through Prinzhorn’s work have been constructed and reconstructed through a dual 
psychiatric lens. 
Further, in other publications, ‘Prinzhorn used the term bildnerei (“image-making”) as 
opposed to kunst (“art”)’.94 Through this distinction, he established a clear binary between art 
(and thus his academic background) and ‘mad’ art. ‘Mad’ art was therefore something ‘other’ 
than art: it was a symptom, and had little worth other than as a psychiatric tool. After 
featuring in Prinzhorn’s study, much of the art was released to be used in a travelling Nazi 
exhibition on ‘Degenerate Art’ which opened in 1938, with the aim of further reinforcing ‘the 
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92 Wieser’s rejection of hegemonic discourse – in favour of championing personal experience and his own quest 
for knowledge – echoes the archetypal Romantic rejection of Enlightenment and celebration of the 
anthropocentric. The idea that knowledge can be found in the sky or the garden – as opposed to embedded in 
grand narratives of psychiatry, science, Industrialisation or Enlightenment – reflects an intense appreciation of 
the natural world, another defining feature of Romanticism. 




“worthlessness” of the artistry of the mentally ill – which eventually culminated in the claim 
of the unworthiness of the mentally ill themselves’.95 The various labels which impress 
themselves on this art immediately condemn it to a state of ‘otherness’. The idea of 
degeneracy denotes ‘one who has lost, or has become deficient in, the qualities considered 
proper to the race or kind’, thus the label of ‘Degenerate Art’ suggests something lacking, 
something ‘other’ than human.96 The title The Art of Insanity immediately evokes a sense of 
distance. It is not art but the art of ‘insanity’: it is a by-product of ‘madness’. In the sub-title, 
we are introduced to ‘Ten Schizophrenic Artists’: they are ‘schizophrenics’ first, artists 
second. Their art is a result of their ‘schizophrenia’.  
An acknowledgement – and negotiation – of these paratexts is necessary for the 
viewer to access Wieser’s narrative. The various labels which hover over Wieser’s work 
(‘image-making’ rather than art; the art of ‘insanity’; ‘Degenerate Art’) serve to undermine 
the value and accessibility of his art by presenting it as ‘other’ (‘other’ than art, or, indeed, 
degenerate – that is other than human). The presence of not one but two psychiatric paratexts 
(the account written by Wieser’s psychiatrist, which was then reconstructed by Prinzhorn) 
enforces distance between the ‘mad’ voice and potential audience. As I have already 
established, context can have a dramatic impact on how the viewer interprets the work, and 
the dual psychiatric presence which frames Wieser’s work is eager to convince the viewer of 
his ‘otherness’ before his art has even been presented. 
Prinzhorn featured six examples of Wieser’s work in The Art of Insanity, displaying 
them alongside a reconfigured account of Wieser’s incarceration and the progression of his 
‘madness’. The images are fairly similar in both style and form, with the favoured medium 
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being merely a pencil and paper: Wieser’s sketches are stark and bold, and often minimalist. 
The account explained that Wieser ‘had already drawn and painted a little as an amateur’ 
prior to his incarceration.97 The psychiatric presence briefly mentioned that Wieser also 
created ‘some watercolour landscapes […] with a surer perspective and lively colours’.98 
However, as the sketches allegedly represented Wieser attempting to ‘reproduce his delusions 
on paper’ under the instructions of his psychiatrist, they held more interest for Prinzhorn than 
the landscapes (presumably not ‘other’ enough to present a spectacle).99  
Figure 1: Hyacinth Freiherr von Wieser, Circle of Ideas of a Man, Projected on the Outside 
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Before I offer an interpretation of Circle of Ideas of a Man, Projected on the Outside World, 
the context demands that we first acknowledge Prinzhorn’s ‘authority’ by looking at the 
analysis which features alongside this image: 
In it we see a mighty head which looks as if made from a slab of stone breaking open 
at the top and transformed into a bouquet of small tableaus [sic], including a palace, a 
tournament, a lion, and women. A metal strip with nails seems to hold the skull 
together. Its even construction and the precision of many parts, notably the hand, 
betray the practised drawer. The head’s disquieting effect is probably due to the calm 
objectivity with which Welz depicts the ‘projected circle of ideas’.101 
 
This initial description seems to stem from Prinzhorn’s academic background as an art 
historian rather than his role as a psychiatrist.  His focus on Wieser’s superficial aesthetics – 
particularly the detail in the hand, which he believes ‘betrays’ practice and talent – suggests a 
focus on technical ability rather than symbolic interpretation. It is only later, when prompted 
by more abstract work, that Prinzhorn reflected: ‘He [Wieser] is wrong in thinking that actual 
ideas can be represented’.102 Prinzhorn deemed Wieser’s ideas too ‘other’, and therefore they 
are unable to find physical representation through art. Arguing that, in his art, Wieser proves 
‘that his very idea contains the seed of absurdity’, Prinzhorn depicted Wieser’s narrative as a 
space in which even Wieser can recognise his own ‘otherness’.103  
 Circle of Ideas of a Man, Projected on the Outside World can be seen to epitomise a 
struggle between the concrete (the geometric, the absolute) and the abstract (and thus 
unknowable). Wieser attempts to pin down his ideas, to present them in physical, concrete 
terms. The head of the figure opens up to reveal a series of images – the ‘ideas of a man’ – 
‘projected’ into the external domain. However, the title itself is telling: it is a man, rather than 
the self, thus Wieser was able to distance himself from the figure in the sketch (and therefore 
protect the self, to an extent, from the gaze of psychiatry). These thoughts are projected onto 
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the outside world, exposed. To return to my earlier discussion of the problems latent in 
accepting the role of ‘outsider’, Wieser suggested that it is the outside world which is ‘other’. 
Circle of Ideas of a Man, Projected on the Outside World attempts to blur the distinctions 
between what is internal (ideas) and external (the outside world). This projection of a private, 
personal narrative into the external, psychiatric context is a powerful metaphor for the 
process of self-exposure latent in accepting the ‘patient’/psychiatrist dynamic. However, the 
physical presentation of ideas suggests anything other than passivity. 
 The prominent idea is the oversized lion, vast enough to clamber over the roof of a 
building. Signifying strength and nobility, the image of the lion supports my earlier argument 
that Wieser was empowered by his independent quest for real knowledge. In a psychiatric 
environment which threatened to render Wieser helpless and silent, his narrative was 
constructed using images of power, from his desire to ‘change the position of the stars by an 
act of will’ to his inclusion of lion imagery.104 Due to the size of the reproduction of the 
image (yet another contextual variable which Prinzhorn presumably dictated), it is difficult to 
pick out other details, despite the bold, understated nature of Wieser’s sketch. This seems to 
be a manoeuvre to ensure that only Prinzhorn and Wieser’s initial psychiatrist have 
interpretive agency. 
 As Wieser’s work has been reconstructed and thoroughly medicalised through a dual 
psychiatric lens, his narrative can either be viewed as a symptom or as art. As I will 
demonstrate over the course of this chapter, it cannot be both, as the concept of the ‘mad’ 
artist is paradoxical. Could a theoretical approach work to ascertain the artistic value of 
Wieser’s narrative? Dewey articulated a triadic relation which depicts the relationship that art 
has with mainstream society: ‘the external object, the product of art, is the connecting link 
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between artist and audience’.105 Because of this relationship, Dewey argued that art ‘cannot 
be private’: it relies on social engagement to verify its status as art.106 However, this 
relationship is somewhat complicated by the context of Wieser’s work. The external object – 
the art – is reproduced in Prinzhorn’s text, which encompasses both the image and 
Prinzhorn’s analysis: to a mainstream audience, the two are inseparable. Further, the 
psychiatric context confuses the notion of ‘audience’. Wieser produced his art in an asylum, 
prompted by his psychiatrist to try to reproduce his delusions. In this microcosm, Wieser’s 
psychiatrist is the audience. The psychiatrist then reconstructed Wieser’s narrative to give to 
Prinzhorn, who was, in that moment, the audience.107 Prinzhorn then crafted his own external 
object – his text – around Wieser’s external object (his art), and delivered it to a social 
audience. In the remit of a standard triadic relation, only the external object (the art) 
simultaneously stands in-between and bridges the gap between artist and audience. However, 
in this context, there is now an external object, a text, and two psychiatrists standing in-
between artist and audience, interpreting, reframing and, ultimately, distorting Wieser’s 
narrative. As this psychiatric context confuses the orthodox relationship between artist and 
audience, it may serve to declare Wieser’s narrative as something ‘other’ than art. 
 Philosopher Thomas E. Wartenberg, when discussing the various criteria involved in 
demarcating art from non-art, observed that ‘those who have had training in the appreciation 
of a given art form […] are more qualified to determine what are and are not instances of 
it’.108 With this in mind, Prinzhorn’s academic background as an art historian does afford him 
interpretative power, allowing him to judge if Wieser’s work is, indeed, art. Wieser’s 
narrative is introduced as art, insofar as the text is called The Art of the Insane. However, as 
                                                          
105 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 111. 
106 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 112. 
107 There is potential to argue that the artist is simultaneously the creator and original audience for their work – 
particularly in the context of art which serves a therapeutic purpose. However, I am looking at this from the 
perspective of narrative theory, which, in accordance with the three stage process detailed in chapter one, 
necessitates acknowledgement from a social audience for a narrative to succeed. 
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my previous discussion has proved, it is a context which draws attention to the ‘otherness’ of 
the art: Prinzhorn carefully employed semantics to suggest it was a process of ‘image-
making’ rather than ‘art’.  
 Wartenberg believed that ‘art objects are created by artists who are consciously trying 
to make art’.109 To what extent are the reader and viewer encouraged to consider Wieser as 
an artist? The context of Wieser’s narrative ensures that his identity as a ‘schizophrenic’ is 
paramount: any potential artistic credibility is incidental. Prinzhorn accepted that Wieser was 
a ‘practised drawer’, but did not call him an artist.110 Because of psychiatric framing, these 
questions of context and artistic credibility have already been answered for the viewer. 
Prinzhorn, as psychiatric ‘authority’ – with the added credibility of being an art historian – 
has constructed and imposed his interpretation: the reader/viewer is unlikely to be inclined to 
challenge this dual expertise. 
Based on these theoretical approaches, it would appear that Wieser’s narrative is not 
art in a canonical, and thus societal, sense. It is difficult, if not impossible, for mainstream 
society to access Wieser’s work as art rather than a symptom. The psychiatric belief that 
‘attending or listening to the voice of the mad is pointless since, by the virtue of their 
unreason, their views are worthless’ dominates the triadic relation.111 Although Wieser 
displayed reason (through his geometric art and quest for real knowledge), the psychiatric 
context must portray it is as ‘absurd’ rather than credible in order to devalue Wieser’s reason 
(and thus portray him as a ‘patient’).112 
However, the perceived and expected nature of what constituted art was changing in 
the nineteenth century, away from Realism towards the anthropocentric. The idea that art 
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could reflect and explore ‘uncovered deep determinants of human behaviour’ changed the 
relationship between art and audience: the audience, instead of anticipating a flawlessly 
imitated landscape or a true-to-life portrait, approached art expecting to exhibit interpretive 
agency.113 With this in mind, Circle of Ideas of a Man, Projected on the Outside World may 
offer the potential for mainstream engagement, were it to be divorced from its psychiatric 
context. The fact that Wieser represented a man, rather than the self, is significant: it could be 
any man, it could even be the viewer. Thus, Wieser did not present his narrative as a product 
of his ‘madness’: it is, instead, a commentary on the human condition. It is a point of 
similarity, an image which unifies, rather than a narrative which exposes Wieser’s alleged 
difference. However, in a context which resolutely reinforces Wieser’s ‘otherness’, this bid 
for narrative power has been supressed. The psychiatric framing has already claimed the 
narrative as a tool, a symptom, the art has already been deconstructed and scrutinised by the 
assumed ‘authority’. 
 
‘Meaningless Smears Approach Serious Art’: August Klett114 
In order to establish the impact of context further, it is necessary to explore the work of 
August Klett (granted the derogatory pseudonym ‘Klotz’ by Prinzhorn: ‘Klotz’ being ‘a 
pejorative term for an idiot’).115 In much the same manner as Wieser, Klett’s art was featured 
by Prinzhorn as proof of ‘some marked deviation from conventional or normal ways of 
acting, or thinking, or feeling [...] to make it appear that there must be something lacking in 
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the constitutional makeup of the individual’.116 However, Klett’s identity as an 
artist/‘schizophrenic’ (the two are inseparable because of his psychiatric context) has endured 
beyond hegemonic discourse which sought to control it. Reclaimed as one of the artists 
fundamental to the genesis of Outsider Art, Klett’s work adorns the covers and the content of 
a handful of critical and historical accounts of the movement.117 It would appear that Klett’s 
‘schizophrenic’ diagnosis did not jeopardise his identity as an artist, despite the psychiatric 
framing, or indeed, because of this psychiatric framing: Outsider Art championed those who 
were socially or psychologically marginalised. Klett’s status as a ‘patient’ verifies his 
position as an ‘outsider’. 
Born in 1864, Klett led a fairly unremarkable life (or, at least, a life removed from the 
psychiatric gaze) until 1903. Following a bout of influenza, Klett ‘fell into depression, feared 
sin […] and was afraid that he might die. Hallucinations appeared and caused him to become 
greatly excited’.118 After an instance of self-mutilation, Klett was incarcerated. Prinzhorn 
remarked that ‘Klotz had been drawing earlier than most of the patients on whom we report 
in this book’.119 Klett’s desire to create – and narrate – led to him rubbing figures ‘into the 
wallpaper with fat […] which could not be wiped off’.120 This raw, enduring form of artistry 
reveals a compulsion to create, regardless of what materials were to hand, reflecting the 
‘urgency, an internal necessity’ which drove Adolf Wölfli’s art, and would later be echoed in 
the work of Barnes.121  
In 1905, Klett created a ‘colour alphabet’, in which each letter of the alphabet is 
assigned a colour: for example, ‘2b = Bronze colour metal’; ‘6f = fire flame red’; and ‘9i = 
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117 See Jean Louis Ferrier, Outsider Art (Paris: Terrail, 1998) and Roger Cardinal, Outsider Art (London: Studio 
Vista, 1972). 
118 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 50. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 51. 
121 Walter Morgenthaler, Madness and Art: The Life and Works of Adolf Wölfli, trans. by Aaron H. Esman 
(Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 22. Italics added for emphasis. 
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sky blue forget-me-not’.122 Although art theory described art as ‘a language [or] many 
languages’, Klett took this approach to a literal level.123 Discarding the current alphabet (and 
thus rejecting the grand narrative of language), Klett created his own: a language of colour 
rather than vocabulary. Reminiscent of ‘schizophrenese’, Klett invented a semantic system, a 
new space in which the self can be reconstructed and narrated. These detailed ‘pairings of 
letters and colours’124 are suggestive of grapheme-colour synaesthesia, in which ‘a letter or 
number triggers an experience of colour’.125 Predictably – and ironically, considering his 
Kraepelinian psychiatric background – Prinzhorn viewed this as a symptom, a ‘compulsion to 
systematize’.126 However, much like Wieser’s desire for real knowledge, this is a significant 
rejection of hegemonic discourse, a refusal to rely on language (a psychiatric tool) to delimit 
an experience of ‘madness’. The psychiatric account observed that Klett ‘does not feel at all 
inhibited by conventional knowledge, but proceeds entirely playfully and arbitrarily’.127 
Klett’s experience transcended conventional knowledge, as ‘the expression of madness 
exceeds what is possible to talk about using conventional […] discourse’.128 Thus, Klett was 
compelled to create a new discourse in order to accommodate it. The psychiatric presence 
dismissed Klett’s system as ‘playful’, something of little consequence, ignoring or refusing to 
acknowledge the revolutionary significance of such self-sufficiency. 
 
                                                          
122 The full colour alphabet can be found in Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 52. We must, of course, keep in mind 
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             Both Wieser and Klett reached beyond the psychiatric realm to understand their 
experiences, and thus their art offers a potential counter-narrative: a discourse of ‘madness’ 
and not about it. However, psychiatric framing allows for this threat to be supressed and 
defused. Klett’s art was accompanied by verbal descriptions, which Prinzhorn dismissed as 
‘nonsense’, which ‘at least is amusing’.130 Figure 2 is a piece produced by Klett in 1919, 
using watercolours.131 Klett also produced the following inscription: 
                                                          
129 Image scanned from Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 61. 
130 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 56. 
131 Klett’s work has been reproduced in The Art of Insanity in black and white, therefore making the colour 
redundant. This clearly shows the distortion of Klett’s narrative – it has been thoroughly ‘plundered, organised 
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Worm holes (bath faces) worm paths (pianomusicstickteeth) worm strings 
(spitbathlife of the archlyregallery-tin-timeler-reflections: ad mothersugarmoon in the 
sevensaltnosewater. The seeingtongue is in the headtonsils of the lowerbodyhoden in 
the changetwitchfiver of the nosetip ad seesim-calender 1905 Jordon ad Biblia = torso 
= yes = donkey bridge = heytraject = stealingholesticker = chestnutwoodghostants = 
copper red = glassmilk = lakmus = lackeys = calcium: lamb-ear on the stone eye on 
the heart = sod under the Brunsteiter = cancer: godrock = son = saltsule = 
Hymenghost = trinity ammonia salmia spiritus veris (antghostwormturn) 
porcupinefish = caviarstaterholes = im = stomachnoseearmouth ‘eye’ = polish = 
polizze = thumbs = ladiessleepsilvertrade = ad M. 500000Y ad Eschrich Zimmermann 
27 March 1919 fingerhackelthumbsladieskidneys = Miss Schwarz (30) Y ‘Look at 
this and give support’ lowerfaced – feeler – strontium – salad Dr.132 
 
Although this text is a translation, it is necessary to acknowledge this description as part of 
Klett’s art: his narrative, much like the work of English poet and painter William Blake, lies 
in the marriage of image and inscription. Reminiscent of Anna O, who attempted to construct 
her narrative ‘laboriously out of four or five languages’, Klett juggled and merged languages 
(both semantics and the language of art/colour) in order to articulate his experiences.133  
Klett’s reference to ‘the seeingtongue’ could be a reference to his intense creativity 
and synaesthesia (‘a condition in which the senses mix together so that sensations we 
normally consider separate start to intermingle’).134 The dates featured (‘1905’ and ‘1919’) 
correspond to Klett moving to the asylum in which he currently was, and the date of the 
painting, respectively. The final two words – ‘salad Dr’ – suggest a knowingness on Klett’s 
part, an acknowledgement of the idea that such free association will be pathologised, declared 
‘word salad’. By nodding to this psychiatric hypothesis, Klett was able to play up to it, pre-
empting the dismissal of his work. He deflected the notion of ‘incomprehensibility’ from the 
self onto his psychiatrist, the ‘salad Dr’. However, even with only the brief information given 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and published’. Klett, as ‘mad’ narrator, had no agency over the production and reproduction of his art. A colour 
reproduction can be found at Aica Hellas, ‘Works from the Prinzhorn Collection’ <http://www.aica-
hellas.org/en/topic71/works-from-the-prinzhorn-collection/f7_5_2_1> [accessed 16 June 2016]. I have included 
the version reproduced by Prinzhorn to expose this additional dynamic of misrepresentation. 
132 Prinzhorn, Art of Insanity, p. 61. 
133 Freud, Hysteria, p. 77. 
134 Smitha Mundasad, ‘Word-Taste Synaesthesia: Tasting Names, Places and Anne Boleyn’ 
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-21060207> [accessed 29 January 2015]. 
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by Prinzhorn, it is possible to draw strong correlations between this ‘nonsense’ and Klett’s 
situation, thus exposing Klett’s inscription as something more than merely ‘word salad’.135 
 Prinzhorn offered the following analysis of Klett’s piece: ‘we can still recognize his 
earlier playfulness in the arches, which consist of a combination of worms, fingers with nails, 
and the heads of caterpillars, while at the same time representing the hair’.136 Reflecting on 
the ‘suspended ambiguity of schizophrenic thought patterns’ which ‘fascinate’ the viewer, 
Prinzhorn introduced Klett’s art as a form of spectacle: a portal through which the viewer can 
witness the chaos of a ‘schizophrenic’ mind.137 In a similar fashion to Wieser, Klett’s art 
represents the construction of self, a reflection on what makes the mind. Despite this being a 
significant bid to configure the mind in physical (and thus controllable) terms (rather than 
abstract, which is the realm of psychiatry), Prinzhorn dismissed his work as ‘an endless, 
aimless, somehow enjoyable game of interpreting forms’.138 The inscriptions for the art make 
Klett vulnerable to psychiatric scrutiny, as he presented his narrative in lexical terms, thus 
evoking the politics and problems latent in the employment of such a narrative form. 
Prinzhorn manipulates the reaction of the viewer, commenting that ‘we observe […] the 
progressive dissolution of his personality as reflected in his written explanations of the 
pictures’.139  
 Klett has been constrained by the same insular context as Wieser: the psychiatric 
presence ensures that the triadic relation is disrupted, thus distorting the relationship between 
artist and audience. Further, due to being introduced as a ‘schizophrenic’ first and an ‘image-
maker’ second, Klett and his work would fail to meet Wartenberg’s criterion that ‘art objects 
are created by artists’.140 However, why is it that Wieser’s work only exists in Prinzhorn’s 
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text, and Klett’s work has survived beyond (although never truly divorced from) this 
psychiatric context? If anything, the chronology of both artists should have resulted in a 
subversion of this social reception: the fact that Wieser (born 1883; incarcerated 
approximately 1908) produced his art later than Klett would, in theory, make him more likely 
to be championed by developing genres such as  Post-Impressionism and Symbolism which 
celebrated originality over Realism. Despite this, Klett (born 1864; incarcerated 1903) found 
a niche in the ever-changing art world, whereas Wieser’s work failed to reach a social 
audience outside of the boundaries of Prinzhorn’s analysis. Was the success of one artist over 
another merely incidental? If so, how can contingent circumstances have such a dramatic 
impact on the social viability of one narrative over another?  
 Klett’s work does make a more prominent appearance in The Art of Insanity, with 
eleven pieces featured, as opposed to the six examples of Wieser’s work. Prinzhorn, as an art 
historian, did seem to favour watercolours: when faced with Klett’s Germania, for example, 
Prinzhorn temporarily lost his psychiatric detachment. The painting is described, however 
briefly, in affective rather than medicalised terms: ‘[it] has a strong emotional impact in spite 
of strange formal inconsistences. Its colours alone make it a symphony of light green and 
light violet, and it emanates a mild and very subtle magic’.141 
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 Was it simply a matter of form which caused Prinzhorn to overlook ‘formal 
inconsistencies’ due to a pervasive sense of ‘subtle magic’, and thus drop his psychiatric 
scrutiny in favour of the gaze of an art-lover? If we are to assume that it is merely Prinzhorn’s 
taste which has led to Klett’s work existing beyond the psychiatric context, there has been 
another significant omission. Wieser did produce watercolours, which were praised by 
Prinzhorn (described as ‘more interesting, with a surer perspective and lively colours’) but 
these did not feature in the text.143 Although we have two ‘schizophrenic’ artists, represented 
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in the same context, using the same materials, one narrative has been heard (albeit in a 
limited social microcosm, as ‘Outsider Art’) while the other remains silent. 
 Prinzhorn’s emotional connection with Klett’s work is striking, and his analysis ends 
with the reflection that, occasionally, Klett’s ‘schizophrenic’ identity fractures slightly to 
reveal his potential as an artist: ‘a few pictures from among numerous, meaningless smears 
approach serious art’.144 It is not serious art, Prinzhorn informed his readers, but it is 
approaching this status. Perhaps Prinzhorn’s implication that Klett has the potential to be an 
artist, rather than just an ‘image-maker’ has resulted in the wider dissemination of his 
narrative. Prinzhorn’s dual identity as art historian/psychiatrist gave him magnified 
‘authority’: he could identify both ‘madness’ and art. In the case of Klett, Prinzhorn finds 
both: the fact that he acknowledged Klett’s ability to be an artist and a ‘schizophrenic’ (rather 
than the art being solely viewed as a symptom of ‘madness’) could go some way to 
explaining Klett’s relative success.145  
Was it merely Prinzhorn’s preferences which allowed one narrative to be successful 
and another to be silenced? It seems tremendously problematic that something as trivial and 
changeable as taste can ultimately determine the viability of a ‘madness’ narrative. The artist 
‘can never escape the thought of a potential audience’ because such an audience will dictate 
the perceived worth of the narrative.146 In light of this, using art as a platform for a vitally 
important ‘madness’ narrative seems far too unpredictable. Although the narrative is able to 
escape the politics of language, it now depends on the changeable tides of fashion and taste to 
determine its accessibility and, ultimately, judge its worth. 
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‘I am Not Among the Tame. And Yet No Wild Animal’: Adolf Wölfli147 
As a point of comparison with both Wieser and Klett, the work of Adolf Wölfli has, on the 
surface, liberated itself from the asylum and created its own space in art galleries (albeit 
under the problematic label, again, of Outsider Art). Although Wölfli’s life and incarceration 
coincided with those of both Wieser and Klett, the reputation of his art has surpassed both, 
and he is generally regarded to be a fundamental part of the foundation of Art Brut, which 
later became the Outsider Art movement.148 Championed by psychiatrist Walter 
Morgenthaler, who later supported Wölfli by providing him with materials and ultimately 
writing his biography, Wölfli’s work was identified as art rather than as mere ‘image-
making’. ‘Departing from the psychiatric practise of using a pseudonym, Dr. Morgenthaler 
wanted to signal that for him the artist matters as much to him as the insane patient’, thus 
Wölfli’s reputation as an artist (albeit an Outsider Artist) seemed to precede his 
‘schizophrenic’ identity.149 Where is this arbitrary line between the ‘madness’ narratives 
which appear to succeed and those which fail? By which criteria is Wölfli’s art publicised 
and Wieser’s lost to history? 
 Wölfli’s contact with psychiatry started in 1895, at the age of 31. Following ‘an 
attempted sexual assault on a three-and-a-half year old girl’, Wölfli was sent for psychiatric 
observation and was diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’.150 Wölfli would remain in the Swiss 
Waldau Asylum until his death in 1930, thus spending the majority of his life in a psychiatric 
environment which forced him into the role and identity of ‘patient’. In 1899, he started to 
draw in an attempt to ‘compile an autobiographical account of the chaos that confronted him 
in his old and his new worlds’.151 During his incarceration, Wölfli produced extensive 
                                                          
147 Adolf Wölfli, From the Cradle to the Grave, in Terezie Zemánková, Wölfli: Creator of the Universe (Bern: 
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148 See Peiry Art Brut, pp. 52-53. 
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volumes of this ‘autobiographical account’, the progress of which has been described by 
Maclagan: ‘[it] starts off fairly close to the actual events, but soon takes off, first into 
imaginary globetrotting and then into a cosmic drama in which he is transformed into St 
Adolf II’.152 This movement away from ‘reality’ displays a ‘progressive escape of reality 
towards delusion’ which allegedly characterises the development of the ‘schizophrenic’ 
condition.153 However, despite this obvious (and increasing) departure from ‘conventional or 
normal ways of acting, or thinking, or feeling’, there have been exhibitions and museums that 
showcase Wölfli’s work.154 How does Wölfli’s ‘otherness’ differ from the ‘otherness’ which 
proved an insurmountable barrier to the reception of Wieser’s work? 
 Critical and psychiatric accounts of Wölfli’s art echo the quest for ‘evidence for the 
existence of a fundamental creative impulse’ which characterised the genesis of the Outsider 
Art movement.155 Throughout Morgenthaler’s account of Wölfli’s life and work, he observed 
that ‘his method of work conveys the impression of an urgency, an internal necessity […] he 
doesn’t usually give the impression of deriving particular pleasure from his work, but of 
fulfilling a painful duty’.156 Reminiscent of Klett using fat to create patterns on the wallpaper, 
or of Barnes using her excrement to construct images, there is something urgent about the 
sort of creation which exists in the bracket of Outsider Art.157 Wölfli was fortunate insofar as 
his relationship with Morgenthaler ensured he was never short of materials: he always had the 
resources to hand to create, and thus never had to resort to a literally raw or rough form of 
art. On the surface, there appear to be numerous similarities between Wölfli’s circumstances 
and those of Klett and Wieser: all were reportedly ‘schizophrenic’ and incarcerated, their 
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lifespans overlap (Klett and Wölfli, in particular: both were born in 1864, and they died just 
two years apart) and their work was reproduced in a psychiatric context (Klett and Wieser by 
Prinzhorn, Wölfli by Morgenthaler). However, the perceived social accessibility of their work 
varies drastically, with Wieser all but a spectre in the art world, and Wölfli being hailed by 
scholar Elka Spoerri as ‘one of the greatest artists of the 20th century’.158 
 There is a diversity of form: Wieser and Klett gravitated towards watercolour, 
whereas Wölfli’s favoured materials seemed to be coloured pencils and/or crayons. 
Morgenthaler suggested that this preference was merely a matter of resources, as ‘he draws as 
long as he has colored pencils, and then works on his biography, writes poems, and composes 
music when he has only plain lead pencils’.159 Wölfli’s rate of production was so intense that 
Morgenthaler reported that a box of coloured pencils would last ‘two or three weeks at most’, 
suggesting an insatiable desire to create and, ultimately, narrate.160 However, Wölfli also 
merged forms and languages (using both semantics and the language of art): his work 
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Amalgamating the verbal, the symbolic and the ornamental (particularly in the border detail) 
to construct a layered image, we are presented with the world of Wölfli’s other self – the 
ballroom of Saint Adolf II.163 The artistic embodiment of Wölfli’s departure from ‘reality’ 
                                                          
162 Image scanned from Peiry, Art Brut, p. 21. 
163 Wölfli’s merging of languages goes beyond the visual. Michael Hall argued that the seemingly ‘delirious 
semantic content’ of Wölfli’s art is ‘rooted in the syntax and vocabulary of the Bernese dialect’. Wölfli also 
constructed his narrative using English, and other foreign words he knew from his access to ‘illustrated 
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has been considered ‘delusional mythology’.164 Wölfli’s self-created environment has been 
assumed to represent a ‘schizophrenic inner world [which] replaces external reality’, thus his 
art is proof of his ‘otherness’, something fundamental to Wölfli’s ‘madness’.165 However, 
even if we were to assume that Wölfli’s inner world had entirely replaced the external, this 
does not have to denote a status of ‘otherness’.166 Echoing Wieser’s desire for ‘real’ 
knowledge and Klett’s construction of his own alphabet, Wölfli created a space divorced 
from psychiatry: it is a bid for authority, a rejection of hegemony. In this self-created and 
self-governed realm, Wölfli was formidable, a saint, ‘the companion and protégé of God-the-
All-Powerful’.167 His art empowered him in the same psychiatric environment which sought 
to render him a submissive ‘patient’.  
 Throughout the volumes of his autobiography, Wölfli displayed an awareness of a 
potential audience, finally addressing his reader directly in the eleventh volume: 
To be sure, the entire verbatim text in this little book has the thought, attitude and 
character of a madman […] At bottom, it is however, fundamentally and throughout, a 
genuine and true edition and narrative. Thus, I herewith hope that the kind reader will 
appreciate my piece of entertainment staged in the cell of the mental asylum.168 
 
Wölfli invited his ‘kind reader’ to look beyond the label of his ‘madness’ and instead receive 
his ‘genuine’ narrative. However, this bid for authenticity is distorted by the terms 
‘entertainment’ and ‘staged’ which denote a performance, much like Klett referring to the 
psychiatric phrase ‘word salad’ in his inscription to Figure 2. There is a playful suggestion 
that Wölfli knew his art would be read as a symptom, and thus he was protecting his narrative 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
calendars, journals, and magazines [and] other French- and English-language publications’. See Michael D. 
Hall, The Artist Outsider: Creativity and the Boundaries of Culture (Michigan: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
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164 Carter-Park, ‘Infinite Spaces’, p. 195. 
165 Ibid. 
166 The human capacity to imagine suggests an ability to manage numerous ‘worlds’ or ‘realities’. We do not 
suggest that authors who explore other worlds (such as Carroll) do so because they have abandoned their own. 
They are able to distinguish between the two, as are their readers. Similarly, one is able to identify what is a 
dream and what is ‘reality’: one may experience both, but it does not imply a break from ‘reality’. The idea that 
Wölfli was unable to recognise the external world (even if he had an alternative experience of it) because of his 
ability to create other worlds seems, at best, a harmful oversimplification. 
167 Morgenthaler, Madness and Art, p. xiv.  
168 Adolf Wölfli, Geographic and Algebraic Books, vol. XI, in Carter-Park, ‘Infinite Spaces’, p. 196. 
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from being ‘othered’ by psychiatry by presenting it as a sort of fictional construct: a creation 
of the self, but not the self.  Perhaps the necessity for this protective manoeuvre is the 
‘genuine’ narrative to which Wölfli referred. The very fact that it must be hidden in numerous 
layers and transmitted through a performance draws attention to the difficulties of articulating 
an authentic, personal narrative in a psychiatric context.  
 Art historian Lucienne Peiry argued that, in the Outsider Art movement, ‘the artist is 
unaware that he operates in the domain of artistic creation’, and yet this seems to contradict 
the knowing playfulness and experimentation which characterise Wölfli’s work.169 Wölfli 
seemed entirely immersed in the domain of artistic creation – regardless of whether this 
preoccupation is deemed to signify a total break from ‘reality’ or simply a manoeuvre to 
protect the self from a hostile psychiatric environment by creating a new space. However, 
that is not to say that Wölfli failed to acknowledge his ‘otherness’ in favour of his artistic 
persona. As with the extract from Geographic and Algebraic Books in which Wölfli 
explicitly referred to himself as a ‘madman’, his art also reflected on his psychiatric 
environment, thus embracing his position of social marginalisation. The ‘mad’ self is not 
divorced from the artistic self: Wölfli did not even attempt to separate the two. 
 Mental Asylum Band-Copse is perhaps the most overt example of Wölfli directly 
addressing his psychiatric context. It ‘symbolizes his sense of the asylum’s institutional 
embrace; it is one of his most grandiose and fearsome works of art’.170 It displays an 
acknowledgement of Wölfli’s external environment, contradicting claims that his art signified 
a total rejection of ‘reality’. Standing in contrast to the vibrant colours and gentle curves 
which characterise Wölfli’s inner world (The Ballroom of Saint Adolf) in Figure 4, the rigid 
structure-in-structure of his outer world (Mental Asylum Band-Copse) suggests 
claustrophobia and restriction.  
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Figure 5: Adolf Wölfli, Mental Asylum Band-Copse, 1910, pencil and coloured pencil, 99.7 
× 72.1cm.171 
 
Described as ‘naïve and child-like. It ignores perspective, lacks horizons, and uses the child-
like device of looking from above’, this piece has been interpreted as symbolic of Wölfli’s 
‘otherness’.172 This infantilisation of the ‘mad’ individual conforms to wider ‘cultural 
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stereotypes of the insane [which] emphasize[d] characteristics, such as […] childishness’.173 
This assumption presents Wölfli as something ‘other’ than an autonomous, reasoning adult, 
and thus highlights an alleged lack or difference which sets him aside from mainstream 
society, his audience. However, this interpretation offers only a superficial perspective. 
 The significance of Wölfli’s apparent ‘naïve and child-like’ perspective cannot be 
overlooked. Produced in 1910, this piece was constructed after fifteen years of continuous 
incarceration, often in isolation. However, in Mental Asylum Band-Copse, Wölfli presented 
himself as not only external to the asylum but also above it: he had transcended its space, and 
was able to offer his viewer an objective overview. There is an obvious power play here: 
despite his physical detainment, Wölfli cannot be exclusively contained in the context of the 
asylum.  
 The asylum itself is constructed like a fort, surrounded by turrets. Evoking ideas of 
surveillance and control, this construct is Foucauldian: forcing the ‘patients’ into a position of 
‘permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’.174 Assembled with 
sombre shades of red and blue (as opposed to the array of colours used in The Ballroom of 
Saint Adolf), there is a suggestion of flames, perhaps to signify Hell. The faces of ‘patients’ 
appear to be merged with the architecture. Further examination reveals additional faces, they 
materialise with unnerving frequency: the viewer realises they are being watched; they are 
exposed; forced into a ‘state of conscious […] visibility’.175 Under the gaze of these 
emerging faces, the audience becomes the spectacle, rather than the observer. The watcher 
becomes the watched. The asylum interior is constructed as a labyrinth: one cannot discern 
the wall from the roof, or doors from windows. It is a space in which the self may be lost. 
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Wölfli’s characteristic merging of languages still features, as the work includes 
handwriting, musical notation and symbolism (particularly in the recurring cross imagery). 
However, both the writing and the notation only exist outside the asylum space. In the 
psychiatric environment, language is militant: it is a weapon exclusive to hegemonic forces, 
used to demarcate and silence the ‘mad’ ‘other’. Thus, Wölfli could only access language 
outside the asylum. Writing and notation form a border to the piece, and are fundamental to 
the construction of the road which leads to the asylum: there is potential for a reading which 
would suggest that language is the path to incarceration.176 
 One cannot deny the impressive detail and artistic construction exhibited in each of 
Wölfli’s pieces: they stand in contrast to Wieser’s stark sketches. However, Wölfli’s 
reception has not been universally positive: his ‘otherness’ poses too much of an obstacle for 
his work to exist in the mainstream art world where it has been described as ‘unusual and 
strange’.177 A psychiatric account of Wölfli’s behaviour noted that ‘his drawings are quite 
imbecilic, a chaotic jumble of notes, words, figures’.178 Maclagan reported that ‘several 
decades ago an advertisement for anti-psychotic medication reproduced a work by Wölfli’.179 
His work was deemed so ‘other’, so ‘schizophrenic’ that it could encourage consumerism: 
this image was held up as a warning to its audience that you could end up experiencing 
‘reality’ like this unless you are medicated. Even the title of a favourable review draws 
attention to Wölfli’s ‘otherness’ as something secondary to his talent, with Roberta Smith’s 
art review referring to him as ‘Crazy Like a Genius’: he is like a genius, but his ‘madness’ is 
apparently beyond doubt.180 Another review title argued that ‘His Art Emerged From 
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Madness’.181 Wölfli’s artistic credibility cannot seem to be separated from his ‘madness’: 
some of his art was even constructed using materials from the asylum, such as magazines. It 
appears that the art is an organic product of Wölfli’s circumstances and, as he was 
incarcerated for over half of his life, it is inevitable that a social audience is unable to separate 
Wölfli’s ‘schizophrenic’ and artistic identity. However, to what extent does this ‘otherness’ 
impact on the accessibility of Wölfli’s narrative? 
 Wölfli’s relationship with Morgenthaler apparently allowed him to be ‘presented not 
as a clinical case […] but as an artist deserving his own presentation’.182 Although Wölfli’s 
‘madness’ was never hidden (most significantly by his own presentation of asylum imagery), 
he was presented as Adolf Wölfli, rather than by means of a psychiatric pseudonym. His 
identity was not entirely dictated by psychiatry: his name endured, an obvious contrast to the 
insulting pseudonym (‘Klotz’) allocated to Klett. Predictably, Morgenthaler’s attempt to 
present Wölfli as an artist rather than a ‘patient’ was ‘ridiculed by the psychiatric 
community’.183 Wölfli was not depicted as a psychiatric construct: his name represented 
something which kept him rooted in the realm of the familiar rather than the ‘other’. By 
contrast, Klett and Wieser’s identities had been entirely governed by Prinzhorn; they were not 
presented as artists (or even human) as their ‘image-making’ was incidental and thus 
secondary to their ‘schizophrenia’. Is the difference between the three artists merely 
circumstantial, resting entirely on Morgenthaler’s decision not to employ a pseudonym?   
 Although not entirely limited to a psychiatric identity, Morgenthaler did still introduce 
Wölfli as a kind of spectacle. The original publication of Morgenthaler’s account was entitled 
Ein Geisteskranker als Künstler, translated as ‘A Mentally Ill Person as an Artist’. Much like 
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the title of Prinzhorn’s work, Wölfli’s ‘madness’ is the priority: his ability as an artist is 
second to his psychiatric environment and diagnosis. Here, in this initial and vitally important 
introduction which shapes the reader’s perception and expectations, Wölfli’s name is not 
mentioned, he is reduced to ‘a mentally ill person’. This label is arguably worse than a 
pseudonym: it is generic, almost flippant, and suggests a total absence of individuality. 
Although Wölfli’s work has been regarded as a cornerstone of Outsider Art, it cannot escape 
this psychiatric context. His art is perceived as a symptom of his ‘madness’, rather than a 
narrative. Through Wölfli’s intricate designs, the viewer may reflect on the ‘schizophrenic’ 
mind in a general sense, but not receive and engage with Wölfli’s narrative. Reviews 
laboriously outline points of departure from ‘reality’ evidenced throughout his work: stylistic 
features become symptomatic of his ‘schizophrenia’ rather than characteristics of Wölfli’s 
art. Journalist, art critic and curator Kristine McKenna reflected that ‘detailed renderings of 
elaborately developed systems are widely interpreted as his defense against his chaotically 
schizophrenic interior life’.184 Wölfli’s art is read as a symptom of his mental distress, rather 
than being received as a ‘human document’, worthy of acknowledgement and a different kind 
of engagement. 
 The social reception of Wölfli’s work has been reliant on its context in the Outsider 
Art movement, which has given Wölfli a platform. However, this context inevitably denotes 
‘otherness’ which prevents it from reaching a mainstream social audience. Peiry observed 
that, in a psychiatric environment, art is ‘limited to itself […] only permitted to reflect the 
illness’, and yet this also seems true of the Outsider Art movement.185 Wölfli’s art is bound to 
a context which inevitably renders it a spectacle. Under the label of the ‘outsider’, Wölfli’s 
art will always be ‘other’, thus preventing his narrative from being heard in a mainstream 
context. As this residual ‘otherness’ apparently characterises the work of Wölfli, Wieser and 
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Klett, it seems to be an inevitable aftermath of the initial psychiatric context which 
reproduced their art. Because this art is deemed the product of a psychiatric environment, one 
can never escape the rhetoric which renders it a symptom rather than a narrative. The result is 
‘either stigma or social death’.186 Although Outsider Art offers scope for limited social 
engagement, these narratives cannot escape the stigma enforced by their contact with 
psychiatry. Such narratives cannot be both ‘other’ and heard: in the words of Laing, ‘the 
experience of the other is not evident to me, as it is not and never can be an experience of 
mine’.187 
 
‘A Quiet Little Man Drawing Cats’: Louis Wain188 
The art of Louis Wain offers a contrast to the work of Wölfli, Wieser and Klett. The success 
of Wain’s early work is indisputable: The Guardian has described him as ‘one of the most 
popular artists in the world for more than 30 years’.189 British statesman Ramsay MacDonald 
reflected in 1925 that ‘Louis Wain was on all our walls some 15 to 20 years ago […] 
Probably no artist has given a greater number of young people pleasure than he has’.190 
Wain’s iconic anthropomorphic cats adorned the walls of nurseries, illustrated children’s 
stories and were available in collectable postcard form.  
Figure 6: Louis Wain, Untitled (White Cat).191 
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Wain found a niche in the Victorian trend for anthropomorphised animals (demonstrated by 
the success of the likes of John Tenniel): he ‘had no competitor in the field he had created’.192 
The supposed quaintness of Wain’s early illustrations ensured mainstream success, although 
they displayed an obvious lack of realism and anatomical knowledge. The Guardian observed 
that ‘the most damaging criticism of him was probably that of a child who was one of the few 
not delighted by his humour: “Mummy, those aren’t cats, they haven’t any bones”’.193 
However, the Great War significantly impacted on Wain’s career as an artist – his success 
was particularly jeopardised by wartime paper shortage – and Wain’s art swiftly lost its 
characteristic humour and playfulness.  
 ‘Troubled by financial difficulties and mental illness’, Wain’s behaviour became 
increasingly ‘erratic and occasionally violent’, resulting in his incarceration in 1924.194 As 
demand for his work declined, Wain quickly fell into financial trouble, and was initially sent 
to the pauper ward of Springfield Mental Hospital in London. However, public appeals, led 
by the likes of H. G. Wells, generated ‘thousands of pounds’ which allowed Wain to spend 
the remainder of his life ‘in a private room of a mental hospital near London’.195 Wain has 
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subsequently been branded with the label of ‘schizophrenia’, often referred to as the 
‘schizophrenic cat painter’, and his later work is believed to demonstrate a progressive break 
from ‘reality’, a typical ‘psychotic’ trait.196 However, this diagnosis has since been 
challenged, with the Wellcome Trust suggesting that ‘he had Asperger’s syndrome and visual 
agnosia’.197 Regardless of the label, Wain’s artistic style changed, evolving into ‘glittering 
and exotic webs of colour’ and becoming increasingly abstract.198 Despite this shift, Wain’s 
work continued to depict his favoured motif: the cat.  
 Cats have been described as ‘the most expressive of all animals’, thus justifying 
Wain’s anthropomorphism.199 If we believe cats are animals of expression and personality, it 
is not necessarily a huge leap to imagine them with distinct characteristics and human traits. 
The cat has proven to be an ambiguous symbol: it can be indicative of a cosy, domestic 
environment, or it can signify something predatory. Cats are ‘both gentle and sinister in 
appearance’.200 There is an obvious link to the supernatural, with cats being the familiars of 
witches, associated with luck and fortune or linked to lunar cycles.201 The Guardian 
speculated that Wain’s use of the cat motif was ‘to show how “human” cats were’.202 
Reviewers have argued that this theme of anthropomorphism is, in itself, representative of 
Wain’s ‘madness’: ‘these cats have just essentially been personified – Wain must have had a 
very troubled life indeed’.203 However, it is much more likely that Wain’s loyalty to the cat 
motif was a response both to contemporary trends for playful anthropomorphism and to the 
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comfort he found, after the death of his wife, Emily, in his feline companion, Peter, ‘a black-
and-white kitten’.204 
 Regardless of the symbolism latent in Wain’s repetition, the cat motif does aid a 
comparison of his earlier and later works. The content rarely changes, merely the execution. 
Maclagan argued that such repetition is symptomatic of psychotic art, as it is ‘marked by a 
constant returning to the same motifs and an intense elaboration of them’.205 However, it is 
difficult to place Wain’s work in any sort of chronological order to reveal progression or 
gradual change. Psychiatric discourses and popular culture have arranged Wain’s work into a 
sequence which allegedly reveals the development of his ‘schizophrenia’, however, it is 
impossible to verify the order of production. Wain’s work was rarely dated unless it was 
published, making it difficult to correlate any changes in style to a certain period of his life. 
However, for the purpose of my analysis, I will examine Wain’s work in the sequence in 
which it most often appears: that of the alleged ‘progressive escape of reality towards 
delusion’ which characterises the development of ‘psychosis’.206 This is how Wain’s work is 
presented most frequently, and thus is the manner in which his narrative has been 
reconfigured and received. 
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Figure 7 demonstrates an early example of Wain’s work, striking in its realism: the 
perspective is faultless, the colours true-to-life and the attention to detail depicts a texture 
reminiscent of fur. A viewer is able to recognise that this is a cat. This is a prime example of 
imitative art, ‘the action or practice of imitating or copying’.208 Wain has depicted something 
familiar in a familiar way, and is thus able to enter collective discourse as the viewer is able 
to recognise and share Wain’s perspective. 
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Later examples of Wain’s work move away from the imitative and towards the 
unfamiliar. This shift is gradual, if we follow the sequence in which these images most 
frequently appear. These three images (Figures 8-10) have been used as paradigmatic 
examples of the ‘progressive escape of reality towards delusion’ which apparently reveals the 
development of the ‘schizophrenic’ condition.210 Biographer Peter Haining reported that 
‘many of the pictures [produced by Wain following his incarceration] revealed the state of his 
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increasing schizophrenia’.211 These cats represent Wain’s gradual point of departure from 
shared social symbols and exchange between artist and audience. The painting in Figure 8 
still conforms to certain social codes which allow it to be identified as a cat: it has a feline 
structure; it has a texture reminiscent of fur; it has the salient features (triangular ears, large 
eyes, the arrangement of the nose and mouth) which allow a social audience to recognise that 
the subject matter is a cat. The colouring of the piece suggests a slight point of departure: the 
subdued, accurate colouring from his earlier work has been lost to bold and bright colours 
which surround the cat like an aura.  














image (Figure 9) still features certain codes which, socially, allow the subject to be identified 
as a feline. The triangular ears protrude clearly from a vaguely spherical shape which 
                                                          
211 Haining, A Cat Compendium, p. 40. 
212 Image taken from Bethlem Heritage, ‘Louis Wain’. 
215 
 
corresponds to the head of the animal. The wide eyes remain, positioned above the 
arrangement of the nose and mouth which is distinctly feline. However, the image as a whole 
has become increasingly abstract: the catlike structure is overwhelmed by a confused, 
equivocal composition of shapes and patterns. There is no clear structure at all besides the 
head; it is lost behind the intense, haunting and almost owl-like glare of the cat. The 
increasingly abstract nature of Wain’s work ‘represents an ongoing restructuring of a 
discursive consciousness, a consciousness that differs sharply from our own sense of reality’, 
demonstrating a struggle between the abstract and the ‘real’.213 Wain’s work balances on the 
border of social validation/invalidation; shared symbols are present, but there is an evident 
move away from the familiar which threatens to place his later art beyond social 
interpretation. To return to Maclagan’s suggestion that psychotic art is ‘marked by a constant 
returning to the same motifs and an intense elaboration of them’, in this collection of images, 
Wain’s focus on cat imagery never wavers, but his approach has evolved; his perspective 
altered.214  
It would, of course, be easy to assume that this change in perception is a direct result 
of Wain’s fractured ‘reality’, and to accept this abstract art as a sign of his increasing 
‘otherness’. However, it is an oversimplification to see this art as representative of Wain’s 
‘schizophrenia’ impairing his perception of the world. Instead, these images can be read as 
Wain throwing out conventional narrative structures (such as the imitative art featured in 
Figure 7) in favour of something more authentic. Wain’s experience of ‘madness’ cannot be 
contained in the realm of the familiar, and so he inevitably gravitated towards the unfamiliar 
and the abstract to find a space in which he could formulate his narrative. However, the 
abstract is only unfamiliar because ‘madness’ had not been allowed a voice. Socially, we do 
not recognise a language of ‘madness’: we only have and know a language about it. Art 
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allegedly ‘helps sustain society [because it ensures] that no man is an island’, however the 
romantic notion that art is all encompassing and universally accessible (to both the artist and 
audience) does not seem to accommodate ‘mad’ art.215 If art is a universal narrative structure, 
designed to connect artist and audience – to ‘communicate […] emotion between a creator 
and an audience’216 – why has it rendered Wain’s work a spectacle, ‘a bit strange’, suitable 
only for ‘a niche audience’?217  















The final piece in 
the series of images (Figure 10) demonstrates a clear point of departure from any socially 
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shared symbols. Wain has not represented the cat in a way which is familiar: perhaps the only 
feline features which remain are the shape and positioning of the ears. This is not a cat which 
could be definitively recognised as such in a social context. As detailed by Saussure, society 
relies on receiving a series of signifiers (such as the feline structure, large, spherical eyes and 
triangular nose) in order to identify something. The colours are lurid and bold, demonstrating 
a total rejection of the realistic, innocuous colouring of the earlier piece. The structure of the 
subject is chaotic, formulated out of abstract shapes and patterns. The eyes, no longer 
spherical and wide, have metamorphosed into triangles; the change in shape has altered the 
personality of the cat motif. The subject has become threatening; where one would expect a 
petite feline mouth (were one to superimpose the social codes and expectations of what a cat 
‘should’ look like), one finds instead a serrated crescent, indicative of a sinister grin. Wain 
moved away from the realm of shared symbols, communicating his own experience of 
‘reality’; his own creation, although socially invalidated as an ‘abstract’ piece, has embodied 
Wain’s ‘private world in concrete form’.219  
The sequence of these images has been imposed to show a progressive break from 
‘reality’ (and thus ‘otherness’). However, they could just as easily represent artistic 
experimentation in the face of change. Psychiatric discourse disregards these images as 
symptomatic of ‘otherness’, a product of Wain’s ‘madness’, rather than as an attempt to 
represent it. Evidence does exist to deconstruct the mainstream assumption that Wain’s later 
art depicts the progression of his ‘schizophrenia’: a handful of dated images suggest that 
Wain was still producing using his characteristic, cartoonish style even after his incarceration. 
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Dated 1932, Blue Cat conforms to shared social signifiers which allow it to be identified as a 
cat. The only point of departure is the colour, however, its subtle shade prevents it from being 
the focal point of the image.221 
 Although Wain has not been explicitly documented in a psychiatric publication (as 
Wieser, Klett and Wölfli all were), hegemonic discourse has still imposed itself on his work. 
The Guardian observed that ‘his later pictures made in a mental hospital have been collected 
for a different reason […] the familiar friendly cats changed into increasingly elaborate 
patterns with the progress of his illness’.222 The psychiatric enforcement of ‘otherness’ has 
retrospectively reclaimed Wain’s work, ensuring that mainstream society perceives it as ‘the 
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progress of his illness’ rather than the progress of his artistic style. They are ‘classic examples 
of schizophrenic art’: these images are only permitted to reflect and objectify Wain’s 
‘schizophrenia’; nothing more.223 Despite the popularity of Wain’s earlier work, anything 
produced following his incarceration has been tainted by his ‘madness’, and thus can be read 
as nothing more than his ‘otherness’. Wain’s contact with psychiatry has prevailed: it 
enforces silence, as ‘several generations have now grown up to whom his name means 
nothing’.224 
 
‘In Thee Burns the Fire of Genius’: Richard Dadd225 
Born in 1817, Richard Dadd pursued a career as a professional artist in an ‘orthodox manner, 
entering the Academy Schools in 1837 and in the same year exhibiting for the first time’.226 
Following the tradition of imitative art, Dadd’s education consisted of ‘copy[ing] from the 
life model or from the Old Masters’, leading to his early oeuvre consisting primarily of 
conventional portraits which display superb technical ability but little originality.227 These 
stand in stark contrast to his later work, which favoured the fantastical over the familiar. 
Dadd’s identity as a professional artist sets him aside from the artists I have covered so far: 
his inclusion, and training, in academy culture serves to situate him firmly as an Artist.  
Dadd’s work is entrenched in the canon of the art world, reported as having ‘a striking 
influence on future artists’.228 In particular, Dadd’s fantastical art has been revered, with The 
Fairy Feller’s Master-Stroke (Figure 12) being ‘generally considered to be Dadd’s 
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masterpiece’.229 Dadd’s legacy as an artist has endured; he has been ‘acknowledged as an 
important British artist whose work hangs in the British Museum and the V&A’.230 Unlike 
the work of Wölfli and Klett, Dadd’s work has surpassed the label of Outsider Art.231 Dadd’s 
ability to ‘harness a magnificent, other-worldly imagination’ seems to have ensured the 
longevity of his work.232 Does Dadd’s art represent the potential for ‘mad’ art to be heeded as 
a narrative? How does Dadd’s experience of ‘madness’ coexist with his esteemed artistic 
reputation? 
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The trajectory of Dadd’s artistic career led him to undertake a tour of the Middle East 
with his patron Sir Thomas Phillips. Dadd ‘was expected to make drawings of the places they 
visited’ in return for Phillips covering the cost of his travel and expenses.234 However, Dadd 
struggled to fulfil this role, complaining that ‘they never stopped long enough for him to draw 
what he saw’.235 Despite these frustrations, this tour did seem to broaden Dadd’s artistic and 
sensory horizons, with him recording in a letter that ‘I had the most unaccountable impulses, 
that would not let me stop to sketch, but were constantly prompting me on, to drink in […] 
the stream of new sensations’.236 On his return, however, Dadd began to exhibit ‘signs of 
mental disturbance’, although, for the most part, this appears to have been interpreted as 
sunstroke.237 Dadd ‘warily controlled his conversation’ in an attempt to keep rumours of his 
altering mental state at bay.238 However, the period that follows does, indeed, suggest that 
this was the genesis of Dadd’s intense paranoia and thus his ‘madness’. Could this perhaps 
suggest that Dadd’s heightened sensory experiences abroad were something other than just a 
response to his new environment? 
Concerned for his son, Dadd’s father, Robert, discreetly sought psychiatric advice 
from Dr Alexander Sutherland, who reported that the young man ‘was dangerous and 
urgently needed quiet and care’.239 Robert Dadd decided to take his son travelling in an 
attempt to remove him from the stress of this barren period in his career (Dadd’s recent work 
had been described as ‘spiritless and poor’ by his peers).240 While in Cobham, on the 28th 
August 1843, ‘Dadd stabbed and killed his father – the attack was obviously premeditated, as 
Dadd had prepared his flight out of the country […] He claimed to be controlled by demons, 
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and that his father was not his real father’.241 After fleeing to Calais and assaulting a fellow 
passenger while travelling to Paris, Dadd was taken into custody. 
Dadd was deemed a ‘criminal lunatic’, a new psychiatric/legal category resulting from 
the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800. Admitted to Bethlem Hospital after his trial, Dadd 
explained that the murder was a result of him believing that his father was an ‘imposter, for 
[his] true father was the Egyptian god Osiris’.242 Alienists recorded Dadd’s diagnostic label 
as ‘insane’, however, the label of ‘schizophrenia’ (a term not in general usage at the time of 
Dadd’s incarceration) has been retrospectively imposed on Dadd by historians and art critics 
alike.243 Dadd spent the remaining forty-three years of his life incarcerated, moving from 
Bethlem to Broadmoor in 1864: circumstances which inevitably impacted on Dadd’s work, 
both in terms of his experiences and his access to resources. 
 However, art historian Nicolas Tromans observed a disconnect between Dadd’s life 
and his art: ‘the factual approach to Dadd’s life and the appeal he had offered to fantasy and 
imagination did not seem to be compatible’.244 Tromans explained that presenting 
biographical information alongside Dadd’s work (as featured in a 1974 Tate Gallery 
exhibition) caused Dadd’s aesthetic appeal to ‘subside’, and ‘derailed’ academic and societal 
interest in Dadd’s work.245 It is apparent that interest in Dadd as an artist – and his role as a 
professional Artist – was not sustainable in light of his ‘madness’: a conflict also evident in 
the work of Wölfli, Klett, Wieser and Wain, as these artists were unable to be received as 
artists due to their psychiatric context. This was also a contemporary issue, with Dadd’s peers 
continuously citing ‘sunstroke’ as the cause of the change in his health and behaviour, even 
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after his incarceration, revealing a desire to excuse Dadd’s suffering as a physical ailment and 
thus not acknowledge his ‘madness’.246 
Removed from the mainstream reluctance to view Dadd’s art as a reflection on his 
experiences, his work can be read as a narrative of the self struggling in a hostile psychiatric 
environment. In addition to the escapism evident throughout Dadd’s fantastical landscapes 
(which would later be echoed in Wölfli’s creation of an internal universe), Dadd created a 
series of images entitled Passions. These represent an attempt to demedicalise the self. The 
images parodied the tradition initiated by physician Philippe Pinel, who created ‘the first atlas 
of the appearance of the insane’.247 The nineteenth-century rise in phrenology sought to 
‘discern the outward marks of a mind’ on the physical self.248 Thus, asylum illustrations and, 
later, asylum photography, would offer illustrations of what a certain type of ‘madness’ 
looked like. They were designed to encapsulate ‘the singular expression arising from morbid 
movements of the mind’, pinning down ‘madness’ to a particular pattern of facial 
expressions, body language and posture.249 
The idea of the ‘passions’ is tightly bound to the Ancient Greek notion of the 
‘humours’: ‘the passions had classically played the role of conduit between the soul and the 
body’.250 In the case of ‘madness’, they were used in an attempt to pin down difference, in 
order to establish a rupture between the soul and body which could account for mental illness. 
Tromans reflects that ‘in nineteenth-century asylum medicine, the passions took on an urgent 
new role as the potential bridge between the split aspects of a patient’.251 Dadd responded to 
this psychiatric quest for an anomaly by constructing his own language, his own 
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interpretation of the ‘passions’ which are apparently fundamental to how the self is 
constructed. 
Figure 13: Richard Dadd, Sketch to Illustrate the Passions: Grief or Sorrow, 1854, 


















Figure 13 takes grief and sorrow out of the psychiatric realm of melancholia and into the 
sphere of human emotion. By presenting sorrow as a response to death, signified by the skull 
and the ornate headstone, it is familiarised. These emotions are no longer symptomatic of 
                                                          
252 Image scanned from Tromans, Richard Dadd, p. 116. 
225 
 
‘madness’ but indicative of circumstances; something transient, rather than something 
reflecting the make-up of the individual. 
Figure 14: Richard Dadd, Sketch to Illustrate the Passions: Agony – Raving Madness, 1854, 


















              A superficial interpretation of Sketch to Illustrate the Passions: Agony – Raving 
Madness could lead to a suggestion that Dadd is supporting psychiatric discourse. Here, the 
‘mad’ individual must be physically detained, presumably because they embody the potential 
for violence. However, the ‘diagnosis’ given in the title – ‘Agony – Raving Madness’ – 
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suggests an internal, rather than external, struggle. ‘Agony’ denotes physical suffering: it is a 
hyperbolic, emotive term. As the image depicts a figure in chains, the viewer assumes that 
this ‘agony’ is not related to his mental state, but rather his physical (mis)treatment at the 
hands of alienists.  It is unlikely that a figure in ‘agony’ is able to pose any form of physical 
threat. Further, ‘raving’ reflects ‘mainline views in psychiatric medicine […] it became 
standard to refer to what mad people said […] through terms such as “chattering”, 
“jabbering” and “ranting”’.254 However, it is a reference to the vocal rather than the physical, 
and, again, does not immediately denote a threat of violence. Although, to an extent, the 
visual theme of incarceration does support hegemonic narratives, Dadd has undermined the 
psychiatric assumption that ‘madness’ needs to be restrained and controlled. He forces his 
viewers to challenge what they see. 
 Further investigation supports the idea that Dadd was encouraging his viewer to 
question the legitimacy of the act of detainment. Despite being well-built, the figure is 
rendered passive: he is on the floor, rather than straining at his chains in a bid to escape or 
attack those around him. He wears a forlorn expression, denoting vulnerability rather than 
aggression. His head is supported by one of his hands, reminiscent, in our twenty-first-
century context, of the clichéd ‘stock’ image of an individual clutching their head to imply 
mental distress.255 This is a common motif in visual representations of ‘madness’, as 
exhibited in the likes of Van Gogh’s At Eternity’s Gate, Albrecht Dürer’s Melancholia and 
Edvard Munch’s Scream. The general impression is of helplessness, rather than ferocity. An 
interesting point of comparison can be found in an illustration by anatomist Charles Bell, 
featured in Anatomy: Expression in Painting: 
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The mise-en-scène is almost identical: the viewer is confronted with the spectacle of a 
‘madman’ in chains. However, Bell’s illustration ‘follows the view that the depiction of 
insanity is related to […] fear and terror’.257 The snarling facial expression and hostile body 
language denote aggression: this ‘madness’ is to be feared, rather than empathised with. In 
this image, Bell argued that physical detainment is justified, even necessary. However, 
Dadd’s illustration, created nearly fifty years later, presents the viewer with a scene which is 
considerably more complex. It is not as easy to ‘other’ the figure in Dadd’s painting. 
 Through the Passions, Dadd exposed the myriad shades which lie between ‘madness’ 
and ‘sanity’. By reclaiming ‘sorrow’ and ‘agony’ from psychiatric vocabulary and depicting 
them as human emotions rather than medicalised phenomena, Dadd argued that ‘madness’ is 
an experience worthy of empathy. These illustrations offer the potential to challenge 
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hegemonic narratives by inviting the viewer to reflect on the treatment of a ‘madman’ (Figure 
14), and more generally on the means used to justify this treatment. If we can relate to the 
‘passions’ which allegedly reveal ‘madness’, does that make us ‘mad’, too? Or does it render 
the ‘madman’ ‘sane’? In theory, Dadd’s context as part of the mainstream art world grants 
him a voice: unlike Wölfli and Klett, Dadd is not limited to the role of ‘outsider’ as he has 
transcended the Outsider Art genre. However, Dadd’s radical counter-narrative has either not 
been received as such or has not been heard at all. 
 For Wölfli, Klett, Wieser and Wain, the psychiatric context portrayed their art as 
inaccessible, and prevented them from being celebrated as artists. With Dadd, the situation is 
subverted. The aesthetic value of Dadd’s work has been divorced from his ‘madness’: it ‘did 
not seem to be compatible’.258 The reluctance to read Dadd’s work as a product of his 
experiences suggests that the art world cannot accept Dadd as a ‘mad’ artist: he must be an 
artist, or he must be ‘mad’, he cannot occupy both spaces. The silencing of Dadd’s biography 
has allowed his art to reach a wide audience. However, his work cannot be read as a powerful 
counter-narrative if the psychiatric context remains unacknowledged. Dadd’s work exists in 
the canon: when tainted with Dadd’s ‘otherness’, it causes appeal to ‘subside’, and ‘derail[s]’ 
interest.259 It is becoming increasingly apparent that the romantic notion of a ‘mad’ artist 
itself is a paradox: one may be ‘mad’ or one may be an artist. Art can be read as a symptom 
of ‘madness’ or art can be interpreted for its aesthetic value. In the world of mainstream art, it 
appears that there is no space for ‘mad’ art. 
 
‘Genius Roams Along Such Mysterious Paths’: Vincent Van Gogh260 
One cannot question Van Gogh’s reputation as an artist. The popularity of his iconic 
Sunflowers has endured: as art historian Martin Gayford observed, ‘the patch of floor in front 
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of it “gets more scuffed” than that in front of any other work in the National Gallery’.261 Van 
Gogh’s ‘masterpieces’ are almost universally celebrated.262 Extensive academic interest has 
ensured that Van Gogh’s life and letters have been widely disseminated, too, reminiscent of 
his own interest in the biographies of artists: ‘I pay as much attention to the man who does 
the work as to the work itself’.263 Van Gogh desired his work to be read as an extension or 
mirror of the self: ‘as my work is […] so am I’.264 Art is a narrative, a reflection of the 
experiences of the artist. With this in mind, it would appear that Van Gogh is well-placed to 
be heard: his popularity, and his deliberate merging of art and artist, suggest that his 
‘madness’ narrative is both acknowledged as a product of his experiences, and received by a 
mainstream audience.  
 Van Gogh’s work has been commended for its originality. French dramatist and poet 
Antonin Artaud observed: ‘For a long time pure linear painting drove me mad until I met Van 
Gogh, who painted neither lines nor shapes but inert things in nature as if they were having 
convulsions’.265 Van Gogh’s style stands out as an anomaly in the nineteenth-century 
tradition of the ‘linear’ and the imitative, and this may account for the underwhelming 
reception of his work in the nineteenth century. His radical style meant that ‘he was not 
widely appreciated during his lifetime’, although his work later found a space in the Post-
                                                          
261 Martin Gayford, ‘Van Gogh’s Sunflowers: the Story Behind a Masterpiece’, The Telegraph, 24 January 2015 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/art-features/10592710/Van-Goghs-Sunflowers-the-story-behind-a-
masterpiece.html> [accessed 4 February 2015]. 
262 Martin Coomer, ‘Vincent Van Gogh: The Sunflowers’, Time Out, 28 November 2014 
<http://www.timeout.com/london/art/vincent-van-gogh-the-sunflowers> [accessed 4 February 2015]. 
263 Naifeh, Van Gogh, p. 6. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Antonin Artaud, ‘Van Gogh: The Man Suicided by Society’, in Artaud Anthology, ed. by Lawrence 
Ferlinghetti and Nancy J. Peters (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1965), pp. 135-63 (p. 140). Artaud’s 
description immediately evokes the narrator in Perkins Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper. She describes the 
‘sprawling flamboyant patterns’ in the wallpaper which resist linearity, and ‘plunge off at outrageous angles, 
destroy themselves in unheard of contradictions’. See Perkins Gilman, Yellow Wallpaper, p. 13. 
230 
 
Impressionist movement after being exhibited alongside the likes of Cezanne, Gauguin and 
Seurat in 1910.266  
 Van Gogh started painting in 1883, and his career as an artist was tragically brief. He 
was incarcerated in 1889, and died the following year.267 Although his letters suggest he 
suffered reoccurring bouts of ‘depression’ throughout his life, ‘Vincent had always managed 
to pull himself out of the abyss’.268 Van Gogh’s  act of self-harm seems to be the first 
explicit, external sign of a mind that could no longer cope.269 Prior to this, his erratic 
behaviour had been perceived as incidental to his artistic temperament, as something which 
validated his chosen profession: he observed that ‘the more sick and fragmented I am, the 
more I become an artist’, thus merging his ‘madness’ with his artistic credibility.270 Previous 
incidents of self-destructive behaviour had been less overt, too closely linked to his eccentric 
lifestyle, ranging from his tumultuous relationship with alcohol and prostitutes (and the 
resulting poverty), and a tendency to refuse food. Van Gogh was hospitalised following the 
amputation of his own ear. His brother, Theo, reflected that ‘his suffering is deep and hard for 
him to bear […] nothing can be done to relieve his anguish now’.271 This seems to be the 
point where Van Gogh’s ‘eccentricity’ became something which could no longer be self-
managed: rather than signifying his identity as an artist, his behaviour became symptomatic 
of ‘madness’.  
 Although Van Gogh temporarily returned to his lodgings in Arles following his 
hospitalisation, the community rejected him. His behaviour now fell ‘on the wrong side of a 
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dividing line’ which arbitrarily separates ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’.272 He was dubbed ‘the 
queer painter’ by the local children, referred to as ‘“fou roux” – the mad redhead’ in brothels, 
and, when locals encountered him, ‘they tapped their heads and muttered to each other “fada” 
– Midi dialect for “crazy”’.273 A petition was formed and signed to have him committed to a 
mental asylum ‘in the name of public security’.274 Van Gogh was taken to an isolation cell in 
Arles Hospital for observation. His inability to produce art during this period further enforced 
his sense of desperation. He noted ‘I miss the work […] the work takes my mind off things, 
or rather keeps me in order’.275 His art represented a refuge, a method of self-management in 
the face of chaos.  
Van Gogh eventually admitted himself to the asylum of Saint-Paul De Mausole, 
which ‘operated more like a resort than an asylum’, the antithesis to the isolation cells which 
had prevented him from working.276 Therapeutic rituals, coupled with scenic views, calmed 
him and aided his productivity. He was diagnosed as suffering from ‘acute mania with 
generalized delirium’, and his treatment comprised doses of bromide, long baths, regular 
meals and small rations of wine: a routine of self-care which had previously been lacking 
during Van Gogh’s self-destructive periods.277 In this asylum space, Van Gogh found 
compassion, as opposed to the hostility exhibited by mainstream society, not least in his own 
community. His letters exhibit a sense of tranquillity, and he produced some of his most 
iconic and imaginative work in the walls of the Saint-Paul De Mausole asylum. The Starry 
Night, hailed as one of his ‘atmospheric epiphanies’, was produced in June 1889, shortly after 
his admission.278 
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Figure 16: Vincent Van Gogh, The Starry Night, 1889, oil on canvas, 73.7 × 92.1cm.279 
Sadly, Van Gogh’s tranquillity was short-lived: his ‘delirious’ periods returned, and 
increased in frequency and intensity. He grew scared of the alienists he had once 
compassionately immortalised in his work. The staff at the asylum removed his paints after 
Van Gogh attempted to eat them several times; he was seized by ‘paralyzing fear and 
hallucinatory fevers’.280 Despite his worsening condition, Van Gogh left the asylum in May 
1890 and, three months later, died from an apparently self-inflicted bullet wound to the 
stomach while out in the wheat fields surrounding the Ravoux Inn with his easel and brushes. 
One of the last paintings Van Gogh produced featured the wheatfields unfolding beneath 
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gathering clouds, encapsulating both the immense serenity and latent power of nature and 
what Van Gogh ‘consider[ed] healthy and fortifying about the countryside’.281 
Figure 17: Vincent Van Gogh, Wheatfield Under Thunderclouds, 1889, oil on 
canvas, 72 × 92cm.282 
 
Throughout his later work (anything produced in 1889-90), there is a subtle change in 
Van Gogh’s style. The detail evident in the likes of The Potato Eaters (1885) or The Harvest 
(1888) gives way to fluidity. Realism has not been entirely jeopardised, but there is a 
different, unique kind of imitation: something more sensual and impressionistic. The sense of 
movement in Wheatfield Under Thunderclouds has been constructed using bold strips of 
colour: it looks as if it has been finger-painted, suggestive of use of a palette knife rather than 
brush. There is texture and movement. Van Gogh’s iconic impasto technique has taken on 
another dimension. This almost abstract, sweeping style characterises the final phase of Van 
Gogh’s artistic progression. 
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 The motif of asylum life was incorporated into Van Gogh’s later works. Figure 18 is a 
portrait of a ‘patient’, produced during Van Gogh’s year at Saint-Paul De Mausole. Although 
Van Gogh takes an external stance here – he is the observer, rather than the observed – this 
image still functions as part of his oeuvre which documents his experience in a psychiatric 
context. It represents ‘madness’ as something familiar: significantly the mise-en-scène and 
general execution are almost identical to Van Gogh’s paintings of the asylum attendants and 
doctors. It is only the title which identifies one figure as a ‘patient’ and another as an 
‘attendant’ or ‘doctor’.284 It also embodies the slight shift in style evident during this period. 
Van Gogh had previously referred to the impact bromide had on his concentration: ‘not all 
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my days are clear enough for me to write logically’.285 This may suggest that the bromide 
dispensed as part of Van Gogh’s treatment was responsible for this increasingly abstract 
execution, allowing us to accept these later paintings as a visual account of Van Gogh’s 
experiences at the hands of his psychiatrists. 
 Another characteristic of Van Gogh’s work was his inclusion of the self as an artistic 
subject: he produced over 30 self-portraits during the last four years of his life, including two 
which feature the absence of his ear following his notorious act of self-mutilation. As with 
Wain’s cat motif, the constancy (or, indeed, mutability) of the self as a subject allows for a 
direct comparison of this change in style. Figures 19 and 20 show the different ways Van 
Gogh negotiated the representation of the self between 1886 and 1889. 
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Academic Daniel Schneider argued that the self-portraits ‘are constantly changing far beyond 
reality’, and the change in execution can be read as representative of Van Gogh’s ‘madness’ 
as it signifies a progressive escape from ‘reality’, much like Louis Wain’s cats.288 Van 
Gogh’s penchant for self-portraits can also be interpreted as a way of holding on to or 
reconstructing the self when selfhood is jeopardised during a period of turmoil and trauma, 
such as illness. They chronicle change: both the external (ageing; changes in environment; 
physical alterations, most obviously the ear, or lack thereof) and the internal (signified by the 
change in style). In the midst of this chaos, the self is simultaneously constant – a consistent 
                                                          
287 Image taken from Van Gogh Gallery, ‘Catalog’. 
288 Daniel E. Schneider, ‘The Psychic Victory of Talent (A Psychoanalytic Evaluation of Van Gogh)’, College 
Art Journal, 3 (Spring, 1950), 325-37, (p. 328). 
237 
 
motif – and mutable, subject to the tides of time and perception. There is also a sense of self-
exposure in these images. Van Gogh wanted the self to be revealed, rather than hidden behind 
the canvas (the kind of absence of self which would divorce Dadd’s work from his 
biographical context).  
Van Gogh, an admirer of writer Émile Zola, responded to Zola’s desire to access the 
artist through art. Zola stated: ‘I am for human truth […] I want artists to make life […] 
according to their own eyes and temperament. What I seek before everything else in a picture 
is a man and not a picture’.289 When embarking on his career as an artist, Van Gogh reflected 
that ‘I pay as much attention to the man who does the work as to the work itself’, echoing 
Zola’s sentiments.290 Van Gogh’s interest in the art as a product of the artist – rather than 
believing that art should be divorced from the context of its creation – impacted on the 
art/artist relationship portrayed in his own work. His desire to see the artist in the art meant 
that his art inevitably represented and revealed his self, therefore Van Gogh’s work merged 
the art with the artist. For Van Gogh, the art must always reflect the self: unlike Roland 
Barthes’s author, the artist cannot be dead. This is particularly significant when we consider 
Figure 20. Van Gogh’s decision to include his bandaged ear reflects Zola’s quest for ‘human 
truth’. Although Van Gogh could have easily omitted the bandage (he was, after all, the one 
with artistic licence) or hidden it by painting the self from another angle, he does not: the 
bandage, denoting the absence of his ear, immediately arrests the eye of the viewer due to its 
central placement. The maimed self is laid bare: Van Gogh did not shy away from this self-
exposure, and went on to paint an additional self-portrait which features the bandaged ear as 
the focal point.291 The bandaged ear represents ‘otherness’: the potential for behaviour which 
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is ‘a product of mental disorder and anguish’.292 Van Gogh’s incorporation of the motifs of 
asylum life and the bandaged ear inevitably reflected on his experience of ‘madness’. Surely, 
it is not possible to read Van Gogh’s work as anything other than a ‘madness’ narrative? 
 In the case of Dadd, there was an evident fracture between aesthetics and biographical 
details – between the art and the artist – in order to justify and, to an extent, protect his 
artistic reputation and academic and societal interest in his work. However, as Van Gogh’s 
work is fundamentally rooted in the integration of the artist and the art, no such separation is 
viable. On the surface, as it is impossible to divorce Van Gogh’s ‘madness’ from his art, and 
because Van Gogh’s reputation as a mainstream artist is indisputable, we finally have an 
oxymoronic ‘mad’ artist. He is both socially accepted and socially ‘other’. Does the work of 
Van Gogh finally lend credibility to the use of art as a platform for a socially heeded 
‘madness’ narrative? 
This creates a complex social paradox: how can Van Gogh’s ‘madness’ be 
commended as visionary art, when ‘madness’ has, historically, been silenced? The morbid 
details of Van Gogh’s life have been widely circulated, distorted and trivialised.293 
Throughout the extensive and varied interest in Van Gogh’s life there is a common trend 
which seeks to minimise or justify his ‘madness’. These accounts take Van Gogh’s behaviour 
out of the realm of ‘madness’ and into the sphere of ‘eccentricity’: a prerequisite for the 
artistic temperament, a variant on ‘normal’ behaviour but not its polar opposite. Thus the two 
significant events which signify ‘madness’ – his episode of self-harm, and his suicide – have 
been socially rewritten in an attempt to read Van Gogh’s experiences as something other than 
symptomatic of ‘madness’. 
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Much like Dadd’s contemporaries, who sought to justify his violent and erratic 
behaviour as a symptom of sunstroke, numerous physical ailments have been superimposed 
onto Van Gogh in an attempt to explain his actions. It has been speculated that tinnitus may 
be responsible for Van Gogh’s self-mutilation: ‘his tinnitus had become intolerable and that 
he felt he might alleviate the “auditory hallucinations” by eliminating their source’.294 This 
places Van Gogh’s ailment in the terrain of the physiological rather than the realm of the 
mind, portraying him as physically ill rather than ‘mad’. Further conjecture offers a range of 
possible infirmities, from lead poisoning to syphilis. Society – despite the change and 
‘progress’ that has occurred since the nineteenth century – seems consistently unable to 
accept Van Gogh’s psychiatric diagnosis. The dominant cultural belief that ‘madness’ is a 
closed text has endured. By virtue of celebrating and circulating his art, to accept Van Gogh’s 
‘mad’ identity would necessitate an acceptance of the ‘other’. 
Recently, German art historians, Hans Kaufmann and Rita Wildegans, put forward an 
alternative explanation for the self-mutilation. Their hypothesis is that it was ‘painter Paul 
Gauguin who actually lopped [… the ear] off with a sword during an argument’, thus 
presenting Van Gogh as the victim of violence, rather than the problematic dual role of 
perpetrator/victim signified by self-harm.295 This theory responded to the ambiguity of Van 
Gogh’s act of self-injury and opened it up to be rewritten: the ‘curator [of the Van Gogh 
Museum] Leo Jansen said “plenty of questions remain unanswered”’, allowing for new 
interpretations.296 The extremity of the act also supported this sense of ambiguity: as ‘clinical 
cases of ear mutilation are quite rare’, there is further scope to entertain alternative 
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theories.297 Although coverage of the event in 1888 described Van Gogh’s act of self-harm as 
one ‘which could only be that of a pitiful madman’, twenty-first-century discourses seem 
determined to obscure the assumption that this act was the result of ‘madness’.298 
For those who find no substance in the claims of tinnitus or who are unconvinced by 
the image of Gauguin wielding a sword outside a brothel, there has been a parallel academic 
trend which attempts to romanticise or eulogise Van Gogh’s self-mutilation. At its extreme, 
French writer and philosopher Georges Bataille literally mythologised Van Gogh:  
There is, in fact, no reason to separate Van Gogh’s ear […] from Prometheus’s 
famous liver […] All the wealth he derives from the mythical delirium is limited to 
the incredible vomiting of the liver, ceaselessly devoured and ceaselessly vomited.299 
 
Like Prometheus, a Greek mythological figure who gifted humankind with fire (and who then 
paid a hideous, visceral price), Van Gogh is presented as a conduit between something godly, 
a knowledge above and beyond human knowledge, and humankind. Prometheus gave us fire; 
Van Gogh gifted us his art, his visions. As punishment, Prometheus was chained to a rock in 
the Caucasus, daily subjected to the agony of an eagle eating his liver, which then regrew, 
only to be devoured once more. Bataille believed that Van Gogh’s act of self-harm is akin to 
this martyrdom: the price of ‘mythical delirium’ and knowledge is eternal suffering. The 
theme of sacrifice runs through numerous accounts of Van Gogh’s life and art: academic Eric 
Michaud observed that ‘all Van Gogh's “madness” is connected to this extreme and painful 
knowledge that his very existence as a painter requires not only separation from others, but 
also the sacrifice of others, and above all of those closest to himself’.300 Van Gogh’s 
behaviour has been reconstructed as a form of martyrdom: suffering necessitated by his 
genius. Thus, his self-harm and eventual suicide can be read as an authentication of his 
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identity as an artist rather than threatening to undermine his art by declaring it a by-product of 
‘madness’. His oeuvre and his experiences have become ‘the substance of myth’ rather than a 
narrative of ‘madness’.301 
 On a more literal level, it has been suggested that the removal of the ear echoes 
Biblical and literary motifs. This discourse integrates Van Gogh further into the realm of the 
symbolic, the metaphoric, and the martyred: a far cry from social ‘perceptions of self-
mutilation as grotesque […] cowardly […] pitiful [and] senseless’.302 Gayford drew a 
comparison between Van Gogh’s self-mutilation and a Biblical parable:  
In the New Testament, after Christ had accepted his fate, Judas burst into the garden 
accompanied by armed men, come to arrest him. When the disciples saw what was 
going to happen, they thought of defending Christ with force, ‘And one of them smote 
the servant of the high priest, and cut off his right ear’.303 
 
Having entertained ambitions of being a pastor and working briefly as a missionary, Van 
Gogh was undoubtedly familiar with this passage, thus potentially lending a new significance 
to his act of self-harm. It has also been suggested that this is ‘a scene that van [sic] Gogh had 
tried to paint the previous summer’, perhaps leading him to decide that, in this instance, his 
body was the most suitable canvas.304  
Zola’s novel, Abbé Mouret's Transgression, written in 1875, also contains a shocking 
scene of ear mutilation in which Brother Archangias is injured as penance for betraying 
protagonists Albine and Mouret: ‘[Albine’s grandfather, Jeanbernat] calmly drew the knife 
from his pocket, opened it, and with a single cut sliced off the Brother’s right ear’.305 As Van 
Gogh’s letters reveal an intense admiration of Zola, it would be a safe assumption that he was 
familiar with this scene which, again, allows for the act of self-harm to be read as something 
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symbolic, rather than an impulsive act of despair. A Freudian reading has also been offered, 
as ‘one school points out the similarity between the Dutch words for ear (lel) and penis (lul), 
suggesting the act was a symbolic castration’, of particular significance in light of Van 
Gogh’s decision to deliver his dismembered ear to the local brothel.306 
 Similar academic trends have sought to rewrite Van Gogh’s final days, claiming that, 
rather than taking his own life, he was actually murdered.307 This reconstructed narrative 
‘resolves many of the contradictions, fills many of the gaps, and fits together many of the 
misshapen pieces of the traditional narrative of suicide that has dominated Van Gogh 
mythology since the day of the shooting’.308 Divorced from the stigma of suicide, Van Gogh 
can be represented as a tragic figure, or victim. As Foucault observed, Van Gogh’s ‘work and 
his madness were incompatible’, and so it became necessary for his ‘madness’ narrative to be 
sacrificed in favour of one which was more palatable.309 
 These alternative narratives reveal an urgent societal anxiety to displace Van Gogh’s 
‘madness’ and offer romantic, symbolic and mythological theories in its place. It is telling 
that Kaufmann and Wildegans spent ten years intensely researching Van Gogh’s act of self-
mutilation in an attempt to debunk it, and that Van Gogh: The Life (complete with its theory 
of murder rather than suicide) was the result of ‘a 10-year venture, involving teams of 
researchers and translators’.310 These theories respond to a need: a desire to find other 
explanations for the behaviour of ‘one of the most famous painters in the world’.311 This 
social trend to deemphasise Van Gogh’s ‘madness’ is a direct result of his accessibility and 
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credibility as an artist: because his work is admired and celebrated, it cannot be read as a 
‘madness’ narrative, lest we find ourselves not only receiving a ‘madness’ narrative, but also 
relating to it and, ultimately finding truth or meaning in it. Although Van Gogh’s work 
directly addressed his experience of ‘madness’, incorporating the motif of the bandaged ear, 
and featuring images constructed in, and reflecting on, the asylum space, there is an enduring 
societal reluctance for his art to be accepted on such terms.  
 
‘The Madness Which Interrupts It’: The Paradoxical ‘Mad’ Artist312 
Although, in theory, art allows for ‘complete and unhindered communication’, the social 
reception of art, necessary for this communication to be heard, proves that the practice is far 
removed from this romantic hypothesis.313 The idea of ‘mad’ art is, in itself, an oxymoron: in 
the realm of social engagement, either artistic credibility is compromised and eventually 
disparaged, or ‘madness’ is deemphasised and, ultimately, silenced. 
 For Wieser, Klett and Wain, the psychiatric context ensured that their ‘madness’ was 
paramount. On the one hand, their art is undoubtedly perceived as a ‘madness’ narrative: it is 
a creation which directly addresses their alternative experiences of ‘reality’. On the other 
hand, because of this, their work is deemed symptomatic of their ‘madness’. Rather than 
being a space in which these experiences are articulated, these narratives become 
representative of the inevitable ‘otherness’ which is enforced by their contact with psychiatry. 
Because their ‘madness’ is paramount, the artistic value of these pieces is jeopardised: the 
process is reduced to ‘image-making’, rather than art, and thus not deemed worthy of the 
viewer’s attention. This art is limited to a rhetoric which reflects ‘otherness’, nothing more. 
The viewer may witness ‘madness’ on such a canvas, but not empathise because of this 
                                                          
312 Foucault, Civilization, p. 273. 
313 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 109. 
244 
 
pervasive sense of ‘otherness’ which has been attached to it: ‘the experience of the other is 
not evident to me, as it is not and never can be an experience of mine’.314 
 Dadd’s and Van Gogh’s work has found a place in the canon of mainstream art. 
However, because of their reputation as artists, their ‘madness’ narratives have been eclipsed 
in favour of the superficial and the aesthetic. With Dadd, there has been an overt rejection of 
biographical detail. Van Gogh’s behaviour has been romanticised and mythologised in order 
for it to be viewed as a by-product of his artistic temperament, rather than his ‘madness’. 
Mainstream society has divorced this art from its ‘mad’ genesis in order to justify its 
reputation as art.  
 Wölfli occupies a liminal space in this ‘mad’/‘artist’ binary. Reclaimed by the 
Outsider Art genre, his work has been granted the limited status of ‘othered’ art. Although 
this platform has allowed Wölfli’s narrative to be seen as both art and an articulation of 
‘madness’, the work’s context necessitated an acceptance of the position of ‘outsider’. 
Because of this, Wölfli’s art cannot be divorced from its ‘otherness’, and therefore it will 
always be couched in the psychiatric conception of ‘mad’ as ‘other’. If anything, it reinforces 
hegemony, exhibiting the inherent and irrevocable difference of the ‘madman’. 
 It is also worth reconsidering context. The artists I have covered all have the privilege 
of voice to some degree: albeit tremendously limited, and often distorted or disregarded. But 
what about everyone else? Maclagan reflected that ‘most psychotic patients did not make 
anything that could conceivably be called “art”: of those that did (less than 2 per cent, 
according to Prinzhorn) only a tiny minority produced anything of real artistic interest’.315 
Those covered in the scope of this chapter are, presumably, in that tiny minority. That two 
per cent have the dubious privilege of having their work exhibited long enough for a 
psychiatric or mainstream audience to consider (and eventually disregard) its merits as pieces 
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of art. But what about the ninety-eight percent, those whose work is immediately considered 
non-art? Although Tolstoy suggested that the main activity of art was empathy, the status of 
‘artist’ seems tremendously divisive and evasive. The fact that ‘madness’ ‘interrupts’ art – 
rather than being a phenomenon which can be contained and communicated in art – suggests 
that the status of ‘mad’ artist is entirely unachievable: a romantic myth with no applicability 
to those who need it.316 
 For the individuals addressed in this chapter, art offered a haven and a creative outlet. 
It was a way of untangling the chaos of life in a psychiatric context; a method of 
documenting the self in the face of tumultuous change; and, for some, it was a space in which 
psychiatric ‘authority’ could be subtly challenged.317 It was a niche in which the self could be 
‘restored from the disfigurements of language’, however temporarily. 318 In a societal context, 
we are stuck in the psychiatric tradition of disregarding the individual narrative in favour of 
hegemonic discourse. We do not acknowledge these narratives because they are ‘other’: 
rather than heeding and embracing this difference, we ostracise it. Until our approach to 








                                                          
316 Foucault, Civilization, p. 273. 
317 In a psychiatric culture which has determined lack of insight as further evidence of ‘madness’, the ‘mad’ self 
cannot overtly challenge hegemonic discourse, a premise which is echoed in Laing’s Knots: ‘They are playing a 
game. They are playing at not playing a game. If I show them they are, I shall break the rules and they will 
punish me. I must play their game, of not seeing I see the game’. See Laing, Knots, p. 1. 




The Psychiatric, The Political and The Personal: How We Talk 




My primary focus on nineteenth-century culture (from psychiatric texts to a variety of 
‘madness’ narratives) has shown how hegemonic discourse of ‘madness’ has been established 
and, more importantly, the impact that it has had on the narration of the individual 
experience. However, this thesis is not intended as simply an historical investigation: this 
chapter will demonstrate that the nineteenth-century model for talking about and representing 
‘madness’ remains firmly entrenched in Western culture. It is still both the foundation for the 
psychiatric conceptualisation of ‘madness’, and the frame through which ‘madness’ is viewed 
in a social context. Despite recent academic and activist trends to identify and eradicate 
stigma, the semantic framework available for diagnosing and discussing ‘madness’ is still 
intertwined with the nineteenth-century asylum ‘us’ versus ‘them’ culture.1 The language of 
hegemonic discourse will always be an implement of oppression rather than liberation: as 
writer and activist Audre Lorde argued, ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house’.2 The master’s tool – the loaded, psychiatric language about ‘madness’ – cannot be 
used to disassemble the master’s house or, in this case, the spectre of the asylum that hovers 
at the margins and that ‘others’ any mainstream representation of ‘madness’.  
By way of introduction, I will revisit and summarise the primary semantic tropes 
which collectively shape the way ‘madness’ is perceived and (mis)understood. These will be 
established by two quotations, removed from any indicators of context: one will be from the 
                                                          
1 Social and academic discourses which attempt to challenge mental health stigma include the Time to Change 
and Rethink Mental Illness campaigns, and the rise of ‘Mad Studies’. 
2 Audre Lorde, quoted in P. J. McGann, ‘On the Transformation of Theory into Poetry and Praxis’, in Cultural 
Activisms, ed. by Gertrude M. James Gonzalez and Anne J. M. Mamary (Albany: University of New York Press, 
1999), p. 351-62 (p. 356). 
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genesis of psychiatric and asylum culture (from the nineteenth or early twentieth century); the 
other will be part of Western twenty-first-century discourse.3 Disconcertingly, these 
quotations feature in psychiatric textbooks: they are being used to shape a new generation 
using this archaic, inadequate and damaging semantic framework of talking about ‘madness’ 
but not of it.  
Next, I investigate narratives taken from popular culture, in order to see the influence 
of psychiatric discourse in shaping social dialogues about ‘madness’. Episodes of The 
Simpsons; House; and Peep Show have been chosen for their universal appeal and wide 
audience: they function as sources of information, both as a product, and a reinforcement, of 
mainstream cultural discourses. What (mis)information about ‘madness’ is disseminated and 
reinforced through these shows? How has this, in turn, (mis)informed mainstream society 
about what ‘madness’ is, and how psychiatry manages ‘madness’? How have such 
representations monopolised the dialogue about ‘madness’, which continues to isolate lived 
experience from a potential audience? 
This chapter also examines other mainstream twenty-first-century sources of 
(mis)information in order to investigate the impact that both psychiatric narratives and such 
fictionalised accounts have had on the collective social consciousness. By exploring the 
language employed by the media and other sources (such as the 2013 controversy over 
supermarkets Asda and Tesco’s ‘mental’ Hallowe’en costumes), I establish what popular 
discourses about ‘madness’ reveal about entrenched societal prejudices. Primarily, I focus on 
the concept of institutionalisation – a continuous theme, despite the deinstitutionalisation 
championed in the 1980s in the UK by the ‘care in the community’ policy. I establish how 
this is demonstrative both of the continued reliance on nineteenth-century discourses of 
                                                          
3 Although these quotations have been edited slightly to remove any indicators of context (such as archaic 
terms), I have endeavoured to leave them as close to their original wording as possible. Any alterations have 
been recorded in parentheses. 
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‘madness’, and also of a deep-seated social anxiety about the ‘mad’ individual who is not 
policed or contained by psychiatric forces. 
            Despite our pretences to civility, of scientific and medical progress, despite our 
heightened awareness of stigma and our efforts to demarginalise the ‘other’, little has 
changed. We know we must dismantle the master’s house (or, indeed, the metaphorical 
asylum), and yet we are still reliant on the master’s tools. Until we find new tools – new ways 
of understanding and discussing ‘madness’ – we will never entirely be able to deconstruct the 
stigma and disenfranchisement at the centre of hegemonic discourse. Once this chapter has 
established how we talk about ‘madness’, I will ascertain what needs to change in order for 
lived experience of ‘madness’ to be at the heart of this discourse, rather than the passive 
object of psychiatric and societal conversation. 
 
Trope One: ‘Madness’ Narratives are Incoherent, ‘Closed’ Texts4 
‘Speech is difficult to interpret […and there is a] loss of associations between words, [so] 
speech is experienced as an incoherent jumble’ 
 
‘Incoherence of the train of thought […] is usually distinctly noticeable […and] the most 
different ideas follow one another’ 
 
These quotations clearly establish ‘madness’ as a deviation from the abstract concept of 
‘normality’. Both quotations feature the term ‘incoherent’ or ‘incoherence’, and both identify 
a lack of connections – apparent signifiers of ‘normal’ speech – between words. The term 
‘incomprehensible’ features prominently in psychiatric accounts of mental illness, 
particularly ‘schizophrenia’: allegedly, its ‘very essence is “incomprehensibility” itself’.5 Use 
of this term, ‘incomprehensibility’, is a tactic used to implement ‘otherness’, to enforce 
distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In the context of the nineteenth century, this 
                                                          
4 I have deliberately withheld reference details for the two quotations at the beginning of each ‘trope’ section, as 
revealing this information would defeat the object. At the end of the appropriate section, full referencing details 
are given.  
5 Sass, ‘Introspection’, p. 4. 
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marginalisation was taken to a literal level: the asylum space signified a removal from the 
social sphere. However, in our twenty-first-century context, where initiatives claim to 
champion individual-led treatment, it seems paradoxical that the trope of 
‘incomprehensibility’ is still a prominent feature in psychiatric discourse.6 How can an 
individual be both central, and peripheral, to psychiatric conversations about their ‘illness’ 
and ‘treatment’? Despite our cultural concerns about stigma and discrimination, psychiatric 
language – the active entity in shaping medical and societal attitudes – still signifies ‘ways of 
not understanding’ ‘madness’.7 
 This assumption that ‘madness’ is ‘incomprehensible’ is a self-defence mechanism 
employed by hegemonic discourse: a manoeuvre which declares any potential counter-
narrative a ‘closed’ text, unworthy of interpretation. It constructs ‘madness’ in terms of 
perceived absence: a lack of comprehensibility. Rather than finding ways to accommodate or 
respond to such narratives, they are discarded. These texts do not conform to hegemony, 
therefore they are beyond orthodox understandings of ‘madness’. Such semantic choices are 
the ‘quickest and most efficient way of implying lack of intelligibility and suggesting a 
pathological or deficient individual’, of demarcating and silencing the ‘other’.8  
            The first quotation, ‘speech is difficult to interpret […and there is a]  loss of 
associations between words, [so] speech is experienced as an incoherent jumble’, is taken 
from a list of ‘psychopathology: disorders of speech’, found in a twenty-first-century 
textbook: Neel Burton’s Psychiatry, the second edition of which was published in 2010.9 By 
contrast, the second quotation, ‘incoherence of the train of thought […] is usually distinctly 
noticeable in the conversations […and] the most different ideas follow one another’, featured 
                                                          
6 For example, the 2013/14 ‘Putting Patients First Initiative’ (despite the obviously problematic label of 
‘patient’) and the recent trend for ‘personalisation’ in mental health care. 
7 Laing, Divided, p. 33. 
8 Mary Boyle, ‘Making the World Go Away, and How Psychology and Psychiatry Benefit’, in De-Medicalizing 
Misery: Psychiatry, Psychology and the Human Condition, ed. by Mark Rapley, Joanna Moncrieff and Jacqui 
Dillon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 27-43 (p. 41). 
9 Neel Burton, Psychiatry, 2nd edn (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), p. 19. 
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in Kraepelin’s Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, published in 1916.10 There are nearly 
one hundred years between both texts, and yet they rely on the same hypothesis – that a 
‘madness’ narrative is ‘incomprehensible’ and unworthy of interpretation. They echo each 
other’s sentiments and semantics: rather than representing progress, a comparison of these 
quotations instead demonstrates just how little has changed. 
 
Trope Two: The ‘Mad’, Unreliable Narrator 
‘An 18-year-old man suffering from hallucinations and delusions […] is unable to give any 
meaningful history’ 
 
‘I begin the treatment […] by asking the patient to give me the whole story of his life and 
illness […] as a matter of fact the patients are incapable of giving such reports about 
themselves’ 
 
Even if ‘madness’ narratives were accessed in spite of their alleged ‘incomprehensibility’, the 
individual experiencing ‘madness’ has been declared an unreliable narrator by psychiatric 
discourse. Any ‘claims to speak authoritatively about their experiences are undermined by the 
predominant public perception of them [the individual experiencing “madness”] as 
“unreliable” witnesses, subject to hallucinations, delusions and violent tendencies’.11 
Psychiatry is the ‘authority’: ‘madness’ has no place to speak of its own history or, indeed, its 
present. This devaluation of lived experience of ‘madness’ is yet another manoeuvre designed 
to reinforce the power of psychiatric hegemony at the expense of the individual’s right to 
speak and be heard. This hypothesis takes ‘madness’ out of the realm of individual 
experience, and into the domain of the medical and clinical. In this dynamic, the individual is 
‘required to be passive, such that medicine can act […] to correct the abnormality’: personal 
                                                          
10 Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox, p. 56. 
11 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33. 
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narratives, which contextualise ‘madness’ in a frame of life experience, are overridden by 
hegemonic discourse which requires only that the self surrenders to its ‘authority’.12 
By establishing and reinforcing the idea that the ‘mad’ individual is unable to offer 
any insight into, or knowledge of, their ailment or their history, the ‘authority’ of hegemonic 
discourse is further reinforced. Psychiatric knowledge dominates: despite living with and 
through an experience of ‘madness’, the individual has no authority. Thus psychiatric 
narratives move further and further away from personal experience: rather than working in 
harmony, there has been an inevitable and seemingly irrevocable fracture. Psychiatric 
discourse prevails, shaping societal perceptions of what ‘madness’ is: it reflects and 
reinforces its own assumptions and myths, and the individual narrative has been excluded 
from this rhetoric. 
The first passage – ‘an 18-year-old man suffering from hallucinations and delusions 
[…] is unable to give any meaningful history’ – has been taken from a psychiatric textbook 
published in 2000.13 The subsequent quotation – ‘I begin the treatment, indeed, by asking the 
patient to give me the whole story of his life and illness […] as a matter of fact the patients 
are incapable of giving such reports about themselves’ – formed part of Freud’s early 
twentieth-century reflections on the case studies of Dora and Little Hans.14 This pattern of 
disenfranchising the individual persists and is still a prominent feature in mainstream 
(mis)understandings of ‘madness’: despite the anti-psychiatric movement attempting to 
reinstate the power and knowledge of the ‘mad’ self, it appears that very little has changed 
during the century which separates these quotations. 
 
Trope Three: ‘Madness’ and Visual Stereotypes 
                                                          
12 Ewen Speed, ‘Discourses of Acceptance and Resistance: Speaking Out About Psychiatry’, in De-Medicalizing 
Misery: Psychiatry, Psychology and the Human Condition, ed. by Mark Rapley, Joanna Moncrieff and Jacqui 
Dillon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 123-40 (p. 126). 
13 Roderick Shaner, Psychiatry, 2nd edn (Maryland: Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, 2000), p. 6. 
14 Freud, Case Histories I, p. 46. 
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‘Anxiety […] mo[u]ld[s] their expression’ 
 
‘Mood states are accompanied by characteristic facial expressions and postures […] turning 
down of the corners of the mouth and vertical furrows in the brow suggest depression; 
whereas horizontal furrows on the brow […] suggest anxiety’ 
 
The nineteenth-century rise in phrenology sought to superimpose ‘madness’ onto the canvas 
of the body, evidently needing to ‘discern the outward marks of a mind’ on the physical 
self.15 Phrenologists attempted to forge a connection between the ‘mad’ self and the ‘mad’ 
body: to read ‘the outer man [as] a graphic reproduction of the inner’.16 As ‘enlightened’, 
twenty-first-century beings, we may collectively scoff at the archaic pseudoscience of 
phrenology and physiognomy, but the similarity between these two quotations suggests that 
we still rely on the foundation of these practices in our attempts to demarcate and represent 
the ‘mad’ body. As with the trope of the ‘mad’, unreliable narrator, the hypothesis that 
‘madness’ can be discerned from the physical self is a way of (mis)understanding from a 
distance. Phrenology and physiognomy are practices which make the personal experience 
redundant: if the self can be read from the exterior, there is no need to consult or 
communicate with the ‘mad’ individual. Again, there is a firmly entrenched disconnect 
between hegemonic discourse and  personal narrative. 
 The idea that ‘madness’ looks a certain way has resulted in the ‘madman’ 
‘encompass[ing] a wide spectrum of visual stereotypes’.17 Such phrenological ideas establish 
‘madness’ as something which consumes the individual, reconstructing both their internal and 
external selves. Rather than being a transient state, ‘madness’ is deemed a destination from 
which the physical and psychological self does not return. It equates alternative mental states 
with visible difference, thus resulting in ‘madness’ being portrayed as an encompassing 
‘otherness’. This is a trope which has endured throughout over one hundred years of 
psychiatry: despite our belief in progress, we still rely on this assumption that the ‘mad’ self 
                                                          
15 Conolly, ‘Physiognomy’, p. 20. 
16 Gilman, Seeing the Insane, p. 164. 
17 Gilman, Seeing the Insane, p. 116. 
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can be read on the body. The first quotation, ‘anxiety […] mo[u]ld[s] their expression’, is 
taken from Lombroso’s 1876 publication, Criminal Man.18 The second quotation, ‘mood 
states are accompanied by characteristic facial expressions and postures […] turning down of 
the corners of the mouth and vertical furrows in the brow suggest depression; whereas 
horizontal furrows on the brow […] suggest anxiety’, featured in a psychiatric textbook from 
2012.19  
 
Trope Four: ‘Madness’ Requires Psychiatric Intervention/Management 
‘Dissimulation on the patient’s part is, naturally, only a concealment of thoughts and 
symptoms […] for they themselves do not consider themselves sick’ 
 
‘Insight is almost always impaired. Most patients do not accept that their experiences result 
from illness, but usually ascribe them to the malevolent actions of other people’ 
 
When I first starting working in mental health, I encountered the phrase ‘lack of insight’. 
When asked, my colleague explained that this was a psychiatric term which was attached to 
individuals who challenged or did not fully ‘comprehend’ their ‘illnesses’. Thus, if a ‘mad’ 
individual does not accept hegemonic discourse (in this case, their diagnosis), they are 
deemed to have no insight – an idea which I found particularly uncomfortable. The political 
ramifications of this concept of ‘insight’ have been explored by Anne Rogers and David 
Pilgrim: ‘insight means that a patient agrees with their psychiatrist […] where agreement 
breaks down in a psychiatric encounter between doctor and patient, then the more powerful 
party has their view upheld’.20 Why does psychiatry assume it understands the experience of 
the individual better than the person in question?  
The concept of insight immediately recalled for me the Lacanian suggestion that 
‘madness’ is perceived as ‘a kind of non-knowledge’: that the ‘mad’ individual, by virtue of 
                                                          
18 Lombroso, Criminal Man, p. 214. 
19 John Geddes, Jonathan Price and Rebecca McKnight, Psychiatry, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 29. 
20 Anne Rogers and David Pilgrim, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, 4th edn (Berkshire: Open 
University Press, 2010), p. 171. 
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their alleged ‘unreason’, cannot comprehend or fully understand the self.21 The assumption of 
an absence of insight suggests that ‘madness’ requires an external force – in this case, 
psychiatry – to manage it, to be the source of knowledge and of ‘authority’. Psychiatric 
intervention is apparently required because ‘madness’ cannot recognise its own ‘otherness’. 
Borne out of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discourses which depict ‘madness’ as a state 
of ‘unreason’, this idea of insight appears, at best, archaic and conceited. How can the 
assumption that ‘madness’ is a deviation from the abstract concept of ‘reason’ be such a 
fundamental component in the medical (mis)understanding of the individual?22  
As both of these quotations show, there is an enduring rhetoric which suggests 
‘madness’ cannot even recognise, let alone manage, itself. Psychiatric intervention is 
necessary to take the ‘mad’ self from a state of non-knowledge to an acceptance of his or her 
own ‘madness’, and thus of hegemonic discourse. Echoing the other tropes, the idea that 
‘madness’ requires psychiatric ‘authority’ disregards the individual experience which has no 
place in the medicalisation of the self.  
The spectre of asylum culture is inescapable: the individual or even mainstream 
society (were it so inclined) cannot accommodate ‘madness’ because it is an experience 
which has been irrevocably pathologised and thus belongs exclusively to the psychiatric 
sphere. As I will discuss shortly, this rhetoric of institutionalisation is particularly 
problematic in the light of political changes, namely the ‘care in the community’ policy 
which promotes deinstitutionalisation. As James Davies observed, ‘as soon as you’re 
assigned a diagnosis […] you become a protagonist in a larger myth […] you have entered 
into a social contract in which you are now socially positioned as dependant on psychiatric 
                                                          
21 Cutler, ‘Philosophical Coquetry’, p. 93. 
22 Let us consider this from another perspective. During a medical examination, if one were to complain of, say, 
nausea and food aversion, the doctor may suggest that the individual could be pregnant. If the individual 
disagrees with this perception, are they deemed as showing a ‘lack of insight’? Or is the ‘authority’ of the 
individual considered reliable enough information to discount that possibility? Why is personal experience 
judged to be reliable in one medical context, when, in the case of ‘madness’, it is not only marginalised but also 
regarded as non-knowledge? 
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authority’.23 In the face of a mental health system which now gravitates towards ‘care in the 
community’ over exclusively psychiatric environments, does this render the ‘mad’ individual 
placeless, ungoverned – perhaps even free? This concept will be explored in more detail 
shortly. However, it is worth acknowledging that the assumption that ‘madness’ requires 
psychiatric management – the emblem of which is the nineteenth-century asylum – has led to 
a societal fear of ‘madness’ which escapes or eludes such ‘authority’. 
The first quotation – ‘dissimulation on the patient’s part is, naturally, only a 
concealment of thoughts and symptoms […] for they themselves do not consider themselves 
sick’ – is taken from Bleuler’s 1924 publication, Textbook of Psychiatry.24 The subsequent 
passage – ‘insight is almost always impaired. Most patients do not accept that their 
experiences result from illness, but usually ascribe them to the malevolent actions of other 
people’ – featured in the Shorter Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 2012.25 Despite being 
written eighty-eight years apart, the similarity between these extracts is uncanny: the primary 
message being that ‘madness’ is ‘madness’ because it does not accept its own ‘madness’. It 
requires psychiatric governance. 
 
Trope Five: ‘Madness’ and ‘Otherness’ 
 
‘Although it may not always seem so [detaining an individual against their will it] may, in 
fact, be a very caring thing to do: akin to lifting and holding a two-year-old having a tantrum’ 
 
‘The patient behaves like a little child’ 
 
The representation of ‘madness’ as a state of ‘otherness’ – here, exhibited by infantilisation – 
may seem quite an obvious trope. All of the quotations I have looked at thus far demonstrate 
the various ways that this ‘otherness’ can be enforced, from undermining the reliability of the 
personal experience, to phrenological assumptions that ‘madness’ is both internally and 
                                                          
23 Davies, Cracked, p. 219. 
24 Bleuler, Textbook, p. 192. 
25 Cowen, Textbook of Psychiatry, p. 257. 
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externally ‘other’. However, the above quotations explicitly portray the ‘mad’ individual as 
something ‘other’ than an autonomous adult, and depict psychiatry as a paternal force which 
must control the ‘mad’, unruly child. As with the assumption that ‘madness’ requires 
psychiatric intervention, this trope is a way of diminishing the power and autonomy of the 
individual. Evoking Lacanian power dynamics, ‘madness’ is depicted as ‘a failure to accept 
or even to recognise what [Lacan] calls nom du père […] the whole complex of rules, 
interdictions, concepts, and words that the child must accept’ to transition into the adult 
world.26 Because ‘madness’ cannot conform to psychiatric discourse without being 
automatically ‘othered’, it will remain in a state of perpetual infantilisation and 
powerlessness. 
Despite representing a break from the conventional psychiatric school of thought, 
even the anti-psychiatry movement portrayed ‘madness’ as a return to a child-like state. 
Barnes, during her stay at Kingsley Lodge, was instructed by Laing and Berke to ‘go down 
and come up again. Be as a child. Go mad. Regrow’.27 However, anti-psychiatric discourses 
saw an experience of ‘madness’ as an opportunity to reconfigure the self: to return to infancy 
in order to regrow, relearn and reinstate the power and autonomy of the individual. By 
contrast, mainstream psychiatric discourse depicts ‘madness’ as a state of childish ignorance 
– again, the recurring trope of non-knowledge – which can only be rectified with an 
acceptance of and voluntary capitulation to the nom du père.                  
‘Although it may not always seem so [detaining an individual against their will] may, 
in fact, be a very caring thing to do: akin to lifting and holding a two-year-old having a 
tantrum’ is an extract from the Oxford Handbook of Psychiatry, published in 2013.28 The 
                                                          
26 Sass, ‘Ineffable’, p. 321. 
27 Barnes, Mary Barnes, p. 109.  
28 Semple, Handbook, p. 16. 
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assertion that ‘the patient behaves like a little child’ featured in Bleuler’s 1924 publication, 
Textbook of Psychiatry.29 
 
Is ‘Madness’ ‘Incomprehensible’, or Are We Just Not Listening? What it All Means 
The purpose of these comparisons is to debunk the assumption that psychiatry is an objective, 
absolute and developed practice. In reality, despite pretences of progression, psychiatric 
(mis)understandings of ‘madness’ are firmly rooted in archaic, outdated models of 
ostracising, alienating and ‘othering’ ‘madness’. It is easy (and undoubtedly comforting to 
our collective social consciousness) to presume that ‘madness’ is in safe hands; that a 
psychiatric intervention is both necessary and just. To question the assumption that 
psychiatry is infallible is simultaneously to challenge our reliance on psychiatric discourse. 
This would force us to face the possibility that we have been actively supporting a damaging 
and totalitarian discourse of disenfranchisement. Until we question what the institution of 
psychiatry tells us, we are complicit. Until we deconstruct assumptions that ‘madness’ is 
‘incomprehensible’, ‘unreliable’, ‘other’, we are no better than our nineteenth-century 
counterparts. Our restraints may be chemical rather than mechanical, but we still control. We 
may section rather than incarcerate, but we still ostracise. We may be aware of stigma, but 
only as an abstract concept: we still do not listen. 
The comparison of narratives from over one hundred years of psychiatric ‘progress’ 
demonstrates that, even though the setting may have changed, the language has not. Although 
nineteenth-century psychiatry could be regarded as having good intentions gone awry, as the 
result of medical or psychological ignorance, we, in the twenty-first century, have no such 
excuse. Philosopher and poet George Santayana mused that ‘those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it’: those who do not learn from history’s mistakes will never 
                                                          
29 Bleuler, Textbook, p. 165. 
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progress.30 This chapter exposes just how stunted this development has been. By examining 
how ‘madness’ is talked about in our twenty-first-century context, I show how psychiatry’s 
refusal to learn from its own legacy has established and reinforced the societal stigma which 
we appear to be so desperate to eradicate. I expose how mainstream discourses of ‘madness’ 
are entirely reliant on medicalised, psychiatric discourse and how our (often unknowing) 
acceptance of hegemonic narratives has resulted in us being complicit in silencing those we 
seek to include. Our quest to comprehend ‘madness’ by extensively documenting it with 
elaborate editions of the DSM; and our attempts to establish a dialogue by (mis)representing 
‘madness’ in popular culture, have only further perpetuated the myth of its 
incomprehensibility. 
            Psychiatrist David Healy has argued that, when it comes to managing ‘madness’, ‘we 
are becoming less rather than more rational’.31 As I show, there is little to distinguish the 
nineteenth-century alienist from the twenty-first-century psychiatrist. The DSM has been 
described as ‘a nineteenth-century construct’; a tool for a categorisation process that is 
distinctly Kraepelinian.32 These attempts to explain the nosology and prognosis of ‘madness’ 
as a biological entity of disease (rather than a social phenomenon) have resulted in 
stagnation, rather than progress: ‘there seems to be a lack of evidence to support the notions 
that explanatory paradigms used by psychiatry changed much over the course of a century’.33  
            Despite decades of somatic treatments, extensive scientific research and numerous 
editions of the DSM, mental illnesses continue to elude psychiatry. Most disconcertingly, the 
individual in the mental health system today has the same chance of ‘recovery’ as their 
nineteenth-century equivalent. In the nineteenth-century asylum, ‘recovery rates of up to 50 
                                                          
30 George Santayana, The Life of Reason (Auckland: Floating Press, 2009), p. 312. 
31 Healy, Psychopharmacology, p. 5. 
32 Edward Shorter, What Psychiatry Left Out of the DSM-5: Historical Mental Disorders Today (London: 
Routledge, 2015), p. 24. 
33 Rogers, Sociology, p. 156. 
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percent were reported. Such rates are comparable to those of psychiatric facilities today’.34 
Prior to the existence of community care, outpatient treatment, and medication, ‘the only real 
treatment for severe mental illness was institutionalisation’.35 A twenty-first-century ‘service 
user’ will likely encounter a dizzying array of powerful medication (and an equally dizzying 
range of side effects, some of which may severely impair quality of life)36; several diagnostic 
labels (which often vary from psychiatrist to psychiatrist)37; and a dubious ‘scientific’ theory 
to explain their suffering.38 We have these ‘tools’ – questionable as they might be – and yet 
our recovery rates are no different from those boasted by nineteenth-century institutions, 
which were borne out of a desire simply to ‘segregate the mad from society’;  to ostracise 
‘madness’, not to cure it.39 Any ‘recovery’ was, indeed, incidental. This façade of ‘progress’ 
may have helped develop the reputation of psychiatry, but it has done little to address the 
primary issue at the centre of the mental health system: we are labelling, we are medicating, 
we are sectioning, administering electroshock therapy, using chemical restraints, and yet we 
are still not helping. 
                                                          
34 Healy, Psychopharmacology, p. 12. 
35 Jeffrey A. Lieberman with Ogi Ogas, Shrinks: The Untold Story of Psychiatry (London: Weidenfield and 
Nicolson, 2015), p. 153. 
36 For example, antipsychotic medication is associated with tardive dyskinesia (which I discuss shortly) and a 
decrease in number of white blood cells; antidepressant medication with increased suicidality; antianxiety 
medication with dependency and memory loss; and mood stabilisers with seizures and hallucinations (to name 
but a few adverse effects). Information taken from National Institute of Mental Health, ‘Mental Health 
Medications’ <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-health-medications/index.shtml> [accessed 17 
June 2016]. 
37 A 2007 study in Psychiatry journal reports that 86 per cent of psychiatrists asked felt that diagnostic reliability 
was poor. See Davies, Cracked, p. 18. 
38 The history of psychiatry is littered with examples of dubious science, including malarial treatments, insulin 
coma therapy and leucotomies. Disconcertingly, however, psychiatry’s present – and the reality of being a 
‘patient’ in the current mental health system – is also defined by questionable science. Consider, for example, 
the continued practice of electroconvulsive therapy, even though The Royal College of Psychiatrists are only 
able to give the following explanation: ‘No-one is certain how ECT works’. See The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, ‘Information about ECT’ <http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/healthadvice/treatmentswellbeing/ect.aspx> 
[accessed 29 July 2015]. Further, the development of psychotropics, the cornerstone of ‘care in the community’, 
is a narrative of the theoretical rather than the empirical and of accidental discovery (not to mention a total 
disregard for ‘patient’ welfare and animal cruelty). For example, most medication to treat ‘depression’ and 
‘psychosis’ is based on the popular hypothesis of a chemical imbalance of serotonin and dopamine: a theory 
which is, according to Healy, comparable to ‘the masturbatory theory of insanity’, prevalent in the nineteenth 
century. Healy, quoted in Robert Whitaker, Anatomy of an Epidemic (New York: Random House, 2015), p. 75. 




 Modern psychiatric publications look back on the nineteenth-century model with 
scorn, berating the crude and unenlightened methods of ‘care’. Renowned psychiatrist Jeffrey 
Lieberman, past president of the American Psychiatric Association who oversaw the 
composition of the DSM-5, observed that ‘in the late nineteenth century, asylums used 
injections of morphine and other opiate-derived drugs to subdue recalcitrant inmates […] the 
practise was discontinued once it became clear that opioids turned patients into hardcore 
addicts’.40 However, in our Western, twenty-first-century context, prescriptions for addictive, 
powerful and potentially damaging psychotropics are commonplace, justified by flawed 
scientific theories and questionable trial results.41 This reliance on medication culture ‘reveals 
much about the capacity of a society to cling to a belief in the magical merits of a pill, even 
though clinical trials produce […] disparaging results’.42 Long-term use of medication 
allegedly curbs financial strain on the mental health system, reducing the likelihood of 
hospitalisation and, of course, cutting overheads (a pill is drastically cheaper than a course of 
therapy: as observed in an article in The Telegraph, ‘the drugs are often doled out because 
they are cheaper’).43 Psychotropics are also extremely lucrative for pharmaceutical 
companies, adding an extra incentive for potentially damaging trial results to be obscured:  in 
2003, for example, ‘antidepressants were the single most profitable class of drugs for drug 
companies worldwide’.44 Although Lieberman may ridicule nineteenth-century asylum staff 
who unwittingly created ‘hardcore addicts’, he does so from the top of a profession whereby 
                                                          
40 Lieberman, Shrinks, p. 173. 
41 Consider the history of fluoxetine (most commonly referred to as its trade name, Prozac), ‘the most widely 
used antidepressant in history, prescribed to 54 m[illion] people worldwide’ (Anna Moore, ‘Eternal Sunshine’, 
The Guardian, 13 May 2007 <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/may/13/socialcare.medicineandhealth> 
[accessed 9 July 2015]).This is despite the drug being deemed ‘totally unsuitable’ for treating depression by the 
German licensing authority after its initial review: see Whitaker, Anatomy, p. 288. 
42 Whitaker, Anatomy, p. 153. 
43 Laura Donnelly, ‘Anti-Depressants ‘No More Effective Than Counselling’, The Telegraph, 8 December 2015 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/12039952/anti-depressants-vs-counselling.html> [accessed 2 
April 2016]. 
44 Daniel J. Carlat, Unhinged: The Trouble With Psychiatry – A Doctor’s Revelations About a Profession in 
Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p. 106. 
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‘the needs of the patients are ignored in favour of the political needs of their treating 
psychiatrists’.45 
 Both the first and second generations of psychotropics – the result of psychiatry’s 
conceptualisation of a biological model of mental illness, and symbols of scientific 
‘advancement’ – ‘trace their origins back to Macleod’s deep sleep therapy at the dawn of the 
twentieth century’.46 Benjamin Rush, one of the founders of American psychiatry, relied on 
somatic treatments, inventing the Rotational Chair (designed to improve ‘patients’’ 
circulation, ‘until his [the ‘patient’s’] psychotic symptoms were blotted out by dizziness, 
disorientation and vomiting’); the Tranquiliser Chair (‘to combat excessive mental input […] 
depriving him [the ‘patient’] of sight and sound’); and ‘his own customized “Bilious Pills” 
[…] Opening up the bowels, Rush attested, expelled any deleterious substances causing 
mental illness’.47 Considering psychiatry’s consistent dependence on dubious bodily 
treatments, it is, indeed, appropriate that Rush’s face remains on the official American 
Psychiatric Association emblem to this day. In the shadow of psychiatry’s absurd and 
outlandish quest for the ‘cure’ (or just the aetiology) of ‘madness’ is a quiet, often unspoken, 
narrative of suffering: of the individual forced into the rotational chair; of the ‘patient’ who 
never awoke from deep sleep therapy; the memories lost after electroconvulsive therapy; the 
identity distorted after numerous diagnostic labels have been applied; the ‘service user’ in 
constant pain from irreversible tardive dyskinesia as a result of a continuous over-prescription 
of antipsychotics.48 
                                                          
45 Rogers, Sociology, p. 161. 
46 Lieberman, Shrinks, p. 176. Scottish psychiatrist Neil Macleod first trialled deep sleep therapy at the end of 
the nineteenth century, whereby ‘barbiturates were employed to produce deep, prolonged sleep as a means of 
disconnecting the mentally ill from their mad thoughts’ (Scull, Madness in Civilisation, pp. 308-09). According 
to Lieberman, benzodiazepines and major tranquilisers are based on this model of perpetual sedation, although 
modified in order for the individual – theoretically – to continue functioning. 
47 Lieberman, Shrinks, p. 62. 
48 A brief definition of tardive dyskinesia can be found on the Mind website: ‘Dyskinesia literally means 
“trouble with movement”; “tardive” means delayed or late-appearing’. For more information, see Mind, 
‘Tardive Dyskinesia’ <http://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/types-of-mental-health-problems/tardive-
dyskinesia/#.VazyV_lViko> [accessed 16 April 2015]. 
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We continue to prioritise the categorisation and medicalisation of ‘madness’ because 
it is a way of not listening, of not acknowledging the true ‘authority’ of ‘madness’ and its 
silenced history. Statistics declare that one in four of us will experience a form of mental 
illness over the course of our lives.49 We are surrounded by experts by experience and yet 
silence their ‘authority’ in favour of an obsolete and outdated psychiatric narrative. We are 
currently caught in a catch twenty-two: psychiatry creates a hypothesis about what ‘madness’ 
is or how it should be managed (this remains hypothetical, as ‘few laypeople realize how 
little we [psychiatrists] actually know about the underpinnings of these disorders’).50 This 
‘mythology [of psychiatric understandings of ‘madness’] defines our present’, it bleeds in to 
popular culture, it shapes the public imagination.51 This is the foundation for cultural 
(mis)understandings of ‘madness’ which, inevitably, shape not only the prognosis of ‘illness’, 
but the social identity of those labelled ‘mad’: ‘it turns out that how a people in a culture 
think about mental illnesses […] influences the diseases themselves’.52 How do we escape 
this cycle? How do we place the individual experience at the centre of this narrative, rather 
than banishing it to the margins?  
 
Popular Culture versus Lived Experience: Discourses About ‘Madness’ 
Not far removed from totalitarian asylum culture, compliance with psychiatric ‘authority’ is 
the cornerstone of the current ‘care in the community’ model. This is how we have 
transitioned from incarcerating ‘madness’ to labelling and medicating it from a psychiatrist’s 
office rather than the asylum space. ‘It is the discourses of and around mental health that set 
the conditions of possibility for talking about mental health’, and hegemonic narratives deem 
                                                          
49 Mind, ‘Mental Health Facts’. 
50 Carlat, Unhinged, p. 75. 
51 Mark Rapley, Joanna Moncrieff and Jacqui Dillon, ‘Carving Nature at its Joints? DSM and the Medicalization 
of Everyday Life’, in De-Medicalizing Misery: Psychiatry, Psychology and the Human Condition (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-9 (p. 2). 
52 Ethan Watters, Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the Western Mind (London: Robinson, 2010), p. 2. 
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any challenge – a refusal to take medication, questioning a diagnosis – a ‘lack of insight’.53 
Although psychiatry now has tools which were not available to the nineteenth-century 
alienist, the dominant discourse is still one which deprives the rights and dismisses 
knowledge of the individual. We still speak of ‘madness’ in the same terms, and the 
outcomes for those experiencing mental illness have not improved. 
But how has this narrative shaped popular culture? How does our desire to eradicate 
stigma coexist with our reliance on an ‘authority’ which, historically, legitimised inflicting 
brain damage under the pretence of psychosurgery, and continues to perform 
electroconvulsive therapy on ‘patients’ while unable to offer any scientific rationale? Which 
sources of (mis)information continue to perpetuate the social and psychiatric myth that 
‘madness’ requires psychiatric intervention, that it is something ‘other’ and alien, that we 
should listen to those who ‘treat’ ‘madness’ rather than those who experience it?  
In order to comprehend the influence of hegemonic discourse, it is necessary to 
investigate a variety of sources in popular culture which reproduce and reinforce psychiatric 
narratives. This is more a cross-section of sources, and not a comprehensive collation. The 
sources from popular culture that I have chosen are required to meet the following criteria to 
ascertain how they function as an accessible source of (mis)information about ‘madness’: 
they must be available to a mainstream audience, and must address an experience of 
‘madness’. With this in mind, I will examine ‘Hurricane Neddy’ (1996), an episode of The 
Simpsons, in which Ned Flanders, neighbour to the Simpsons family, is incarcerated and 
treated for an apparent breakdown. As a point of comparison, I explore ‘Broken: Part One’ 
(2009), an episode of House, which follows misanthropic protagonist Gregory House’s 
experience of incarceration at Mayfield Psychiatric Hospital. Finally, I will look at an episode 
of Peep Show – aptly titled ‘Sectioning’ (2005) – in which Merry, a friend of the 
                                                          
53 Speed, ‘Discourses of Acceptance’, p. 125. 
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protagonists, suffers from what is termed a ‘manic episode’ and is hospitalised. This cross-
section of genres allows for an investigation of how these narratives translate to different 
target audiences. Despite the geographical diversity, all three of these sources present both a 
‘mad’ character, and a psychiatric presence, meaning that these narratives offer both a 
commentary on what ‘madness’ is, and how it should be dealt with, in a Western context. 
They also offer insight into how psychiatric forces are socially perceived. 
  
‘Ned, You So Crazy’: ‘Madness’ in ‘Hurricane Neddy’54 
The popularity of The Simpsons cannot be disputed: its pertinent commentary on American 
life has ensured its longevity: it has been running since 1989, and, to date, has aired 574 
episodes. Attracting ‘an estimated 33.6 million viewers’, The Simpsons is well-placed to 
explore topical or controversial issues in an influential manner.55 So, what happens when 
Matt Groening’s animated sitcom decides to portray mental illness? How does this feed into – 
or challenge – current societal discourses on ‘madness’? 
Written by Steve Young and directed by Bob Anderson, ‘Hurricane Neddy’ first aired 
in December 1996. The episode focuses on Ned Flanders, a reoccurring character: neighbour 
to the Simpsons family; a devout Evangelical Christian who, despite consistently 
demonstrating compassion to his neighbours, is ridiculed and despised by Homer Simpson. 
At the beginning of the episode, a hurricane strikes Springfield and somehow only destroys 
Ned’s home, resulting in Ned challenging his faith in God. The townspeople rebuild his 
house, but in an inferior manner, and it soon collapses again.  
At this point, Ned’s calm and tolerant demeanour finally slips. His characteristic 
verbal tics (such as his catchphrase ‘okily-dokily’) take a darker turn: ‘Neddilly-diddilly-
                                                          
54 ‘Hurricane Neddy’, The Simpsons, 29 December 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent quotations 
are from this source. I have transcribed all quotations from television programmes myself. 
55 Anthony Cody, ‘The Simpsons in the News’, The Telegraph, 27 September 2011  




diddilly-diddilly-diddilly. They did their best. Shodilly-idilly-iddilly-diddilly. Gotta be nice. 
Hostility-diddilly-diddilly-diddilly- Aw, hell! Diddily-ding-dong crap!’ We later learn the 
reason behind Ned’s distinctive speech patterns. However, for the moment, it is worth 
considering this semantic representation of the genesis of Ned’s ‘madness’. Ned loses control 
of his language: the contrast between what is later termed ‘nonsensical jabbering’ and 
rational fragments (‘They did their best’, ‘Gotta be nice’) is used to signify a conflict between 
Ned’s ‘sanity’ and ‘insanity’. It immediately evokes psychiatric discourse, in which ‘it 
became standard to refer to what mad people said […] through terms such as “chattering”, 
“jabbering” and “ranting”’.56 This trope further perpetuates the myth that ‘madness’ 
narratives are ‘closed’, ‘incomprehensible’ texts, not worthy of interpretation. If something is 
‘nonsensical’, it is characterised by an absence of reason or wisdom, a Lacanian term which 
constructs ‘madness’ as a deviation from knowledge. 
Ned’s ‘madness’ is indicated by dishevelled hair (a nod to the trope that ‘madness’ 
conforms to visual stereotypes) and a drastic change from his usually overly polite manner. 
He is taken to ‘Calmwood Mental Hospital’: a vast building isolated from the population of 
the town, surrounded by high, daunting walls. On entering the building, Ned converses with a 
nurse: 
Ned. I'd like to commit myself. 
Nurse. Very well. Shall I show you to your room, or would you prefer to be dragged 
off kicking and screaming? 
Ned. Ooh, kicking and screaming, please. 
  
Ned, despite voluntarily admitting himself, is immediately taken to an isolation room which 
has padded walls. He is placed in a straight-jacket: the first scene which reveals this shows 
him contentedly leafing through the pages of a magazine using his toes. In addition to 
representing a psychiatric environment based on politics of confinement and control, this 
narrative also informs the audience that ‘madness’ requires such management.  
                                                          
56 Porter, Social History, p. 32. 
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 Ned’s current mental state is explained as a form of regression as the result of an 
experimental therapy he was exposed to as a child. The psychiatric presence – Dr Foster – 
explains that ‘from that point on, any time you felt angry you could only respond with a 
string of nonsensical jabbering’. Foster overrides Ned’s memory with details of his medical 
history, reconstructing Ned’s past: Foster is the ‘authority’ on Ned’s identity. As Ned is 
rendered a passive ‘patient’ who requires psychiatric intervention in order to understand 
himself, the narrative further perpetuates the belief that ‘madness’ cannot recognise itself, and 
thus cannot be managed by the self. It necessitates the presence of psychiatric ‘authority’. 
            The narrative of how ‘madness’ should be dealt with in ‘Hurricane Neddy’ is 
complicated when the Simpson family visit Ned. The Simpsons are forced to wear labels 
which declare them ‘sane’, simultaneously enforcing the gulf between ‘us’ and ‘other’ and 
exposing the arbitrary nature of such distinctions (after all, if one needs to be visibly 
identified as ‘sane’, that suggests that there is a possibility that they may be assumed to be 
otherwise). There is potential for this discourse to destabilise the idea that ‘madness’ 
conforms to visual stereotypes, despite Ned’s dishevelled hair implying a reinforcement of 
this idea: if ‘madness’ is visually apparent, there would be no need for such labels. 
               However, immediately after this visual demarcation occurs, Dr Foster informs the 
family that ‘you folks are free to roam the grounds. Just remember, one of our patients is a 
cannibal. Try to guess which one. I think you'll be pleasantly surprised’. Seconds ago, there 
was the possibility that ‘Hurricane Neddy’ could be subtly challenging hegemonic narratives 
by suggesting that the ‘sane’/‘insane’ binary was fluid, and potentially unstable. Now, Dr 
Foster – the ‘authority’ on ‘madness’ – is blurring the lines between ‘madness’ and abhorrent, 
violent and criminal behaviour, by evoking the taboo of cannibalism. He invites the Simpsons 
to try and identify the cannibal, thus encouraging them to be voyeurs, to witness the spectacle 
of ‘madness’, neutralised and detained by psychiatric forces. The Simpsons are cast into a 
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pseudo-psychiatric role, urged to categorise the ‘patients’ they encounter, much like the 
psychiatric process of consulting the DSM and applying labels. 
There are, however, a few subtle suggestions that ‘Hurricane Neddy’ is not blindly 
representing and feeding back into hegemony. When the episode depicts a flashback to Ned’s 
childhood, the disobedient child is seen climbing Dr Foster’s bookshelf, at which the 
psychiatrist cries: ‘Hey! Hey! Get down from that bookshelf, please! Most of those books 
haven’t been discredited yet’. There is a suggestion here that the ‘authority’ of Dr Foster 
could be questioned. Ned’s insubordinate behaviour is perceived to be the result of a lack of 
discipline: an almost Laingian concept which places the responsibility of the mental health of 
the child with the family unit, specifically the parents.57 By evoking anti-psychiatric 
narratives, ‘Hurricane Neddy’ could be implying that hegemonic discourse is not the only 
‘authority’ on ‘madness’. The experimental therapy Ned received is called ‘University of 
Minnesota’s Spankelogical Protocol’: a clearly absurd ‘treatment’ that consists of young Ned 
being spanked constantly by Dr Foster for eight months. By representing psychiatry as 
potentially misguided, and a force which essentially advocates child abuse, ‘Hurricane 
Neddy’ could be perceived as challenging psychiatric hegemony. 
Although his ‘therapy’ is represented as quackery, and the ‘authority’ of Dr Foster is 
compromised, Ned does recover. On his release, Ned’s return to mainstream society is 
marked by a crowd of his neighbours welcoming him as he steps out of the hospital. Ned 
announces to the crowd: ‘thanks, everyone. I'm all better now’, trivialising the long-term 
struggle many have with mental illness. The implicit message here is that psychiatry has 
‘cured’ Ned almost immediately, thus reinforcing the ‘authority’ and wisdom of psychiatry.  
            This rapid ‘cure’ could represent a fragment of hope: Ned’s ‘madness’ is deemed a 
                                                          
57 In The Divided Self, Laing observed: ‘there may be some ways of being a mother that impede rather than 
facilitate or “reinforce” any genetically determined inborn tendency there may be in the child towards achieving 
the primary developmental stages of ontological security. Not only the mother but also the total family situation 
may impede rather than facilitate the child’s capacity to participate in a real shared world, as self-with-other’. 
See Laing, Divided, p. 189. 
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temporary divergence from ‘sanity’, and, once recovered, Ned is welcomed back into society. 
However, Ned’s ‘madness’ appears to be residual: Ned advises his neighbours that he will 
‘run you down with my car’ if they irritate him, further affiliating ‘madness’ with violence 
and criminality. The final line of the episode is attributed to Homer Simpson, who comments: 
‘Ned, you so crazy’. The viewer may interpret Ned’s breakdown and subsequent recovery as 
a testament to psychiatric expertise. However, Homer’s closing line suggests that once 
psychiatric intervention occurs, the individual who is branded ‘mad’ can never shed that 
label. This could be perceived as a failure on psychiatry’s part, or even a commentary on 
cultural stigma. However, the dominant and enduring message of ‘Hurricane Neddy’ seems 
to be that Ned’s aggression and potential for violent behaviour demonstrate that a full return 
to ‘sanity’ is not possible. Thus, the binary of ‘mad’ and ‘sane’ enforced by psychiatry is 
upheld, as Ned is unable to move fluidly between states. 
 
‘I Was Deluded Into Thinking I Might Be Crazy’: ‘Madness’ in ‘Broken: Part One’58 
American medical drama House presents an interesting paradox when eponymous, esteemed 
diagnostician Gregory House is admitted into Mayfield Psychiatric Hospital, following a 
prolonged period of substance misuse and hallucinations. Simultaneously embodying the role 
of ‘patient’ and medical ‘authority’, House’s incarceration has the potential to undermine 
hegemony by presenting a ‘mad’ individual who is hyper-vigilant of, and thus able to 
manage, his own ‘madness’. Reaching an estimated audience of 16.5 million viewers, 
‘Broken: Part One’ was aired in September 2009, and follows House’s experiences in a 
psychiatric institution during a traumatic detox. 
The opening of the episode is assembled using quick cuts to signify House’s 
disorientation, and his intermittent consciousness. The focus on images such as House’s 
                                                          
58 ‘Broken: Part One’, House, 21 September 2009. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent quotations are 
from this source. 
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hospital ID bracelet; a nurse watching House from the door to his room; and the restraints 
which shackle House to the hospital bed, reconstruct House’s identity as that of ‘patient’ 
rather than doctor. During the opening sequence, House fluctuates between vulnerability 
(exhibited by him lying in the foetal position) and aggression (punching the door to his room 
several times). Both of these roles evoke hegemonic discourse, representing ‘madness’ as a 
state of ‘otherness’. Initially, we are able to witness the trope of the infantile ‘mad’ individual 
who requires psychiatric intervention in a pseudo-parent role (consider the extract I discussed 
earlier from the Oxford Handbook of Psychiatry, which compared sectioning to ‘lifting and 
holding a two-year-old having a tantrum’).59 House’s display of aggression and hostility 
reinforces the marriage of ‘madness’ and violence, as such alleged ‘violent tendencies’ 
dominate societal preconceptions of those experiencing mental illness.60 
Once House has completed his detox, he demands to leave: considering his voluntary 
admission, such a request is not unreasonable. House explains that he only admitted himself 
as ‘I was deluded into thinking I might be crazy’: a suitable oxymoron for House’s liminal 
‘patient’/doctor state. Dr Nolan, the psychiatric presence, informs House that although he is 
legally ‘free to go’ whenever he wants, Nolan will not write the letter of recommendation to 
the board of medicine (necessary for House to continue practising medicine) unless House 
allows himself to be transferred to the long-term ward and cooperate with treatment. 
Although there is potential for the ethics of the psychiatric presence to be undermined here, 
with House demanding ‘Is that a popular new treatment – blackmail?’, regular viewers of the 
show would recall House’s increasingly erratic and reckless behaviour (such as self-
administering insulin shock therapy; inserting a cochlear implant into a ‘patient’ without their 
permission; and pretending to have cancer) and be forced to agree with Dr Nolan. As House 
is now constructed as a ‘patient’, he is portrayed as showing a lack of insight into his mental 
                                                          
59 Semple, Handbook, p. 16. 
60 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 33. 
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state and his ability to do his job. Much like Flanders’s inability to return to ‘sanity’ at the 
end of ‘Hurricane Neddy’, it appears that House’s new identity as a ‘patient’ has overridden 
his previous status as a medical professional.  
House’s response to psychiatric ‘authority’ is one of hostility: his role as ‘patient’ 
demands that he ‘agree[s] to take meds, participate[s] in group and individual therapy [and] 
work[s] on goals’. Further perpetuating the myth of aggression and lack of insight, House 
warns that ‘I can smile through gritted teeth and play nice, but there are serious risks of 
violence involved in that choice’. However, seeing no other option, House is transferred to 
ward six to undergo further ‘treatment’ in order to meet Dr Nolan’s requirements.  
              Shortly after House’s transfer, the viewer is introduced to his roommate, Alvie, who 
is escorted to the room by a nurse. Agitated and animated, Alvie’s initial interaction with 
House (and with the viewer) is telling: 
Who are you? You believe these guys? Lecturing me on manic depression, like I 
couldn’t write a book or two. I stop taking my meds because I want to stop taking my 
meds, because nothing is wrong with me. No reason to keep dragging me back here. 
When I’m on them, everything slows down. That’s when the problem is.  
 
Alvie believes that he is the ‘authority’ on his ‘madness’, assuring House that he could ‘write 
a book or two’: a stance of knowledge which threatens to challenge the ‘mad’/‘sane’ 
knowledge/non-knowledge binary. Alvie represents psychiatric resistance by refusing the 
drug-based model of care that is enforced on him. He believes medication is the cause of the 
‘problem’, rather than its ‘cure’.  
However, those around Alvie display open irritation towards him: he mentions that 
‘my roommate last time couldn’t stand me’, and House snaps at Alvie: ‘shut up. No one likes 
you’. This suggests that Alvie, like House, is also displaying a lack of insight into his conduct 
and his mental state. The character of Alvie is thus reinforcing the trope that ‘madness’ 
requires psychiatric management. Alvie revels in the pace of his thoughts, and is dismissive 
of any indication that this perceived abnormality should be controlled by medication: ‘they 
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[the psychiatrists] tell me my mind works too fast. [They would] probably tell Usain Bolt he 
runs too fast’. However, as the episode unfolds, there is clearly a strong implication that 
Alvie’s rash and excitable temperament needs to be curbed, particularly as his behaviour 
allows House to exploit him (Alvie permits House to attack him as part of House’s scheme to 
acquire phone privileges), and he becomes reckless (Alvie sells some of House’s valuable 
possessions later in the series). As with House’s earlier fluctuation between defencelessness 
and aggression, Alvie is characterised by contrasting states of vulnerability (suggesting he 
needs to be looked after) and potentially dangerous impulsiveness (suggesting he needs to be 
managed). Thus, the underlying message appears to be that Alvie’s claim that ‘nothing is 
wrong with me’ has been suppressed by psychiatry’s insistence that his mental state is 
abnormal, and requires ‘treatment’. 
An enlightening contrast to Alvie’s resistance can be found in the character of Hal. 
Hal’s real name is Connor, but he is referred to as ‘Hal’ due to his reliance on Haldol (the 
trade name of typical antipsychotic haloperidol), which the nurses refuse to give him, despite 
his feigned seizure at the beginning of the episode. House quickly deduces that Hal is 
suffering from anorexia nervosa, exhibited through his unremitting concerns regarding eating 
and weight. The vast majority of Hal’s interactions concern either his issues with food, or his 
desire for Haldol. Indeed, the latter has proven such a prominent feature of his identity that it 
has become his identity, as demonstrated by his name. Hal’s ‘madness’ has consumed him to 
the extent that his character remains undeveloped: in the psychiatric realm, the only salient 
information is his diagnosis and his medication (a residual side effect of the DSM and 
medication-based approach). Hal consistently cooperates with psychiatric forces, and is the 
only ‘patient’ on the ward who has earned the highest tier of privileges, allowing him to use 
the phone (which makes him a target for House, who covets his phone card). He is 
constructed as a model ‘patient’, but nothing more. 
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 House’s paradoxical role as ‘mad’ ‘patient’ with a doctor’s knowledge allows him to 
observe and participate in the politics of this psychiatric environment. House is both the 
spectacle and the observer. During a group therapy session, House asks ‘can I get a pen?’, 
foreshadowing his ability to detect and retain sensitive information which he later uses to 
manipulate the other ‘patients’. Although the gathering of this information evokes his 
previous identity as a diagnostician, his use of it is cruel, aligning his behaviour with a 
rejection of social norms and codes (an ‘otherness’ indicative of ‘madness’). As the ‘patients’ 
participate in a game of basketball, Dr Beasley encourages House: ‘just talk. Be honest […] 
Try to deal with people’. House responds to this psychiatric ‘authority’ with his own display 
of power: 
House [to Richter]. 
- The CIA satellites aren’t watching me. They’re watching you, ’cause you’re wearing 
green. 
[As Richter tears off his sweater and throws it on the ground, House turns to Dr 
Beasley].  
-That one was just too easy 
[Turning to Hal].  
-Seriously, anorexia? What, are you supposed to be a girl? And, in answer to your 
implicit question, yes, those pants do make you look fat. 
[Hal backs away quickly. House looks around and sees Susan standing under the 
basket].  
-How upset were you when you woke up in the ER and you were still alive and a 
failure? 
[She turns and walks away. House looks at Beasley]. 
 
These hyperbolic stereotypes of ‘madness’ (the intense paranoia, the perceived vanity of an 
eating disorder, the self-destructive tendencies exhibited by a suicide attempt) reinforce over-
simplistic assumptions of what ‘madness’ is. The fact that House’s observations clearly hit a 
nerve with the ‘patients’ suggests to the viewer that these assumptions are, in fact, true. The 
features of ‘madness’ that are emphasised to the viewer are those which draw attention to 
perceived abnormalities: as none of these characters are developed any further than their 
diagnosis and their ‘otherness’, their ‘madness’ is the defining feature of their 
characterisation. Their actions and their dialogue are permitted only to reflect their illness, 
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thus the viewer is likely (unless they have personal experience of such supposed 
abnormalities) to be unable to forge an empathetic relationship with these characters. Such 
characters are not developed beyond the tropes of their ‘madness’, therefore reinforcing the 
trope that to be ‘mad’ is to be ‘other’. 
 House’s desire to challenge psychiatric ‘authority’ leads him to embark on a 
friendship with a new ‘patient’, Freedom Master. Freedom Master believes that he can fly, 
hence his superhero inspired name (to which Alvie responds ‘Coooool. We got more Jesuses 
than superheroes’, further reinforcing over-simplistic stereotypes of the ‘deluded’ individual 
to the viewer). Freedom Master is characterised by his illness – specifically, his ‘delusion’ – 
which fortifies the trope that the ‘mad’ individual is unreliable and out of touch with ‘reality’. 
Echoing the methodology of Dr Maillard in Poe’s ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor 
Fether’ (whose radical system consisted of ‘encouraging’ the ‘delusions’ of those committed: 
‘we contradicted no fancies which entered the brains of the mad. On the contrary, we not only 
indulged but encouraged them’), House listens to and responds to Freedom Master’s 
‘delusions’ by taking him to a free-fall flight simulator at a local fairground.61 With his belief 
in his ability to fly reinforced, Freedom Master launches himself off a building, and ends up 
gravely injured. House is reprimanded by Dr Nolan: 
He’s lucky to be alive. He’s got a lacerated spleen, rotational pelvic fracture, 
compound break of the femur and humerus. Everything in your life has been about 
finding the truth. But suddenly, with this guy, you decide to reinforce a sick man’s 
delusions.  
 
Although this scenario is complicated by House’s oxymoronic ‘patient’/doctor role, the 
message is clear: entertaining or even just acknowledging the ‘delusions’ of the ‘mad’ is 
dangerous. Such ‘delusions’ should be dismissed and medicated, not listened to: doing so is 
                                                          
61 Poe, ‘Tarr and Fether’, p. 268. Both House and Maillard embody the paradox of ‘patient’/doctor. This 
empathetic approach – of listening to and attempting to understand ‘madness’ – seems only to feature when the 
psychiatric presence is, in fact, ‘mad’ too. 
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damaging to the ‘patient’. Yet again, ‘Broken: Part One’ reinforces hegemony by suggesting 
that only psychiatry is able to manage ‘madness’. 
 
‘Downside: Might Get Lobotomised’: ‘Madness’ in ‘Sectioning’62 
Compared to The Simpsons and House, cult comedy Peep Show attracted modest viewing 
figures, with an estimated ‘total audience of around 1.5 million’ during its initial airing, 
although part of this difference may be attributed to its UK, rather than US, origins and 
audience.63 However, it has been celebrated as an accurate representation of the trials and 
tribulations of twenty-something British life: The Independent commented on how it ‘never 
stop[s] being relevant’.64 So, what happens when a show revered for its relatability tackles 
something as socially strange and ‘other’ as ‘madness’?  
 Rather than the tactic used in The Simpsons – making a previously familiar and ‘sane’ 
character ‘mad’ – Peep Show introduces a new character to portray ‘madness’. Merry is a 
friend of protagonists Mark and Jeremy from their time at Dartmouth University, and only 
features in this episode, therefore her character remains undeveloped. As with the ‘patients’ 
we encounter in House, the focus is primarily on Merry’s apparently abnormal behaviour, 
thus her ‘madness’ is portrayed as the fundamental component of her identity.  
Merry recently purchased a pub, and Mark and Jeremy visit as she has offered Jeremy 
a job running it. Merry’s first ‘mad’ trait is revealed: her overt sexuality. Evoking archaic 
nineteenth-century discourses which rendered a woman ‘mad’ if she exhibited any manner of 
sexually ‘deviant’ behaviour (or, indeed, any manner of sexual behaviour), Mark discusses 
                                                          
62 ‘Sectioning’, Peep Show, 25 November 2005. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent quotations are from 
this source. 
63 Viewing figures taken from ‘The Event Struggles with a 3.1% Audience Share’, The Guardian, 29 November 
2010 <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/nov/29/the-event-audience-share> [accessed 7 March 2015]. 
64 Christopher Hooton, ‘Peep Show Season 9 Finale Review, Channel 4: The El Dude Brothers Go Out With a 
Whimper, Appropriately’, The Independent, 16 December 2015 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/tv/reviews/peep-show-season-9-final-episode-review-channel-4-the-el-dude-brothers-go-out-
with-a-whimper-a6775636.html> [accessed 3 April 2016]. 
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his concerns with Jeremy: ‘I think something’s wrong with Merry. She made a pass at me 
[…] I’m worried about her. She’s not right in the head’. Jeremy defends Merry’s 
eccentricities with an assortment of clichéd colloquialisms: ‘She’s always been a bit full on. 
She’s kooky […] maybe she is a bit up and down’. As Merry’s behaviour becomes more and 
more erratic – such as turning up at Mark and Jeremy’s flat with a baguette and a tin of paint 
– Mark grows increasingly concerned. Finally, action is taken: 
OK, OK, I guess we’ve just got to bloody take responsibility, haven’t we?  
[picks up phone and dials]. 
-Hello, NHS Direct? Hi. Listen, I want to get my friend sectioned. Yes, but I don’t 
know what the procedure is? How easy would that be to do? Would I have to be 
involved or could I just give you the house number and assure you that she’s mental?  
 
Mark feels that Merry is unable to manage her ‘madness’ and thus calls on the ‘authority’ by 
requesting to have her sectioned. 
However, the theme of sectioning is in the episode solely for comedic effect. It is a 
ploy used by Jeremy to try to rid him of his friend Hans when his presence becomes 
inconvenient:  
Hans. Well somebody tried to get me sectioned and nobody gets Super Hans 
sectioned. 
Jeremy. Well, I definitely didn’t try to get you sectioned.  
[Internally: That sounded pretty convincing]. 
I guess it was just one of those freaky urban things like those people who go on fire 
for no reason. 
  
The entire process of psychiatric intervention is trivialised, with Jeremy internally musing: ‘if 
I got sectioned, I’d put up more of a fight. Downside: might get lobotomised’. This nod to 
psychiatry’s controversial past (and the associated public outcry) could be perceived as an 
attempt to undermine psychiatric ‘authority’.65 However, as I shall demonstrate, Jeremy’s 
                                                          
65 Along with electroshock therapy, the psychiatric practice of leucotomy (or lobotomy, as it is most commonly 
referred to) is firmly entrenched as a symbol of psychiatric tyranny. Through his development of this procedure 
in 1935, Portuguese neurologist António Egas Moniz was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1949 ‘for his discovery of 
the therapeutic value of leucotomy in certain psychoses’, and he is generally regarded as the founder of 
psychosurgery. His treatment ‘was celebrated as a miracle cure […] After a relatively simple surgery, endlessly 
troublesome patients could be rendered docile and obedient. Leucotomies spread like wildfire through the 
asylums of both Europe and America’. See Lieberman, Shrinks, pp. 162-65. The procedure itself consisted of 
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understanding of ‘madness’ and psychiatry is shown to be misinformed, and his actions and 
speech fuelled by greed, rather than any desire to empathise with Merry’s experience or 
genuinely question the care that she receives. 
 When Merry is sectioned, Mark, Jeremy and Hans go to visit her. Jeremy is keen to 
get Merry released as a matter of urgency, and so attempts to normalise her ‘mad’ behaviour 
to the psychiatrist on duty: 
Psychiatrist. I’m afraid Merry needs to be kept a close eye on just now. 
Jeremy. But she’s fine. She’s always been the life and soul. Tabasco in your pint, 
Frisbee in the kitchen, that’s Merry. She’s kooky. 
Psychiatrist. She’s in the acute stage of a manic episode. 
 
As with his earlier use of colloquialisms, Jeremy’s assertion that Merry’s behaviour is rooted 
in eccentricity rather than ‘madness’ sets him up in opposition to the psychiatric presence 
which medicalises Merry’s experience. However, during this exchange, Jeremy’s idiomatic 
language (‘she’s kooky’) is overridden by the psychiatrist’s medicalised terminology (‘She’s 
in the acute stage of a manic episode’).66 Psychiatry, immediately able to offer a label and 
thus a form of justification for Merry’s behaviour, is shown to understand Merry better after 
a brief assessment than someone who has known her for a decade. Psychiatry’s dominance is 
upheld. 
 However, Jeremy continues to attempt to challenge psychiatric ‘authority’: 
Jeremy [to the psychiatrist]. Your little world is threatened by all the amazing Jack 
Nicholsons and Robin Williamses burning so bright you’ve got to keep them down 
with your chemical cosh […] Your dream is just everyone on the omnibus, grey, 
eating grey sludge. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
drilling into the skull and inserting a knife into the frontal lobes and slicing out brain tissue. The precarious 
scientific theory behind Moniz’s treatments – ‘that mental illness resulted from “functional fixations” in the 
brain [which] occurred when the brain could not stop performing the same activity over and over, and Moniz 
asserted that the leucotomy cured patients by eliminating their functional fixations’ – has been denounced by 
modern psychiatrists as ‘pure cerebral mythology’. Continuing the trend of invasive and horrific somatic 
treatments with little or discredited scientific justification, we must remember that – as historian Andrew Scull 
pointed out - in the first half of the twentieth century, such procedures were the cornerstone of care for the 
overwhelming majority of ‘patients’. See Scull, Madness in Civilisation, p. 322. 
66 Use of the definite article here (‘the acute stage’) reveals a homogenisation of lived experience. Merry is not 
described as experiencing an acute stage, but ‘the acute stage’, thus exposing an assumption that ‘manic 
episodes’ consistently follow the same trajectory. This statement entirely ignores the significance, context and 




Hans. She’s just wacky, basically fine. 
Mark. She’s not fine, she’s temporarily mad. 
Jeremy. You’re with them now, are you, Mark? Tell me, is it mad to be diagnosed 
with a mental disorder or is it in fact much more mad to get up every morning to go to 
your boring job so you can print out lots of meaningless documents?  
Mark [to the psychiatrist]. I’m sorry about this, it’s the ’60s’ he thinks he’s living in 
the ’60s. 
 
Jeremy’s reference to Jack Nicholson evokes One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. This goes 
some way to explaining Jeremy’s earlier mention of a lobotomy: it suggests that Jeremy’s 
knowledge of ‘madness’ is an amalgamation of fictional accounts and outdated information. 
Thus, although Jeremy is staging a rebellion against psychiatry, his stance is weakened by his 
use of questionable information (and, later on, his dubious motivations). Fuelled by his 
familiarity with One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest – a tale of totalitarian ‘authority’, 
embodied in the ‘Combine’, which suppresses individuality and punishes with psychiatric 
‘therapies’ those who do not conform – Jeremy’s argument verges on the political, accusing 
the psychiatrist of desiring conformity and institutionalisation, not just for his ‘patients’ but 
for ‘everyone’.  
 Jeremy’s increasingly socio-political speech is undermined by a mortified Mark (who 
is, throughout the show, the more grounded and practical of the two protagonists). He 
apologises to the psychiatrist and explains that ‘he thinks he’s living in the ’60s’. However, 
the final factor which completely deconstructs Jeremy’s argument is the revelation of his true 
motivations. Merry had, during her alleged ‘manic episode’, offered Jeremy and Hans the 
deeds to the pub, at no cost. Jeremy’s impassioned, anti-psychiatric speech was, in fact, a 
ploy to get her released as quickly as possible in order for her to hand over the deeds, and, 
presumably, so the transaction was not obstructed by the Mental Capacity Act. As soon as 
Jeremy learns that Merry has given Mark the paperwork, Jeremy no longer has any need for 
Merry to be released, and so his anti-psychiatric attitude quickly vanishes. He tells the 
psychiatrist: ‘OK, fair enough, mate, I’ve said my piece, but you win. After all, you’re the 
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expert’. This abrupt change of Jeremy’s opinion leaves a significant impression on the 
viewer. The implication is that psychiatry is not only ‘the expert’, but also a protective force, 
able to defend those it simultaneously labels ‘mad’ from any who seek to prey on such 
vulnerability. Compared to Jeremy’s mercenary behaviour, psychiatry is depicted as a 
benevolent presence, able to act in Merry’s best interests when she is unable to make such 
judgements. Anyone who challenges psychiatric ‘authority’ must be doing so with ulterior 
motives. 
 
‘We Invariably Rely on Cultural Beliefs and Stories’: Myths of ‘Madness’ in 
Mainstream Society67 
Despite spanning different genres, the message in these narratives remains the same. These 
three – The Simpsons, House and Peep Show – reinforce psychiatry’s dominance over 
‘madness’. By exposing any characters who attempt to undermine hegemonic discourse as ill-
informed, harbouring ulterior motives or gambling with the welfare of the ‘patient’, these 
examples of popular culture fortify the idea that only psychiatry can govern ‘madness’. 
Although House and Peep Show present a drug and DSM-based paradigm of care 
(exemplified by use of diagnostic labels and medication), suggesting psychiatry has 
developed from the asylum culture of the nineteenth century, all three shows present 
‘madness’ as institutionalised. This representation appears to clash with ‘care in the 
community’ which champions deinstitutionalisation. By depicting Ned Flanders wearing a 
straight-jacket in an isolation room; Gregory House shackled to his hospital bed with ankle 
and wrist restraints; and Merry on a hospital ward, these discourses seem to have more in 
common with asylum culture than the twenty-first-century model of community care. How 
might this theme of institutionalisation – in a psychiatric landscape which claims to be 
                                                          




moving away from such measures – have prevented narratives about ‘madness’ from 
changing? How has this reoccurring trope perpetuated other myths, such as those I 
established at the start of this chapter? 
 As a point of comparison, I will now briefly move away from historical and 
fictionalised accounts to identify sources which enforce stigmatised assumptions about 
‘madness’: ‘cultural beliefs’ which are universally relied on to (mis)understand ‘madness’.68 
These will be examined as a means of establishing a societal discourse about ‘madness’; the 
relationship this has with psychiatric tropes; and to understand how lived experience of 
‘madness’ is still marginalised. 
 In September 2013, established supermarket chain Asda sparked controversy after 
revealing their new range of Hallowe’en costumes. The offending item was called ‘Mental 
Patient Fancy Dress Costume’: comprised of a tattered, bloodstained shirt, bloodstained 
plastic meat cleaver and gruesome mask, the product had a description informing potential 
customers that ‘it’s a terrifying Hallowe’en option’.69 Asda elaborated that ‘every one [sic] 
will be running away from you in fear in this mental patient fancy dress costume’.70 Asda 
later withdrew this item from sale and issued a public apology, in addition to donating to 
Mind, a mental health charity. Despite the obvious ignorance and insensitivity behind such a 
product, it does provide an opportunity to observe how myths of ‘madness’ are established – 
and upheld – in mainstream society. 
 Here, the salient discourse is rooted in archaic constructs. The obvious marriage of 
‘madness’ and criminality (exhibited by the weapon and the bloodstains) could be straight out 
of Lombroso’s 1876 publication, Criminal Man. The representation of ‘madness’ as a 
spectacle echoes the staff at Bethlem hospital ‘seiz[ing] a marketing opportunity by allowing 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 ‘Asda Withdraws “Mental Patient” Halloween Costume’, The Guardian, 26 September 2013 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/26/asda-mental-patient-costume> [accessed 7 March 2015]. 
70 ‘Asda’, Guardian. 
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the paying public entry to the hospital to view the inmates’.71 Indeed, the title of ‘Mental 
Patient’ denotes an individual who is institutionalised (thus a ‘patient’), a concept which 
seems to fit harmoniously with nineteenth-century asylum culture rather than the current 
‘care in the community’ model.  
 Perhaps the most enlightening feature of this product is what it reveals about fear. 
Clearly, the suggestion that one should dress as a ‘Mental Patient’ to evoke terror reveals 
some form of societal phobia of ‘madness’. However, in addition to perpetuating ‘madness’ 
myths which are positively Victorian, an analysis of what this costume represents exposes a 
very specific fear. Although the title suggests an incarcerated individual – the ‘Mental 
Patient’ – the weapon and the blood-spattered outfit suggest this is an escaped ‘patient’: an 
autonomous and free ‘madman’. This is why popular culture portrays institutionalised 
‘madness’: because the idea of ‘madness’ at large and without psychiatric management is an 
object of terror, so much so that it was available as an option for a Hallowe’en costume. 
The same year, Tesco came under fire for a similar issue. Customer complaints 
mounted regarding their ‘Psycho Ward’ costume. This ensemble consisted of a bright orange 
boiler suit, branded with the word ‘Committed’ on the back and ‘Psycho Ward’ printed on the 
front; a Hannibal Lecter-inspired mask; and a syringe. Potential customers were invited to 
‘dress up as the most thrilling psycho killer character of all time in this Psycho Ward 
costume’.72 Yet again, the latent social anxiety which led to the marketing of such a product 
is one of the fugitive – and thus autonomous – ‘psycho’. The object of fear here is the 
institutionalised ‘patient’ (signified by the ‘Committed’ stamp) who absconds from both a 
psychiatric environment and psychiatric policing. The syringe – symbolic of the tools used to 
                                                          
71 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 49. 
72 Rebecca Smithers and Sam Jones, ‘Tesco Removes 'Psycho Ward' Boiler Suit Costume After Consumer 
Anger’, The Guardian, 26 September 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/sep/26/tesco-
withdraws-psycho-ward-costume-complaints> [accessed 7 March 2015]. 
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sedate and thus control the ‘psycho’ – has become a weapon. Both of these costumes equate 
the liberation of ‘madness’ with the certainty of criminality, violence and murder. 
In the midst of this controversy, on the 7th October 2013, British tabloid newspaper 
The Sun blazoned the following headline across its front page: ‘1,200 killed by mental 
patients’. The article declared that ‘A Sun investigation today reveals disturbing failings in 
Britain’s mental health system that have allowed high-risk patients to kill 1,200 people in a 
decade’.73 As with the Hallowe’en costumes, this prime example of media sensationalism 
exposes and propagates a fear of the ‘high-risk patients’ who are reintegrated into mainstream 
society. The article had its genesis in an annual report which was published in July 2013 by 
the University of Manchester. A cursory glance at the report reveals just how misinformed 
and misleading The Sun’s headline is.  
The original investigation explains that the homicide figures for those The Sun 
labelled ‘mental patients’ consisted of ‘perpetrators who had symptoms of mental illness at 
the time of the homicide: People who experienced symptoms of hypomania, depression, 
delusions, hallucinations, or other psychotic symptoms […] were defined as mentally ill at 
the time of the offence’.74 In other words, the study categorised anyone exhibiting symptoms 
– ‘of all severity’ – which could be interpreted as indicative of a mental illness as ‘mentally 
ill’.75 However, The Sun classified such perpetrators as ‘mental patients’: a semantic 
distinction which misleadingly suggests that such individuals were diagnosed as mentally ill, 
when actually they were just considered to exhibit symptoms of mental illness. The original 
report explained that ‘on average, 67 people per year committed homicide whilst 
                                                          
73 ‘1200 Killed By Mental Patients’, The Sun, 7 October 2013  
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5183994/1200-killed-by-mental-patients-in-shock-10-year-
toll.html> [accessed 15 July 2015]. 
74 University of Manchester, ‘The National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by People with 
Mental Illness (July 2013)’ 
 <http://www.bbmh.manchester.ac.uk/cmhr/centreforsuicideprevention/nci/reports/AnnualReport2013_UK.pdf> 




experiencing an abnormal mental state […] Most of these people were not under mental 
health care’.76 Thus the truth is a far cry from The Sun’s claim that ‘high-risk patients’ are 
‘allowed’ to kill due to ‘failings in Britain’s mental health system’.77 
Had The Sun remained true to the report’s use of the term ‘patient’ (defined as a 
‘person [who] had been in contact with mental health services in the 12 months prior to the 
offence’), the headline would have been quite different.78 The report states that: ‘during 
2001-2011, 26 people convicted of homicide (13% of the total sample) were identified as 
patients […] this was an average of 2 patient homicides per year, ranging between 1 and 4 
annually’.79 When compared to broader statistics on homicide, The Sun’s argument is further 
undermined, as ‘95% of murders [perpetrated during the stated time frame] were committed 
by individuals who had not been diagnosed with a mental health problem’.80 It is clear that 
The Sun’s article is, at best, the result of media hyperbole, misinterpreted statistics and 
writing which champions its shock value over accuracy and informed journalism.81 
Yet the fear which underpins this sensationalist headline is obvious and telling. An 
equally fitting alternative to ‘1,200 killed by mental patients’ would be ‘dangerous lunatics at 
large due to “care in the community” initiative’. The ‘disturbing failings in Britain’s mental 
health system’ to which The Sun refers are the result of the process of deinstitutionalisation: a 
‘disturbing fail[ure]’ to police and incarcerate ‘high-risk patients’ – or, indeed, anyone 
labelled or even potentially labelled ‘mad’.82 Similar articles from 2013 tell the same story. 
An article entitled ‘My schizophrenic son says he’ll kill ... but he’s escaped from secure 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 ‘1200 Killed’, Sun. 
78 University of Manchester, ‘National Confidential Inquiry’, p. 76. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Mona Chalabi, ‘The Sun Says 1,200 People Have Been Killed By 'Mental Patients' – Is It True?’, The 
Guardian, 7 October 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/society/reality-check/2013/oct/07/sun-people-killed-
mental-health-true> [accessed 8 March 2015]. 
81 The shock value of such journalism echoes the role of the nineteenth-century Sensation genre which, 
according to Punch, was concerned with ‘Harrowing the Mind, Making the Flesh Creep, Causing the Hair to 
Stand on End, [and] Giving Shocks to the Nervous System’. See Anon, Punch, ‘Sensation Times’, p. 193. 
82 ‘1200 Killed’, Sun. 
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hospitals 7 times’ explains how ‘a mum has told how her paranoid schizophrenic son has 
been able to escape from secure hospitals SEVEN times’.83 Another article informs its 
readers of how ‘a mentally ill man freed [and] unsupervised’ committed a horrendous and 
fatal attack on a schoolgirl.84 This reporting is not far removed from Kraepelin’s assertion, 
made over a century ago, that ‘all the insane are dangerous, in some degree’.85 
In addition to reinforcing an evident fusion of ‘madness’ and criminality, such articles 
condemn the ‘care in the community’ model which allows the ‘mentally ill’ to be ‘freed’ and 
‘unsupervised’. The latent message here is that the ‘mad’ do not belong in mainstream 
society. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ myth which dominates societal discussions of ‘madness’ is a 
direct legacy of asylum culture and is reinforced by the use of the DSM (which applies labels 
to demarcate the ‘abnormal’ from the ‘normal’). But what does this mean for those bearing 
the brunt of this stigma, for those attempting to reintegrate into society, or just remain a part 
of it? As I have established, the representation of ‘madness’ in popular culture is one of 
sanitisation and control: the ‘threat’ posed by those deemed mentally ill, such as House, 
Flanders and Merry, is neutralised and contained in a psychiatric space. In contrast, the media 
and other mainstream discourses depict the autonomous and dangerous ‘mad’ individual, at 
large and unsupervised in society, and propagate social fear of such a figure. This establishes 
a binary, with the sedated and controlled ‘mad’ on one end, and free and violent ‘mad’ at the 
other. But what about those who occupy the liminal space in-between such extremes? What is 
the prognosis for such purgatory?  
 
The Political and the Personal: Problems and Solutions 
                                                          
83 ‘My Schizophrenia Son Says He’ll Kill But He’s Escaped Secure Hospitals’, The Sun, 8 October 2013 
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5189349/My-schizophrenic-son-says-hell-kill-but-hes-escaped-
secure-hospitals-7-times.html> [accessed 16 July 2015]. 
84 ‘Police and Medic’s Mistakes That Led to Christina Edkin’s Murder’, The Sun, 2 October 2013 
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5176367/police-and-medics-mistakes-that-led-to-christina-
edkins-murder.html> [accessed 16 July 2015]. 
85 Kraepelin, Lectures, p. 2. 
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When I talk about ‘madness’, I do so from three perspectives, often simultaneously. First of 
all, I approach it as an academic, from the perspective of historical research and 
representation. Second, I examine it from the standpoint of someone who works in the mental 
health system, who, on a daily basis, engages with and supports those psychiatry has labelled 
‘mad’. Finally, I am inevitably influenced by my own assemblage of psychiatric diagnoses, 
my own experience of stigma, of medication, and of the trials and tribulations of living with a 
mental illness (or several, according to my medical notes).  
 From this academically, personally, and professionally informed vantage point, I have 
identified two fundamental issues with the representation of and the way we deal with 
‘madness’ which, if unaddressed, will continue to enforce silence on those who desperately 
require a voice. These are aside from the language problem, which I have already outlined, 
and for which I will suggest solutions shortly. The first problem is that those who fall in-
between the twin pillars of ‘madness’ in popular culture (with controlled, incarcerated 
‘madness’ on one side, and unsupervised, dangerous ‘madness’ on the other) are not 
meaningfully represented in popular culture. This hyperbolic binary presents ‘madness’ as a 
dichotomy which can only be sanitised and controlled with psychiatric intervention. This 
means that the lived experience of the vast majority of those labelled ‘mad’ does not enter 
popular currency, and remains unacknowledged. The primary discourse about ‘madness’ 
which established this binary still enforces the societal conviction that there is no place for 
‘madness’ on the social landscape. We need to instigate a dialogue which speaks of lived 
experience of ‘madness’, rather than the current narrative which only addresses incarcerated 
or apparently dangerous ‘madness’. Our representation of ‘madness’ has not moved on from 
asylum culture, which imposes a clear ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary, and continues to depict 
‘madness’ as a state of ‘otherness’.  
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 This hegemonic discourse – supported by the DSM approach – limits those 
experiencing ‘madness’ to their ‘madness’, and nothing else. As I have shown, popular 
depictions of ‘madness’ (such as Hal and Merry) suggest that ‘madness’ is perceived as the 
entirety of someone’s identity, that such characters are permitted only to reflect their alleged 
abnormalities, and little else. However, one does not cease to be a multifaceted individual 
once a psychiatric label has been attached. This label does not override a life of diverse 
experience, of relationships, of personal interests, hobbies and passions. And yet popular 
culture – informed by psychiatric discourse – suggests that ‘madness’ renders someone 2D; 
an identity irrevocably appropriated by a diagnostic category. 
 In the liminal space between the binary of ‘incarcerated’ and ‘unsupervised’ 
‘madness’, exists the clients I support, me, members of my family, people in my social circle, 
students that I have taught, and colleagues with whom I have worked: individuals with so 
much more to their identity that their medical notes. We need to represent those who do not 
fit with the oversimplified, damaging caricatures I have established because lived experience 
of ‘madness’ lies in between this binary, and beyond the realm of limited and limiting 
psychiatric labels.  
 This leads me on to the second fundamental issue with societal and psychiatric 
attitudes to ‘madness’: that of the encompassing and permanent sick role. Journalist and 
writer Robert Whitaker observed that ‘as the psychopharmacology revolution has unfolded, 
the number of disabled mentally ill […] has skyrocketed’.86 With the dissolution of asylum 
culture and the associated removal from the social sphere, the sick role represents 
metaphorical alienation. It is the product of the new psychiatric model of medication, the 
DSM, and ‘care in the community’. However, the discourse is the same as that enforced by 
                                                          
86 Whitaker, Anatomy, p. 5. 
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the nineteenth-century alienist: the end result is that of social marginalisation, and a loss of 
self. 
 In order to establish what I mean by the term ‘sick role’, imagine this scenario. 
During a particularly stressful period in your life, you begin to experience sensations which, 
to you, are unusual. Perhaps you were confronted by a stranger during a solitary walk home 
one night; worry that you were followed home; or heard about a local mugging. You get 
increasingly anxious about leaving the house afterwards in case a similar incident occurs.87 
Perhaps this anxiety leads to intense paranoia; you begin to worry that you are being 
followed, or that you or your loved ones will be harmed. Over the course of several weeks, it 
becomes harder and harder for you to continue functioning as this anxiety and paranoia area 
paralysing: unable to leave the house to go to work or buy food, you remain housebound. 
Someone close to you is concerned for your wellbeing: when they attempt to visit you, you 
are overwhelmed by the worry that they may be an imposter or a spy, and you feel unable to 
let them in. Perhaps you know, on some level, that these beliefs are irrational, or perhaps you 
are entirely immersed in them: regardless, you do not feel that you can stop them. Eventually, 
the authorities are alerted, and a psychiatric evaluation takes place in your home as you have 
not felt comfortable leaving your house for a few weeks. You are placed under section 2 of 
the Mental Health Act.88 You are assessed. You are told you are suffering from ‘persecutory 
delusions’ – a classic ‘schizophrenic’ symptom. Your section becomes a section 3, which can 
last up to six months. You are placed on a regime of antipsychotic medication. After several 
                                                          
87 This is not intended to oversimplify the catalysts or social triggers which may contribute to an experience of 
‘madness’, nor am I suggesting that mental illness necessitates such a trigger. This is merely for illustrative 
purposes. 
88 Section 2 allows an individual to be detained in hospital involuntarily for a period of up to 28 days for 
psychiatric assessment. See ‘Mental Health Act 1983’  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/20/section/2> [accessed 30 March 2016]. An individual detained 
under section 2 ‘can’t refuse treatment’. Rethink Mental Illness, ‘Mental Health Act 1983 - Sections 2, 3, 4 & 5’ 
<https://www.rethink.org/living-with-mental-illness/mental-health-laws/mental-health-act-1983/sections-2-3-4-
5> [accessed 16 June 2016]. 
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months, you are released and, under section 117 aftercare, are placed in a supported housing 
scheme as those around you fear you returning to your isolated and withdrawn state. 
 You are now in an environment which fortifies your ‘schizophrenic’ identity. You are 
assigned a social worker, and an outreach worker, who visit you solely to talk about your 
illness. You regularly meet with a psychiatrist to ensure you continue to take your 
medication: a daily reminder that you are ill and ‘other’. The medication brings with it a host 
of unwelcome side effects which, at best, make you perpetually drowsy. You are unable to 
work and so become state dependent. Your fellow tenants experience similar ailments. Every 
professional you encounter has risk assessed you and is familiar with your medical history. 
This environment is that of a pseudo-asylum: it is a situation which enforces the sick role by 
limiting your identity to that of a ‘patient’. If ‘recovery’ were to occur (a term that I use 
without clear definition, as it is dependent on the individual’s concept of ‘recovery’), you 
would still be labelled ‘schizophrenic’ – albeit ‘in remission’.  
 When I started working in mental health, I was slightly taken aback by how candid 
some clients were about divulging the details of their illness. The first conversation I had with 
many of them was regarding their medication, or their current symptoms. In some cases, it 
took months of encouragement for certain clients to feel comfortable talking to me about, for 
example, their family, their friends or their personal interests. It quickly dawned on me that 
this was primarily conditioning by the mental health system: when someone in the capacity of 
‘staff’ interacts with a ‘service user’, the majority of the time that conversation revolves 
around their identity as a ‘patient’, rather than a human being. 
This entrenched sick role can hinder ‘recovery’: if you are given an enduring label 
and put on medication that is likely to be a dominant feature of your daily routine for the 
foreseeable future, then those aspects of ‘identity’ which were so fundamental to the self 
before ‘madness’ are lost. After psychiatric intervention, it can be very difficult to retain any 
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sense of self which has not been distorted in some way by the momentous experience of 
being labelled with a mental illness. Some ‘services users’ do, eventually, manage to move 
on and rebuild their lives away from a formally supported environment, but when it does 
happen, it happens despite the mental health system, not because of it. 
 When I talk about the spectre of the asylum, this is what I mean. Although the mental 
health system is now gravitating towards deinstitutionalisation, the language about ‘madness’ 
has not changed. Those afflicted by ‘madness’, or mainstream society, do not have ways to 
talk about or deal with ‘madness’ that are not rooted in nineteenth-century asylum culture. 
Instead of a physical asylum, the current mental health system enforces a metaphorical one: a 
regime of daily medication, psychiatric involvement, and perpetual risk assessments, where 
any challenge to psychiatric ‘authority’ is labelled as a ‘lack of insight’, and thus a 
verification of illness. To return to Healy’s statement that nineteenth-century asylum 
‘recovery’ ‘rates are comparable to those of psychiatric facilities today’, it is clear that our 
current medicated, ‘care in the community’ model is not improving the quality of life of those 
deemed ‘mad’, nor is it impacting on the prognosis of such illnesses.89  
 The fundamental issue here – comprised of the enforcement of the sick role and the 
absence of suitable representation – is one of identity, more specifically lost identity. A large 
component of this is semantic, which I will address shortly. However, a considerable element 
of this is tied up into both popular culture – such as the examples I have explored – and the 
structures in place to deal with ‘madness’ (from psychiatric intervention to ‘care in the 
community’).  
To return to the scenario I discussed earlier, in which the reader received a diagnosis 
of ‘schizophrenia’, one must really pause and reflect in order to appreciate the impact of such 
a label. What comes to mind when you consider the term ‘schizophrenia’? The misinformed 
                                                          
89 Healy, Psychopharmacology, p. 12. 
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social image of a split personality, like Jekyll and Hyde? Someone constantly in a state of 
delusion? Someone entirely out of touch with ‘reality’? Someone dangerous? A 2012 study 
suggested that the two primary means of (mis)representing ‘madness’ in popular culture are 
as follows: ‘to present mental illnesses in a way that promotes stigma (e.g., by conflating it 
with violence and crime) and/or perpetuates myths about mental illness (e.g., by presenting 
information that is inaccurate about, say, treatment and prognosis).90 This is hardly a surprise. 
However, what we do not tend to consider is how these social misconceptions impact on 
those given such a label. Reflect on, for example, the myths and stigma surrounding 
‘schizophrenia’: those labelled with this illness are immediately burdened with that baggage, 
on both social and personal levels. When you combine the disorientating experience of trying 
to align selfhood with this illness, with the sick role which erodes any sense of self that 
remains, the result is a fractured identity – if not one in a total state of dissolution. 
This is further perpetuated by a lack of positive or relevant representation in popular 
culture. Representations of lived experience of ‘madness’ are misinformed and rooted in 
stigma. As an example, consider the myth that mental illness is associated with violence. 
When one enters the mental health system, one is constantly risk assessed: something which 
inevitably suggests the potential for danger. One absorbs the available information – The Sun 
headline I discussed earlier, for example – which also propagates the myth of violence. If 
there is no non-violent representation available for those living with ‘madness’ in the 
community – no point of reference for the illness which is not blazoned across tabloid 
headlines – would not the assumed merging of ‘madness’ and violence become internalised 
to some degree? Would this disorientating, new-found realisation that you may be capable of 
violence not then impact on how you interact with those around you? On how you engage 
with your friends and family? On how you view yourself? 
                                                          
90 Jane Pirkis and Catherine Francis, ‘Mental Health in the News and Information Media: A Critical Review 
(April 2012)’ <http://www.mindframe-media.info/home/resource-downloads/other-resources-and-
reports/?a=6322> [accessed 8 March 2015], p. 3. 
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There is hope. The charities Mind and Time to Change are dedicated to combatting 
stigma. Revered (and very privileged) celebrities have opened up a discourse on their 
personal experience of mental illness. We are – gradually – redirecting and reshaping some 
societal attitudes towards ‘madness’. Some recognise that, for example, The Sun’s headline 
was a misinformed and tactless example of sensationalist journalism. The petitions and 
backlash provoked by this headline were significant, and tremendously encouraging. 
However, as we are stuck in an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ culture – the spectre of the asylum – in a 
mainstream context, we still do not quite appreciate how such (mis)representation impacts on 
those desperately trying to recover a sense of self after a psychiatric diagnosis. We are yet to 
offer viable alternatives, and thus entirely overhaul the societal discourse about ‘madness’. 
This suggests that mainstream society is still not at the point of empathy. Using our current 
model and our current semantic foundation, we will never get there. 
I do not believe that, as a society, we can ever truly empathise with those 
experiencing ‘madness’ until we acknowledge and deconstruct the political, psychiatric and 
popular discourses in place which continue to present ‘madness’ as a state of ‘otherness’. We 
need to talk of ‘madness’ in human – rather than medicalised – terms. Writer and activist 
Jacqui Dillon argued that fighting for the rights and the voice of those labelled ‘mad’ is the 
‘last great civil rights movement’.91 This starts as the whole process began: with language. As 
I have shown throughout this thesis, language is the foundation which establishes and 
sustains psychiatric politics, stigma and ‘otherness’. Language both constructs and 
deconstructs identity. Language is the basis of representation. Language has built the master’s 
house – or, indeed, the master’s asylum. But language and representation are our only 
weapons in this final battle for civil rights. 
 
                                                          
91 Jacqui Dillon, ‘The Personal is The Political’, in De-Medicalizing Misery: Psychiatry, Psychology and the 
Human Condition, ed. by Mark Rapley, Joanna Moncrieff and Jacqui Dillon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 










It is 2016. Stigma is not an alien concept. Actor, writer and comedian Stephen Fry recently 
publically discussed his personal experience of ‘bipolar disorder’.1 In an interview with The 
Independent, Fry explained: ‘I want to speak out, to fight the public stigma and to give a 
clearer picture of a mental illness most people know little about’.2 In April 2015, it was 
announced that broadcaster and campaigner Ruby Wax was to be awarded an OBE for her 
services to mental health, and was commended on ‘her rare skill of being able to speak of the 
deepest and most painful things with openness’.3 Known for speaking candidly about her 
own experience of ‘depression’, Wax established the Black Dog Tribe, ‘a dedicated social 
networking community for mental health’, with the intention of encouraging openness and 
halting stigma.4 The Black Dog Tribe manifesto explained that ‘us tribers believe that by 
talking more openly about mental illness, we can help one another, stop stigma and raise 
awareness. Our motto is: the more people we get talking, the more we will be heard’.5 The 
narratives of such prominent, public figures with large fan-bases ‘can potentially reach an 
audience beyond the “woolly liberal” sorts who you’d probably expect to criticise mental 
                                                          
1 Fry has been described as ‘one of Britain's best-loved actors and comedians’; his popularity is significant, as it 
allows him to be well-placed to talk of ‘madness’ in a mainstream context. See Johnathan Owen, ‘Stephen Fry: 
My Battle with Mental Illness’, The Independent, 23 October 2015 <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/health-and-families/health-news/stephen-fry-my-battle-with-mental-illness-416386.html> [accessed 30 
October 2015]. 
2 Stephen Fry quoted in Owen, ‘Stephen Fry’ 
3 ‘Ruby Wax to be Awarded OBE for Mental Health Work’, BBC News, 27 April 2015  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-32477545> [accessed 30 October 2015]. 




health stigma anyway’.6 These conversations, vocalised by the likes of Fry and Wax, are 
making more and more of us aware of the importance of being able to talk of ‘madness’ as a 
personal experience, and how essential it is that we listen. 
 In October 2015, the Department of Health invested £660,000 in a national campaign 
to address and reduce mental health stigma in young people.7 Sue Baker, the director of Time 
to Change, described the stigma faced by young people as ‘life-limiting’.8 Surveys conducted 
by Time to Change reveal ‘that stigma prevents young people from doing the everyday 
activities that are part of teenage life […] 26% said negative reactions from others had made 
them want to give up on life’.9 As a society, we appear to have acknowledged the devastating 
impact of stigma. Dialogues have started. Investments are being made. Educational 
programmes designed to target stigma are being developed. But how has this apparent 
awareness impacted on our everyday discourse – on the way we talk about and perceive 
‘madness’ – conversations which have historically, as I have shown, reinforced stigma?  
 As I demonstrated in chapter one, the genesis of stigma can be found a two-fold 
language problem which established the assumption that ‘madness’ equates to ‘otherness’. 
First, psychiatric language used to identify and demarcate ‘madness’ enforces ‘otherness’; 
second, the language use of the ‘patient’ is pathologised. Psychiatric discourse, established as 
the ‘authority’ on ‘madness’, is a conversation which excludes and invalidates lived 
experience: as a result of this hegemony, personal accounts of ‘madness’ have been silenced. 
As evidenced by my Saussurean approach, taxonomy is the enforcement of signification, 
projecting the signifier (the label) onto the signified (the individual), thus burdening the 
                                                          
6 Dean Burnett, ‘Did 2014 Mark the Beginning of the End for Mental Health Stigma?’, The Guardian, 19 
December 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/science/brain-flapping/2014/dec/19/2014-mental-health-stigma-
end> [accessed 30 October 2015]. 
7 Information taken from Time to Change, ‘New Campaign Set to Tackle Life-Limiting Mental Health Stigma 
Among Teens’ <http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/news/new-campaign-set-tackle-life-limiting-mental-health-





individual experiencing ‘madness’ with the baggage and social stigma latent in such 
terminology. The signified is reduced to the signifier: as Laing asserted, the application of 
taxonomy is a ‘social fact [and] a political event’.10  
Examining taxonomy through a Saussurean lens does also offer some potential for 
change. Although the arbitrary and gradual evolution of language could move away from or 
disempower stigmatising terms, it is something over which we have little agency. However, 
Saussure’s claim that signification must also encompass ‘association[s] and coordination[s]’ 
offers more fluidity: instead of attempting to deconstruct and neutralise stigmatising labels, 
the context of this language can be revised.11 Much as ‘darkness’ is understood in relation to 
an absence of ‘light’, so the meaning of ‘madness’ is established as a deviation from the 
social construct of ‘sanity’. ‘Madness’ is viewed in an oversimplified dichotomy: a legacy of 
psychiatric dominion. However, by challenging or even being aware of this problematic 
binary, ‘madness’ can be spoken of as a variant of ‘sanity’, rather than its antithesis. If 
conversations about ‘sanity’ alter, discourses of ‘madness’ shift alongside them.  
 Chapter two explored how ‘madness’ narratives are caught in a conflict between 
accessibility and authenticity. A personal account of ‘madness’ constructed in psychiatric 
terms is socially familiar and thus accessible, but delimits the individual to the residual 
‘otherness’ imposed by hegemonic narratives. An account which rejects psychiatric discourse 
to communicate ‘madness’ is not limited to its vocabulary but is pathologised by psychiatry 
and deemed a ‘closed’ text: although authentic, the narrative is unable to be validated by a 
social audience. The expectation that a ‘madness’ narrative is ‘incomprehensible’ invalidates 
personal experience, and reinforces the dichotomy of ‘mad’ and ‘sane’. Any voices which 
may attest to the grey area in-between the Kraepelinian ‘sane’/‘insane’ binary are silenced by 
these politics. I have also reflected on how this dichotomy is evidenced in popular culture 
                                                          
10 Laing, Politics, p. 100. 
11 Saussure, General Linguistics, p. 13. 
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today and how this reductionist approach continues to marginalise lived experience of 
‘madness’. ‘Madness’ does not have to equate to ‘otherness’ and silence: this assumption is 
not an inherent truth, but merely a social and psychiatric construct. 
 Some case study narratives included in chapter two further complicate this conflict 
between accessibility and authenticity by performing and ventriloquising the ‘patient’ role. In 
these instances, although the experiences of the self are constructed using sanctioned 
psychiatric vocabulary, the individual does not entirely submit. Although the self accepts the 
assumption of social and medical ‘otherness’, there is a personal victory: selfhood is not 
completely usurped and reconstructed to accommodate a psychiatric label and the 
concomitant ‘patient’ role. This simultaneous echo, and deflection, of psychiatric 
terminology is replicated in twenty-first-century ‘madness’ narratives, particularly by the 
Mad Pride movement.12 Although far from a mainstream discourse, there is a significant 
reclamation of language: of using stigmatised terms such as ‘mad’ to construct an identity, 
form a community and make a political statement, without submitting to the role of 
disenfranchised ‘patient’.  
This thesis has exposed that the grassroots struggle to reclaim language to speak of 
the self, and to recover selfhood from the damage caused by language, dates back to the 
genesis of psychiatry. As illustrated by Poe’s short story ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and 
Professor Fether’, ‘madness’ is a phenomenon of context: it is only after psychiatry 
established itself as the ‘authority’, the managing force,  that ‘madness’ becomes ‘other’. 
Although poignant and powerful, the fact that the likes of Mad Pride are still not 
acknowledged in mainstream culture suggests that this tactic has not yet destabilised the 
                                                          
12 Mad Pride describes itself as ‘the first great civil liberties movement […] of the new millennium’, a 
‘survivor’-led campaign which is ‘concerned with reclaiming the experience of madness and the language 
surrounding it […] language can be subverted and […] words derive their meanings from the contexts in which 
they are used’. Mad Pride ‘mock[s] conformity, resist[s] “normalisation” and refuse[s] to be co-opted […] 
rejoic[ing] in madness from a standpoint of anger, humour and rebellion’. See Mad Pride: A Celebration of Mad 
Culture, ed. by Ted Curtis, Robert Dellar, Esther Leslie and Ben Watson (London: Chipmunka Publishing, 
2000), pp. 7-8. 
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‘mad’/‘sane’ binary (a dichotomy which Poe himself tried to challenge in 1845). So what 
other possible solutions are available? 
By exploring fictional representations of ‘madness’, discourses which inform and are 
informed by public perception, chapter three established the main tropes and techniques used 
to discuss ‘madness’ during the nineteenth century. Disconcertingly, much like the examples 
of popular culture examined in chapter five, mainstream representations of ‘madness’ seem 
unable to escape hegemonic discourse. Canonical texts such as ‘Maud’, ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’ 
and Dracula rely on psychiatric (mis)understandings of ‘madness’. Although these fictional 
representations act as a continuation of psychiatric hegemony, they do inevitably reflect on 
the individual in a psychiatric context, and thus on the politics of the ‘patient’/psychiatrist 
relationship. For example, despite the characters Renfield and Lady Audley being ‘othered’ 
by psychiatric forces, Stoker and Braddon are unable to present a ‘mad’ character without 
commenting on the reality of being ‘mad’ and being disenfranchised by psychiatry. The 
personal experience of ‘madness’ is acknowledged, albeit in an oversimplified and fictional 
manner. 
 ‘Madness’ literature has the potential undermine the ‘mad’/‘sane’ binary by offering 
an intimate, first-person narration (such as Perkins Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper) or 
portrayals which have the potential to challenge hegemonic discourse (as found in Poe’s ‘The 
System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether’). Fiction can also defuse ‘otherness’ by 
portraying ‘alien’ states (such as hallucinations or experiences of multiple selves) in a way 
which allows the reader to relate or empathise. However, representations of ‘madness’ as 
consistently other than ‘other’ are few and far between. Chapter four further exposed the 
difficulties in trying to communicate ‘madness’ in a mainstream context, despite visual art 
being a medium that is, in theory, divorced from the politics of language. A ‘madness’ 
narrative cannot be validated by a social audience without being somehow compromised, 
296 
 
reduced or censored. As chapter five showed, mainstream representations of, and 
conversations about, ‘madness’ have not progressed since the nineteenth century, and are still 
stigmatising and damaging by virtue of relying on psychiatric discourse.  
It is vitally important that we accurately portray mental illness: to destabilise 
dichotomies and eradicate stigma, to validate lived experience of ‘madness’ and to encourage 
those who need it to start a dialogue and seek help without fear of becoming ‘other’. In 2014, 
Time to Change conducted a survey about how people responded to portrayals of mental 
illness in popular culture, specifically television dramas. Despite noticing trends of ‘overly 
simplistic portrayals of mental health problems’ and ‘misinformation’, the survey reported 
that ‘25% of those surveyed who had personally experienced a mental health problem were 
encouraged to seek professional help after seeing a character with similar issues’ and ‘25% of 
those surveyed who know someone with a mental health problem felt prompted to contact a 
loved one, friend or colleague who has a mental health problem after seeing a storyline on the 
issue on TV’.13 Imagine the dialogue that could be started, the help that could be accessed, 
the stigma that could be neutralised, if popular culture moved away from the ‘overly 
simplistic’ and erroneous and, towards the multi-faceted, the dynamic, the authentic, the 
human behind every mental health statistic.  
 Attitudes towards ‘madness’ are changing, albeit it at a glacial pace. In 2014, 
academic and writer Dean Burnett observed that ‘those with mental health concerns do still 
have to deal with all manner of dreadful obstacles and ordeals on a regular basis; [but] there 
seems to be a growing agreement that this is unacceptable’.14 This gradual shift can be 
charted in the Attitudes to Mental Illness 2011 survey conducted by the NHS. In the report, 
public responses are compared to previous results: for example, ‘the percentage of people 
                                                          
13 Time to Change 2014 Survey, ‘Making a Drama Out of a Crisis’ 
 <https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/sites/default/files/Making_a_drama_out_of_a_crisis.pdf> [accessed 29 
April 2016], pp. 6-8. 
14 Burnett, ‘Beginning of the End’. Emphasis in original. 
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agreeing that ‘Mental illness is an illness like any other’ increased from 71% in 1994 (the 
first year this question was asked) to 77% in 2011.’15 From 2009 to 2011, the percentage of 
those asked if they would feel comfortable talking to a friend or family member about their 
own mental health rose from 66% to 70%.16 However, in some areas, the absence of progress 
is disconcerting. In 1994, 8% of participants agreed with the statement: ‘I would not want to 
live next door to someone who has been mentally ill’; in 2011, that number increased to 
11%.17 Similarly, in 1994, 92% of people asked agreed with the following statement: ‘we 
need to adopt a far more tolerant attitude toward people with mental illness in our society’. In 
the 2011 survey, only 86% agreed. Is this, somewhat paradoxically, reflective of progress – 
that, in 2011, we were more tolerant, and thus an attitude change was deemed less necessary? 
Have we convinced ourselves that we are tolerant enough? Has the work of organisations 
such as Time to Change – campaigns which condemn stigma – lulled us in to a false sense of 
security? Has it led us to believe that stigma has already been tackled – that the war has been 
won – when, for the one in four of us experiencing ‘madness’, the battle against everyday 
discrimination is still ongoing? 
 In 2014, I attended a conference in London centred on the theme of ‘alternative 
psychiatric narratives’. During a roundtable discussion, an esteemed academic described 
himself as ‘anti anti-stigma’. He felt that stigma was no longer an issue. I was astounded. If 
someone who has dedicated time to conduct research and write in the field of mental illness 
and representation believes that stigma has been eradicated, might those less informed also 
make the same false assumption? In chapter five, I mentioned that we are aware of stigma but 
only as an abstract concept. We recognise stigma as a theory but are not familiar with it in 
practice. This is because lived experience of ‘madness’ (and thus of being on the receiving 
                                                          
15 National Health Service, ‘Attitudes to Mental Illness 2011 Survey Report’  
<http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB00292/atti-ment-illn-2011-sur-rep.pdf> [accessed 30 October 2015], p. 
5. 
16 National Health Service, ‘Attitudes’, p. 5. 
17 National Health Service, ‘Attitudes’, p. 9. 
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end of stigma) is not part of the mainstream discourse. For the most part, we are hearing 
about stigma from those who have not experienced it. We are rarely encouraged to reflect on 
the role we may have played in this legacy of discrimination. We have never been made 
aware of the steps necessary to defeat stigma: we are not urged to take an active role, to 
reflect on our own attitudes, and to comprehend the impact of our language choices. This is a 
key purpose of this thesis: to reflect on and encourage agency and responsibility; to 
comprehend the political reality of being ‘mad’ and of being silenced; and to understand 
where stigma began and how it can be realistically and achievably challenged. 
 Throughout this thesis, I have shown the function of language in establishing and 
enforcing stigma. I have demonstrated how the language (and silence) of ‘madness’ is an 
enduring issue which is culpable for current societal attitudes from the nineteenth century to 
the twenty-first century: namely, the assumption that ‘madness’ is ‘other’, and requires 
psychiatric management. I have exposed the politics of the diagnostic process: how the 
allegedly ‘mad’ individual is reduced to and fixed to a linguistic anchor – a diagnosis – which 
reconstructs and dictates identity. The personal narrative is silenced in favour of psychiatric 
hegemony. Lived experience (an experience that could be familiar, with which we might, 
perhaps, empathise) of ‘madness’ is overruled by psychiatric discourse (the narrative which 
‘others’ ‘madness’). But what do these theoretical ideas look like in reality? As soon as the 
lived experiences of, for example, Wax and Fry enter popular currency, and give ‘madness’ 
familiarity, there is potential for society to have a point of reference for ‘madness’ which is 
not solely psychiatric or entirely ‘other’. When engaging in conversation with someone on 
the topic of ‘bipolar disorder’, one may employ Fry as an example – a human reference point 
– rather than relying on psychiatric oversimplifications, damaging myths or 
misrepresentations from popular discourse.  
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 By championing the individual experience of ‘madness’, we can undo the deeply 
entrenched pattern of silencing that this thesis has exposed. We know that one in four people 
will experience a mental health problem each year in the United Kingdom.18 As I established 
at the start of this thesis, on average that equates to over thirty-five people in our immediate 
social network who experience some form of mental illness. We are surrounded by experts by 
experience. Encouragingly, this is now being recognised, albeit on a small scale. Mind invites 
those with experience of psychotropic medication to ‘review’ these drugs on their website: 
rather than relying on psychiatric discourses, Mind is not only acknowledging and listening to 
lived experience, but is also providing these narratives with a platform.19 This has the 
potential to change how we find and share information about ‘madness’. Imagine that you 
have recently learnt that a friend has been prescribed antipsychotic medication. Out of 
concern or curiosity, you research these drugs online. What if, instead of being bombarded 
with terminology which immediately evokes ‘otherness’ – ‘psychosis’, ‘schizophrenia’, 
‘hallucinations’, ‘mania’, ‘sectioned’ – you were able to access and learn from the experience 
of someone who has been prescribed similar medication?20 From the perspective of someone 
who has been medicated intermittently for fourteen years, I would much rather those around 
me asked me, rather than exploring the frightfully stigmatising psychiatric discourses which 
currently dominate available information. 
 If we allow a new discourse of ‘madness’ to permeate social consciousness, one of 
lived experience, rather than of psychiatric (mis)understandings, then there is potential for 
stigma to be entirely eradicated.21 As I have already established, this new dialogue allows for 
information to come from those who are living through, or who have lived through, 
                                                          
18 Information taken from Mind, ‘Mental Health Facts’. 
19 See Mind, ‘Help Us Improve Our Information’ <http://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/review-and-
quote-landing> [accessed 30 October 2015]. 
20 All of these terms appear on the first page of a Google search for ‘antipsychotic’, conducted October 2015. 
21 Of course, an autoethnographic account of ‘madness’ is not new in the sense that these narratives have always 
existed. However, as these voices have either not been allowed to reach a social audience, or have been 
disregarded and thus silenced, they are – in effect – new to the mainstream social sphere. 
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‘madness’. Mainstream dissemination and acknowledgement of the personal account of 
‘madness’ challenges the problematic binary I established in chapter five. If those who fall 
in-between the twin pillars of ‘madness’ in popular culture, with controlled, incarcerated 
‘madness’ on one side, and unsupervised, dangerous ‘madness’ on the other, find a voice, and 
are thus represented, then this binary opposition is rendered obsolete. This new discourse 
would also depict ‘madness’ as a spectrum rather than a dichotomy, as something fluid and 
unstable, a phenomenon ‘relative to the place at which we stand’.22 If lived experience were 
to enter popular currency, the presence of ‘mad’ voices would ‘illuminate […] the myriad 
shades of humanity that lie between supposed black and white distortions between the mad 
and not-so-mad’.23 
 How do we achieve this? I have shown how firmly entrenched hegemonic discourse 
is, and how psychiatric politics have prevented us from accessing personal experiences of 
‘madness’. Is this sudden desire to listen somewhat naïve, or too little too late? How can our 
individual actions or even just our language undo well over a century of psychiatric 
hegemony? The first step is to recognise the role we have played in supporting and affirming 
psychiatric ‘authority’. Whenever we employ the tools of psychiatry, often without explicit 
thought (the language about ‘madness’, the discourse of ‘otherness’ and judgement), then we 
are complicit.  
As psychiatric (mis)understandings of ‘madness’ are embedded in our everyday 
vocabulary, it can be very difficult to identify instances where we are active agents, 
supporting hegemonic discourse. But whenever we imply that ‘madness’ is a state of 
violence, of unreliability, an absence of reason, indeed, anything other than human, we are 
echoing psychiatric narratives, and imposing judgement and silence. Whenever we employ a 
semantic field of ‘madness’ as an insult – ‘bonkers’, ‘maniac’, ‘psycho’ – we are further 
                                                          
22 Richard P. Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 117. 
23 Cross, Mediating Madness, p. 30. 
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estranging those who are living with and through ‘psychosis’, or ‘mania’, or any experience 
of ‘madness’, thus furthering psychiatry’s legacy of silencing the individual narrative. When 
we reduce and dismiss individuals to such labels (albeit less sanitised categories), we are 
merely imitating the psychiatric process. 
The assumption that ‘madness’ needs to be ostracised (whether in an asylum or, in a 
twenty-first-century context, a hospital) is a trope established by psychiatric discourse. The 
conviction that ‘madness’ requires psychiatric management and, more often than not, 
medication is not an innate truth: it is something hegemonic discourse has taught us to 
believe. All that we think we know of ‘madness’ has its origins in psychiatric narratives: 
hypotheses established by those who, in the vast majority of cases, observe and study 
‘madness’ without experiencing it. An ‘objective’ discourse written by the watcher will 
always lack empathy. We are taught to speak of and (mis)understand ‘madness’ as observers, 
mirroring the clinical detachment of the psychiatrist, but we are rarely taught to connect with 
experiences as fellow human beings. 
Recognising the power of hegemonic discourse is the first step in challenging it. This 
thesis is intended to help readers with this initial step: to demonstrate how psychiatry 
established itself as the ‘authority’; how the conversation about ‘madness’ started by 
psychiatry reinforced this assumption; and how these politics have prevented us from 
accessing any other narratives about ‘madness’. Armed with this knowledge, I invite my 
reader to become an active force in deconstructing the assumption that only psychiatry can 
teach us about ‘madness’. This process is twofold: first, we must challenge what psychiatry 
has told us about ‘madness’. Second, we must acknowledge and learn from alternative 
narratives, primarily, lived accounts of ‘madness’, and celebrate the ‘authority’ of those who 
are experts by experience, not by observation. 
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Revolution begins with small changes. We need to regulate our own discourse, to 
ensure that when we speak of ‘madness’, we are not simultaneously silencing it. We must 
identify instances when we inadvertently use psychiatric tropes or assumptions, and reflect on 
alternatives. If we have never known any different, it is easy to take for granted the ability to 
speak and to be heard. We are able to make conscious language choices, although we often 
rely on entrenched signifiers. For example, when describing changeable weather, or erratic 
behaviour, we may employ the terms ‘schizo’ or ‘manic’ without acknowledging why we 
equate ‘madness’ with unpredictability (another trope of ‘otherness’ established by 
psychiatric discourse), or considering the ramifications of using psychiatric terms in such a 
casual fashion. 
Part of this battle is challenging the growing trend to trivialise mental illness by 
employing psychiatric terms as adjectives: when someone particularly tidy describes 
themselves as ‘so OCD’; when nervousness is labelled as ‘anxiety’ or a ‘panic attack’; when 
sullenness is called ‘depression’; when moodiness is declared ‘bipolar’.24 From a semantic 
perspective, this could be deemed as a positive step: after all, mainstream use of these terms 
could potentially deconstruct taboos surrounding these historically ‘othered’ states. It is 
revealing that a condition such as ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’ is considered a quirky 
personality trait and problematically fashionable, to the extent that we, as a society, are 
increasingly keen to apply this label to ourselves. This trend has been described as ‘a 
common form of hyperbole’.25  
Previously, I examined how popular discourse informs our everyday vocabulary, and 
this is yet another example of the influence and disconcerting irresponsibility exhibited by the 
                                                          
24 I appreciate that my inclusion of ‘OCD’ (an abbreviation) is problematic in an academic thesis. However, the 
mainstream appropriation of the initials ‘OCD’ shows how familiar the term is: a social audience will recognise 
the initials, and understand what they refer to. It is also an interesting neutralising strategy, almost as if it is 
being spoken of in code and thus not acknowledging the ‘disorder’ that the ‘D’ refers to. 
25 Kelly and Winterman, ‘OCD’. I am, however, yet to encounter someone casually describe themselves as 
‘schizo’ or ‘psychotic’ in the same way that someone might declare themselves ‘so OCD’. 
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media and other mainstream agencies. Journalist Ashley Fullwood recently observed that 
programmes such as Channel 4’s Obsessive Compulsive Cleaners have distorted the trauma 
and suffering of the condition: ‘while the media continues to portray OCD to be a beneficial 
trait of choice, the general populace […] will fail to grasp th[at] […] it’s a disorder’.26 On the 
one hand, these mainstream discourses enable us to talk about certain types of ‘madness’, and 
to view mental illness as a spectrum (or, indeed, an eccentricity or a personality trait). 
However, as I established in chapter one, ‘madness’ is already vulnerable to multiple and 
contradictory social and psychiatric misconceptions, and the manner in which terms such as 
‘OCD’ have re-entered our everyday vocabulary causes further confusion and 
(mis)understanding. Policing the use of these terms may seem petty – or even irrelevant – but 
my concern is that it is the start of yet another social trend which prevents lived account of 
‘madness’ from being acknowledged. On the rare occasions where I do talk about my own 
experience of what has been labelled ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’, I have to battle with 
entrenched social misconceptions and trivialisation.27 Of course, of all the stereotypes 
attached to psychiatric labels, the assumption that I am clean (albeit ‘obsessively’ so) is not 
explicitly a damaging one. However, it is a stereotype which invalidates my own experience 
(which does not conform to assumptions in popular culture about what ‘obsessive compulsive 
disorder’ is), or belittles it (because ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’ is considered a quirk 
rather than a debilitating disorder).  
Earlier, I discussed how psychiatric terms have taken on a semiological life of their 
own. This process cannot be reversed: when this vocabulary entered mainstream currency, 
psychiatry lost control of it, and this is an inevitable and organic part of language evolution. 
                                                          
26 Ashley Fullwood, ‘9 Things You Only Know if you Have OCD’, Metro, 2 November 2015 
<http://metro.co.uk/2015/11/02/9-things-you-only-know-if-you-have-ocd-5464505/> [accessed 2 November 
2015]. 
27 The predominant social misconception that I have faced is an assumption that the label ‘obsessive compulsive 
disorder’ mean that I am just tidy, picky, or fussy. This has led to my experiences being trivialised, as OCD is 
(mis)understood as a personality trait rather than as a disorder. 
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For now and perhaps for the foreseeable future, the assumptions that ‘schizophrenia’ is a split 
personality, that ‘psychosis’ equates to villainy and violence, and that someone who is 
sectioned looks like Asda’s ‘Mental Patient Fancy Dress Costume’ are likely to linger in our 
collective social consciousness. But the vitally important and very exciting redeeming feature 
of language is that it continues to evolve. We are shaping the discourse of future generations. 
We have shown that we can (to an extent) break down the taboo surrounding certain 
conditions: this was not intentional, but merely a by-product of the media’s dialogue. If this 
can happen by accident, what can we achieve by conscious effort? If we start conversations 
which acknowledge, validate and champion lived accounts of ‘madness’, we have the 
potential to shape future discourses. In a decade, a new generation will emerge to whom the 
personal experience of ‘madness’ is the first point of reference for what ‘madness’ is. The 
one in four of us will be the experts: psychiatric narratives will perhaps be complementary, 
but far from the ‘authority’. Psychiatric discourse of ‘madness’ will be a perspective, but not 
the perspective.  
It is easy to overlook our involvement in supporting hegemonic discourse. It must be 
recognised that in our relationship to this dominant narrative, silence is still a form of 
consent. Whenever we hear someone disparagingly refer to another as ‘psycho’, and do not 
interject, the assumptions that it is okay to employ that term in such a manner, and the belief 
that ‘madness’ is a state akin to a damaging insult, are validated and reinforced. We are social 
beings. We regulate our behaviour according to what we understand is acceptable in our 
immediate context. In the microcosm of conversation, challenging stigma is achievable. 
When I question people on their language use, for example, when I challenge the common 
trope that the term ‘psychotic’ is a euphemism for ‘serial killer’, the most common reaction is 
one of surprise. This shows how embedded psychiatric discourse is: the belief that ‘madness’ 
is ‘other’ is so entrenched that the suggestion of an alternative approach is unexpected, 
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something alien. Most sanism is not overt.28 But, as with sexism and racism, if mental health 
stigma remains unchallenged, it is endorsed and enforced by silence. Questioning the 
language of others does not have to be confrontational: it can, instead, be a process of 
education. I can tell someone how it feels when the term ‘psychotic’ is banded about as an 
insult, or a criminal category, when I take antipsychotic medication (and so, by extension, 
require medication so as not to be ‘psychotic’). I can challenge, I can inform, I can suggest 
alternatives. To those with whom I converse, I can become a new human point of reference 
for what ‘psychosis’/‘neurosis’/‘depressive’/‘mentally ill’ look like.29 
Over the course of this thesis, I have identified several different approaches available 
when it comes to talking of and about ‘madness’, as potential solutions to overcoming stigma. 
As I have already established, the initial step is realising how hegemonic narratives have 
interfered with the reception of counter-narratives, as exhibited by this thesis. There are other 
ways to comprehend and communicate ‘madness’: models divorced from the ‘otherness’ 
imposed by psychiatric (mis)understandings. I have already discussed the necessity of 
understanding ‘madness’ as a spectrum. This model has been tremendously successful in 
breaking down gender binaries, and popular culture increasingly gravitates towards non-
binary representations of gender and sexuality.30 If gender can be something other than a 
                                                          
28 ‘Sanism’ is a term I first encountered in Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies, ed. by 
Brenda A. LeFrançois, Robert Menzies and Geoffrey Reaum (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2013). 
Although obviously less established than terms such as ‘sexism’ and ‘racism’, the growing trend for ‘mad 
studies’ offers hope that ‘sanism’ will become increasingly familiar, both as a phrase and as a concept. 
29 My own psychiatric labels present an interesting paradox. For the most part, were I asked to declare some 
form of diagnostic allegiance, I consider myself ‘neurotic’, as a result of elements of ‘depression’, ‘anxiety’, and 
‘obsessive compulsive disorder’. However, some parts of the latter have been interpreted as a break with 
‘reality’, hence my experience with antipsychotic medication. Even in a psychiatric context which established 
the ‘neurotic’/‘psychotic’ distinction, the disorder of human experience refuses to be pinned down to these 
oversimplified, broad categories. 
30 For example, the publicity surrounding American television personality and retired athlete Caitlyn Jenner’s 
transition from male to female – including a documentary series dedicated to chronicling Jenner’s journey – 
demonstrates that this less fixed way of viewing gender has become part of the social consciousness. In some 
respects, Jenner’s transition from one label (male) to another (female) does uphold the gender binary (although 
the popularity of gender-fluid celebrities such as model and actress Ruby Rose and model Rain Dove challenges 
this further). However, the ability to move between labels – and to choose one’s own label – is revolutionising 
mainstream representations and understandings of gender. Why would this model not also work to destabilise 
the ‘mad’ and ‘sane’ dichotomy? 
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series of dichotomies, can we not also be fluid in our ‘sanity’ as we are with sexuality? Can, 
as Lady Audley explained, one’s mind be perceived to ‘regain […] its just balance’ after an 
experience of ‘madness’?31 Can one move from the label of ‘schizophrenia’ to the ‘norm’ of 
‘sanity’, without the qualifier ‘in remission’?  
There are binaries within binaries. There is the ‘sane’/‘insane’ dichotomy, perpetuated 
by psychiatric discourse, and which has established a binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, 
encouraging society to ‘other’ ‘madness’. As chapter five revealed, this is a legacy of asylum 
culture. I have shown that mainstream representations of ‘madness’ are also subject to 
another binary, meaning that lived experience of the vast majority of those labelled ‘mad’ 
(those who fall in-between these categories) does not enter popular currency, and remains 
unacknowledged. We need to instigate a conversation which speaks of lived experiences of 
‘madness’, rather than a dialogue of archaic dichotomies which are, at best, reductionist and 
irrelevant.  
In chapter five, I also identified another issue which has a drastic influence on the 
prognosis of ‘madness’, and has severe ramifications for those labelled ‘mad’: that of the sick 
role. Identifying, never mind solving, the problems latent in the current mental health system 
can be daunting, and it can be easy to feel resigned and to assume that this is a realm in which 
we can have little direct impact. However, we should not understate the positive impact that 
challenging language (and thus stigma) can have. I established in chapter five that a large part 
of the sick role was fractured identity: damage caused by the enforcement of a psychiatric 
label, and the social baggage associated with that label. If, using the approaches I have 
established, we were to destigmatise these terms, or, at least, to neutralise them, then the 
impact on the self could be minimised. If ‘madness’ is, instead, perceived as a transient, 
                                                          
31 Braddon, Lady Audley’s Secret, p. 345. 
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temporary state – to and from which one can move fluidly – then previous notions of identity 
would not have to be entirely dismantled and rebuilt to accommodate a psychiatric label.  
Talking about talking about ‘madness’ has been a difficult journey for me. Writing 
about being more than one’s psychiatric label has, inevitably, made this thesis very personal, 
and has forced me to reflect on my relationship with my ‘madness’. But I cannot preach about 
how vitally important it is for us to listen if I, myself, am unable to speak. Talking of 
‘madness’ is – at present – a form of self-exposure, a kind of ‘coming out’. This is because it 
is assumed that ‘sanity’ is the ‘norm’, and so to reveal oneself (or, indeed, be revealed) as 
‘mad’ is to be burdened with the stigma of being something other than everyone else. But 
statistics are on our side. When I talk of my ‘madness’, I am only ‘other’ to the three out of 
four without personal experience of mental illness. And if any of the ‘sane’ 75% of the 
population are capable of empathy, of listening, then the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary which has 
historically enforced silence can be entirely deconstructed: ‘madness’ can truly be accepted 
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